The establishment of the north-west frontier of Afghanistan, 1884-1888 by Fitzhardinge, Hope Verity Hewitt
  THESES SIS/LIBRARY        TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 
R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2      FACSIMILE:  +61 2 6125 4063 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY      EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au 
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USE OF THESES 
 
 
This copy is supplied for purposes 
of private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be  
copied or closely paraphrased without the  
written consent of the author. 
---
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF 
AFGHANISTAN, 1884-1888 
SYNOPSIS 
British and Russian imperial interests in Central 
and Middle Asia having grown geographically closer to 
one another in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
each power was anxious to prevent future potential 
encroachment by the other on its preserves. The frontier 
peoples involved, used to the traditionally complex 
tribal and feudal relationships of Central Asia, did not 
at all understand the monolithic character of the 
newcomers, whether Russian or English, so that each 
frontier achieved proved only to be the threshold of 
further disciplinary, and finally occupativ~ measures 
against a new group of tribesmen. By the end of the 
eighteen-sixties the interest of both imperial powers 
pointed to the desirability of the establishment of a 
barrier between them, whether neutral zone, buffer state 
or demarcated frontier. 
Although Russia was already interested in 
Transcaspia, little was known of its south and east, 
and no one, Russian or English, as yet supposed there 
was anything but desert between the west bank of the 
Amu and the Heri Rud, the river of Herat, on the 
confines of Persian Khorassan. Discussions which took 
place in 1869 led to the Clarendon-Gorchakov Agreement 
of 1872-73, declaring the need for establishing the 
northern frontier of Afghanistan, and roughly defining 
it as from Sarrakhs on the Heri Rud, directly to the 
Amu at an agreed-upon point where an earlier traveller 
had crossed the river forty years before, whence the 
boundary would follow the Amu towards its unknown 
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source near the Chinese frontier. All this was arranged 
with a fine disregard for future geographical findings. 
Little further was achieved until 1884, although there 
was much sporadic discussion between the English and 
Russian Foreign Offices and their Representatives. 
This included a definite approach by the Russian 
Foreign Minister, de Giers, in 1882, and in the same 
year a request was made by the new Afghan Amir, 
Abdurrahman, for British help in establishing hi~ 
northern frontier against the Russians. The Amir's 
request was quietly pushed aside, and in 1882 British 
diplomacy was engaged in unsuccessfully seeking a share 
in Russian-Persian discussions about a boundary between 
Persia and the new Russian territories in Transcaspia, 
and disregarded de Giers' overtures. But after the 
Turkmen Oasis of Merv was committed to Russian hands in 
early 1884, the related regions of Herat Province in 
Afghanistan and the Turkmen lands immediately north of 
it, which had seemed so remote, became conspicuously 
closer to the interests of all three, English, Russian 
and Afghan. In May, 1884, the Russian Foreign Minister, 
acting in good faith, agreed with the British to 
establish a Joint Boundary Commission, and both English 
and Russian Commissions were appointed during the 
summer of 1884. 
The English Commissioner and a small Political 
Section were to come from England, but the Intelligence, 
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Survey and Escort Parties, to come from India, were 
the subjects of elaborate preparations in India, this 
being a highly prestigious occasion, a first meeting on 
the frontier, and for peaceful purposes, between 
military representatives of the two great European 
masters of Central Asia. This was also not long after 
the Second Afghan War, so there was a certain spice of 
danger, especially about the crossing of the unknown 
region of Western Afghanistan. The Amir would have 
preferred the Indian Party to travel through Beluchistan 
and Persian Seistan, but when the Indian Government 
insisted on the party's crossing Western Afghanistan, 
he guaranteed its safety. 
Although, largely to satisfy Russian susceptibilities 
there was no Afghan Commissioner, an Afghan Agent was 
appointed to accompany the British Party, and from quite 
an early stage there was considerable personal and 
political friction between the' English Commissioner and 
the Amir's Agent. Throughout the duration of the 
Commission the interplay of personalities at many 
different levels from high diplomacy to purely localised 
minor diplomacy is both interesting and significant. 
The exclusion of the Amir from any direct contact with 
the Russians made for a diplomatic situation which 
frequently became almost ludicrously circuitous. 
What the Russian Foreign Office had conceded, the 
Russian War Office and its agents in Transcaspia were 
by no means ready to permit, and the English Commission, 
arriving on the frontier in November, 1884, was forced 
to play a waiting game for a whole year to November, 
1885, before the Russian Party arrived and the work of 
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delimitation and demarcation could proceed. Russian 
military interests had achieved the delay so that they 
could be sure of procuring the scientific 'ethnographic' 
frontier to which they were committed. Having come into 
Transcaspia to quell the predatory Turkmens, they 
wished to ensure peaceful control of all Turkmen-
inhabited lands, which included the middle course of 
the Heri Rud (Tejend) on the west of the Kara Kum 
Desert, flowing north to the terminal oasis of Tejend 
(Tedzhen) and the Murghab which divided the Kara Kum and 
flowed north to terminate in the great Oasis of Merv. 
Both these rivers rise in Afghan territory in western 
outliers of the Hindu Kush. In 1884, soon after the 
news of the occupation of Merv, Abdurrahman ordered a 
military occupation of the extended Penjdeh oasis on 
the middle course of the Murghab, a region at that time 
occupied by Turkmens but with a very indeterminate 
history. The Russian extension to plan up the Murghab 
during the winter of 1884-5 led to a short sharp battle 
between the Afghans and the successful Russians on JO 
March, 1885. This was the cause of the notorious 
Penjdeh Crisis during which (April 1885) there was a 
violent popular clamour from the British and Russian 
press and public, urgent military activity on both 
sides; and intense diplomatic activity which 
successfully reduced the threat of war. 
This crisis involved the British Boundqry Commission 
in a change of leader, whose political abilities were 
fully tried in the summer of 1885 by the Russian 
intention to come further south on the Heri Rud to 
Zulfikar, a pass along a gorge of the Heri Rud, for which 
the formidable Amir threatened to fight alone, even if 
the English would not, rather than see it left in 
Russian hands. 
This was the time when the men on the frontier 
were pre-occupied with the possibility of holding the 
fortress of Herat against Russian attack. However, in 
spite of past promises from Ripon to the Amir, and the 
good intentions of Dufferin, avowed in his meeting with 
the Amir at Rawalpindi, the military and political 
pundits in England and India were ready to sacrifice 
the province of Herat if a Russian attack were to take 
place. ' 
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Firm political action by the new Salisbury 
Government and the continued reasonable, placatory 
policy of de Giers led to the avoidance of any outbreak 
of hostilities, and, behind-the-scenes diplomatic 
discussions about the frontier itself having proceeded 
quietly throughout the months of tension, both 
Governments agreed in August 1885 that, on the basis of 
the detailed frontier surveys made independently over the 
last year by the British Boundary Commission Survey Party 
and the Russian Transcaspian Military Survey, a great 
deal of the Boundary delimitation could be settled at 
home. This was done, and promulgated in the London 
Protocol of 10 September, 1885, which traced most of 
the main lines of the Boundary from the Heri Rud to the 
Murghab, and so much reduced the work of the Joint 
Commission, which at last assembled on the frontier in 
November, 1885. Not only was its work reduced but its 
size and prestige were both diminished. The intense 
limelight which had fallen on the organisation and 
march of the Indian Party and the Penjdeh and Zulfikar 
Crises was quite burnt out. 
The Joint Commission functioned on the whole 
smoothly but struck serious trouble on two points, one, 
the amount of water and irrigated land which the 
Afghans should make over to the Sarik Turkmens of the 
now Russian-controlled Penjdeh Oasis, and secondly (a 
matter which finally caused the termination of the 
Boundary Commission in September, 1886) one of those 
comic ironies of history. The 'one certain point', as 
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de Giers asserted, Khoja Saleh, the terminal point of the 
Heru Rud-Amu section of the boundary, had vanished from 
the face of the earth, and the Russians were most 
unwillihg to adopt the Bokharan-Afghan frontier point 
between Bosagha in Bokharan territory and Khamiab in 
Afghanistan as the eastern terminal. An unsatisfactory 
summer-long quest for 'Khoja Saleh' led to the return of 
the English Party to India, the Russian Party to 
Transcaspia, and the opening, after several months, of 
the Final Discussions in St Petersburg, where from 
April to late July, 1887, Colonel Sir West Ridgeway, 
the English Boundary Commissioner, proved himself an 
able diplomat, and with the Russians, thrashed out the 
settlement of a boundary which, with several later minor 
local encroachments and diplomatic adjustments, became 
the frontier between Afghanistan and Transcaspia, as it 
is to-day between Afghanistan and the Turkmenn S.S.R. 
Even before the protracted quest for 'Khoja Saleh', 
the Amir had abandoned his intention of having this 
Commission demarcate his frontier right through to the 
Pamirs, as he had originally intended it should. One 
reason for this seems to have been his distrust of 
British intentions in Badakhshan, following Colonel 
Lockhart's expedition into Wakhan from Gilgit in 1886. 
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As to the new frontier, the Amir did not get all 
that the Afghans claimed on the basis of the 1872-73 
Agreement, but he got his dearest wish, a stable 
frontier, and although sacrificing to the Russians some 
territory he would have liked, he actually acquired more 
than he had lost, most of his gains being in the northern 
part of Badghis, a Turkmen-damaged region of potentially 
rich agricultural land, which had generally been 
considered Persian until the Persians had abandoned it 
some time before. He undoubtedly felt some soreness at 
his military defeat by the Russians, and during the 
period of crisis he had possibly made a bitter appraisal 
of British promises, but he knew he was assured of 
British money and that was what he needed most. He was 
deaf to all hints that British officers should be 
permanent~y established along the new frontier. England 
and the Amir equally were satisfied with the knowledge 
that now there was a legal frontier any violation of it 
by Russia must be accounted a deliberate act and not an 
accident. The Russians could feel the same legal security 
against any possible Afghan intrusion on behalf of the 
Turkmens or Bokharans. The Russians had full control 
over the Turkmen lands of the Heri Rud and Murghab, 
acquired by their own efforts in 1884-85, but now 
fully recognised by all. Even if many Russians would 
have liked to see the frontier a geographical one 
established along the watershed just north of Herat, 
instead of an ethnographical one, the Russian War Office 
was in the main satisfied that the agreed-upon boundary 
allowed them reasonable lines of communication from 
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west to east, just north of the Afghan frontier, across 
their new domain. The new frontier did much to establish 
the stability of Central Asia as well as the internal 
stability of Afghanistan, and undoubtedly did much to 
fix the image of this comparatively new country as a 
national state. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The piece of history which is to be examined in 
these pages is rather like a summer rain-storm bringing 
relief to a parched land. The land in question is that 
which historically and regionally is a part of both 
Central Asia and Middle Asia, and lies on the confines 
of Afghanistan and the modern Turkmen S.S.R. The thesis 
is the story of the formation of a frontier which was 
needed by three interested parties: the new Amir of 
Afghanistan, Abdurrahman, who needed it because he felt 
within himself the power to weld Afghanistan into a 
united whole: the Russians, who, excluding some of 
their more chauvinist men of war, needed it to set a 
limit to their sprawling, huge, under-manned and money-
consuming empire in Central Asia: and the English, who 
needed it to set an internationally agreed-upon frontier 
as a barrier to th.is same Russian advance, which had 
been seen by many throughout the century as a potential 
threat to British India. 
To return to my metaphor 9 by the end of the 1860s, 
mutual diplomatic approaches by England and Russia, 
occurring intermittently like the hopeful gusts of wind 
and scurries of cloud beginning to appear in a brazen 
sky, suggested that respite was on the way. But during 
the next ten years the clouds continued too vaporous, 
too attenuated, for rain. After 1881, when Russian 
success against the Turkmens of Southern Transcaspia 
suddenly narrowed the gap between Russian and Afghan 
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territory, the air grew sultry, and the distant growl 
of thunder could be heard. The lightning flashed at 
Merv in early 1884 and it seemed that this might bring 
the long-awaited rain. In the spring of 1884 an Anglo~ 
Russian Afghan Boundary Commission was at last appointed: 
the English acting for the Afghans. 
But the relieving downpour was still to be delayed 
for another 18 months. Oppressive diplomatic airs 
continued to brood over the thirsty land, and the early 
months of 1885 saw the dangerous chain-lightning of 
the Penjdeh Crisis, and the equally dangerous but less 
dramatic electrical disturbances of Zulfikaro The 
Anglo-Russian Afghan Boundary Commission was only to 
meet at last on the frontier in Nqvember 1885. The 
extended metaphor is used to suggest how it came about 
that, although this thesis deals with a Boundary 
Commission, so much of it is inevitably concerned with 
the period which intervened between the appointment of 
the Joint Commission and its actual functioning and 
termination. 
The diplomacy regarding English-Russian relations 
in this part of the world, after the period of the 
Crimean War, is well-known and has been dealt with by 
many historians, for example, by G.J. Alder in British 
India's Northern Frontier, 1865-95 and in N.A. Khalfin's 
Politika Rossii v Srednei Azii, 1857-68 and Proval 
Britainskoi agressii v Afghanistana (XIX v. nachalo XX 
v.), although one has the feeling that this well-known 
Soviet authority has not made a comparable detailed 
study of archives with that which has gone into the work 
of the above~named English writer. I have therefore 
only sketched in as much of this as is necessary to the 
present study. 
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Because I see this as a piece of Russian-English 
Imperial diplomacy as well as a piece of Russian~Afghan 
frontier relations, I have devoted most of the rest of' 
the introduction to a synopsis of the story of earlier 
events from the Russian end. My first chapter is a 
brief review of the arrival of Abdurrahman to the 
position of power in which he was by 1884, because it 
seems to me that he is the significant background figure 
of this whole thesis. Then, again, because I see this 
as primarily a piece of Central Asian history rather 
than British Indian history, I have devoted a whole 
chapter to an attempt to give some picture of this 
comparatively unfamiliar part of the world, as it was 
at that time. I have done this because of a strong 
sense of the incompleteness and lack of reality of 
history treated solely from a diplomatic angle. In the 
same way, in an attempt to present a short period of 
history 'in the round', having, in the first part of 
Chapter IV, dealt with the immediate diplomatic moves 
which created the Afghan Boundary Commission, I have 
then given some time to the elaborate process by which 
the 1 Indian 1 Party and its Escort was prepared and 
moved to Afghan, and how it spent its time in North 
Afghanistan during that first winter, when the Russian 
Commission failed to arrive. For the same reason too, 
I have devoted some time to the story of the Russian 
engorgement of the Turkmen lands which brought them to 
the Afghan frontiers and led to the crises of 1885 and 
the initial non-functioning of the Commission. 
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This is not an isolated survey of the Afghan 
Boundary Commission of that time~ but it has been 
presented here with rather a different purpose. The 
story has been treated briefly, or not so briefly, by 
the general English and Indian historians of Afghanistan. 
By the very amount of the official papers relating to 
it, it has literally overwhelmed one or two, who have 
either swallowed half the story in unnecessary detail 
and neglected the rest, or else attacked the whole and 
not been able to see the wood for the trees. As far as 
English and Indian writers have been concerned, too, it 
has naturally appeared as a part of English-Afghan 
relations and not in its broader perspective. 
To me it has appeared as a particularly interesting 
moment in Asian history, which I have tried to the best 
of my ability to treat as a whole. It is a matter of 
regret to me that I cannot read Persian well enough for 
research, and that I have not had access to enough 
Russian material. But at all times I have tried to 
remain aware of the three-fold aspect of the events here 
recorded. 
* * * * * * * * 
Russian expansion in Asia was an inevitable 
historical development. The Russian forward movement 
southward from her old Siberian territories and down the 
Lower Volga-Caspian areas had long since brought her 
into contact with the Islamic world of Central Asia. 
Her eighteenth century conquest of Krim-Tartary had 
even earlier familiarised her soldiers, administrators 
and merchants with a peaceful, negotiable Islam round 
the Northern Black Sea. After 1558, when Anthony 
Jenkinson gave Ivan the Terrible a full report of his 
three years' residence in Bokhara, Russian merchants 
increased their trade with Central Asia. Very few non-
Moslem Russian merchants actually made the journey 
themselves, and the Russian government prohibited the 
journey thither of any non-Russian Europeans. The 
caravan trade of Central Asia to the north-west was 
directed to the great fairs of places like Kazan where 
the exchange of goods between Central Asia and Northern 
Europe was transacted. By the end of the eighteenth 
century both the needs of Russian trade and the 
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damaging raids of the 'Tatars' made military expeditions 
inevitable. Whatever the purely punitive purposes of 
the Government may have been, Russian military 
adventures bred in many commanding officers a lust for 
conquest, and St Petersburg was far away from the 
'Kirghiz Steppes'. Very often St Petersburg knew only 
after the event that some new strip of nomad territory 
had been occupied, or some new tribe 'protected'. 
In the period immediately after the Crimean War, 
Russia's other natural line of advance, towards the 
Aegean, was cut off. Russian resentment over the 
English-Turkish alliance was deep-seated. During the 
war years 1854-56 the Russians had been very worried 
about the prospect of Turkish agents stirring up against 
Russia their fellow-Moslems in Central Asia. They saw 
the hand of England too in all this 1 and the reports of 
various Russian1'o{ficials 1 for example 1 of Duhamel, the iv~ru'"' 
then governor of Siberia, are full of rumours about 
"" English and Turkish agents and spies in Central Asia. 
The British in India loomed to the Russians as a great 
threat to Russia 1 s expans1on 1n Asia, espec1ally in 
matters o.f trade. Russian trade {notably her export 
trade in manufactured goods) had increased in the first 
half of the century 1 and after the Crimean War Russian 
manufacturers were anxious to build up a much greater 
export to Central Asia, and were bitterly jealous bf 
the English, also penetrating the Central Asian markets 
chiefly by supplying textiles to caravan~merchants of 
Persian or Indian origin. The Russians declared that 
most of the English material was shoddy, and sold at 
cut rates and on much extended credits in a deliberate 
attempt to capture a traditional Russian market. 
Basically England and Russia had the same sort of goods 
to sell 1 cotton and woolen piece-goods, and iron-ware, 
and the question was who could sell them most cheaply, 
the supplierl~~ho sent them by caravan across Western 
Asia or the supplier who sent them by ship to India or 
Persia and then by caravan. Until the Russians 
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occupied these old lands, they, almost equally with the 
English, had had to depend on the Moslem trader buying 
and transporting their manufactured goods to the Central 
Asian markets. Russ:ian occupation and the rapid 
building in the 1880s of the Transcaspian Railway gave 
Russia an advantage so that England's hopes of 
capturing the Central Asian market receded finally. 
7 
The two Eur~pean Imperial powers in Central Asia 
each had their special chimeras with regard to the other. 
I have already mentioned that a major Russian one 
concerned loss of Central Asian markets, but they too 
imagined English armies as arriving in Northern 
Turkestan just as they imagined them coming by the Black 
Sea or across Persia to the Caucasus. Each collected 
horrifying reports of the other's secret agents and 
spies, many of whom actually did exist outside the world 
of the imagination, And the English knew as well as 
the Russians that, heretofore~ vast armies had marched 
and counter-marched across the breadth of Asia. There 
was no doubt that Napoleon not a century before had a 
plan with Tsar Paul to join forces and march with 70,000 
men on India and that just before Paul 1 s death unhappy 
Cossack generals had already been ordered to organise 
the Russian force. Nor was there much secret about the 
Plans made by various Russian strategists during the 
Crimean War and the Polish Revolt period of the 1860s. 
Colonel MacGregor's Defence Plan of 1879 against a 
hypothetical Russian two-pronged, two-year advance down 
through Afghanistan into India dove-tailed in very 
neatly with the plan for a similar Russian Offence Plan 
worked out by General Kuropatkin some eight years later. 
At the military level there is plenty of evidence 
that both English and Russian officers frequently rather 
fancied the idea of a major Asian war. In spite of all 
this, and in spite of several near misses, two in 1885, 
the diplomats and foreign affairs experts of both 
countries were on the,whole engaged in overcoming any 
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crises which threatened to lead to armed conflict. This 
is not to say that after the Crimean War the Russians 
did not realise that their way to harass the English in 
any future European war would be to threaten the Indian 
borderlandso At the time of the 1877-1878 Balkan War 
a large Russian force was assembled in Central Asia. 
When it came to a point, the Russians in Central Asia 
might besiege Herat and take it long before an army from 
India could come to its relief, but they could hardly do 
the same to Peshawuro The Russians on their side had a 
very accurate knowledge of the size and structure of the 
Indian army, but they were comforted by the knowledge of 
how much of it would have to remain on police and regular 
duties in India if the English chose to attack Central 
Asia through Afghanistan. So to a certain extent the 
u great game 1 was mainly just thato A convivial officer 
said to Captain Fred Burnaby in a Russian guardroom 
near Khiva in the mid~l870s: 1 If we do fight we will 
shoot at each other in the morning, and liquor up 
1 together when there is a truce 1 o In spite of all the 
undoubted tensions, this happily anticipated encounter 
never came abouto 
This thesis is concerned with frontier delimitation 
and as frontiers, however artificial, divide states it 
will be concerned with 1 colonisators 1 and there wiil be 
something to say of the Russians in Turkmenistan and 
the Afghans themselves in Afghan Turkestan. It is not 
concerned so much with the English in the same role, 
because neither English nor Afghan would care to say 
1 Fred Burnaby, A Ride to Khiva, n.d. (1878?), PPol68~9. 
that Afghanistan was ever in the nature of a British 
Colony, however restive the actua.l relationship at 
times made the Afghans. The Russian pacification o:f 
Central Asia was not achieved without periods o:f great 
unrest and discontent whlch tried the resources of 
comparatively small milltary :forces spread over a large 
area, and Russian colonisation was not always such a 
matter o:f exploitation as ls suggested in the following 
quotation :from Colonel Grodekov, who at close quarters 
had :formed the most hostile opini.on of the Turkmens in 
particular and Central Asians generally. 
It is difficult to say what the Turk.men will 
do under our rule in the :future 1 but the 
suppression o:f the raids, to which hal:f the 
population owed their livelihood, cannot but 
act prejudicially on their numerical increase 
•••• The immediate result will be the 
pacification of the Turkmen as they will be 
unable to wage war and forced to work. After 
that, it is very probable that part o:f them 
will emigrate to Bukhara and Afghanistan •••• 
Those who remain, giving up their own fruit.f'ul 
lands to a newly arrived and hard~working 
population, will soon assume the type o:f our 
Kalmuks and Kirghiz i and lead the life o.f' 
nomqd shepherds.I 
Al though Russian Imperia.l colonisati.on had many good 
aspects, the Russians regarded colonisation as a 
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permanent state, just as the nineteenth century English 
saw themselves as permanent occupiers of the sub-continent 
It was this sense of ownership which made each party spend 
1 Major~General N.I •. Grodekov, The War in Turkumani.a~ 
Skobele:ff 1 s Campai.gn o:f 1880-1881 (trans. Lieutenant 
J.M. Grierson, Simla 188-4), vol.I, p.52. 
so much time brooding on the possi.bility o:f physical 
invasiono Trade rivalries have already been mentioned 1 
but a third :field was the political 9 the spheres o:f 
influence and 1 climates o:f opinion 1 being cultivated by 
both powers frequently in the one place - especially 
Persiao The position o:f Persia too at the time o:f this 
delimitation between Transcaspia and A:fgha.nistan was a 
very open and curious one. 
lC 
When in May 1884 the Anglo-Russian Boundary 
Commission to establish the North West Frontier o:f 
Af'ghanistan became a de:fini te commitment for both powers, 
it was a stage in a long series o:f diplomatic 
negotiations between them which opened in 1869 but had 
its real origins somewhat earlier. In early 1864 the 
Khanate o:f Kokand east and north o:f the Khanate o:f 
Bokhara was captured by the Russians and Tashkent was 
successfully besieged. At this stage Prince A.M. 
Gorchakov 9 the legendary Russian Minister :for Foreign 
A:f:fairs 1 issued on 21 November 1864 9 his :famous 
Memorandum (the so-called 1 Circular Letter 1 ) through his 
resident ministers to all the Foreign Departments o:f 
the main European and Asian countries. This was a 
brilll.ant apologia :for Russl.an policy 9 past 9 present 
and :future, in relation to his own t1me 9 probably the 
best known text in nineteenth century Central Asian 
history. It opens thus: 
The Russian newspapers have described the 
military operations which have been carried 
out by a detachment o:f our troops in the 
region o:f Central Asia with remarkable 
success and vast results. It was inevitable 
that these events should excite attention in 
:foreign countries 9 and the more so because 
their theatre lies in regions hardly known •••• 
The position of' Russia in Central Asia is that 
of all civilised states which are brought into 
contact with half savage 1 nomad populations, 
possessing no fixed social organisation •••• l 
Having thus inaccurately summed up the decayed and 
corrupt but fully organised Moslem khanates of' the Syr 
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and Amu with which the Russians had now come in contact, 
he went on to describe the recurring process of' 
subjugating troublesome tribes only to find that their 
neighbours on the further side would next have to be 
pacified. This led him to observe first that the time 
had come when Russia must make firm boundaries to the 
Syr Darya territories, and that this was a matter of' 
urgency, the only means u ••• to escape danger of' being 
drawn on from repression to reprisals in a way which 
might end in a limitless expansion o:f our empire' • 2 
His second objective, which might almost be said to be 
a neutralisation o:f the :first, is an exact description 
o:f Central Asian colonisation as it was understood by 
the theorists, geographers and military men who belonged 
to the Imperial Russian Geographical Societyi and possibly 
saw all Asia as their oyster: 
With this object it was necessary to lay the 
:foundation o:f a system founded not merely on 
considerations o:f expediency but on geographical 3 and political data which were fixed and permanent. 
1 India O:ffice Library [I.O.L. M/3/563.] [Secret] 
Correspondence, :from 1864~1881, respecting the movements 
of Russia in Central Asia and her relations with 
Afghanistan, pp.2-6. (Dr H.A. Lamb 1 s 1 Recordak 1 re~ 
prints.) 
2 Ibid. 
J Ibid. 
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Shortly after the publication o.f this document 9 
Tashkent was reoccupied and together with Samarcand fell 
permanently into Russian hands; in 1868 Bokhara was 
converted into a Russian vassal~ though still ruled by 
its hereditary khans 9 and in this way Russian influence 
reached that part of the Amu on the south bank of which 
one was already in Afghan Turkestan. The remaining 
Uzbek khanate of Khiva on the lower Amu and shores of 
the Aral Sea did not become a Russian vassal until 1873. 
In September 1867 Sir John Lawrence, the Viceroy, 
had suggested to the British Government that it was high 
time Britain discussed with Russia the matter of 
Afghanistan and in 1869 through the Russian Ambassador 
in London, Brunnov, Gorchakov had much discussion first 
with Granville and then with Clarendon, who succeeded 
him as Foreign Secretary. From these discussions emerged 
the idea of Afghanistan as a 'neutral zone 1 but from the 
very first this idea was not in alignment with the 
attitude expressed positively by Gorchakov that 
Afghanistan was right outside Russia 1 s interest in 
Central Asia, and hence by implication in England's. 
Further discussion as to the geographical limits of 
Afghanistan and its likely boundaries were pursued until 
1873 when the fall of Khiva made England more interested 
in finding a geographical limit for her Northern fellow-
imperialist. As the result of the 1872-73 discussions 9
1 
Russia renounced her previous claims that Badakhshan and 
Wakhan on the north-east were not part of Afghanistan 9 
and the north-west frontier was at last given putative 
1 See Appendix Ao 
terminal points 9 the western being at Sarrakhs where it 
was supposed that Persiani Afghan and Transcaspi.an 
territory met, The frontier was then to cross unexplorec 
territory assumed to be largely desert and therefore 
easy to delimit 9 until the Amu was reached at a place 
called 1 Khoja Saleh' 7 which everyone erroneously assumed 
was to be easily found because that was where the Englisb 
travel.ler to Bokhara and Merv, Lieutenant Alexander Burne 
reported having crossed the river into Bokharan territory 
over forty years before in 1832. 1 
Discussions continued in a leisurely :fashion, 
matters which were re:ferred to General Kaufman in 
Tashkent being hopelessly delayed be:fore any answer was 
received. Quite o:ften Kaufman refrained from replying. 
By 1876 the Russians admitted that a 1 netural state' 
was an obsolete idea and they were willing to admit that 
Afghanistan was o:f direct English concern. The Russians 
closely watched Lytton us 1 forward po.licy 1 at work and 
used English activities in Beluchistan as a measure by 
which to justify their own advance. The :fall of the 
Akhal Tekke oasis in 1881 brought about a new English 
diplomatic approach to the Russians in 1882i mostly in 
th_e :form o:f an English :frustrated attempt to 
participate in the Russian-Persian boundary discussions. 
1883 saw growing English and Afghan alarm at the 
Russian advance~ and the Persians 9 tooi :felt that they 
had received a rough handling over their :frontiers 
with their new neighbour to the north of Khorassan. 
1 See Appendix B. 
It was during this period that the Indian Viceroy, 
the Marquis of R:ipon, wrote a warm-hearted but 
unintentiona.lly perfidious piece of diplomatese to 
Abdurrahman 1 which one should keep in mind when 
following the story of the British and the Defence of 
Herat~ 
Your Highness is in possession of' the assurance 
of' th.e British Government that if any f'oreign 
Power should attempt to interfere in Ai~ghanistan 
and if such interference should lead to 
unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your 
Highness, in that event the British Government 
would be prepared to aid you •.• to such extent, 
and in such manner as may appear to the British 
Government necessary ••• in repelling it, provided 
that your Highness fol.lows unreservedly the 
advice of the British in regard to your external 
relation.I 
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The diploma t.ic relations of great powers with their 
prot~g~s are inevitably full of such well-intentioned 
speechef and promises, in which too late the small power 
realises it should not have trusted, and too late the 
great power's government must in some measure rescind. 
Merv fell in February 1884 and almost immediately 
de Giers, the Russian Foreign Minister who had succeeded 
Gorchakov in 1882 and Granville, Gladstone's Foreign 
Secretary, agreed upon the long~talked-about Joint 
Commission. De Giers was throughout always anxious to 
meet Great Britain half~way. He wished however for the 
1 Great Britaing P3_rliamentary Papers (1884), vol.87; 
Central Asi.a 1 No. 1 i ( 1.884) ~ No" 94 ( inclos .)9 Viceroy to 
Abdurrahman 1 22 February 1883. This series will 
henceforth be referred to as C.A. Italics added. 
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Boundary Commission to start from the supposed fixed 
point on the Arnu and work westward but the English 
insisted on going the other way and de Giers yielded the 
point. His choi.ce for the post of Russian Commissioner 
was an admirable one 1 and no one should ever believe 
that de Giers showed any guile in making ito Although 
circumstances dictated that General Zelenoi would not 
effectively take up the Cornmissionership to which he had 
been appointed, he appeared as one of the most helpful 
and friendly background figures in the whole proceeding 
of the Commission right up to the successful conclusion 
of the Boundary Negotiations at St Petersburg in 1887. 
CHAPTER II 
ABDURRAHMAN 
Reaching the Transoxian khanate of Hissar in the 
early winter of 1879 1 on the journey from Samarcand 
which was to take him to Kabul, Abdurrahman Khan came 
to the town of Hissar and put up at the inn of the 
Drunkards and Smokers, because, as he recalls 1 it was 
the only clean and nice place in the town. Next day 1 
refreshed by sleep and well furnished with six new 
horses taken by ruse from the son of the Amir of 
Bokhara 1 he continued hi.s dangerous journey southward. 
A nephew of Sher Ali, the recently dead Amir of 
Afghanistan, and himself pretender to the throne, he 
was now involved in a gambler 1 s throw, but even he 1 a 
courageous opportunist, had no clue how soon, and how 
easily, the winning dice would be in his hand. 
lE 
Abdurrahman had spent the eleven previous years in 
Russian Central Asia as a fugitive from his own country 
and a pensioner of the Russian Government. On the whole, 
realising his potential future usefulness, they had 
treated him rather well. This characterful personage, 
who was soon to become the Strong Man of Afghanistan, 
and beyond all doubt the man who welded it into a stable 
state, was given to outbursts of violent and 
1 The Life of Abdurrahman by himself, edited by Mir 
Munshi Sultan Mohamed Khan, vol.I, p.169. 
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contradictory speech 1 and some of his outbursts are 
wildly anti~Russian, but on the whole he was rather 
friendly and grateful to the Russians than otherwise. 
Nevertheless 9 having seen at first hand the thorough-
going nature of the Russian takeover of Central Asia, he 
made up his mind that if he achieved the Amirate of 
Afghanistan he would never dance to the Russian tune, as 
it was clear that neighbouring Khiva and Bokhara must, 
in spite of their nominal independence. As to the 
English 1 they were notorious, especially in Central 
Asia, where the Russian purse was sometimes very low, 
for the generosity of their distribution; they often 
changed their policy with their change of Cabinets and 
in this way might prove more manageable over a period. 
And in addition his grandfather 9 Dost Mahomet 9 had got 
on with the English pretty wellJever since his time as 
a political detainee in Calcutta, when evening after 
evening, he had played chess with Miss Eden, Lord 
Auckland 1 s sister. 
The amirate of Afghanistan, as distinct from the 
Afghans, Aryan tribes long established in a homeland 
centring on the Suleiman mountains, had assumed its 
full size under its first ruler, Ahmad Shah (reigned 
1747~1773), an Afghan tribesman, chief of the Saddozai 
Branch of the Abdali clan, who had been the brilliant 
general of the Persian, Nadir Shah. Nadir Shah had 
died at the hand of an assassin on his victorious 
re turn from India 9 and Ahmadi :in charge of the vast 
treasure accumulated on this expedition, realised his 
opportunity and made off with i.t back towards Kandahar 1 
to use in building up a very successful state. He left 
a too numerous kin, and 1n the next 100 years, in fact 
until Abdurrahman began a steady policy of e.i ther 
ex1ling or exterminating his more untrustworthy or too 
ambitious relations, Afghanistan, except for the period 
of the second reign of Dost Mahomet, was a scene of 
bitter dynastic struggles. 
From the time of Ahmad Shah, in honour of his 
achievement, his tribesmen took on the name of Durrani, 
meaning 'Pearl' in place of Abdali. From the Durranis 
have come all the rulers of Afghan1stan 1 the earlier 
ones belonging to the branch of Saddozais, and from the 
time of Dost Mahomet they have been Mohammedzais. 
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Abdurrahman was the son of Afzal Khan, eldest of 
the many sons of Dost Mahomet and for many years 
Governor of Afghan Turkestan (North-Western Afghanistan) 
with its capital at Balkh. Here Abdurrahman had grown 
up 1 and had his military training from a very remarkab~ 
renegade Briton, General Campbell, an army doctor who 
had fallen into Afghan hands in the First Afghan War 
(1838-42) and adopted Islam. Afzal was an easy-going 
man who did not take it too greatly to heart when Dost 
Mahomet, dying outside Herat in 1863, left the throne of 
Afghanistan to his third and favouri.te son, Sher Ali. 
But other members of the Mohammadzai family felt strongly 
otherwise and the early part of the reign of Sher Ali 
saw again a period of sharp dynastic warfare and 
national disintegration. Afzal, misled, soon fell into 
the hands of Sher Ali. Abdurrahman fled for the first 
time across the Amu Darya, but not for long. On his 
return, he found the English in India were encouraging 
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and financially help~ng Afzal as Amir of Kabul and 
Kandaharo In 1868 Afzal died of cholera and the English 
recognised his full brother 9 Azim 9 second son of Dost 
Mahomet 9 as Amira Azim 9 by his own short~comings 9 for 
he was both stupid and lazy, soon alienated the people 
of Kabul, and Sher Ali 9 helped by the military ability 
of one of his sons, Yakub Khan 9 regained his place as 
Amir in 18680 Azim and Abdurrahman joined forces and 
opposed him fiercely, but 1 after initial success, had 
their rebellion broken. They fled penniless and almost 
bereft of followers, and quarrelling, parted companyo 
It was at this stage that Abdurrahman went through 
Khorassan (Eastern Persia) and then northward to throw 
himself on the mercy of the Russians in 18690 He 
remained in Russian Turkestan until the time came for 
him to return as claimant to the throne. 
In September 1868 9 Sher Ali, feeling his position 
secure, reopened communications with the English in 
Indi.a and received the congratulations of the Viceroy 9 
Lord Lawrenceo Soon the flow of English (or Indian) 
money to Afghanistan was re-established 9 as useful to 
both parties as it had been in the days of Dost Mahomet. 
The proud but desperately poor rulers of Afghanistan, 
depending on the uncertainties of revenue collected 
from feudal dependents 9 knew how to receive with 
dignity gifts bf money and war materials from their 
wealthy neighbouro The English in Ind:ia 9 constantly 
fearful of" the Russ:ian advance in Central Asia 1 regarded 
the many lakhs of rupees sent annual.ly to Afghanistan 
as well spent if only they were used in building up the 
military efficiency of the buffer-state. They were 
pleased to see that to Sher Ali the army was his main 
concerno He was a man of varied ability and for the 
next eight or nine years he continued to build up and 
modernise Afghanistan along certain linesi but from the 
first his relations with the English were never easyo 
He had been very hurt because the English would not 
enter into a full 'offensive and defensive• alliance 
with him as he had suggested. The English in their 
turn were annoyed when they heard in 1873 that he was 
demonstrati.ng his independence by exchanging friendly~ 
although harmless 1 letters with General Kaufman 1 the 
famous first governor o.f Russian Turkestan. Sher Ali 
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was terrified that the British would insist on 
establishing an infidel British Resident at Kabul 9 
instead of a Moslem 'Agent' o The arrival of Lord Lytton 
as Viceroy in 1876 and the development of the 'Forward 
Policy' 1 especially in Afghanistan's neighbouring and 
related Beluchistan 1 increasing.ly worried Sher Ali. He 
again declared that Afghanistan was a neutral state bound 
to neither English nor Russian. 
The Russians 1 fearing that the English would 
actively help Turkey in the Bulgarian troubles of 1877-
81 had prepared a diversion for them by building up a 
Russian striking force in Central Asia 1 and at the same 
time a Russian Mission under General Stolietav suddenly 
appeared across the Amu and entered Afghan territory 
and proceeded towards Kabul in an unheard·~Of overriding 
of the Afghan officials 1 who expected visitors to wait 
until the Amir's permission for their entry had been 
receivedo In spite of his former brave prates tat.ion of 
neutrality and freedom to do as he liked 1 Sher Ali tried 
desperately but unsuccessfully to persuade the Russian 
Mission not to come to the capital, but, although the 
Balkan War had finished and the treaty of San Stefano 
had been signed just as Stolietov had set out from 
Tashkent, the Mi.ssion duly arrived at Kabul. 
With the conclusion of the War, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry ordered the Russian troops near the 
Afghan frontier to retire, and the Mission was almost 
abandonedo Stolietov 1 after keeping the members of his 
mission like prisoners in their Kabul quarters, himself' 
departed suddenly for the North to •write a memoir of 
the Mission•. He appears never to have done this. The 
Mission, under its second~·in~·command 1 languished there 
in Kabul for the period before the outbreak of the 
Second Afghan War 1 and li tt.le would be known of' it 
except for the Journal kept by the Mission's young 
doctor, Yavorsky, which, beginning awkwardly as the 
sentimental travel~diary of' a raw and self,~,conscious 
writer, develops later into a valuable day-by~day 
appraisement of Afghan affairs in the last part of the 
reign of Sher Ali. 
As Sher Ali had feared, the arrival of the Russian 
Mission had led immediately to an ultimatum from the 
English demanding that he should allow the English 
Mission already waiting at Peshawur immediately to 
proceed to Kabul, and in addition that he should 
apologise for having allowed the arrival of the Russian 
Mission. The former request he realised he must now 
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accede to; 
hi.m to give. 
the apology his Afghan pride would not allow 
Instead, as three English armies entered 
his territory and a British Political Agent. Major Louis 
Cavagnari, prepared to come as Head of the Mission to 
Kabul, Sher Ali determined to leave the Amirate in 
charge of Yakub Khan and go personally to visit the 
Tsar and plead with him for Russian or even European 
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help against the English. At this juncture his favourite 
son and chosen heir, Abdulla Jan 1 a lad of 16, died after 
a short illness. The British Mission arrived and insistec 
upon being received by the grief-stricken Amir. He 
departed for the North, but on arrival at Tashkurgan he 
sickened and died. This news soon travelled over the 
few hundred miles between Samarcand and Afghan Turkestan 
and Abdurrahman began to plan his return. 
Yakub 9 declaring himself Amir, signed the treaty of 
Gandomak by which Britain was to continue payments to 
the Amir while controlling Afghan foreign policy, and 
unfortunately also he was compelled to allow the arrival 
of a British Resident 1 although he protested that he 
could not guarantee the safety of such an officer at the 
hands of his fanatical people. Cavagnari, promoted 
from Political Officer to British Resident and knighted, 
was not very surprisingly murdered shortly after, and 
the Second Afghan War flared up anew. Yakub abdicated 
in despair and lived on an English pension in India, 
where he died in 1923. The British held Kabul. Heroic 
Afghan local resistance made a difficult job for General 
Roberts, but at last, assisted by the armies of Gough 
and Stewart, he reduced the country south of the Hindu 
Kush except for Herat, where Ayub, the youngest brother 
of Yakub, continued to rule. 
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Kabul was in English hands 9 but what was to be the 
future of Afghanis tan? One thing was clear to the Ind:ian 
Government 9 and that was that they wished to withdraw and 
be rid of any further cause for interference in the 
internal affairs of Afghanistan, the policy which had 
involved them in the disastrous wars of 1838-42 and 
1878-79. The only way to do this was to see that the 
country was in the hands of a suitable ruler and continue 
to give him financial backing 9 and it dawned upon the 
Viceroy and most of his Council that the only suitable 
Amir was the Russian-domiciled Abdurrahman. In January 
1880 news was received in India of his arrival in 
Badakhshan and this was followed by news of his 
receiving much support in his familiar territory round 
Balkh. Still with a very small fighting force, he was 
engaged in attacking the town of Kunduz whose Mir was 
opposed to him, when he received an unexpected letter 
from the English Political Agent in Kabul 9 Lepel Griffin, 
which made it clear that he need not fear British 
opposition but rather that they would welcome his 
approach. Abdurrahman played his winning hand cautiously 
and left it to the English armies to subdue some of his 
chief opposition 9 the Ghilzai tribes in the South East, 
while he continued to strengthen his position in Afghan 
Turkestan. At last on 22 July 1880 he was Vformally 
recognised by the British as Amir of Kabul' • 1 
British forces in Kabul were preparing to withdraw, 
and Kandahar was likewise still temporarily in British 
hands 9 when Abdurrahman 1 s only real rival, Sher Ali's 
1 Sir Percy Sykes 9 History of Afghanistan 9 vol.II, p.137. 
son, Ayub, Governor of Herat, made a heroic blunder. 
Instead of waiting and making an attack 9 which might 
easily have been successful, directly on the forces of 
his cousin after the English had withdrawn, he 
impetuously marched instead to attack the English at 
Kandahar. The British forces under General Burrowes 
made a long forced march to meet him some JO miles to 
the north-west of Kandahar and were bitterly defeated 
by the Herat army near Maiwando Maiwand is still the 
classic victory over the English engraved on the Afghan 
heart, but i,t was a flash in the pan 9 because it led to 
as bitter an Afghan defeat at the hands of General 
Roberts, henceforth Lord Roberts of Kandahar. The 
English withdrew and by March 1881 Abdurrahman was in 
firm control of Kandahar and in September he defeated 
Ayub 9 who fled to Persia. Thereupon Herat was also in 
Abdurrahman 1 s hands, and so, within less than two years 
he had re-established the amirate as it had been at 
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the accession of Sher Ali, except for the Uzbek khanate 
of Maimana, north-east of Herat Province, which 
maintained the independence it had won in the time of 
Sher Alio This, too, was subdued by two armies coming 
in concert from Herat and Afghan Turkestan in mid-1884. 
So, by the time that the English section of the Anglo-
Russian Afghan Boundary Commission arrived in late 1884, 
Abdurrahman had, in a scant four years, produced a 
disciplined state, with people in high positions whom 
he ruled by winning in some cases their undying 
devotion and in others their craven, fearful obedience 
and in some cases by meting out the most sudden fatal 
punishment, for he ruled as a despoto As to the common 
people, though they trembled at his one-in-eight military 
levy and his harsh taxation 9 they felt on the whole 
secure. Several rebellions, however, took place during 
his reign (he died in 1901) and each was put down with 
severity. His position was never in doubt. 
CHAPTER III 
ABDURRAHMAN'S HOUSE 
General Observations of the culture of Afghanistan and 
its relation to Central Asia. Afghan Turkestan. 
2t 
Modern Afghanistan, the direct descendant of the 
eighteenth century state established by Ahmad Shah, is 
unquestionably artificial, built ffi'-racially and 
linguistically disparate elements, its component provinces 
having had long recent periods either of complete 
independence or of allegiance to other neighbouring powers 
before being inexorably incorporated; some of its modern 
boundaries having cut across harmonious geographical 
regions or ethnological groups and split long 
established economic and racial relationships. 
Ahmad Shah 1 s 1 kingdom had lines of cleavage in all 
these directions, and all that held it together was the 
personal prestige and military power of the despot. 
Under his immediate successors it fell into its former 
fragments until another despot, Dost Mahomet, 2 
reconstructed it wholly. What can be said is that with 
Ahmad Shah, the 'dream' of Afghanistan as a united state 
was formulated. Sher Ali, 3 in his desperate efforts to 
hold the south, virtually restored the independence of 
1 Ahmad Shah, Shah of Afghanistan, 1747-1773. 
2 Dost Mahomet, Amir of Kabul, 1826-1839, Amir of 
Afghanistan, 1843-1863. 
3 Sher Ali, Amir of Afghanistan, 1863-1879. 
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some of the small northern principalities in retuen for 
lump payments, thus abandoning even the pretence of feudal 
vassalage. This was something which very much shocked 
1 Abdurrahman, who, like Dost Mahomet earlier, set 
particular store by Afghan Turkestan. Under the 
despotism of Abdurrahman not only were these regions all 
re-unified but his centralisation of power in Kabul may 
be said to have ended feudalism in Afghanistan as it 
affected the relationship of the ruler and his provincial 
nobl.es. These might remain as important tribesmen and 
wealthy landowners but Abdurrahman liked to see some 
members of their families close under his hand in Kabul, 
and he was careful to appoint his governors Turkish-
s tyle as vice-gerents of the Amir, who might be moved 
from one province to another. They were dignitaries 
because they were officials, not because they were local 
men of note. 
Because English association with Afghanistan came 
by way of India, it has frequently been forgotten that 
the high land of Afghanistan looks three ways, to Persia 
and Central Asia as well as to the plains of the Indus 
and formerly as far east as the Jumna. But the greatest 
link is with Central Asia - geographically as well as 
historically. 
The social structure of Central Asia has been 
shaped since early times by several main factors. As 
always, the underlying factor is the nature of its 
geography, that of a great land-mass without dividers, 
in the way that seas and gulfs are dividers. Ranges of 
1 Abdurrahman, Amir of Asghanistan, 1880-1901. 
fold-mountains are dividers too, but only to a certain 
extent. They lack the definition of a sea-coast. 
Valleys are made by rivers, and rivers always tempt men 
to ascend them to their very sources. The landsman 
looking for a ford will usually travel up rather than 
down a river. Sources of rivers are at the very top 
of mountain slopes, divided by the merest saddle from 
other watercourses which, once found, lead irresistibly 
down elsewhere. 
28 
The student of Afghan history quickly realises that 
mountain ranges, even those of the most formidable kind, 
are no absolute deterrent to travel and communication. 
One does not know what first men, persevering and loaded, 
like ants carrying treasure up and down tall stems of 
grass and clods of earth, crawled along the painfully 
narrow mountain valleys and found the dreadful saddles 
between the more dreadful peaks. So, in a sense, since 
the dawn of history there has been the inducement for 
many people of Central Asia to move onwards, primarily 
because movement was possible. Not only was it possible, 
but to a much greater extent than in Europe, for example, 
it was geographically desirable. In Europe, much more 
climatically favoured, the means of advancement has been 
not so much in moving out to the unknown as in clearing 
more and more of the well-watered temperate forest land. 
Excluding Herat with its several faces, modern 
Afghanistan is made of two main elements, the one which 
looked south and east towards India and the one looking 
north to the plains of Central Asia and the mountains of 
modern Tadjikistan, but there was always contact between 
the two. Before the rise of the Mohammedzai, all this 
2< 
part of the world had looked to Bokhara as its great 
market. It is interesting to see that at the present 
time more and more of the Afghan product, especially from 
its northern plains, makes its way to the u.s.s.R., and 
Tashkent has merely replaced Bokhara as the central 
market. 
Central Asia, at any rate in known historical times, 
has been climatically and geographically much as it is 
now, a land of contrasts, absolute desert and semi-arid 
pasture lands lying side by side with rich irrigated 
river valleys, snow-clad ranges in well-watered regions 
like Tadjikistan and Badakhshan bringing a steady immense 
volume of spring waters to the Syr Darya, Zarafshan, Ili, 
Amu and such rivers, while the main Hindu Kush range to 
the south and east has a much lower rainfall and an 
uncertain snow-fall so that most of Afghanistan has a 
poor or erratic water supply. But in Afghanistan too 
there has been sufficient variation for some land to be 
much more desirable than other. Throughout Central Asia 
certain areas have been the object o.f envy to the would-
be conqueror. In desert and semi~desert regions thinly 
scattered population never could be actually 'conquered' 
but merely counted as part of the total acquired by the 
conquest of an adjoining fertile area. Desert tribesmen, 
though often related to settled tribesmen, and nominally 
controlled by the present overlords of the farming people, 
were able to maintain a greater degree of independence, 
a greater racial and cultural purity and pride, but their 
units were often very small and economically and 
poli ti,cally weak. Those living in the river valleys and 
associated irrigable areas were able to organise or be 
organised in states in which the tribal element might or 
might not remain strong. They were, however, vulnerable 
when attacked by determined predators. Because of this 
vulnerability a system of vassalage emerged throughout 
Central Asia whenever no central dominating power was 
able to maintain control. This is what happened after 
the death of Nadir Shah, when strong Persian control was 
withdrawn and before the Russian power had replaced it 
from the north. Khiva remained isolated, Merv was a 
weak dependency of Persia, Bokhara lost its dominance, 
the powerful Afghanistan of Ahmad Shah was not durable 
and so the late eighteenth century and the first three 
quarters of the nineteenth saw the formation and 
reformation of these uninstitutionalised, feudal 
relationships between mirs and khans of small states 
with their temporarily more powerful neighbours. 
The feudal elements in Afghanistan were of 
comparatively recent origin and could not be said to 
have superseded tribal society but only to have provided 
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a top-hamper to it; and both the feudal elements and the 
tribal had links with surrounding regions and people which 
were not ultimately to become part of the modern delimited 
state. Tribal histories are long and obscure, often most 
elusive, especially when the great majority of tribesmen 
are quite illiterate, but in Afghanistan some tribal 
leaders and some tribes became associated with what may 
be called city-states. Herat, Kandahar, Ghazni and Kabul 
in particular each had brilliant civilised pasts reaching 
peaks of splendour at various times in earlier Moslem 
history and these past splendours still gave them lustre 
although by the nineteenth century they had mostly 
reverted to shabby and small provincial walled cities, 
market towns to a rural hinterland. In such an Asian-
type feudal state the frontiers were bound to be fluid. 
The central ruler held certain tribal leaders in a 
relationship of vassalage, but it was the tribes who 
knew the limits of their territorial grounds - the 
places beyond which their flocks could not graze, their 
water-rights ceased, their people could not go in 
safety, the places where strangers could be asked their 
business before they might be allowed to proceed. But 
in many places there were large areas where flocks of 
various tribes grazed on common lands in certain 
seasons, divided simply by their watchful shepherds; 
there were precious salt fields where many tribes had 
ancient rights to come for salt; there were cultivable 
lands abandoned by their original occupiers, and by the 
Moslem land-laws based on the Adat or Common law these 
lands became the property of the tribe or persons who 
restored them; many villages contained people of 
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several different races living side by side and these 
might in some cases owe allegiance to distant tribal 
chiefs. The most that the central ruler could claim was 
that he held certain other mirs or maliks in fee and 
received from them so many fighting men at need or so 
many gifts in money or kind, and that they formed a 
protective fringe to his own immediate lands. In 
addition, the small principalities of Central Asia saw 
nothing exceptional in paying varying forms and amounts 
of tribute to more than one of their powerful neighbours 
simultaneously. The frontiers were tribal business and 
frontier disputes were settled mostly at the local level. 
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Except in this matter of tribal volatility, Kabul 
and Kandahar were in the nineteenth century the two best 
established major provinces of Afghanistan proper, the 
region lying both in and south of the central ranges of 
the Hindu Kush. To the West, Herat was territorially a 
known unit but its proximity to Khorassan and also to 
Central Asia gave it a history of association with Persia 
or Bokhara rather more than with Kandahar or Kabul, and 
also at times of a powerful independence. 
Very often, the small groups best able to defend 
themselves were the tribes who occupied mountain valleys 
with narrow defensible necks and precipitous ridges 
dividing them from neighbouring valleys. There are many 
such valleys in the Hindu Kush, and the cultivable land 
in them is usually very limited. The natural solution 
for such tribes~ as for example, branches of the 
Firozkohi living to the south of Maimana, was to use 
their valleys as robber strongholds and lead a life of 
plunder and man~stealing. Leaving their women, children 
and old men to tend their own few goats, ancient mulberries 
and walnuts and pitifully tiny upland grain fields, the 
mounted men set off over known mountain tracks to steal 
from other tribes or caravans or small parties of 
travellers. 
How much the fertility of the near-river lands of 
this part of the world depends on artificial irrigation 
is one of the first lessons brought home to the 
traveller. In places the most conspicuous feature of 
the landscape is the ubiquity of ruins and their 
association with what appears to be absolute desert. 
But it is not eternal desert. One will usually find that 
not far away there is water or the possibility of water. 
The presence of ruins like this does not mean that there 
is less water here than there was in the long past. It 
means that in this place, either the inhabitants are 
using the water as of old but in a nearby place, because 
there is only so much water and it cannot be used over a 
whole region at once; and hence they have developed a 
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sort of long-term shifting agriculture; or it means that, 
for some reason, more likely political than economic, 
people have simply abandoned that place; and the water, 
or the means of bringing water from nearby, still exists. 
Even the well in the desert did not usually dry up. It 
filled up with wind~blown waste, or was filled up by the 
deliberate act of an enemy, or as part of a scorched 
earth defence policy. Even the stone or brick thrown in 
by the traveller to test the depth of the water by its 
sound was as good a means, given long enough, as any for 
making it hold less water. Such neglect was generally 
indication of political decline in that region, because 
in the Moslem world the original building of bricked 
wells or tanks, caravanserai or bridges, was undertaken 
by wealthy rulers or wealthy individuals building up for 
themselves treasure in heaven. And the subsequent upkeep 
was linked with the continuing prosperity of the users. 
A second dominating feature of Asian society is the 
variety of racial origins of peoples living often in 
close association with one another. ('Ethnology' said 
the Turkmen historian, 'is one of the greatest problems 
for the Marxist historian'). A possible analogy for 
this close co~existence of racial types as divergent as 
the Iranian, Indo~Iranian, Turanian and Mongolian, is 
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to be found in the botany of this same part of the world. 
Here~ especially in Afghan Turkestan, botanists believe 
they are very close to the homelands of wheats, certain 
melons and some kinds of legumes, for they find so many 
associated wild strains of these plants. If certain 
strains of mankind originated, as seems likely, in Central 
Asia, then it is only to be expected that these same 
racial types will be more closely associated in 
homogeneous groups as in Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan and 
will also spread out and intermingle with, sometimes 
intermarry with, other native strains. The whole of 
north-western Afghanistan belongs to this pattern. For 
instance the region immediately south of the Amu down to 
Mazar-i-Sharif is as predominantly Uzbek, as is the 
region north of i.t, old Bokhara, modern Uzbekistan, and 
yet on the river itself there is a long intrusion of 
Ersari and other Turkmens and south of it among the 
Uzbeks there are many Afghans, Tadjiks and Hazaras. Not 
all of this confusion was caused by natural migrations. 
In literally hundreds of instances it was caused wholly 
or partly by the compulsory transplantations or~ered by 
Central Asian (including Afghan and Persian) despots, 
sometimes as punishment to the people moved, sometimes 
for military or strategical reasons to ensure that 
frontier lands were in the right hands, and sometimes at 
the whim of a ruler who wished to populate or re-populate 
potential agricultural lands. Sometimes peoples so 
transplanted have ultimately returned to their former 
homes, but mostly they have settled down in the new home 
always remembering these migrations in their tribal 
histories. Except among the pure nomads to whom 
transplantations meant new grasslands which they could 
leave overnight, these compulsory transferences were 
unwelcome. Such a statement as the following can be 
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paralleled in many places: 'Forty families of the people 
of Obeh who have come to Kili Rekhta refuse to settle at 
Kila Wali but the Governor will force them to do so. 11 
Such people remained like islands in a sea of other 
tribesmen. One of the Afghan Boundary Commission Survey 
officers reported his surprise at finding a small 
settlement of transplanted Balkhi people settled for 
several generations beyond Obeh to the east of Herat 
still remembering their origins as citizens of the Mother 
of Cities but never having been enterprising enough to 
make the long journey home. 
A third factor contributing to the close 
interrelation of the populations of Central Asia, it need 
hardly be added, lies in the universality of Islam there 
since early times. Except for a few Kafiristans, Islam 
long since gave to Central Asia a language of universal 
communication, a common code of law and certain basic 
rules for conduct. The differences between Islamic sects 
have been over historical doctrine rather than over 
social ethics. Sectarianism has been bitter indeed, but 
the code of conduct has long been standardised. As to 
languages, Arabic, the language of the church, was 
supported widely by Persian, the language of government, 
1 National Archives of India, Foreign and Political, 
Secret F, July 1886, Nos 318-449, Doc.411, Trans. of 
Newsletter from Mirza Yakub Ali Khan at Bala Murghab to 
Col. Ridgeway, 23 April 1886. [This series hereinafter 
will be referred to as N.A.I., For. J 
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and Turkic, a language with such minor dialect differences 
that it could be understood from end to end of the Turkic-
speaking lands of Asia. In addition to the social, 
linguistic and religious links established by the spread 
of Islam, another very important matter which helped 
establish a sense of being part of the same culture, 
i.e., of knowing how to behave as part of a community, 
was the spread of the Arabic-Persian (Turkish) system of 
military and administrative organisation. The military 
plan of grouping in tens, hundreds and thousands was 
accepted as the norm, and wherever there was a state, 
there was the standard system of governors and their 
durbars, Kazis and their ecclesiastical courts, kotwals 
(police local chiefs) and kotwals' courts, Treasury and 
tax-collection procedure, the Kafila Bashi (caravan 
Controller) and the organisation of transport, raises and 
the municipal organisation of towns, and other matters of 
common interest; and new rulers soon took over this 
organisation. All these things meant that the 
inhabitants of Central Asia, different as they might be 
in appearance, native language, costume, local custom, 
had in the nineteenth century a much greater common field 
than could be said for the inhabitants of the many 
states of Europe. 
To summarise these points with regard to Afghanistan, 
and especially to North-Western Afghanistan, we find these 
various factors at work, desirable and undesirable terrain 
in close association and linked by many caravan-routes 
over not insuperable mountains and deserts; a great 
local variety of race and language among peoples 
accepting a similar social and government structure, a 
great degree of formation and refo~mation of states as 
independent units, or as associates and appanages of 
other states, all welded by the religious and ethical 
teaching of Islam, Afghanistan being to this day about 
ninety-nine per cent Moslem with only one per cent of 
Jews, Hindus and others. 
One should not overlook the close relationship in 
Central Asia between nomad and settled, who are often 
tribally and economically closely bound to one another. 
In the old Central Asian world the richest and the 
poorest were both nomad - the richest, for who did not 
find it pleasantest to move about over a wide terrain 
on fine horses, owning many camels burdened down with 
rich carpets and household goods and fine felt yurts 
and surveying one 1 s herds of sheep and cattle? - and 
the poorest, the failed men, who come empty handed, or 
bringing their few sheep, to work as semi-slave 
shepherds for their rich relatives in return for keep. 
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In between were various classes of agriculturalists -
those who owned their own land and those who farmed 
settled farms for the wealthier nomads as serf or tenant, 
and again those poorer semi-nomad agriculturalists who 
paid no water-rates but took what water was left over 
for a little haphazard farming at the ends of the canals 
on the fringes of irrigated areas. 
Almost as ancient as the agricultural regions were 
the caravan roads which, with small variations, have 
followed the same geographically determined routes across 
Asia since long before the Christian era, connecting East 
and West and South in a well-marked network of trade 
roads and stopping-places from brackish wells in the 
desert to fine market towns at crossroads. Several of 
the best known caravan route nexuses happened to be in 
Afghanistan - one was Balkh near the Amu - one was 
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Kapisa a little north of modern Kabul. A third which 
connected the West and India by way of the Persian desert 
road, and fertile Seistan or through Meshed and Herat, 
was Kandahar. From Balkh, the greatest of all, one route 
went across the Hindu Kush through Bamian and Kabul and 
Peshawur and the other went up the Amu valley and through 
Badakhshan and across the Pamirs and Kashgar and so to 
China. From the West Balkh received caravans from Herat 
and Meshed; caravans from Ferghana and beyond crossed 
the Amu at Termez - still one of the main ferry-
crossings and a modern u.s.s.R. railhead. 
North-Western Afghanistan, the region affected by 
the 1885 Boundary Survey, consisted of the Province of 
Herat and that of Afghan Turkestan, broadly speaking, 
the land lying from the northern slopes of the Hindu KuSl. 
and its western extensions and reaching to the Amu and 
the Kara Kum desert. The word Turkestan was widely 
used, as one will see by reference to any late 
nineteenth century map of Asia. Here is Russian 
Turkestan, centring on Tashkent, the land between Amu 
and Syr Darya and the Zerafshan, Afghan Turkestan 
centring on Balkh (Mazar-i-Sharif) and Eastern Turkestan, 
that is, modern Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan, centring 
on Kashgar. Before and during the first abortive period 
of the Boundary Commission of 1885 it was expected that 
the demarcation would continue beyond the confines of 
Afghan Turkestan and through Badakhshan to the sources 
of the Amu, but as it happened the survey only covered 
Western Afghan Turkestan. 
Afghan Turkestan was so called not because it 
included a predominantly Afghan population (it did not) 
but because, since the time of Ahmad Shah, it had been 
claimed as part of the Afghan state even although for 
much of the time the Afghan ruler had no hold upon much 
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of it. When in 1872 British and Russian discussions were 
taking place about the position of the two powers over 
Afghanistan, Granville1 instructed Loftus at St 
Petersburg that Afghan Turkestan included: firstly, the 
districts of Kunduz, Khulm and Balkh, the northern 
boundary of which would be the line of the Amu from the 
Kokcha River to 1Khoja Saleh 1 on the high road from 
Bokhara to Balkh; secondly 9 the internal districts of 
Akcha, Seripol, Maimana, Shibbergan, and Andkhoi, the 
latter of which would be the extreme Af~han frontier 
possession to the North West, the desert beyond belonging 
to independent tribes of Turkmens. This definition was 
also acceptable to Russia. As it turned out, the Survey 
Party was not allowed to proceed to Kunduz and although 
surveys took place in all the other districts mentioned 
here, only Maimana, Andkhoi and Akcha districts were 
connected with the Boundary demarcation itself. In 1873 
this definition was perfectly clear. The Koktha River 
1 India Office Library: Correspondence 1864-81, respecting 
movements of Russia in Central Asia and her relations with 
Afghanistan, p.44. [These 1 Recordak 1 sheets made from 
microfilm from the India Office Library were made 
available by Dr H.A. Lamb. They are hereinafter referred 
to as lOL/M.] 
was the last tributary joining the Amu on the southern 
shore. After that the great glacier-fed river flowed in 
a westerly direction until it turned north-west to 
discharge into the Aral Sea. Somewhere near this change 
of direction of the river, Burnes had crossed it by 
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ferry at 1 Khoja Saleh' which appeared as a named location 
on General Walker's map. The other southern rivers of 
the Amu system which came from the Hindu Kush and 
Paropamisus suffered from the inadequate and erratic 
rain and snowfall of their source and once they were off 
the slopes their channels flowed across a hundred miles 
or so of low flat country and their currents slackened so 
that they failed to cut through the great silt deposits 
and sand strips built up along this middle course of the 
Amu. Balkh and Akcha were on separate distributaries of 
the Bamian-Balkh-Ab system and in each dry year every drop 
of the water was used up by the agricultural canals while 
wet years saw the formation of great swamps to the south 
of the sand hills. Further west a generally poorer river 
system, the Kaiser-Andkhoi, flowed north from the lower 
Band-i-Turkestan range, Maimana being favourably situated 
closer to the mountains on one of its main tributaries, 
and Andkhoi being situated on the terminal oasis with a 
most uncertain water supply. The settlement of the 
question of the western boundary of the pastures of these 
two provinces took up a good deal of the Commission's 
time, because here as elsewhere the 1873 agreement had 
thought in terms of a straight line across desert, but 
in 1885 the Boundary Commission found that, to people 
who depended on spring pastures for much of their 
livelihood, the position of the boundary line was a 
matter of life or death. 
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On the Upper Kaisar was a little village called 
Charshamba where the English Section of the Boundary 
Commission took up its winter quarters for 1885-1886, the 
second winter in these parts for most of them. Just 
beyond this was the watershed between the Murghab and the 
Kaisar-Andkhoi systems, and also the accepted tribal 
boundary between Maimana and Badghis 1 the northern sub-
province of Herat. 1 About 200 miles west of the supposed 
Khoja Saleh, the Murghab River with its two main 
tributaries drained Badghis and flowed north as a quite 
substantial stream to form the terminal oasis of Merv. 
In 1873 no one among the diplomats was very much concerned 
about the population movements of this part of the world, 
unknown in Europe and assumed to be desert. A line could 
easily cross the river at a suitable spot. But the 
Murghab had been one of the ancient traffic ways of 
Central Asia 1 just as the Amu was. It was quite true 
that the rivers of Central Asia were not used much for 
navigation but mainly for ferry-passage and local fishing 
operations. It was not realised how much the river banks, 
often both banks 9 were used for traffic, and how 
settlement of different tribes spread up and down the 
valleys. The final low western section of the Paropamisus 
the Boorkhut Mountains, had a northern extension forming 
the low divide between the Murghab system and that of the 
Heri-Rud-Tejend. 
Heri-Rud, the river of Herat 9 the long stream rising 
in the centre of Afghanistan 9 forms the beautiful river-
valley oasis country of Herat and then flows north, its 
1 C.E. Yate~,;i Letters from North Afghanistan, p.126. 
course marking the border between Khorassan and Herat 
Province. On its way it flows through the defile of 
Zulfikar, and near Persian Zoorabad1 takes the name of 
Tejend. At Pul-i-Khatun it receives on the west the 
considerable stream on which Meshed is situated. About 
forty miles north of this junction is the town of 
Sarrakhs, a place which had been long inhabited, but 
which was in the early 1880s chiefly important as a 
Persian outpost fort against the Tekke Turkmens. In the 
low-lying land east of Ashkabad the Tejend terminates in 
an agricultural oasis with all its distributaries used 
for irrigation canals. The Heri-Tejend system has a 
point of geographical interest in that it forms the 
valley dividing the great mountain systems of Central 
Asia from those of Western Asia and Europe. Immediately 
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west of the Tejend begin the slopes of the Kopet Dagh 
mountains dividing Persia from the Turkmen S.S.R. These 
are the eastern outlying ranges of the Elburz range. 
The British, prior to the appointment of the Afghan 
Boundary Commission in 1884i had already learnt a good 
deal about Afghanistan, but it was geographically 
restricted to the Kohistan, the mountain land surrounding 
and north of Kabul; and the southern region of Kandahar; 
while Herat had been briefly and romantically known to 
them during the Persian-Afghan War of 1837-38 as the 
scene of the single-handed heroism of young Lieutenant 
Eldred Pottinger, and the political skill of Major D'Arcy 
Todd, head of the small British Political Mission at 
Herat for several years after that. The Commission, on 
1 C.A. No.2, 1884~1885~ No.94. 
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the other hand, :in i.ts several years of activ:i ty was to 
focus interest on North-Western Afghanistan 9 the region 
which, as far as Persian history had been concerned, had 
occupied the two eastern 'Quarters' of Khorassan, the one 
Herat, the other Balkh (Afghan Turkestan). 1 But because 
the picked English officers on the Commission were in 
those parts for a long time as trained survey, 
engineering and political officers, they enthusiastically 
filled in as many as possible of the blanks in European 
knowledge about so forgotten a land, and they extended 
their enquiries very thoroughly to other adjoining sub-
provi~ces of Afghan Turkestan, Saripul 9 Shibbergan, the 
district round Balkh 1 the Mother of Cities 1 , as well as 
to the ranges and valleys of the western Hindu Kush, as 
far east as Bamian. 
Agreements at various times over the previous 
centuries between the rulers of Persia and Central Asian 
rulers, especially the Khans of Bok.hara, affirmed the 
principle that the northern boundary of Khorassan, and 
hence of' Pers:ia 9 was the Amu Darya; but in practice it 
was often not so. Nevertheless, when in periods of 
weakness in the Pers:ian sovereignty Uzbeks made annual 
raids into Khorassan ~ it was f'rom across the Amu that 
they came and thither were driven back. Balkh and 
Andkhoi, Nishapur and Sarrakhs, Meshed and Herat were 
regions under the Central Asian shadow, and the famous 
city of Merv was originaLly established by the Persians 
to keep the Uzbek in check. Over the centuries the 
immediate cis-Oxian region became increasingly Uzbek in 
1 The other two 1 Quartersu were Merv and Nishapur. 
population but these settled Uzbeks were also raided by 
their kinsmen from the North. One must understand both 
the sense of continuity of these several provinces, each 
centring round its particular historic town, and also 
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the traditional linkages between them in the way of trade 
and communication~ as a continuing reality in spite of 
variations of political control, and in spite of 
intermittent destructive warfare. This story of 
continuity is best followed in the history of Herat, 
but it is also possible to piec~ together much of the 
past of smaller places such ~s Maimana. 
Herat 
When the question o.f a Joint Commission was at last 
settled, the city of Herat assumed an increased 
significance. For many years already it had never been 
far from the thinking of Russians and English, whether 
diplomats, military men or political theorists, who had 
contemplated the possibility of an invasion route to 
India. Every other way was blocked by mountains; only 
through Khorassan and Herat was there a viable approach. 
Long before they reached the Province, all the English 
officers in the Commission party hoped they would have 
access to the city, a magic name to those whose blood 
was stirred by tales of the prowess of Eldred Pottinger, 
and an even greater magnet to the several officers in 
the Indi~n party who were keen students of Persian 
language and culture. 
Although most of them were to be disappointed in 
their hopes and only see it from afar, like Griesbach, 
the geologist, whose Afghan guides or guards would not 
even let him photograph it from the hill-tdfs, Herat, 
notwithstanding, was the political point of contact for 
the Boundary Commission in its dealing with the Amir, 
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who ruled there through his Governor and Commander-in-
Chief of Herat, and who saw to it that these two closel~ 
assisted his Agent with the English Party. And while the 
crises of the f'irst half of 1885 were looming, Herat and 
its historic citadel were the focus of all the senior 
officers 1 most anguished discussion. When at last the 
Amir allowed a small party of English officers in to 
advise on the defences, it was for most of them a moment 
of the highest achievemento Hundreds and hundreds of 
pages of the proceedings of the Commission are filled 
with detailed descriptions of Herat by several hands. 
One of them, Colonel Stewart, reported: 1 The town 
of Herat is on a mound, evidently the debris of former 
• t • I 1 ci ies • The history of the city and to some extent 
of its surrounding districts is ancient and continuous. 
Already an established Iranian town when it fell to 
Alexander the Great, who built there one of his various 
Alexandrias, the reputed ruins of which can still be 
seen in the fields on the road to Zindajan, Herat had 
been coveted and occupied by Scythians, Parthians, 
Kushans, Haytals, Arabs, Seljuk Turks, Khorezmians before 
it was destroyed by Genghiz and grew again as part of 
the Mongol realm. Devastated by Timurlane in punishment 
for the insurbordination of its vassal rulers, it 
became the home-city and pri~e of his son, Shah Rukh, who, 
with his Timur.id successors, built Herat into a great 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros October 1885, Nos 385-700, 
No.598. 
artistic centreo In the sixteenth century the coveted 
city suffered very much from the strife between Persian 
rulers of the Safavid dynasty and Uzbek rulers from 
Central Asia, both of whom wished to control Herat. 
Frequent local struggles then led Herat to a period of 
decline. Herat province remained a basically Iranian 
region, except in the South where its poorer country was 
occupied by Afghan nomad pastoralists, many of them of 
the Abdali tribe, which spread into similar country in 
Eastern Khorassan. The local Tadjik (basic Iranian) 
inhabitants of the river~valley were f'requ~ntly called 
1 Parsiwan1 , a variant of Farsio The Safivids held it 
under weak control throughout the seventeenth century, 
often under local governors. In 1715 for the first time 
Herat city fell into the hands of' Durrani tribesmen, and 
was recaptured for the Persians by Nadir Shah in 1731, 
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but he left it under the governorship of Abdali (Durrani) 
aristocrats. Ahmad, on becoming the independent Afghan 
Shah after the death of' Nadir, united Herat with Kandahar 
and Kabul in 17490 Herat entered into a period of renewed 
prosperity in the latter half' of the century. 
The tides of many conquests left Herat with a very 
mixed population yet the present Herat population gives 
an impression more 1 Parsiwan 1 than Afghan. The rural 
population is undoubtedly more 1 Parsiwan 1 , but the town 
population is so blended that for a long time they have 
been generally referred to as 1 Heratis 1 , and many have 
lost any tribal i.dentity beyond that. The city 
aristocracy of to~day largely stems from the ranks of 
the conquerors, Arab, Seljuk, Uzbek and Afghan. To 
these have now been added wealthy Turkmen 1 f'eudalists 1 
who fled in some cases from Tsarist Russian controls and 
more recently from collectivism. 
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In the dissolution of Afghanistan which took place 
during the dynastic struggles of Ahmad Shah's descendants 
in the early nineteenth century Herat was practically 
independent for the first sixteen years of the century, 
then it was subdued by Fateh Khan, a brilliant general, 
eldest son of Painda Khan, Durrani, the Grand Wazir of 
Afghanistan, whose twenty-one sons 'daily emerged from 
the harem •.. like so many ants' , 1 and whose youngest son 
was Dost Mahomet. 
Dost Mahomet became Amir of Kabul and Kandahar in 
1834, and in his attempt to dislodge the Saddozai branch 
in his family from its control over Herat he negotiated 
with the Persians and, for good measure, the Russians, 
to help him conquer Herat. The Persians besieged Herat 
for almost a year over 1837-38 and in their camp English 
and Russian agents tried to outplay one another. This 
was the period when Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger helped 
the Heratis drive off the Persians. Having saved Herat 
from the Amir's allies, the English now engaged in the 
first Afghan War on behalf of their chosen puppet, Shah 
Shuja, at the same time sending Major D'Arcy Todd as the 
Head of a small 1 English Mission to Herat 1 • When Dost 
Mahomet returned in 1843 from exile in India to regain 
the throne of Kabul, Herat remained independent under an 
ageing and ruthless master, Yar Mohamet, Grand Wazir 
of the debauched Saddozai Amir of Herat. There was 
constant intrigue between Persia and Herat and in 1853 
1 Sirdar Effendi, M.A., Royals and Royals Mendicant, p.J. 
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England, hoping to prevent :further intrigue 1 :forced on 
the Persians a treaty guaranteeing the integrity o:f Herat, 
This was :followed in 1855 by an Anglo~A:fghan Treaty to 
the same e:f:fect 1 nevertheless in 1856 the Persians once 
more invested the town. The English took a hand and 
occupied the Persian island of Kharak and the port of 
Bushire. By the Treaty o:f Paris, in 1856 1 the Persians 
evacuated Herat; but a nephew o:f Dost Mahomet was made 
Sirdar under nominal Persian ruleo In 1863, old Dost 
Mahomet at last besieged and occupied Herat and reunited 
it with Afghanistan, but he himself' died o:f gout in a 
tent outside the city three weeks later. 
In the 1870s Herat became the city o:f Amir Sher Ali's 
wayw;ard son, Yakub 1 who occupied it :first with the 
connivance o:f the Persians and then. forgiven by his 
:father, as governor, and again, independently, :from 1873 
until he became Amir o:f Kabul in 18790 His younger 
brother Ayub 1 who had been in exile in Persia, now 
returned as governor. Herat was not :forgotten by the 
strategists. In 1875 Disraeli tried vainly to establish 
an official British agency there. In 1879 Colonel 
Grodekov made it the southern terminus o:f his famous 
horseback ride in full uniform :from Russian Central Asia. 
On the death of Sher Ali, the Persian Shah once more 
attempted to establi.sh i.n:fluence over Herat. Ayub Khan 
marched from Herat towards Kandahar, only to be defeated 
on 22 September 1881 by the new Amir, Abdurrahman. The 
Amir, 'knowing that Aypb would once again seek shelter in 
Herat 1 had sent a small :force under one o:f his trusted 
companions~ General Abdul Kuddus Khan 1 to reach Herat 
first by :forced marches. The Heratis rather willingly 
surrenderedo There is much evidence to show that both 
Yakub and Ayub had bled the town beyond endurable limits. 1 
Ayub fled to Khorassan and 9 taking up residence at 
Meshed with a number of his followersi the 1 Afghan 
Refugeesv, who were to be such a problem for the British 
authorities in India 1 began to intrigue from across the 
frontier, but the strong control of the new Amir kept 
Ayub from any chance of successo 
This was the stage at which the long history of 
Hera t had arrived when the Indi.an Section of the Afghan 
Boundary Commission arri.ved in the vicinity of the city 
in November 1884 9 and urgent approaches to the Amir were 
made to allow the British to advise and supervise 
improvements to the cityus fortifications in case of a 
Russian attack. The attack never occurred, nor has Herat 
had any need for its fortifications since that time. 
But 1 the record of the sieges of Herat is greater than 
that of any city in Central Asiau 2 In spite of its 
tumultuous history, Herat was able to survive as a place 
of importance because of several things. The great Herat 
oasis along the Heri~Rud has proved one of the most 
durable farming regions in world history 9 owing both to 
the natural fertility of the soil and to the inherited 
farming skills of its indigenes 9 the Tadjik peasantry who 
many thousands of years ago learnt the arts of 
irrigating and manuring the cultivable land. 1 0n this 
plain, in the centre of which the city stands, the great 
1 N.A.Io 9 For. Seco F. March 1888 9 Nos 124~275. K.W. No.7. 
2 N.A.Ioi Foro Sec. F. October 1885 9 Nos 385~700 9 No.475, 
Note on Herat by Major-General Sir Peter Lumsden. 
roads from all the principal countries of Asia meet 1 • 1 
This gave Herat not only a constant economic, but a 
recurrent military-political importance. Her citadel 
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was at all times one of the strongest in the whole 
Iranian world. Time after time in spite of its strength, 
the citadel fell into alien handsi and in the process 
Herat was destroyed only to be built again. Even the 
destruction of buildings in a mud~brick region is not 
an insuperable blow. Trade can be carried on in open 
~ 
yards; patient toil will provide new building materials 
quite cheaply, and indeed people who live in mud-brick 
buildings are accustomed to frequent repairs. As to the 
many caravan routes 9 each one of these links had many 
local variants as to pathway. The feet of camels and 
hooved animals have more choice than have the iron or 
rubber tyres of vehicles. 
The worst city destroyers of all were the long 
periods of tribal faction or dynastic fights within a 
town, which sometimes lasted as feuds for many years. 
Over the centuries Herat had its share of troubles of 
this sort, but its greatest internal strife at this 
period was caused by unruly soldiery from its own 
garrison troops. For example 9 a newswriter reports: 
I found the Heratis in a great fight. They 
were afraid they would be plundered by the 
troops. Some of them were thinking of 
removing their families to Meshed or some 
other safe place •.•• But the Afghan 
1 J.P. Ferrier, Caravan Journeys, p.165. 
authorities had issued strict orders that 
no one was to leave and they had put a 
guard on the gate.l 
This was the state of affairs when some of the Afghan 
soldiers defeated at Pul-i.-Khisti i.n March 1885 were 
struggling back into Herato 
By the Amir's orders 9 large government stores of 
wheat, barley 9 rice 9 ghee 9 fodder and opium were kept in 
the Herat Government store. When this was broken into 
and quantities of opium stolen 9 the newswri.ter reported 
that the city authorities could not find out the 
perpetrators and cynically remarked: 'It may be safely 
concluded from this that the soldiery must in some way 
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be connected with the robbery 1 • 2 Again, reporting a 
robbery from the house of a Zami.ndar, the newswriter 
reports that six of the seven culprits were soldiers. 3 
Sir Thomas Holdich also contrasts 'the truculent Dooranee 
soldiery' of the garrison with the 1 blue~cotton-shirted, 
skullcap-wearing Parsi.wan of the country with their 
triangular spades' 9 'the hewers of wood and the drawers 
of water for the Afghan community' • 4 Colonel Stewart, 
reporting on Herat in mid-1885 writesg 
1 N.A.I., For. and Pol. Sec. F, Pros. September 1885, 
Nos 1510-1543, Statement by Haji Muhammed Husain, 
newswriter of Penjdeh. 
2 N.A.I., For. Seco F, February 1889, Nos 82~102, Herat 
Newsletters, No.780 
J N.A.I., For. Seco Fi May 1887, Nos 42-92 9 Herat 
Newsletters, No.45 (January 6, 1887). 
4 Haldi.ch, pol38. 
Herat has been so often besieged and destroyed 9 
and the licence permitted to the Afghan soldiers 
has been so great that the town is almost desert. 
During our late war in Afghani.stan, a fight took 
place near the Malan bridge between the Herat and 
Afghan troops of Sirdar Ayub Khan in which the 
Afghan troops were victorious and pursued the 
Herat troops into the towno On this occasion the 
whole of the bazaars and shops and many of the 
private houses were plunderedo It must be 
remembered that this was a mere contest between 
the sections of the garrison and is likely to 
recur at any moment that Herat happens to be 
ruled by a weak governor.l 
And further~ 
I was able from,Py residence during more than 
four years on the Perso-Afghan :frontier 9 within 
about 80 miles o:f Herat 9 to :form some idea how 
intensely the A:fghans are hated by the 
population o:f the Herat Valley 9 irrespective o:f 
:faith 9 they being most equally unpopular with 
the Sunnis and Shiahso It is not merely that 
there is a dif:ference of race; the small 
Afghan population settled in the Herat Valley 
seem to be almost equally hostile to the A:fghan 
rule w~th the rest of the peopleo2 
The situation in Herat at this time was aggravated 
by the avarice o:f the governor 9 Mahomed Sarwar Khan. He 
was another of the small band of' Abdurrahman 1 s :faithful 
supporters and was a strong personality 9 but already 
before he had been appointed to Herat 9 he seems to have 
been suspected of accumulating government money. The 
Amir was very short of men whom he trusted 9 and so 
Mahomed Sarwar Khan continued as Governor of Herat 9 
although 9 as Ridgeway commented 9 'there is no doubt that 
1 N.A.I. For. Seco F 9 October 1885 9 Nos 385-700 9 No.598. 
2 Ibido 
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the Governor believes his days are numbered, and when the 
order to return to Kabul comes he is unlikely to obey it'.· 
His replacement was not announced until early in 1887, 
and he did not leave Herat until late in 1888. 
The merchants were very bitter about the governor's 
rapacit~ He sold monopolies in such trades as dyeing. 
Stewart reported that since 1881 no money had been spent 
on repairing defences and any repairs effected had been 
done by forced labour. The Persian merchants complained 
that the Afghan authorities made the levies on various 
imports so heavy that trade was nearly impossible. There 
was a hard and continuous demand for revenue from the 
Amir's Treasury, but a Provincial Governor was in a good 
position to resort to squeeze and there is no doubt that 
Mohamed Sarwar Khan used the Governorship of Herat 
extensively to feather his own nest. The money was said 
to be being sent by various secret routes to Central 
Asia. No such charge seems to have been made against 
the Amir's other chief representative in Herat, the 
Sipah Salar (Military Governor or Cavalry Commander in 
Chief), Faramurz Khan, who had sta~ted life as a slave 
and risen to the rank of General [Djarneil]. He seems 
to have been widely respected, and when early in 1887 
he was stricken with a serious illness (from which he 
presently recovered) all the citizens were distressed 
to hear of it, and the 'soldiers of the Kabuli Regiment 
were heard to say that if it were not for the Sipah 
Salar there would be disturbance on the part of the 
military' • 2 
1 N.A.I., For. Sec. F 9 October 1885, Nos 385~700, No.603, 
Ridgeway to Salisbury, 1 July 1885. 
2 N.A.L, Sec. F, May 1887, Nos 42-92, No.6.3. 
Such a state of unrest and discontent had brought 
the population of Herat to a rather low ebb by 1884-85 
and up to the end of the eightieso Stewart found that 
in general the people of Herat disliked Kabul control 
but the city was so impoverished that no attempt could 
be made to achieve complete independenceo 1 The Heratis 
fully expected to be overrun by the Russians or by the 
English and dreaded either prospecto Colonel Stewart 
said that of the twoi the Mohamedan priesthood of Herat 
preferred the English because the English in India did 
not interfere with the Mohamedan religion 9 whereas the 
Russians while not interfering with religious practice 
did interfere with customso 2 
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One of the basic facts to remember is that this was 
a Moslem part of the world 9 under jealous Afghan control 9 
and that foreign travellers were inevitably few and 
suspect 9 and although people knew of the existence of 
Inglesi and Rusi and had heardof other Feringhi 9 only a 
very few had actually seen a Europeano 
As to the city 9 s numerical strength 9 this 
undoubtedly fluctuated 9 but most of the travellersv 
estimates were no more than guess-work. It is rather 
hard for Europeans to estimate the population of 
oriental towns" Elphinstone was told that in 1810 it was 
as large as 100 9 000. Ferrier estimated that prior to 
1838 it must have had about 70 9 000 inhabitants but that 
when he saw it in 1845 it had declined to 20 9 000 or 
1 N.Aoio 9 Faro Sec. F 9 October 1885 9 Nos 385-700 9 No.4750 
Notes on Herat 9 Sir Peter Lumsden. 
2 NoAoia 9 Seco F 9 Proso October 1885 9 Nos 385-700 9 No.5980 
221000. In 1879 Colonel Grodekov had called it 'a big 
town no smaller than Tashkent and second city after 
Meshed in this part of the worldu . 1 Yet in 1885 Colonel 
Stewart went to some trouble to make an estimate of 
about 12 9 000 persons. Colonel Ridgeway believed there 
were even fewero Grodekov described the streets as 
crooked 1 narrow and dirty. 
In spite of the obvious unrest and distress 1 
Colonel Ridgeway came to the following conclusion: 
The Amirus procrustean policy has made him 
feared and hated by the higher and ambitious 
classes 1 though the bulk of the population 
has never enjoyed so much peace and comfort 
as under Hig Highness' rule. 
Violent crime is almost unknown, and even 
the rapacity of the Governor of Herat is 
admitted to be mild when com~ared with the 
tyranny of Ayub Khanvs ruleo 
There is general agreement on the fertility of the Herat 
Oasis. Stewart refers to the Vteeming population in the 
neighbourhood villagesv and says that people preferred 
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to remain in their garden homes and villages from which 
they could without difficulty flee away if a siege 
threatened, rather than in the town 1 which they would 
not be permitted to leaveo He estimated the extent of 
cultivation in the Herat valley as about 1 9 075,000 acres. 
Of the many villages near Herat, he describes one 1 
Shikebani as 
1 .. \ N.bo Grodekov, Cherez Afghanistan.L...Pooteviye Zapiski, 
p .125 0 
2 NoA.I. 1 Faro Seco F 9 Pros. October 1885, Nos 388-700 1 
No.603 1 Ridgeway to Salisbury 1 1 July 18850 
large and flouri.shing 9 the whol.e country being 
cultivated like a gardeno The whole of the 
Herat valley 9 from Obeh to Kuhsan 9 or a distance 
of nearly 120 miles by a width of perhaps 14 
miles, is cultivated like a gardeno Everything 
grows with the greatest luxuriance and in the 
greatest profusiono Wheat and barley enough 
to feed man and horse of a large army are 
always procurable, while fruits such as peaches, 
apricots 9 grapes of many varieties 9 plums of 
many sorts 9 walnuts and almonds 9 are grown in 
great plenty,l 
Nearer to the frontier the picture was less prosperous. 
Grodekov found villages half destroyed and a population 
much diminished because of Turkmen raidso Watch-towers 
were built everywhere in the rields 9 and nearer the 
Persian frontier 9 at Kuhsan 9 the village was three-
quarters in ruins and he was told there was not a family 
2 but had lost a member to the Turkmenso 
By far the most interesting picture of life in 
Herat about this time is to be found in the series of 
letters for 1887-1888 9 written by Mirza Yakub Ali Khan 
who had succeeded Mirza Mohamed Taki Khan as British 
Newswriter in Herat when the former was promoted and 
transferred to serve directly under Sandeman in 
Beluchistano Although many of these were written after 
the completion of the Boundary Commission 1 s work on the 
frontier 9 they are still close enough to it in time 9 
only a few months to a year later 9 to be important in 
completing this picture of Herat, They give us many 
interesting impre~sions of the nature of Herat society 9 
1 N.A.I. 9 Fora and Pol. Seco F 9 Pros. October 1885 9 
Nos 385~700 9 No.598 9 Stewart 9 Report on Herat 9 May 1885. 
2 Grodekov 9 Cherez Af'ghanistan 9 Pol27o 
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the relations of the people with authorityi of the 
occasional by·-passing of authority by mass disapproval 1 
recruiting methods, flight as a weapon, or as an 
ultimate protest 1 and many other matterso 
In these letters there is much ~vidence to show how 
strongly integrated town-life could be in such a place 
as Herato The newsletters continually refer to the 
reactions of 1 the people' of Herat. 1 In the one letteri 
for example 1 we read~ 'The people of Herat think that a 
quarrel will take place between the Shah and the Sultan 
of Turkey• and againg cThe people of Herat are greatly 
distressed and disheartened at the apprehension of 
2 
removal of boys aged six or seven years at this time of 
severe cold' o His 1 people 1 would in general be higher 
class landowners 1 mullahsi merchants and master-
craftsmen rather than workers, but tribal relationships 
did allow for some free associations of all classeso 
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This integration was brought about firstly because 
the public life was purely a masculine one and being such 
it meant far freer association and discussion in the 
public places 1 the mosque, the chai~khanas and the whole 
length of the bazaar streets themselveso The Friday 
mosques were above all the places for discussion and 
assembly 1 and very often the mullah was the agent 
whereby official pronouncements were distributed in the 
communityo It was in this way that Abdurrahman 1 s 
l N.A.I. 1 For. Seco F 1 May 1887 1 Nos 42-92 9 Noo50 1 13 
January 18870 
2 Political hostages 9 the son' of Yalantush Khan, 
Jamshidi 1 of whom more anon 1 and of Fateh-ullah Beg 1 
Firozkohio 
I 
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pamphlet on his meeting with the Viceroy at Rawalpindi 
was published; and his pamphlet on the organisation of 
taxation matters in Turkey, which the people, discussing 
it in the Mosque yard after the religious service, rightly 
assumed was the Amir's way of softening them up for more 
efficient and higher taxation in Afghanistan. 
Islam sometimes showed its elements of fanaticism, 
but by and large, it produced a great many citizens of 
fine gravity and high morality, capable of discussion at 
a serious level, within strict limits imposed by their 
religion. Conversely, the same close community life also 
brought about a lot of intrigue and spiteful recrimination 1 
tales o:f which also f'ind their way into the newsletters. 
It happens that the two British Newswriters in Herat in 
the 1880s, first Mirza Mohamed Taki Khan and then Mirza 
Yakub Ali Khan, were men of high repute who because of 
their contact with the British were frequently regarded 
as Agents as well as Newswriters and received a great 
deal o:f respect and confidence :from the local authorities. 
Their advice was o:ften asked and they were at liberty to 
attend the Governor's Durbar. There was no secret as to 
their identity. And accordingly the newsletters of 
these two are unusually valuable documents. 
Not only was Herat economically depressed in these 
years but, in spite of the government refusal to allow 
emigration, by April 1887 five or six hundred ramilies 
1 
of Herat refugees were living in Eastern Kharassan. 
1 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, November 1887, Nos 1~198, Na.14, 
Preci~ of Information, April-May 1887 covering Meshed, 
1886. 
There was also continual unrest among the Herat troops 
and in June 1887 a Hazara regiment in Herat actually 
rebelled but was put down and its leader and other 
mutineers were caught as they fled towards Meshed. The 
unrest spread to one of the Kabul regiments in Herat and 
then, in Farah in the South-West of Herat Province, 
soldiers combined with townspeople to drive out the 
unpopular Governor of Farah. 
Herat, then, in the middle and later 1880s appears 
as a rather depressed city situated in the midst of a 
rich and productive countryside, the town population 
much reduced but still acting in a proper and bourgeois 
way in the face of its financial difficulties and its 
unpleasant position as a garrison city overrun with 
unpopular and unbridled soldiery. As to the importance 
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or not of its military position and defences, this is a 
question that was to occupy a great deal of time, thought, 
emotion, penmanship and telegraphy in the period of the 
Afghan Boundary Commission. 
~Sub-province of Badghis, Herat Governorship 
Some forty miles north of the city of Herat lay the 
1 
region of Badghis, 'the land where the winds arise', a 
land of alternate ranges and valleys all running 
northward from the crest of the lower western end of 
the Paropamisus. Westward it touched the Persian 
frontier along the Tejend, and extended eastwards to the 
boundary of Maimana. The many small streams which 
flowed down its mountain valleys formed four main 
1 G. le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, 
p.403; quoting Yakut, 11th c.A.D. 
streams, the Kushk, Moghor 1 Kashan, and Murghab rivers 1 
the latter being the major river which flowed northwards 
to spread out in the terminal oasis of Merv or Marwy. 
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By Afghan standards this was really most accessible 
country, connected with Herat by no less than twenty-
three means of easy approach, that is to say 1 twenty-
three possible caravan-routeso 1 A curious error had for 
many years given Europeans a very false impression of the 
impenetrability of these ranges, which stemmed from the 
first and still most interesting English book on the 
A~ghans, that of Mountstuart El~instone, who himself 
never penetrated beyond Peshawur, the then winter capital 
of the Afghans, where he visited Shah Shuja in 1809 1 and 
based his book on the most extensive conversations with 
informed Afg4an or other travellerso In most fields he 
was able by this method to produce a book of great 
accuracy, but in this matter of the geography of the 
region north of Herat he received descriptions which 
were only too true of the region north-east of Herat but 
not of that immediately north, and emphasised them in 
such a way that his readers formed a very erroneous 
picture~ Elhpinstone writes: 
l 
The Paropamisus chain which bounds the Cohistan 
on the West extends 350 miles from East to West 
and 200 from North to Southo The whole of this 
space is such a maze of mountains as the most 
intimate knowledge would scarce enable us to 
trace, and though it affords a habitation to 
N.A.I., For. Sec. F, October 1885, Nos 388-700, N-00598 1 
Ridgeway's Report. 
the Eimaks and Hazaurahs 9 it is so difficult 
of access and so little frequented, that no 
precise accounts of its geography are to be 
obtained.l 
He did mention that the valleys at the western end were 
wider and better cultivated, but his readers all seem 
to have formed their impression from the earlier parto 
Because of it, strategists 1 both English and Russian, 
had formed an opinion that from the North Herat would be 
impregnable and must be approached through Eastern 
Khorassan. In 1884 the explorations of Lessar for the 
Russians and of Stewart for the English began to present 
a very different picture of Badghis g!'ographically 9 as 
well as to reveal it as an area likely to be politically 
very interesting to both powers. 
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When the Europeans arrived, most of this land was 
very thinly populated, or used seasonally by flock-
keepers nomadising from elsewhere, or by agriculturalists 
who had re-opened old canals and planted crops, but 
themselves lived at a distance 9 or it appeared utterly 
uninhabited; and yet to the experienced eyes of the 
travellers, it was obviously fertile land, superior to 
most. The land of Badghis was frequently mentioned in 
itineraries of mediaeval Arab geographers from the ninth 
to the fourteenth centuries, and it was yet another of 
the regions devastated by the armies of Genghis Khan. 
Badghis had been an independent princedom of some size, 
1 Hon. M. Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of 
Caubul and its dependence, in Persia, Tartary and Indi.fl, 
£Omprisin~ a View of the Afghan Nation and a History of 
the Dooranee Monarchy, 2 vols, 2nd e~ition 1842 (orig. 
edition 1814). 
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and its several large towns had been established along 
major caravan routeso The Arab Traveller, Mukaddasi, in 
the fourteenth century, describes the 1Epart of Badghis' 
as beginning some thirteen leagues north of Herat and 
mentions its three chief cities, Ba ban, Kayf' and Baghshur, 
also nine others. He also mentions Bala Murghab as 
having been a populous city destroyed by Timur. 'During 
the earlier middle ages all the country along the Murghab 
was under cultivation and studded with villages' • 1 The 
ancient name of this region was Kanj Rustak (Ganj al 
Rustak). Colonel C.E. Yate mentioned meeting tribesmen 
there called Badghisi or Baighisi who claimed Arab 
descent. Captain De Laessoe, of the English party of tbs 
Afghan Boundary Commission, who reported very fully on 
Badghis in 1885, comments that, in a region which has 
been so much depopulated, it is sometimes very hard to 
identify place-names mentioned in the records of former 
times. Colonel C.E. Yate said on one occasion 
I could get no name for it [a mound] though 
there is one, as a Jamshidi told me that an 
old man had once given him the name, but he 
had forgotten it.2 
This was very tantalising to the archaeologically~ 
minded travellers in a part of the world so studded with 
'ruins'. Many of the traces of ruins were of much more 
recent origin than Arab times. In Badghis many 
buildings - robats, shrines, forts, wells ~ although in 
decay, were not so long abandoned. Especially where the 
1 Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, p.406. 
2 C.E. Yate, Letters from North Afghanista~, Po224o 
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buildings were of mud brick it was reasonable to assume 
that they were fairly recent as in general unrepaired mud 
brick walls will wash down into mounds within about two 
hundred years, in places where there is at least a 
modicum of rainfall. Further west 9 the still existing 
town of Gulran seemed to have a long history as an 
important town De Laessoe especially mentions that the 
ruins of caravanserai and covered water~cisterns there 
both bore sixteenth century dates 1 and that most of the 
tomb-inscriptions were in Persiano He says it is known 
that Badghis was well-populated in the time of Nadir 
Shah. He found that in the more northerly, drier regions, 
where the last hills were fading into the edges of the 
desert, there were fewer ruins away from the Murghab 
river-precincts. This was in Turkmen country, but for 
thirty years Mishwani and Ghilzai (both Afghan) black~tent 
nomads had occupied Naratu, an ancient fortified mound, 
and used the surrounding grazing~grounds. 1 The people of 
the Chahar Aimak, that is, the majority of dwellers in 
Badghis, nomadi.sed from base~towns or villageso For 
instance, Kushk was, and still :is, the centre of the 
Jamshidi tribe, though the actual site of the town has 
moved somewhat in the last eighty years. It was the 
tribal centre where the Khan and his family usually 
possessed a fort, near which were a bazaar and a few 
dwellings. For most of the year the tribesmen and their 
families followed their flocks up and down the valleys 
and cultivated or reaped barley and other grain crops 
which they had planted at the right seasono The town 
l N.A.I., For. Sec. F, July 1886, Nos 318~449, 359B. 
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was the gathering placei and the fort was a protection :in 
time of danger. If' it was large enough, it had a mosque, 
perhaps there was a mullah's school. 
The Chahar Aimak, or 'Four Tribes' were people of 
mixed race but more Iranian than Mongol for the most part, 
speaking Persian with a sprinkling of' Turkic words. They 
had been settled in Herat Province for some time and 
seem to have been military transplantations of' the time 
of Nadir Shah. They were all semi~nomadic semi~ 
agricultural people in the.ir way of' lif'e. They were 
never very numerous. Of' these tribes, the Timuri lived 
south of the Heri-Rud and do not concern this narrative. 
The Taimani lived in the mountains east and north~east of' 
Herat and some settlements and individuals came in 
contact with the of'ficers of' the Boundary Commission. 
The Jamshidis lived f'rom the Kushk river westward to the 
Persian f'rontier and north of the Paropamisus. The 
Firozkohi, a tribe which claimed descent f'rom the tribe 
of' the same name in Northern Persiai lived in the 
mountains between the upper Murghab valley and Maimana. 
The Firozkohi and the Jamshidi lived in yurts and were 
general~y more like the Turkmen in their way of' lif'e, 
while the Taimani and Timuri were black~tent dwellers 
though the style of their tents varied each f'rom the 
other. Associated with the Chahar Aimak and living 
between the Jamshidis on the West and the Firozkohis on 
the East, was a tribe known as the Hazaras, with Kala Nao 
on the upper Kashan as the.ir chief' town. Although Mongol 
in origin, these Hazaras must not be confused with the 
Ha:zaras (or Tatars as they of'ten refer to themselves) 
of central Afghanistan. The Hazaras of' Kala Nao claimed 
descent from a single hazar [regiment of liOOO] which 
settled here during one of the Mongol invasions of the 
thirteenth or fifteenth centuries. They are now of 
mixed Iranian-Mongol stock 1 but their language is still 
much closer to Turkic than that of their Chahar Aimak 
neighbours. They are much more numerous than the Chahar 
Aimak and are more devoted to agriculture. Amongst all 
these tribes there were to be found groups of temporary 
settlements of pure nomads such as the Afghan Mishwani 
and Ghilzai, and even Jats (Gipsies). 
Observers from the Boundary Comm:iss:ion 9 such as 
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C.E. Yate and Griesbach 1 frequently commented on the 
considerable intermixture of tribes and races to be found 
living in the one village or district. It was an 
intermixture without intermarriage usually 9 and 1 although 
close neighbours, the people lived their own lives. Mr 
Merk, a Political Officer with the Commission 1 made an 
excellent report on the Jamshidis and related tribes in 
which he points out that they were alike in being 
Persian-speaking, non-Afghani semi~nomadici semi~ 
agriculturalist, but especially they were alike in 
having 'some broad political interests in commoni the 
principal of which is immunity from taxation by the 
1 Afghan government'. Their relations with the A±~ghan 
government were in effect purely feudal; they or their 
Khans, while not paying regular taxes 9 were expected to 
provide bodies of irregular soldiery for frontier 
protection, and sometimes a quota of men for regular 
service. The collection of revenue was attempted 
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sometimes from Herat, but it caused much trouble for the 
local representative of the Herat Governoro These frontier 
tribes could seldom be relied upon; only.certain 
individuals among them could be relied upon to give a 
steady personal allegiance. Their history was one of 
continual flux, and they looked always two wayso Whoever 
from the north or the south or the west held control 9 
these were still the frontier tribes 9 and as such they 
were continually buffeted by the waves of conquesto 
1 For the whole of Muslim Asia the eighteenth century was 
a period of political, economic and cultural decadence' 
wrote Professor Barthold. He ascribes this collapse 
largely to the economic depression of Central Asia 
consequent on the development of the maritime trade 
routes between Europe and India and Canton 9 which led 
to depression in the Asian caravan trade. Samarcand and 
1 
Kh.iva were especially affectedo Khiva (Khorezm), which 
in the time of Khan Abdur Ghazi in the mid~seventeenth 
century had been master of most of Afghan Turkestan 9 
including Balkh, fell during the eighteenth century under 
weak rulers into a state of ferment almost equal to that 
of the Turkmens, but under a change of dynasty recovered 
somewhat in the early nineteenth century. The dynastic 
troubles of Afghanistan in the early and middle parts of 
the nineteenth century meant 9 too, that even if the 
frontier tribes were looking towards Afghanistan 9 they 
sti~l had a choice of allegiance to rival Afghan 
pretenders. 
1 V.V. Barthold, Four Studies in the Histor of Central 
Asia, translated by Minorsky, vol.i A Short History of 
Turkestan), p.63. 
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The following history of the Jamshidis, in 1885 the 
occupiers of Badghis, is based mainly on the English 
Political Officers of the Boundary Commissiono The most 
important thing to notice is that the history of the 
Jamshidis is closely bound with the Penjdeh lands along 
the Murghab, and cannot be separated from it, although 
Badghis ended at Maruchak and the Penjdeh oasis went north 
from there. 
Nearly all the report on which this history is based 
was made from the depositions of Jamshid and Sarik 
(Turkmen) headmen, supplemented by reference to the 
1 
records of Todd, Abbot, Shakespear, Ferrier and so forth. 
This history goes back to the time of Zaman Shah 9 grandson 
of Ahmad Shah, who became ruler of Afghanistan in 17930 
At this time the Jamshidi tribe occupied both Badghis and 
most of the Penjdeh Oasis, but a Taimani seems to have 
been chief in Badghis. During the reign of his successor, 
a Jamshidi, Yalantush, lived at Bala Murghab and rebuilt 
the fort at Maruchak. His brother, Mahmud Khan, was his 
Deputy Governor in Penjdeh and repaired the Old Penjdeh 
fort. Mahmud then succeeded as Khan of the Jamshidis and 
ruled until about 1835, when he was killed in a tribal 
battle with the Hazaras of Kala Nao, and was succeeded 
by Mahmud Zaman Khan, who indeed had enlisted the help 
of the Hazaras for this very purpose" Zaman Khan, 
Jamshidi, took up his residence at Kushk but fell 
completely under the influence of Yar Mohamed, the Wazir 
of Herat, and lost control of his tribeo At this stage, 
a son of a former important Jamshidi seceded to Maimana 
1 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, Proso July 1885 1 Nos 208~236, 
K.W., Ridgeway to H.M. Durand, 6 May 18850 
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and took a large portion of the tribe with him. 1 This 
happened at the time of the Persian siege of Herat (1837-
8). Meanwhile Zaman Khan 9 Jamshidi 9 and his soldiers 
were among the besieged at Herato Khiva at this time had 
occupied Merv and sent troops to help Shah Kamran try to 
regain Herat. On the way 9 the Khivans occupied the 
Penjdeh Oasis, and when Abbot passed through it on his 
way to Khiva in 1839 it was held by Khiva and he found 
many Yomut Turkmens in tents there paying tribute to 
Khiva. He found Jamshidis at Kara Tepe and the frontier 
was at Kala Maur. He found Badghis almost deserted 
because of the ravages of the Persian and Khivan armies. 
Abbott remarked that Penjdeh was ·a post of importance to 
Herat and that the valley was highly cultivatedi but that 
the oasis had been also depopulated by the Persian troops 
and that Maruchak 9 belonging to the Jamshidisi was also 
2 devastated. 
Yar Mohamed sent a map of the Herat territory 
including Penjdeh to Sir W. Macnaghten and asked for the 
help of the Indian Government. Macnaghten suggested to 
the Indian Government that the question of Penjdeh should 
be 'settled by negotiations 9 or that at all events the 
rights of Herat be established in the clearest way before 
any action be taken 1 • The Government replied (11 May 
1840) that this might be a good idea if the sovereignty 
of Khiva remained with the then Khan 9 but iif in the 
confusion consequent on the subversion or suspension' of 
his authority 9 Herat could re~establish its authority 
1 Ibid., quoting report of Major Todd, 26 February 18400 
2 Ibid., quoting consultation No.41 9 8 June 1840. 
over the district, the result in the exclusion of Russian 
influence would be satisfactory to the government of 
India. Major Todd had included Penjdeh as in the district 
of Maruchak, part of Badghis. In May 1840 Shakspear found 
Penjdeh deserted. This was at a time when the Jamshidis 
were being persecuted by Yar Mohamed for having refused 
him their allegiance. He removed a great many Jamshidis 
to the Herat Valley, where many Jamshidis live to the 
present time. But at this time the bulk of the tribe 
migrated, via Penjdeh and Merv, to Khiva. Here they 
remained until about 1856 or 1857, while two Hazara chiefs, 
who were brothers, governed the districts of Bala Murghab 
and Penjdeh for Herat, but they were not trusted, and a 
third brother was kept at Herat as hostage. Many Ersari 
Turkmen tribesmen had come into these empty lands of the 
Penjdeh Oasis in the 1840s and 1850s and paid tribute, 
but in the mid-1850s they went to Merv. During the 
absence of the Jamshidis, they paid tribute to Herat 
through the Hazara Mirs. They were sa.id to have paid 
5,000 Bokhara tillas (about £2,857 sterling at that time) 
of annual tribute. About 1858 the Jamshidis, returning 
from Merv to re-occupy Badghis and reaching Charjui on 
the Amu, met up with some Sarik Turkmen exiles from Merv 
who had been driven out from their home by the Tekke 
Turkmens, and the Jamshidi Khan, the 1 Khan Agha 1 , invited 
them to settle in Penjdeh which was deserted except f'or 
a few Salor and Ersari Turkmens. He did not know that 
an advance party of Sariks were already doing just this. 
Meanwhile, the Jamshidis returned to Badghis and made 
their chief centre at Kushk. The Sariks of Merv had 
only finally driven out the Khivans in 1855 when they 
themselves were driven out by the Tekke Turkmens. Salor 
Turk.mens were mainly at Yulatan down the Murghab nearer 
to Merv. When the Tekkes went to Merv they abandoned 
Sarrakhs and the Salors moved there to escape the Sariks. 
The pattern of these migrations is characteristic of the 
history of semi-nomadic tribes who had no firm central 
government to control them. The movement of the Ersari 
Turk.men had been even more extensive. 
At this stage, it will be interesting to refer to 
the journeys of the Merv Sari.ks who had come to occupy 
the Penjdeh Oasis. Both the Russian Lessar and Colonel 
C.E. Yate have written at some length on this and as the 
differences are not important, the version here given of 
their wanderings is that of Colonel Yate. When Merv had 
been seized by the Tekke Turkmens, there had been five 
tribal groups of Sariks living in the Oasis, and of these 
the wealthiest tribe, the Soktis, were the first to flee. 
They set off straight up the Murghab river until they 
came to the Penjdeh region. Having dispossessed the 
Ersaris, the Soktis proceeded to occupy the best lands 
in the oasis and were in a dominant position by the time 
the other four tribal groups arrived. These had left 
Merv and gone eastward to the Amu where for a while they 
tried to settle down at Charjui., but it was already 
overpopulated. They presently moved up-river to Karki, 
then to Andkhoi, and later again they moved across the 
Karabel plateau and turned southward to Maimana. 
Finally after a migration of several years they moved 
north-west to join the Soktis in the Penjdeh Oasis, which 
was under 100 miles from Merv, their original point of 
departure. In doing so, they had moved clockwise through 
about three-quarters of a circle. An overflow group of 
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one of the poorer and later refugee tribes of Sariks, the 
Hazargis, went south again and settled in Afghan territory 
near Maruchak. 
When the Jamshidis returned to Badghis, the Hazaras 
who had taken their place had already been alienated from 
Herat and Yar Mohamed had broken their power. The 
Hazaras threw in their lot with the Persians and at this 
stage (1857) when Persia made another attack on Herat, 
the Jamshidis fought valiantly to help the besieged 
Hera tis. When the Persians withdrew in 1858, most of the 
Hazaras went with them to Khorassan. British diplomacy 
had forced the Persians to end the war, but British 
diplomacy saw to it that a Persian nominee, the Afghan 
Sultan Jan, should become ruler of Herat, rather than have 
it handed over to the direct control of Afghanistan. The 
Jamshidis fought against Sultan Jan as they had no wish 
to recognise the Persian overlordship implied by his 
appointment. In spite of this running feud, the 
Jamshidis drove back a Turkmen force from Sarrakhs who 
entered the North of Herat Province, and for some time, 
too, a son of the Khan Agha was governor of Penjdeh, but 
afterwards an Afghan Sardar, Ahmad Khan, was appointed 
governor. Iskander Khan, the son of Sultan Jan, stated 
to Mr Mitchell of the British Embassy in Persia in 1875 
that his father had twice collected taxes from Penjdeh. 
In 186J, on the accession of Sher Ali to the Afghan 
amirate, his son, Yakub Khan, seized_Herat and then 
became Governor. His wazir and the actual governor was 
the Khan Agha, Jamshidi. In 1872 a new Afghan Governor 
of Herat was appointed, and an Afghan was made Governor 
of Penjdeh. This loss of prestige alienated the Khan 
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Agha, and he and most of his tribesmen abandoned their 
allegiance to Herat and Herat lost also effective control 
of Penjdeh. The new Governor of Herat wrote on 26 April 
1883 that during the period of the new governorship of 
Penjdeh, its inhabitants had paid taxes of 500 tillas per 
year to Herat. The Sarik evidence-givers in their 
statement of 23 November 1884 said that when the Khan Agha 
was alive the people of Penjdeh paid to the Jamshidis 
1,000 ot 2,000 tillas. Out of this money the Governor 
of Herat paid the Jamshid and Sarik local sowars. It 
was in this period of coolness between the Jamshidis and 
Herat, 1874, that, in retaliation for a Sarik raid from 
p~njdeh into Khorassan, the Persians from Turbat-i-Sheikh-
Jam came across the Heri-Rud and stole a huge nwnber of 
sheep, it is said about 100,000 (roughly sixty-five flocks 
of 1,500) and drove them off from the Penjdeh Sarik 
watchmen who were minding them as they grazed in northern 
Badghis. This led to reprisals in Khorassan and Turbat-
i-Sheikh-Jam was devastated. 
-When Yakub Khan wen't to Kabul, and, on the death of 
Sher Ali, became Afghan Amir, Ayub his younger brother 
became ruler of Herat, and appointed still another of his 
supporters as Governor of Penjdeh, who was unsuccessful 
~n raising revenue. He was replaced by the former 
Governor, Yusef Beg. Because of his alienation from 
Yakub and Ayub, the Khan Agha actively supported the 
British in their occupation of Kandahar at the time of 
~ . 
Ayub's victory at Maiwand; and after the latter's 
return to Herat, and before its occupation by Abdurrahman 
in 1881, the Khan Agha was cruelly murdered in revenge by 
the agents of Ayub Khan. His three sons, Yalantush, 
Amanulla and Hyder, took refuge with the Sariks of 
Penjdeh. In 1882 Amanulla Khan Jamshidi went to Kabul 
to offer his allegiance to the new Amir. In 1882 the 
Khivan Governor of Merv required the Sariks to recognise 
his authority but they refused, saying they were Afghan 
subjects. They then sent a deputation to Herat to ask 
that their taxation be reduced, and at the same time 
Governor Yusef Beg returned to Herat. 
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Abdurrahman appointed as Governor of Penjdeh during 
1882 and 1883 yet another of his proved supporters, Osman 
Beg of Andkhoi, who in these two years was able to raise 
double the taxes previously paid by the Sariks. At the 
end of 1883 or beg~nning of 1884 the Sariks made a raid 
on the Hazaras of Meshed. They were intercepted near 
the frontier by Afghan sowars, but they produced a letter 
from Osman Beg which authorised them to make the raid. 
This was reported to the Amir, who recalled him and then 
appointed Yalantush Khan, Jamshidi, as Governor of 
Penjdeh, but for some reason his appointment was not 
financed by the Governor of Herat and Yalantush remained 
at Kushk in succession to his father, and Amanulla was 
sent back from Kabul to become Governor of Penjdeh, a post 
he held when the Commission arrived in Afghanistan. 
The third brother, Hyder, the eldest son, but by a mother 
of humble origin, was angered that he was not Khan o.f the 
Jamshidis and was presently to make trouble for his two 
abler brothers. 
About 1870 some of the Penjdeh Sariks had moved 
north to Yulatan but there had been constant interchange 
between the sections of the tribes who lived in the two 
places. Ridgeway commented on this in his report: 'If 
the objection were admitted, the remedy would be to 
remove the Yulatan Sariks to Badghis or to move the 
Penjdeh Sariks to Yulatan if there is room there'. The 
above short account of the relations between Herat and 
Merv through Badghis and Penjdeh and the involvement of 
the several tribes is enough to show that the 
ethnological approach so strongly held by Lessar and 
other Russians was one with no easy solution. 
The Turkmens 
Our conversation chiefly turned upon the 
Turcomans •••• We had proceeded in this manner 
for several days, when the cha6ush informed 
us, in a solemn and important manner, that 
we were now approaching to the places where 
the Turcomans generally lie in wait for 
caravans, and directed that we should all 
march in a compact body, and invited us to 
make preparations for a desperate resistance 
in case we were attacked •.•• But when we in 
reality perceived a body of Turcomans coming 
down upon us, the scene instantly changed. 
Some ran away; others, and among them my 
master, losing all their energies, yielded 
to intense fear, and began to exclaim, 'Oh 
Allaht --Oh Imams~ --Oh Mohamed the prophet; 
we are gonei we are dying~ we are deadt' 
The muleteers unloosed their loads from their 
beasts, and drove them away. A shower of 
arrows, which the enemy discharged as they 
came on, achieved their conquest, and we 
soon became their prey •••• l 
The name Turkmen to refer to Turkic tribes living in the 
desert lands East of the Caspian Sea seems to have been 
first used, according to Barthold, by an Arab geographer 
Magdist (Mukkadisi) in the tenth century, when they also 
1 James Morier, The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan 
(1824), World's Classics edition, pp.21, 23, 25. 
75 
lived along the Syr Darya and about this time drove out 
from Persia and North Afghanistan the Ghaznavid 
successors of Mahmud of Ghazni. The Turkmens themselves 
have legends which connect them with the invasions of 
Alexander the Great and also with twenty-two families of 
Oghiz Turks and two of Karlaq (hence the common name 
Ghallach) but the closer probability is that they were 
Seljuk Turks, and over the centuries acquired an 
admixture of Iranian blood. The Turkmens of to-day are 
very mixed in type, the majority being long~headed 
people; their features of Iranian type but rather heavier 
than the true Persian, but one meets all types of 
countenance among them from European to true Mongol. In 
spite of their well-earned bad reputation among their 
neighbours, they were among themselves a quiet and law-
abiding people with a great reputation for poetical and 
musical achievement, as well as for horsemanship and 
skill in sheep-raising. They were nomads, semi-nomads 
or settled agriculturalists as their situation required. 
The Turkmen tribes who had occupied these lands for 
centuries had never admitted complete allegiance to any 
overlord but they had not been able to produce a leader 
strong enough to weld them into a nation. Many Turkmens 
lived in the good farm lands of North Persia and were 
completely settled and peaceful citizens. Others lived 
on the river-lands of the Amu, Tejend and Murghab rivers 
which were on or near the frontiers of Afghan Turkestan, 
Herat and Khorassan, and except when forced to migrate 
because of pressures of various kinds they were in the 
main settled or only semi-nomadic. While Persia was a 
strong state the Turkmens lived fairly peacefully. Nadir 
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Shah had recaptured Merv and for a time in the mid-
eighteenth century the Persians controlled the Turkmens, 
but in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the 
nineteenth, the Turkmen became a menace not only to his 
settled neighbours but also to his own brethren. Weakened 
Persia could not maintain her hold on the Merv Oasis and 
here violent civil wars broke out in the Merv Oasis 
between two traditionally feuding groups of Turkmens, 
the Black Sheep and the White Sheep Turkmens. Poorer 
nomads and those uprooted from their traditional circuits, 
as well as the numerous poor amongst the settled Turkmens, 
resorted more and more to t.he alaman or organised 
predatory raid into distant territory, be it Persian, 
Khivan, Afghan or even other Turkmen. Khorassan was so 
devastated that in 1857 the Shah's Governor-General there 
managed by a major piece of trickery to capture a number 
of Turkmen chiefs. Then he subdued Merv but it had to be 
reoccupied again very shortly. The Tekke Turkmens of 
Merv by a feint flight induced the Persians to attack 
their fortress, whereupon the people inside fell on them 
and overthrew them. Persian slaves flooded· the Bokharan 
market and this was the last serious attempt by the 
Persians to reduce the Turkmens. It was now left to the 
Russians to deal with them. It was this destroyer which 
the Russians set out to quell, making their first progress 
in the early 1870s and not finally quelling the Turkmens 
until the occupation of Merv in early 1884. The Turkmen 
raiders not only drove off flocks but whole villages, as 
well as caravans. They were notoriously rrian-stealers and 
if they could not receive ransom for their captives they 
either sold them to middle-men slavers or themselves took 
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them to slave-markets. Bokhara was the biggest slave-
market, and as Central Asia was mainly Sunnite and the 
Persians Shiite, there was nothing particularly abominable 
in the idea of buying and selling the latter, from the 
Central Asian Moslem point of view. Slavery was part of 
the way of life, and the slave market had to be supplied. 
In North Afghanistan equally, in the 1880s slavery was 
usual, and the Hazaras were the commonest slaves, simply 
bought or stolen from nearby, commonly as children. 1 
Penjdeh Sar'ik Turkmens usually raided the Chul of Maimana. 
So also did the Sariks of Yulatan and the Kara Turkmens 
from north of the Amu. The Tekkes had raided on three 
occasions within recent years. The Tekkes would have 
by-passed Penjdeh for the Sariks were hostile to them. 
Merk, who supplies this information in his report, adds 
that in 1853 a party of Tekkes plundered Charshamba in 
Maimana and that at this time the Tekkes were in Sarrakhs, 
the Salars at Yulatan, the Sariks in Merv, the Ersaris 
at Penjdeh. In 1878 a mixed party of Sariks and Tekkes 
went through Maimana to raid Daulatabad, south of 
Andkhoi, but they were defeated by a party of Afghan 
soldiers. Many died in the snow. In 1879 Tekkes raided 
in the vicinity of Andk.hoi and stoie horses. 2 The 
Russians saw the Paropamisus as the natural ethnological 
frontier because they regarded it all as Turkmen country, 
and it was the Boundary Commission which showed how mixed 
the population actually was. 
1 For Russian View of Turkmens, see esp. Lessar, paper on 
Kara Kum Desert, reported in Novoye Vremya, JO December 
1883 - 9 January 1884 (N.A.I., For. Sec. E, May 1884, 12-51 
2 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, July 1886, Nos 552-711, No.653, 
Merk's Report on Maimana. 
The Tejend had appeared to the Russians in 
Transcaspia as a natural line of extension since 1881 
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but it was not until the occupation of Merv that extention 
south down the Murghab appeared essential in the policy 
of cleaning out the Turkmen stable. It was the fate of 
the Turkmen people to beco~e the raison d'~tre for the 
frequently justified expansion of Russian power to the 
East of the Caspian. 
Maimana 
Some sixty miles east of the Murghab lay the town 
of Maimana, 'Happy Town', the centre of the old mirate 
of that name. The boundary with Herat Province lay 
along the watershed between the Murghab and Andkhoi 
river systems formed by a low range linking the Karabel 
Plateau on the north with north-westerly spurs of the 
Band-i-Turkoman range, an almost detached outlie~ of the 
Paropamisus, forming the south-eastern limits of Maimana. 
Maimana traditionally used pasturage on the Karabel 
Plateau and also spring pastures of the desert fringe to 
the north west. On the north it adjoined the limits of 
Andkhoi and on the north east Shibbergan, as well as the 
;small mirate of Sar-i-pul lying nearer the mountains. 
It was, and is, the chief centre of manufacture of the 
carpets known as 'Royal Bokhara'. 
for wool and camel hair. 
It is a chief market 
Griesbach, returning from the hazardous mountains of 
the Firozkohi country, was enraptured to overlook from a 
high point the evident fertility of Maimana oasis, the 
.".\ 
valley of one of the several upper tributaiies of the 
And~hoi (or Sangalik) river. He describes how as far 
as the eye could see, the valleys and surrounding hills 
were highly cultivated and studded here and there with 
villages nearly hidden in orchards. The city itself 
disappointed him. It was enclosed in irregularly shaped 
mud fortifications and contained a dilapidated citadel. 
'The moat and shirazes were of an equally useless nature 
and only used for the filth of the city'. 1 It was 
possibl¥ still in disrepair after its capture in 1884 by 
two separate forces sent by the Amir. Another of the 
ancient caravan towns, Maimana was 
Arabian times as Al Yahudan, Jew's 
capital of Juzjan3 (Western Afghan 
known in earlier 
2 Town, and was the 
Turkestan.) It was 
frequently able {b maintain its independence or semi-
independence because of its fringe position in relation 
to each of the three local powers, Bokhara, Kabul and 
Herat. In name at least it became known to Europeans 
from the strange map of Adam Olearius, 4 1669. On this 
map 'Meimeine' appears due south of 'Belch' (Balkh) and 
due east of Herat, but the significant thing is that it 
figures here at all. During the dynastic wars between 
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the sons of Haidar of Bokhara (1800~26) there seems to 
have been an alliance between one son, Nasrullah, who was 
1 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, Pros. October 1886, Nos 12-22, 
No.18, Griesbach 1 s Report, Charshamba to Bamiano 
2 Le Strange, pp.424-5. 
J A province name recently re-adopted by the present 
Afghan Government but its modern capital is Shibbergano 
4 Adam Olearius, The Voyages and Travels of the 
Ambassadors sent by Frederick, Duke of Holstein to the 
reat Dukes of Muscov and the Kin of Persia in 
the year 1633 and finished in 1639 London, 1 
including a new map of Persia by A. Olearius. 
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to succeed to the Emirate of Bokhara and rule from 1827-
1860, and the small Khanates south of the Amu, down to 
and including Maimana. When Lieutenant Alex Burnes 
visited Afghan Turkestan in the early 1830s he reported 
that these provinces, including Maimana, were sometimes 
formally allied to Bokhara, but usually independent. In 
1886 the recent history of Maimana was fully enquired 
into by Merk, and this is largely the source of the 
following material. 1 According to his local inquiry, 
Maimana became virtually independent and reached a high 
state of prosperity under its Mir, Mizrab Khan, 1830-
1845. Disputes as to the succession opened the way for 
Yar Mohamed of Herat to invade Maimana in 1847, and he 
systematically bled Maimana of its wealth until his death 
in 1853. In 1855 the Wali of Maimana, Hukmut Khan, gave 
his allegiance to Dost Mahomet, but in 1858 Maimana was 
again besieged by Herat, The Herat Khan, Shah Nawaz, 
was unsuccessful, but he drove off the Uzbeks of the 
districts adjoining Herat Province and forcibly kept them 
in Herat and Kushk. In 1859 he attacked again and 
secured the nominal submission of the Wali, and the 
exiles were allowed home, but they were much impoverished, 
having been deprived of most of their sheep. In 1860 
Hukmut Khan was killed by his brother, Mir Husein Khan, 
who became Wali and was still Wali in 1885. Vamb~ry, 
the.Hungarian traveller, says that in 1863 Maimana had 
about 1,500 families and a large bazaar. He says that 
the population was very mixed, having in addition to the 
Uzbek majority, Afghans, Tadjiks, Jews and Hindus. In 
1 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, Pros. July 1886, Nos 552-711, 
No.653, Merk's Report. 
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1867 Abdurrahman besieged it unsuccessfully during his 
attempts to defeat the Amir Sher Ali. This disaster and 
two years of drought led to a famine which lasted until 
1871. Flocks were almost exterminated, many people 
migrated elsewhere and Turkmen raids increased so that 
hardly any Uzbeks dared stay in the frontier villages such 
as Charshamba. In the 1870s, according to Russian 
information, 1 the governments of Andkhoi, Maimana and 
others regularly sent 500 to 2,000 horsemen for service 
with the Bokharan army. In 1875 at the order of Sher Ali 
an Afghan army of 24,000 under Naib Mohamed Alam Khan, 
Governor of Balkh, besieged the town, which fell in 1876. 
Many Uzbeks were slaughtered. Wali Husein was taken 
captive to Kabul and the Afghan army ate up the countrysidE 
The Afghans remained in control until the abdication of 
Sher Ali, when Afghan troops withdrew, leaving the Uzbeks 
embittered against them. Dilawar Khan, the son of the 
assassinated Hukmut was made Governor. In 1880 
Abdurrahman gave Maimana semi-independence2 but he 
presently believed that Dilawar Khan was intriguing 
against him3 and was a supporter of Ayub. Abdurrahman 
sent Ishak Khan against Maimana, 'But he reported ••• that 
the Wali was too strong to be defeated •••. 14 Abdurrahman 
continues the story as follows: 
1 P.P. Ivanov, Ocherki o istorii srednei Azii XVI-...-~~~~"--~~~~---.--~~'--~....;.;;,~~_.~ 
seredina XIX v. , Mosk. 1958, p.l 2. 
2 C.E. Yate, p.319. 
J The Life of Abdurrahman, vol.I, p.224. 
4 Ibid., p.235. 
In 1884, it was considered necessary that 
Dilawar Khan, Wali of Maimana, who had 
proclaimed himself an independent ruler 
•.• should be brought to his senses. This 
time I was determined to give him no 
chances •..• I therefore gave instructions 
that two separate forces should proceed on 
Maimana; one of them was sent from Herat 
under the command of a Brigadier, Zabardast 
Khan, which consisted of one battalion of 
the Herat infantry, 200 sowars of cavalry 
and six guns. 
The Jamshidi chief, named Yalan Dush Khan 
[Yalantush], also accompanied the Brigadier, 
with 600 militia soldiers •••. At the same time 
Mahomed Ishak was instructed by me to march 
from Balkh with 5,000 fighting men. The fort 
of Maimana is a very strong one, but after a 
few days' siege and a small skirmish, the 
insurgents submitted to my rule. Dilawar was 
taken prisoner for his misdeeds and brought to 
Kabul. Mir Hussain Khan, who had been a 
prisoner of Dilawar's hands, was released from 
gaol, and appointed Governor of Maimana in the 
place of Dilawar.l 
Merk reported in April 1886 that the 'town was slowly 
recovering' • But its position was unenviable. Letters 
from the Russian newswriter at Maimana, Abdul Hakim, in 
August 1885, mentioned the continued complaints of the 
inhabitants of Maimana against the Afghan government and 
soldiery. 
The troops live on the people and the latter 
are eaten up. They. abuse the Uzbeks and 
curse them foully. The Uzbeks are worse off 
than even Jews.2 
And further: I 
1 Ibid., pp.239-40. 
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2 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, July 1886, Nos 318-449, No.350 Trans, 
The Ami.r's of'f'icials here wish to interfere 
with internal matters. The Wali is not 
permitted much authority. Afghans watch and 
spy everywhere and prevent Uzbeks from coming 
to the British of'f'icials. The people are well 
disposed to the British Government •••• l 
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This picture of' Maimana was corroborated in the Report of' 
Allah Bakhsh to his superior of'f'icer, Merk. Following 
interviews with leading Uzbeks, Bakhsh reported: 
The General Sherbet Khan speaks with very 
anti-Russian feelings. The Uzbeks say 'We 
should be defending ourselves here at 
Maimana •••• What is the use of' keeping such 
a large number of' Afghan troops who are a 
crushing burden ••• it would be better to arm 
us with the weapons of' India •••. We have a 
large number of' wells and can collect any 
quantity of' provisions within the city during 
a siege'. They expressed gratitude to the 
Amir f'or restoring Wali Husain, but they were 
very distressed to hear that the Amir was 
transplanting a thousand families from Kabul 
to settle on the Maimana frontier, because now 
that the Turkmen raids were being stopped they 
could use the land themselves.2 
.One of' the most interesting matters in Merk 1 s report 
concerns the extent both geographical and economic, of' 
the sheep-holding of' Maimana, sheep being the principal 
product of' the province and the bulk of' ~ts people 
being engaged in pastoral pursuits. He found that among 
the Uzbeks there were many Arab and Ersari Turkmenf'lock-
owners, but that many of' the Arab nomads had moved 
themselves and their flocks to Sar-i~pul in 1884. He 
1 Ibid., No.351. 
2 Ibid., No.420. 
pointed out that they needed three regions for their 
annual pastoral activity, first, for spring grazing, the 
Chul which spread out for twenty miles or so from .the 
foothills and became more and more arid towards the 
north-west; secondly, the home-base for winter use; 
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thirdly the higher pastures for the summer. The Wali 
said that the maximum number of sheep had been 2-Z1/4 
millions grazed in the time of his father, Mizrab Khan. 
But now the Arab flocks taken to Sar-i-pul would have to 
be deducted, also the flocks which Ersaris had taken to 
other parts of Afghan Turkestan in the last twenty years, 
and also those of the Jamshidis of Bala Murghab, who had 
formerly paid allegiance to Mizrab but no longer had any 
allegiance to Maimana. The Wali estimated that even in 
the time of Yar Mohamed there must have been at least 
1-1! millions owned by Uzbeks, but that now there might 
be only 400,000. Merk noted that these figures were 
given in the presence of Uzbek and Afghan officials 
nominated by the owners of flocks. The figures would by 
no means be over-estimated because over-estimation would 
only increase the revenue demanded by the Afghan 
authorities. The numbers of kibitka-owning tribesmen 
who had nomadised in the chul and the Karabel Plateau 
had decreased during the time of Yar Mohamed and had not 
increased since then. Merk points out that the worst 
period of Turkmen raids generally occurred when the 
Uzbeks could offer least resistance to· them because of 
drought or political disturbance. 
A hostile Army Corps of Afghans settling in 
this little state for six months, or a famine 
such as that of 1869-71 effected a more rapid, 
thorough-going and lasting ruin than a dozen 
years of Turkmen raids.I 
Andkhoi 
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The most northerly of the western mirates of 
Afghanistan is Andkhoi, as near to the Kara Kum desert as 
one can get without being actually in the desert. It lies 
at the distributary end or terminal Oasis of the uncertain 
Andkhoi (Mirabad or Sangalik) River, about seventy miles 
north from Maimana and thirty miles from Daulatabad, the 
only other town of any size on the river. Andkhoi is 
quite a large town with possibly to-day over 30,000 
inhabitants. It owed its origin and former importance to 
being a caravan centre on the most direct route from 
Bokhara to Herat and Khorassan. It was, and is, one of 
the greatest karakul markets, and of old was famous for 
its horses. This is where in 1825 the veterinary officer 
from India, Moorcroft, and his faithful Eurasian companion, 
Guthrie, were at last able to purchase some of the great 
Turkmen horses they had set out from India almost four 
years previously to find, and where both men contracted 
the fever which was to kill them within a few days, so 
that they found a grave at Balkh, instead of returning 
in triumph to India with a string of the most admired of 
all cavalry horses. According to Merk, Andkhoi 1 s 
prosperity had been at its height in 1821-1843 under a 
certain Mir Shah Wali Khan. An invasion by Yar Mohamed 
of Herat and a severe famine weakened the Andkhoi oasis 
1 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, Pros. July 1886, Nos 552-711, 
No.653, Merk on Maimana. 
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to such an extent that if fell prey to Turkmen raids, 
In 1864 it fell under Afghan supremacy. In 1882 the local 
Afghan government (at the order of Ishak Khan) so severely 
punished the Kara Turkmen raiders, who lived in Bokhara 
territory but were not controllable by Bokhara and had 
terrorised the oasis for a generation, that they had not 
returned since. In 1886 there were J,000 families in 
Andkhoi, and the sheep-flocks amounted to 75,000. The 
ownership, dates of construction and names of the 
constructors of most Andkhoi wells were known. During 
the progress of the Commission the names of some of these 
wells, such as Dukchi, Oikul and Imam Nazar, lying in 
territory disputed by the Russian and the British mentors 
of Afghanistan on the Boundary Commission, were to figure 
almost daily in the Russian and English diplomatic 
consultations. 
Ak Cha and its sub-province, Kwaja Salar 
Adjoining Andkhoi on the east was the province of Ak 
Cha, its capital a market town of the same name. The 
town of Ak Cha was habitually associated with Balkh, a 
little further to the east. Ak Cha, at least its 
northern part, played a very prominent part in the 
proceedings of the Boundary Commission, because this lay 
along the southern bank of the Amu, and somewhere here 
there must have been the ferry-crossing mentioned by 
Lieutenant Burnes, which at a European conference table 
long ago English and Russian had academically agreed upon 
as the Northern end of the proposed demarcation. 
Approaching the modern town from Balkh over a poor 
gravel road, one is aware of the progress that is 
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stirring today's Afghanistan. On the horizon are oil-
derricks; on the road one comes suddenly upon earth-
moving machines at work gouging out new canals and making 
embankments for bridges, and motor-trucks competing with 
the panniered donkeys to carry away rubble. But the 
roads and canals go through an old land of many small 
villages, where the hurricane-lantern is still advanced 
illumination, in the midst of mud-walled fields and small 
irrigation canals, the 1 juis 1 or 1 joes 1 , as one of the 
survey-officers always wrote. And the desert, thickly 
studded with ruins, is close at hand. At Ak Cha there 
are three stages of town, an almost completely desiccated 
one lying in present desert, a second one still almost 
whole, but abandoned, and finally the modern town of some 
15,000 inhabitants, a central market for karakul sheep 
and their precious skins, for horses and camels, carpets, 
coarse woven cotton, leather harness, some grain and 
fodder, some fruit, this corner of Afghanistan, especially 
neighbouring Shibbergan, being famous for its apricots. 
Ak Cha lies on the western terminal canal of the Balkh-Ab, 
a much more productive stream than the Andkhoi, as it 
rises in the high mountains near Bamian, and the famous 
mountain lake of Band-i-Amir forms part of its upper 
course. 
It lies about twenty miles south of the Amu at the 
junction of two caravan routes from Bokhara to Andkhoi 
and Maimana and beyond. One of these crossed the rive~ 
by the ferry at Ak Kum in Bokharan territory and the 
other by the ferry at Kilif, which is where the chief 
trade-highroad from Bokhara to Balkh and Mazar, the road 
called Abdulla Khan's, crossed south into Afghan Turkestan. 
Ak Cha had been annexed by Ahmad Shah in 1751, 
together with Maimana, Andkhoi and all the other units 
of this region, and he had appointed an Afghan governor 
over the Uzbek, Turkmen and Tadjik population. In 1789 
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Ak Cha rose with Balkh in revolt against the Saddozai 
rule; Timur Shah, Saddozai, sent an army and the vassalage 
to Afghanistan was re-established. Somewhere between 
1825 and 1840 it became a vassal of Bokhara, but was 
reunited with Afghanistan by Dost Mahomet in the mid-
1850s. The Amir wrote to Ridgeway: 
Khamiab [part of Ak Cha] had been a district 
of Afghanistan for more than forty years •••• 
The Bokharan Government had never called t'he 
Turkmens south of the Amu their subjects. 
For forty years they had been subjects of 
Afghanistan.l 
There appears to have been a period in the first part of 
the 1850s when Ak Cha began to turn towards Afghanistan 
while maintaining allegiance to Bokhara. By 1860 Dost 
Mahomet had deposed and imprisoned its last independent 
mir, Ishan Urak, and it became solely an Afghan vassalate. 
In the later part of the reign of Sher Ali it was 
independent. Since 1873 the Russians had acknowledged 
that it was part of Afghanistan. In Protocol No.11 of 
the Meetings of the Boundary Commission, 2 there is much 
detail about the recent history of Ak Cha and its sub-
governorship of Kwaja Salar. 3 There is a complete list 
1 C.A., No.2, 1887, No.97, Amir to Ridgeway, 15 March 1886. 
2 Ibid., No.174, Khamiab, 21 May (2 June), 1886. 
J I have used the spelling 'Kwaja Salar' in referring to 
this northern district of Ak Cha as was done in the 
Boundary Commission Reports. 
of the governors and their terms of office, and a survey 
of the Ak Cha total expenditure for the last thirty-six 
years (i.e., back to 1850), including the expenditure on 
sowars employed on guard-duty at Khamiab, and much more 
to prove beyond all doubt that since that time Khamiab, 
and so Ak Cha as a whole, had been under Afghan control. 
This does not quite agree with the description given above 
of Ak Cha as still being a vassal of Bokhara, after 1850, 
information based on Document 127 in the same Central Asia 
series. 
Ak Cha was divided into five sub-districts, the 
northern one of which was Kwaja Salar, under a sub-
governor, and this in turn was divided into four sub-
divisions, of which Khamiab was the most north-westerly. 
The whole of Kwaja Salar was only about twenty miles from 
east to west and the sub-divisions were tiny. For 
instance, Merk reported that Khamiab, including Dali, was 
a district containing about three square miles of 
cultivation and about 990 families. 1 The district of 
Khamiab consisted of five canals. Mohamed Aslam Khan, one 
of the sub-surveyors of the Commission party, reported 
that all the inhabitants of Kwaja Salar were Turkmens 
divided into two tribes, Ersari and Karkins. The Karkins 
considered themselves to be ~etter born, and although 
they had mi.grated together, and were on good terms, the 
Karkins, while allowing their sons to marry Ersaris, 
considered it would degrade their daughters to allow them 
2 to do so. 
1 Ibid., No.235, inclosure No.2. 
2 Ibid., No.185, incl. 1, 
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Captain De Laessoe reported that there were 4,800 
families in the Kwaja Salar district of whom 2,800 families 
were Karkins and the remaining 2jOOO, Ersaris. There were 
long straggling villages along the irrigation canals and 
people frequently changed from one village to another. 1 
'Since the days of the Uzbek chiefs by the names of 
Eshan Nakib, Eshan Sudur and Eshan Aorak' , 2 [Ishan Urak], 
the revenues of the sub-division of Kwaja Salar had been 
paid into the Ak Cha treasury. The Governor of Kwaja 
Salar was under direct orders from the Governor of Ak 
Cha but was appointed by the Governor of Afghan Turkestan. 
Since 1860 this sub~governor had had his headquarters in 
the village of Karkin. 
These brief surveys of Herat, Mai.mana, Andkhoi. and 
Ak Cha may serve to give some i.mpression of the structure, 
and recent history of the several di.stri.cts of 
Afghanistan most concerned in the Boundary Commission 
Survey which was to build Abdurrahman 1 s durable north~ 
western wall, but they hardly touch on the wealth of 
fascinati.ng records of the Commi.ssion's surveyors, who 
have left some of the fi.rst, fullest and still most 
i.nteresting accounts of Shibbergan and Sar~i.~pul, the 
Firozkohi country, Bamian, Balkh, Tashkurghan and 
Haibak, to mention some of the main ones. Since 
Abdurrahman's time all these have been geographi.cal 
entiti.es controlled by a central state, but one must 
realise that, earlier, each small ancient district 
centri.ng on its ancient caravan~town had a sort of 
N.A.I., For. Sec. F, July 1886, Nos 552~711, No.595, 
Appendi.x No.l. 
2 C.A., No.2, 1887, No.185, Inclosure No.l. 
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protozoan life, in which the town was the constant nucleus 
and the rest was capable of all sorts of assimilating or 
being assimilated, as tribal or political circumstances 
changed. 
Afghanistan and its neighbours 
The traditional foreign relationships of Afghanistan 
were of various kinds; first, the local frontier 
relationships, often tribal; second, instances where local 
frontier relationships were interfered with or overridden 
by central powers; as for instance when the dispute at 
Hashtadan stopped being a minor local matter and became 
a very serious dispute between Persia and Afghanistan; 
third, genuine diplomatic relations at the higher level 
with Persia or Bokhara, a field which at this period had 
become very open to interference by interestea Russian 
and English parties; for example, the position of Ayub 
Khan during his residence in Persia was of extreme 
interest to English and Russian as well as to Persian 
and Afghan diplomacy; and all parties, as another 
example, were very anxious to sheet home the true 
allegiance of the dervish, Siah Poosh; fourth, there is 
the very interesting question of the pictures which 
Afghans and other Central Asians formed of the outside 
world and the means by which they arrived at them. 
Local disputes could be bitter, but they could also be 
reasonably and amiably settled, as"they were in the case 
of the Bosagha-Khamiab settlement. Settlements of mutual 
advantage were reached by discussion between headmen as 
in the case of the Jamshidi-Sarik allocation of the empty 
lands of Penjdeh. 
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The Bosagha~Khamiab settlement, of which a great 
deal more will be heard, was a very sensible local 
boundary settlement which had been made in 1874 as to the 
boundary between Afghanistan and Bokliara on the lef.t 
bank of the Amu before it turned north to flow through 
Bokharan territory. The settlement had worked very 
satisfactorily for twelve years before the matter of 
Khoja Saleh began to occupy the Boundary Commission. 
The following is the transcript of the statement given 
to the Commission by the Headman of Bosagha on the 
Bokharan side. This simple and touching document provides 
one of the many occasions during perusal of the enormous 
amount of literature created by this Commission when 
one's gorge rises at the hypocrisies of power politics. 
Khamiab was a pawn for trading in the English-Russian 
diplomatic game, and only a few of the European officers 
on the spot were really concerned about the diplomats' 
likely subversion of local arrangements. As it happened 
in the end, ·the Khamiab-Bosagha arrangement was allowed 
to stand. 
The Headman of Bosagha's statement ran: 
In the month of January 1874 (zi Hijja, 1290, 
A.H.}, we, Karches of Kerki 9 had a dispute 
with the people of Khamiab, in Ak Cha, 
regarding a disputedpiece of land between 
the two Mohammedan governments. At the 
instance of the two parties, a ditch was 
dug between the territories of the two 
Governments, and the lands of the two parties 
were separated. The eastern bank of the canal 
was considered Kerki territory, and the 
western bank was considered Ak Cha territory; 
and thus the dispute was settled. To the east 
of the canal the house of Murad Bai belonged to 
Ak Cha, Bazar Jui, east of the Canal, belonged 
to Kerki, and the shop of the blacksmith, west 
of the canal, belonged to Ak Cha •••• The canal 
forms the boundary. 
If we, Karches of Kerki, go beyond these limits 
and claim the land belonging to the people of 
Khamiab in Ak Cha we will not have a right to 
do so and our claim will be false (signed and 
sealed by Kazi Mullah Abdur Rahim and sixteen 
others).1 
It is interesting to note, incidentally, that this was 
an almost complete racial division. There were only 
about JOO Ersaris living among the Bosagha population 
and all the rest were Uzbeks, as they were from here 
northwards. Of this part of the world, Merk reported: 
Bokharan flocks graze in Afghan territory, not 
only unmolested but effectively protected against 
raiders by Afghan guards. Afghan officials when 
they visit the Bokharan villages are treated with 
as much courtesy and respect as if they were in 
their own country, and are on the best terms with 
the Bokharan authorities. Trade is unimpeded and 
daily increasing. The Ersari inhabitants of Kwaja 
Salar are contented and well-behaved.2 
There are many other small instances of this sort in the 
reports of Merk, Peacock, Maitland, Imam Sharif, Allah 
r~" 
Baksh, De Laessoe and friesbach, especially in the case 
of old tribal boundaries between related tribes or where 
a certain amount of geographical intermixture of tribes 
had taken place for one reason or another, when 
settlements were made simply by a local committee of 
the ak-sakals of the canals or villages involved or some 
1 C.A. No.2, 1887, .No.174, Protocol No.11, Annex No.9, 
Khamiab, 21 May (2 June), 1886. 
2 Ibid., No.127. 
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other accredited persons. In drought time ag:istment 
rights were given to foreign flocks. Also, the use of 
wells and other utilities was often decided temporarily, 
by consultation between groups or flock-keepers, or 
agriculturalists wishing to open canals for a season or 
so. The Kangrueli salt-fields in the desolate terrain 
between the lower Tejend and the Murghab, which Captain 
Maitland found to be divided up between several groups of 
Sariks and Salors who made annual visitations there for 
digging salt for their tribe, are another example of inter-
tribal communalty. 
One of the most frequent causes of friction was that 
of a tribe or local ruler giving rights of sanct~y to 
f\ 
political or other refugees or out-casts, who could then 
live in villages near the frontier of the territory they 
had left and create trouble. Meshed, the great holy city 
and caravan centre of Eastern Khorassan, was only a few 
days' journey from Herat, and become a home of Afghan 
political refugees and a hotbed of intrigue. One of the 
most interesting documents relating to tribal frontiers 
is that recording a long consultation between Major-
General Sir Peter Lumsden, Kazi Sa 1 ad-ud-din, the Afghan 
Am:ir's Agent w:ith the Boundary Commission, and Mohamed 
Sarwar Khan, the Deputy Governor of Herat, which took 
place on 21 December 1884, the existing report having 
been made by the Kazi 1 s secretary and translated. Sir 
Peter Lumsden had only recently arrived and had come by 
way of Northern Persia and Sarrakhs, then down the Persian 
side of the Tejend. The Russians already occupied Pul-i-
Khatun and were still moving south down the river. It 
would have been much easier for Sir Peter if Pul-i-Khatun 
had been i.n Persian territory, as Nasrulla Khan of Jam, 
a Khorassan frontier town, had tol.d him it was. 
the conversations, the Kazi said: 
During 
It is clearer than the sun that Pul-i-Khatun and 
the forts of Kiliah Khan are included in 
Afghanistan, because Kiliah Khan is a Taimuri, 
and the Taimuris are subject to Herat. With 
regard to Nasrullah Khan's statement, which you 
mentioned, if it is true, it must be owing to 
the fact that Nasrulla Khan of Jam belongs to the 
Taimuri tribe. He fled from here and took up his 
abode there. If the frontier offi.cers of Herat, 
out of regard for his being a kinsman of theirs, 
allowed his cattle to graze at times in these 
localities, it does not exclude them from our 
limits and include them in Persian territory. 
In fact no one has grazed his cattle for many 
years in those places through fear of the raids 
of the Te.kke Turkmens. How can they then call 
them their pasture-grounds?l 
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Sir Peter replied that if they attempted to establish 
their rights by claiming that the Taimuris were subjects 
of Herat, they would find that the Russians would 
similarly claim Penjdeh, as the Turkmens were subjects 
of Russia. He told them they should only make claims i.f 
they could produce maps and documents. The Kazi replied: 
1 
There is a vast difference between the two 
arguments, which men of penetrating minds 
can see. I pointed out to you, and you also 
stated, that Penjdeh was first the land of the 
Jamshidi tribe, whose chief, Ata Ulla Khan, 
Sak Aslamani, lived thereo When he removed 
from there to the plains of Herat, the Sarik 
Turkmens got it from the Jamshidi chiefs, to 
whom they paid tri.bute as an acknowledgement 
of submission. I sent you a copy of their 
acknowledgement, with a copy of the list of 
N.A.I., For. Sec. F, Pros. February 1885, Nos 187-·326A, 
No.306. 
names of governors of Panjdeh, as requested by 
you. Taimuris and Hazaras have fled from Herat 
and settled in Persia. Yusef Khan, Hazara, for 
instance, after killing Isa Kh0-n, fled to Persia 
when the Persian troops were withdrawn [from 
Hera t] and Sardar Sul tan Ahm~f.t Khan came to 
Herat. You should therefore get these people 
back from the Persian government and make them 
over to us. You yourself blame the Russians for 
having allowed the Salors of Zurabad [in 
Khorassan] to go over to them and settle in 
Sarrakhs ..•• l 
The British Commissioner again urged these well-informed 
Afghan officials not to let themselves be deceived and 
asked them to collect all documents. 
In country which was mostly so uninhabited it was 
easy for quite large groups to move about inconspicuously, 
most of all for desert-traversers like the Turkmens. The 
Turkmens were the acknowledged professional raiders, 
usually raiding in distant parts for motives of profit, 
but local raids between Khorassan and Herat outer districts 
occurred from time to time for motives more frequently of 
revenge. Turkmen raids were usually carried out in the 
winter when snow provided drink for men and beast on 
routes waterless in the summertime. 
A prolonged local Persian~Afghan dispute, the 
Hashtadan affair, 1884 and 1887, is a good example of a 
purely local dispute being brought to a higher level of 
Persian-Afghan diplomacy. 
The question of irrigation and the division of 
water is in these arid tracts the most important 
of all questions, differences regarding which, 
l Ibid. 
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affecting as they do the very subsistence of the 1 people, lead to desperate struggles and animosities. 
Hashtadan was in Persian territory near the frontier and 
was the site of ancient canals but for many years it had 
been used only by Af'ghan nomads for grazing. Then the 
Persians began to repair an aqueduct and open up canals. 
This caused much local ill~feeling. According to the 
British newswriter in Herat, 'It is rumoured in Herat 
that the Shah of Persia intends to fight with Afghanistan, 
and the people think Russia to be the instigator of this'." 
The Amir took a firm line and ordered Afghan officials to 
see that there was no Persian cultivation in Hashtadan. 
So a serious international clash threatened out of a 
quite small local dispute. During the period of the 
Commission there were several occasions when bad relations 
with Bokhara arose over the raids of Kara Turkmens from 
Bokhara territory into Afghan Turkestan, the Russians, to 
whom complaint had been made, virtuously pointing out that 
the conduct of' the Kara rrurk.mens was Bokhara's affair. 
Except when political and dynastic troubles occurred the 
people of the two regions were constantly brought in 
contact with one anothBr by trade exchange, caravans 
running regularly from Bokhara to all the quite small 
towns of the whole area. For example, Sardar Mohamed 
Aslam Khan 1 s report on the d:istrict of Kwaja Salar 
mentions that silk, sheep's wool, skins 9 numdahs and 
carpets were sent from many districts south of the Amu 
to Bokhara and in return tea, sugar, indigo, tobacco, 
1 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, September 1886, Nos 1-80, No.7, 
Ridgeway to Salisbury, 1 February 1886. 
2 . r 88 Herat Newsletter No.I?, 25 February 1 7. 
rice, cloth, salt and silk head-kerchiefs were distributed 
from Bokhara. Mazar-i-sharif was the chief distributary 
point for these Bokharan goods in Afghan Turkestan but 
there was network of caravan routes big and small. Also 
Bokhara was a magnet to Sunni Moslems seeking higher 
theological education. And there was a constant traffic 
of holy men, many from India, passing through Afghanistan. 
Judging from the newsletters and information passed on 
that had been collected by the Amir's numerous agents in 
many Central Asian towns (a habit which he had not learnt 
from the English, but rather they had learnt from Asians), 
the Afghans were always extremely interested in the affairs 
of the Mangit Amirs of Bokhara and their family disputes. 
One of the best sources of information about the relations 
of Bokhara and their dependent smaller states is to be 
found in Abdurrahman's o~n autobiography. Refugees of 
importance such as Ayub Khan and their dependents were 
carefully watched and reported on and refugees were also 
used as sources of information. 
The Moslem tribesman of Afghan Turkestan, taken up 
with their own busy world and warned against the Infidel 
by their religion, had little contact with the European. 
They lived rather out of ran~e of the English from India 
who as soldiers had been seen in other parts of Afghanista1 
during the two wars; the Europeans who had travelled in 
Persia rarely penetrated so far, and the Russians had only 
now begun to be heard about in first-hand reports from 
travellers returned from Bokhara and more recently from 
Merv. The Russians had been known about for centuries, 
but it was onl.y after the middle of the nineteenth century 
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that their presence in Uzbek Asia had been felt, and more 
recently still in South-Western Turkumania. 
Of Russia, the Tekkes had, up to the date of 
their subjugation, most original ideas. They 
thought it the greatest and most powerful of 
countries, inhabited, however, by a c~rrupt 
people. A Russian was called by them Kara-
giaour (infidel of bad religion), in contra-
distinction to an Englishman or 'Mussulman 
Giaour', that is, a heretic with a more 1 
enlightened religion, nearer to a Mussulman. 
Elsewhere Grodekov says that until a few years before, 
the popular Central Asian belief was that the Russian 
soldiers 'spat fire and devoured children' but that by 
this time (1881) they were so used to Russians that they 
were losing their fear of them. Before the Afghan Wars 
had acquainted many Afghans with the ways of the British 
soldiers from India, the processes of trade had already 
brought English goods from India, carried by the Powindars, 
or Ghilzai camel-owners, who went down, as they still do, 
every year to the valley of the Indus. And the strange 
word 'Coompanee' (that is, 'John Company') had already 
found its way into Afghan speech at the time of 
Elphinstone's visit to Peshawur. The traditional Afghan 
contact between there and Western India meant that a 
watch was kept on the English in India. By the time of 
Abdurrahman quite a number of English words, military 
words for commands and equipment, had been introduced and 
widely used wherever the military power of Kabul penetrated 
1 Grodekov, The War in Turkumanis, vol.I, p.57, This 
was a belief held mainly because of the Orthodox use 
of ikons, while the English soldier was not observed 
to put his faith in images. 
100 
while the names for senior military ranks had been 
borrowed from the French soldiers, such as General 
Ferrier, who had trained the armies of the Persian Shahs. 
By the time of the 1885 Commission the introduction 
of newspaper printing to Tashkent by the Russians' had 
considerably increased the scope, if not the reliability, 
of news from Europe. The translation of a newsletter 
received by the Amir from Syed Abdulla, His Highness' 
newswriter in Tashkent, contains a masterly account of 
the fate of General Gordon. It runs as follows: 
It appears from the Tashkent Gazette that 
nearly J2,000 troops have been killed near 
Alexandria by the religious warrior, the 
Vice-gerent of the Imam. The Capital of 
Egypt has also fallen into his hands. Twenty-
four steam-boats belonging to the English have 
been drowned. He has also taken the port from 
the English. The English feel very anxious on 
this account as Egypt supplies food-grains to 
England, Constantinople and other places, 
consequently they have brought the French and 
the Germans over to their side. Sultan Abdul 
Hamid Khan secretly assists Khalifa Imam because 
he is afraid of the Christian governments. 
Ninety thousand ghazis left for Egypt to join the 
religious war. Upwards of 500,000 warriors are 
in attendance on the Mahdi. This news has been 
welcomed by the Russians and has caused them 
pleasure.l 
Some of the newswriters employed by Colonel McNeil at 
Meshed got hold of very odd news, such as that the Tsar 
had gone mad and killed five of his servants with a 
pistol, or got it from very odd places such as rarun: Burn', 
which meant Orenburg. With true Asiatic courtesy, they 
.L . . . . .. 
N~A.I.~ For. Sec. F~ July 1885, Nos i25~207, No.197. 
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were always interested in the doings of the Ak Padeshah, 
the White Tsar, and Queen Victoria, and when the marriage 
of two young people connected the two royal families of 
Russia and England it was much approved of in the 
bazaars. News also reached Baku. 
They write from Kandahar to a Persian newspaper 
of Turkmen emissaries distributing a proclamation 
among the Durranis in Afghan border cities 
urging them to join with Turkmens and follow 
friendly relations with the Russians. 
This is a piece of diplomatic reporting from the Caspian, 
a Baku newspaper for 16 (28) April 1885. 1 
The Turkmens and the Uzbeks of Russian Central Asia 
quickly familiarised themselves with those wonders of 
civilization, the railway and the electric telegraph, 
and learnt to make use of them. By the time of the 
Boundary Commission such things would be talked about by 
the Turkmen and Uzbek inhabitants of Western and Northern 
Afghanistan, and the Afghan special camel-sowars who 
rode between the English Commission and the Persian 
telegraph at Meshe.d saw the mysterious message-sender at 
first hand. The Russian telegraph got to Penjdeh by 
1887, 'but by this time traffic between Penjdeh and 
Afghanistan was much discouraged, Educated Afghans no 
doubt knew far more about the outside world than appears 
from these general remarks. For instance, both the Kazi 
Sa'ad-ud-din and the Governor of Herat received and 
quoted the Constantinople newspaper, Aktar. 
l Ibid. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FIRST BOUNDARY COMMISSION, 1884-1885 
The Establishment of the Commission - English and 
Russian Diplomatic Moves 
Since 1881, when the victorious army of General 
Skobelev subdued the Tekke Turkmens of the Akhal Tekke 
Oasis and advanced to occupy Ashkabad some fifty miles 
further east, the fate of the Oasis of Merv, also occupied 
by Tekkes, had been a matter of interest not only to the 
Russians but also to the Persians, the Afghans and the 
English. Diplomats, and to a less extent military men, 
might keep their thoughts to themselves, but somehow 
the press and the public in England got the idea that 
Merv was a 'key' to Asia. The intervening three years 
saw the famous wave in England of what the Duke of Argyll 
neatly called 1 mervousness'. In the background, the 
matter of defining an Afghan-Russian Central Asian 
frontier was never quite out of the thinking of Russian 
and English diplomats, but any movements in the direction 
of actual delimitation went by fits and starts; 
willingness in London and St Petersburg rarely seemed to 
synchronise. 
Merv passed into Russian hands on 12 February 1884. 
This news was received in London on the fourteenth by 
telegraph from St Petersburg. By this time the Russians 
had developed their plans for the peaceful absorption 
of the Turkmen world. To a certain extent they were 
succeeding well, but in 1883 and early 1884 the South-
Eastern Turkmens were being thrown into commotion by 
the activities, religio-patriotic and hence anti-Russian 
in purpose, of a mysterious dervish, Siah Poush ('Black 
Robe'), who claimed to be a son of the Amir of Bokhara, 
but whom the Russians naturally regarded as an 'Afghan 
Emissary11 and hence an English Agent, but about whom 
the Indian Government itself seems to have been 
genuinely puzzled. Concerning him, the English 
Ambassador to Persia reported to the Foreign Office: 
On the 13th February last, Colonel Stewart and 
Muhamad Taki [the Herat News-writer] both wrote 
he was hostile to Abdurrahman and we know that 
on one occasion he wrote to the Governor of 
Herat warning him that the people of Yulatan 
were disloyal towards Afghanistan. As regards 
his reported intrigues with Ayub, the Herat 
newswriter reported in January last that the 
Siah Poush dervish had offered to assist Ayub 
in escaping from Persia and to bring plenty of 
men to fight the Persian unbelievers .... But 
this has only helped to confirm the opinion, 
which has all along held of him that he has 
been a mere adventurer trying to impose on the 
Turcomans.2 
The English Ambassador to St Petersburg, Sir Edward 
Thornton, reported to Granville, Gladstone's Secretary 
lC 
of State for Foreign Affairs, that de Giers, the Russian 
Foreign Minister, claimed that, in effecting in April the 
capture and confinement of Siah Poush, the Russian 
authorities had rendered a service to the Amir of 
Afghanistan, although they still considered the Dervish 
was an Afghan. 3 
1 C.A. No.2, 1884-85, Further Correspondence, March 1884, 
p.2. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. July 1884, Nos 77-80, K.W. 
J Ibid., No.79, Thornton to Granville, St Petersburg, 6 
May 1884. 
Also, in 1883, Abdurrahman, feeling himself in a 
strong position, had begun to turn his attention to the 
Mirate of Shignan, which with Roshan, had been 
traditionally associated with Badakhshan and so, by his 
reckoning, had to be re-incorporated in the State of 
Afghanistan. But, by the reckoning of the two European 
Imperialists, it had long since been decided that 
everything North of the Amu lay within the Russian 
sphere. In March 1884, the Viceroy, Ripon, reminded 
the Amir he must not become involved North of the Amu. 
The Turkmen unrest and the claims of Abdurrahman 
were two reasons why the Russian Foreign Office was now 
in a mood to reopen the matter of a final frontier 
delimitation. 
lC 
But in any case the fall of Merv and the consequent 
Russian extension into the south-east of the Turkmen 
territory, especially the extension to Yulatan at the 
very south of the Merv Oasis, brought about that which 
had been long awaited, the absolute abutment on one 
another of the Russian and the English spheres of 
influence in Asia. The Ministry of Gladstone in 
England, and the conciliatory nature of de Giers, in 
conjunction with this diplomatic situation, meant that 
the moment seemed very favourable for opening 
discussions on the Northern Afghan frontier delimitation, 
from Persia to Sinkiang. 
In the spring of 1884, there began a period of 
1 sounding out 1 and re-marking the solid ground already 
arrived at in the many diplomatic approaches which had 
occurred since 1864. The first move possibly came from 
the Indian end. Already in January 1884, H.M. Durand, 
the Acting Foreign Secretary, was writing: 
The only statesmanlike course is to endeavour 
to come to a really frank and friendly 
understanding with the Power which we have 
hitherto tried in vain in a half-hearted way 
to thwart and impede. I would, if possible, 
embody that understanding in a formal treaty, 1 precisely defining the limits of Afghanistan. 
Although the submission of Merv did highlight the 
situation, it is only fair to point out that in the eyes 
of the Government of India it was Abdurrahman's 
aspirations North of the Amu and his having pointed out 
the ~iscrepancy whereby two Bokharan towns, Karki and 
Char9ui, lay south of the Amu, which made the urgency of 
a Boundary settlement more apparent. This is revealed 
in the important telegram which the Viceroy sent to Lord 
Kimberley, the Secretary of State for India, on 23 
February 1884: 
1 
Secret. Your secret telegram 19th and earlier 
correspondence regarding Afghan frontier. We 
have very carefully considered whole subject 
..• and we are unanimously of the opinion that 
under the circumstances it has become absolutely 
necessary to endeavour to come to a closer 
understanding with Russia as to exact line of 
entire northern and north-western frontiers of 
Afghanistan. We therefore strongly urge that 
the Russian Government should be invited without 
delay to agree to the appointment of a Joint 
Commission consisting of representatives of the 
British, Russian and Afghan Governments, and, so 
far as may be necessary~ of Persia, for the 
• purpose of demarcating those frontiers on the 
spot. It is expedient that we should have a 
Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p.135. 
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reply as soon as possible, as the Commission, 
if appointed, should commence work in early 
Autumn, and preliminary arrangements including 
negotiations with the Amir will take time. 
Meanwhile we will do what we can to restrain 
Amir, who had moved troops into Roshan. We 
have already addressed him but warning arrived 
too late.I 
On 29 February, in reply to Thornton's letter of 15 
February enlarging on his talk with de Giers about the 
submission of Merv, Granville sent to Thornton a long 
memorandum going over all the events of the Russian 
advance across Transcaspia. It concludes meaningfully: 
1 
M de Giers, in making the announcement to you, 
expressed a hope that the measures which were 
about to be taken would be to the advantage of 
the Turkoman territory and of the neighbouring 
states of Persia and Afghanistan, and would be 
viewed by Her Majesty's Government as being 
adopted only in the cause of peace and good 
order. 
He did not state in any detail what those 
measures were to be, and I cannot, therefore, 
express an opinion of them, but you will take 
an early opportunity of urging His Excellency 
to lose no time in communicating to Her 
Majesty's Government the proposals which the 
Russian Government may have to make to them in 
order to provide against the complications to 
which this further extension of Russian 
soversignty in the direction of the frontiers 
of Afghanistan may give rise.2 
N.A.I., For., Sec. E., Pros. March 1884, Nos 145-97 
[i.e., 197], No.194, Tel, Sec. to Govt. of India to Sec. 
of State for India, 23 February 1884. 
2 C.A. No.2, 1885, No.6. Thus, M. de Giers' placatory 
speeches were met by the 'hard line' of diplomacy in 
accordance with the wishes of the English and Indian 
Governments. 
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On receipt of the memorandum, Sir Edward had a further 
discussion with de Giers which he reported to Granville 
on 12 March: 
I took the opportunity of asking His Excellency 
what he considered was the extent of the Merv 
territory. He replied that he supposed it would 
reach to the eastward to the Oxus, and to the 
South to the northern frontier of Afghanistan 
from Khoja Saleh to the Tejend. 
He added that I should remember that he had some 
time ago proposed that the boundary should be 
agreed upon and laid down. 1 I said that I 
certainly remembered his doing so, and presumed 
that he was still of the opinion that it would 
be advisable to take measures in that sense. To 
this he replied in the affirmative, but I did not 
think it expedient to continue the conversation.2 
On 17 March, he reported a further conversation with de 
Giers during which the latter had said that it was very 
desirable that an agreement should be reached as to the 
Boundary of Afghanistan from Khoja Saleh to the Tejend. 
By 29 March, Thornton was able to submit a report of 
still another interview with de Giers referring 
specifically to the proposal of 1882. 
That proposal was to continue from Khoja Saleh 
westward the line of demarcation agreed upon in 
1872-3. Her Majesty's Government hesitated at 
that time to give an opinion on this proposal. 
If they desire to resume the negotiations, the 
Imperial Cabinet will willingly concur.3 
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1 This was quite true; it had occurred in 1882 
when English diplomacy was more concerned with 
in the Russo-Persian Frontier discussions, and 
largely ignored. 
at a time 
interfering 
had been 
2 C.A. No.2, 1885, No,8. 
3 Ibid., No.13, 31 March 1884. Inclosure dated 29 March. 
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On 24 April, Granville telegraphed to ask Thornton to 
inform de Giers that a despatch would be sent to Thornton 
accepting the Russian proposal for delimiting the Afghan 
frontier, at the same time stating that Her Majesty's 
Government was most anxious to meet the wishes of the 
Russian Government in maintaining tranquillity in the 
Shignan-Darwaz frontier region, but that the Amir 
1 
considered it part of Badakhshan. This was followed by 
a letter of 29 April, asking Thornton to tell de Giers 
that the British Government were of the opinion that the 
principal points of the boundary line should be laid 
down on the spot, and that a Joint Commission, including 
an Afghan representative, should be appointed and should 
2 
start work next Autumn. This followed closely the 
suggestions of the Indian Government in the telegram of 
23 February. On 7 May, Thornton wrote that he had asked 
de Giers whether he did not think it desirable that the 
same Commission should work eastward as far as Kashgaria, 
and de Giers had agreed that it was. 
On 17 May, Thornton forwarded the Russian official 
acceptance of the proposal for a Joint Commission dates 
3 May O.S. (17 May). But the Imperial Cabinet would not 
agree to Afghanistan's full membership on the Commission, 
and said that the Afghan representative must only be 
considered as an 'expert' to 'furnish explanations on 
questions of detail and purely local matters whenever 
the Commissioners of the two Powers might wish to 
consult him' • 3 On 17 June, Thornton reported having told 
1 Ibid., No.21. 
2 Ibid. , No.23. 
3 Ibid., No.40 and Inclosure. 
de Giers that the British wished the Commissioners to 
meet at Sarrakhs on the Tejend, or, as both parties were 
calling this part of the river in the early days of the 
1 Commission, the Heri-Rud, on 1 October. 
In June two Russian trends were noted in quotations 
from the Russian press. From Kavkaz, the official army 
gazette of the Caucasus, came an inspired article which 
pointed out that the natural frontier of Afghanistan was 
the Paropamisus, and that to the north lived only 
Turkmens and Uzbeks. And a Moscow paper also reported 
that the Transcaspian railway was soon to be extended to 
Ashkabad, and went on to mention the possibility of its 
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being extended by sections to Herat. On 23 June Thornton 
reported the arrival of an unsigned memorandum from the 
Russian Foreign Office referring to Abdurrahman's 
impending military occupation of Penjdeh and protesting 
about it as being 'inconsistent with the understanding 
which has just been established between the two powers 
for the delimitation of the frontier 1 • 2 
An unexpected disagreement as to the actual 
starting point of the Commission occupied the diplomats 
in June and July, and was not settled until August. 
Replying to the English suggestion about Sarrakhs (New 
Sarrakhs) on the left bank of the Tejend, de Giers told 
Thorn ton on the 18 June that the Imperial Cabinet had no 
real objection to Sarrakhs as a meeting-place, but, in 
that case, they thought that preliminary discussion 
1 Ibid. , No . 40. 
2 Ibid. , No. 51. 
110 
should take place between the two Governments, to prevent 
on-the-spot difficulties, as they regarded the Tejend as 
a still undecided area. They were in favour of 
beginning the Demarcation at the fixed point of Khoja 
Saleh and keeping strictly within the bound of Lord 
Granville's despatch to Lord Loftus, the then British 
1 Ambassador to St Petersburg, of 17 October 1872. This 
raised English suspicion immediately that the Russians 
had something to hide on the Tejend. But it was also 
quite in keeping with the doctrinaire Russian attitude 
towards past agreements which was to trouble the 
Commission later. On 2 July, Thornton said the British 
would like to start the delimitation on the Tejend, 
probably at the place where the Russo-Persian boundary, 
being extended from Baba Dormuz, would strike it. De 
Giers said that negotiations with Persia were not 
advanced enough to enable him to state where that point 
2 
would be. The English preference for Sarrakhs was, 
firstly, that it was much nearer, and secondly, that if 
the meeting was to be on the Amu it would mean travelling 
still later into the Autumn cold of Central Asia with 
the unacclimatised Indian escort. De Giers stuck to his 
point that Khoja Saleh as a known place would be much 
better for a beginning, and he asked, 'Why begin where 
misunderstandings are most likely?' It was a reasonable 
viewpoint, the historic irony of which only became 
apparent later when English and Russian parties searched 
the Amu shores vainly for Burnes' now non-existent 
'Khoja Saleh'. 
1 Ibid., No.56. 
2 Ibid., No.56. 
The matter was so serious that de Giers finally 
referred it to His Imperial Russian Majesty, and on JO 
July he gave his verdict that the two Governments could 
agree on a point of departure on the Heri-Rud. 1 The 
British Government asked Thornton to inform de Giers 
that up to then Her Majesty's Government has assumed 
that Sarrakhs would be the northern terminal of 
Afghanistan, but that this could only be decided when 
2 the Commission was actually there. Thus English 
diplomacy prepared the ground for a possible policy of 
give-and-take with Russia. 
Establishment of the Commission - Abdurrahman 
Not only had the Russian Foreign Office been ready 
for a delimitation in 1882, but so had Abdurrahman. In 
October 1882 he had written to the Viceroy, Lord Ripon: 
'I think it is high time to have the question of my 
boundaries settled with such a powerful enemy as Russia, 
through the good offices of the British Government' • 3 
11 
As in the Russian approach, so in the Afghan, the British 
took no decisive action at that time. Now, in 1884, the 
Amir ubdoubtedly welcomed the proposed Boundary 
Commission, but in his usual style expressed himself 
violently this way and that about it. The letters from 
the British Agent at Kabul, Sirdar Afzal Khan, during 
this period, make very interesting reading. The Amir 
continually dramatised the situation; at one durbar 
1 Ibid., Nos 73, 74. 
2 Ibid., No.SO. 
3 Quoted in Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p.135. 
imagining the Afghans fighting against the Russians to 
the last man; and at the next lauding the prospect of 
England and Afghanistan combining their brotherly might 
victoriously against the same enemy. But underneath 
11:: 
all these passionate and flamboyant posturings, he went 
on to criticise, advise and assist the projected Indian 
Party and Escort with a statesmanlike approach, combining 
a fine practicality and hospitality with a jealous regard 
for the honour of his kingdom. 
Already on 11 March, the Viceroy had sent a letter 
to the Amir stating that he had sent to Her Majesty's 
Government the Amir's request for a document showing 
his precise boundaries. 1 On 10 June from Simla the 
Viceroy wrote to the Amir to report that communications 
had passed between the British and Russian Governments 
on the matter of the Afghan Frontier, and that a 
Commission would be arranged shortly, and asking for 
the name of the Afghan officer 'possessing the full 
confidence of Your Highness' whom Abdurrahman would care 
to send, and suggesting that the selected officer might 
be sent to India 'in order to explain your views to me 
in detail 1 • 2 This document was sent from India to 
London with a covering note signed by Ripon and seven 
members of the Council on 20 June. It was received by 
Kimberley at the India Office on 21 July and on the same 
day was sent to the Foreign Office. 
On JO June the Amir wrote to the Viceroy to say that 
he did not have a single person in his entourage who 
1 C.A. No.2 (1885), No.67, Inclosure 2. 
2 Ibid. 
would know all the boundaries, but that he might be able 
to find one for the various regions of the frontier, and 
1 he would select and hold in readiness such men. On 29 
July the Amir's Agent at Peshawur, General Amir Ahmad 
Khan, wrote to the Indian Foreign Secretary asking how 
many persons would accompany the Commission. On JO July 
the Amir wrote to the General suggesting that the 
Commission Party would do better to come through Persia 
to Meshed and so to Sarrakhs, where an Afghan official 
acquainted with the local frontiers and 'who knows how 
to demarcate boundaries' should go from Herat to meet 
them. 
Should any point arise for discussion in any 
place, the Governor of that place will discuss 
it himself or will refer it to me if he thinks 
it necessary to do so, and I will answer him 
according to the requirement of the times and2 in consultation with the British Authorities. 
This policy was indeed the one he insisted on and at 
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times it created slowness of procedure which upset the 
European Commissioners, but it was surely a correct one. 
In the same letter he criticised the nature of his people, 
saying 'They possess little strength but are very 
irascible and always take a wrong view of everything' • 
It is clear that he would have preferred not to have had 
the British Party from India cross South Western 
Afghanistan, but when the British insisted, he saw to it 
that they were well protected. 
l Ibid., No.89. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. September 1884, Nos 80-189, 
No.89 (translation of letter). 
On 1 August the British Agent wrote from Kabul that 
the Amir had been much aroused by a copy of the Russian 
demands on Persia regarding her north-eastern frontier, 
which read 
All the cultivation to the north of the Darband, 
with all the watercourses which irrigate them 
should be destroyed, and the obstructions in the 
course of the stream should be removed within 
seven days after the ratification of the 
Protocol .•.• No cultivation whatever shall be 
allowed throughout the extent of the Cha Cha 
valley in the Darband near the village of 
Amirabad •.•• The paddy now standing in their 
fields should be destroyed with all the water-
cuts and the water be thrown into the stream.l 
The Amir said to his durbar: 
Russia will likewise call upon me 
stop the cultivation of the paddy 
must also agree to their demands. 
inevitable, why should we not get 
that time comes? The Russians as 
this manner. To-morrow they will 
to-morrow to 
in Herat. I 
This being 
killed before 
a rule act in 
tell us -
Here is the green line (the Russian 
boundary on the map); consequently 
withdraw a little quietly, so that 
we may advance a bit and thereby save 
your honour. Otherwise a red line is 
farther on ••.• 2 
But it was in this same durbar that he complained about 
his lack of money to fight the Russians, and then went 
on to announce the establishment of the Boundary 
Commission, or partially to do so. According to the Agent, 
he said 'A Commission of British officers has now been 
1 Ibid., No.9JA. 
2 Ibid., No.93. 
appointed ... I shall also have an officer to represent 
1 
me'. Several days later in the durbar of 5 August, he 
said, as the Agent reports: 
I will first talk with the Russian Government. 
If the negotiations ended satisfactorily, well 
and good, otherwise I will fight them and get 
killed, for the Russians are sure to advance on 
Afghanistan. There is no doubt whatever about 
their doing so. I will call on the people of 
Afghanistan to pay two years' revenue in advance 
and I will take one man in every twenty; but 
the other nineteen will stand security for the 
men thus levied and will pay for their 
maintenance.2 
Nothing more was heard of his desire that the Party 
should go via Meshed. Two days later, on 1 August, the 
British Agent at Kabul said that the Amir was arranging 
that the Governor of Herat with five or six hundred 
cavalry and two mule-guns could meet the Commission, and 
if anything unforseen occurred, the British officers 
could enter their (presumably the Herati) camp. After 
they had completed the Herat frontier, they would be in 
the hands of Ishak Khan, Governor of Turkestan, and the 
Commission would later proceed to Badakhshan and Wakhan. 
It is interesting to see that this was definite in 
Abdurrahman's mind at this early period, for at a later 
period he had quite changed his mind about this extended 
demarcation, with that party and at that time. 
In his letter of 30 July to his Agent at Peshawur, 
he also wrote: 
l Ibid. 
2 Ibid. , No. 91. 
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It will also become evident to the people of 
Afghanistan that the British do not want to 
interfere with their country, but that they 
have their welfare at heart. Then I shall be 
able to tell them boldly -
0 People, I have been telling you 
these four years that the British 
have nothing but your and my welfare 
at heart but you do not believe it. 
After they have seen that the British 
officers demarcated their boundary 
without interfering in their country, 
they will understand the matter 
rightly •.•. l 
In a similar strain Adburrahman wrote to the Viceroy on 
20 August: 
I wish the people of Afghanistan to prosper and 
secure a good name •••• I trust in the Lord of 
the Universe that, if through the efforts of 
tMQ @•sw L ?!f the representatives of the British 
Government, the Afghan Frontier be separated from 
the Russian Frontier, that if these people know 
that the glorious British Authorities anxiously 
wish for their happiness and prosperity, that if 
I and my people get a good name, and that if my 
advice take effect on their minds, our hearts 
will be set at rest regarding everything.2 
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A most interesting report is to be found in a 
translation of a newsletter from Mirza Mohamed Taki Khan, 
the British Newswriter at Herat, dated 4 September 1884. 
It shows how energetically Abdurrahman had undertaken 
to look after the Indian Party. 
1 
2 
The Amir has written to the Governor and the 
Sipah Salar on the subject of the Boundary 
Commission. He informs them that the British 
Ibid., No.89. 
Ibid., No.162. 
officers with six hundred cavalry will march 
by way of Kharan and Lash Jowain to Kala Koh 
and to Pareh in the Province of Herat. From 
the day they enter Afghan territory until 
they leave it, they are to be treated as guests 
of the Amir. The following supplies are to be 
collected at every halting place - 4 kharwars 
(Kabuli) of barley and the same amount of grass, 
60 seers (Kabuli) of flour and 20 seers of ghi, 
40 sheep, one bullock, 40 fowls, 4 mauns of 
sugar and tea, opium, and other articles. Four 
hundred Herati sowars are to be detailed to 
accompany the Mission. The Amir adds that in 
all probability the Russian Delegates will meet 
the English on Afghan soil. He would wish them 
to be treated with hospitality, but on this 
point, the Governor is to be guided entirely by 
the desire of the English. His Highness further 
states that the English officers will proceed to 
Turk~stan by way of Maimana .••• The Amir enclosed 
two proclamations, one for the troops and the 
other for the civil population of Herat. After 
a declaration that the object of his life has 
been to secure prosperity to the Mussulmans of 
Afghanistan, he goes on to state that a number 
of English officers are now marching to Herat 
in order to settle the boundaries of Afghanistan. 
After this is accomplished it will be the duty 
of every loyal subject to repel anyone who 
violates the boundaries fixed. He expects the 
people of Herat to treat the English officers 
with respect. The letter to the troops was read 
to them by Colonel Wali Muhammed Khan ..• and all 
present declared that they would cheerfully obey 
the command of their sovereign ••.• On the following 
day the proclamation was read in the Jama Musjid 
from the pulpit ••• and was very well received by 
the congregation.l 
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In the newsletter of 19 September, the Newswriter recorded 
that the Governor was to meet the Commission as it 
drew near the Herat Frontier and accompany them to the 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. December 1884, Nos 293-302, 
Herat Newsletter 7, 8, 19 of 1884, No.294. 
frontier. He was to take with him regular infantrY, 
2,000 Herati cavalry and two guns. There was a rumour 
of the usual kind that twelve English regiments were on 
the way and the people were withholding stocks of grain 
in the hope of enormous price rises. He added: 
The more intelligent understand the object of 
the Mission; but the lower classes believe 
the English are coming to fight the Russians. 
The whole matter is incessantly debated, and 
I am constantly asked for information. People 
are, generally speaking, prepared to welcome 
the British warmly.l 
11 
Meanwhile, as the British wished to go through 
Afghanistan, the question of route had to be discussed. 
In Simla in late July and August, Captain Frederick De 
Laessoe, who was to be one of the party, was engaged in 
making, with the advice of Ridgeway and H.M. Durand, a 
thorough report on the whole field of writing by 
European travellers in this region, especially Abbott, 
Pottinger, Todd, Ferrier, Khanikov, Vambery, Petrusevich, 
MacGregor and Stewart. But the best help they had came 
from Abdurrahman himself. Early in August, it was 
decided to travel from Quetta through Northern Beluchistan 
which was under the watchful eye of Sandeman, westward 
to Nushki and then north~west to the Helmand River at 
Kwaja Ali, westward again along that river and then 
north to Herat Province over the extreme western route 
in Afghanistan. This would avoid the direct route too 
close to Kandahar with its hostile memories of the 
British. On 9 August the Viceroy sent a more than 
usually flowery kharita (letter from one head of state 
l Ibid., No.297. 
to another) to the Amir requesting permission to go from 
Nushki by way of Girishk to Herat and explaining why an 
escort of considerable size was necessary: 
Your Highness is also aware that among 
ignorant people like the Turkomans and 
other frontier tribes, a mission 
representing a great government should 
not appear without proper attendants and 
followers.l 
In the light of this polite request to be allowed to 
travel from Nushki, it is interesting to note that on 
the very next day, before the Amir could even have 
received this request, a telegram was sent from Simla 
to Sandeman instructing him .to have three or four 
hundred good camels ready at Quetta by the end of the 
month. 
On 16 August, the Amir wrote to his Agent in 
Peshawur: 'Now it rests with them {the British Party) 
to do as they like •••• • 2 On the nineteenth, after 
discussing the matter in durbar, he consented to the 
whole party going via Nushki and said that the governors 
of Kandahar, Farah and Herat would each supply to the 
party four hundred mussucks of water, sixteen maunds of 
wheat flour, two of rice, sixty-four of barley and one 
of ghi, forty sheep, one cow, salt and other things. 
(This is possibly the official list which was seen by 
the Herat newswriter later). He refused however to let 
119 
the party or its baggage go as far east as Girishk, 
although he allowed the mails to go by this shorter route. 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. September 1884, Nos 80-189, 
No.106. 
2 Ibid., No.132. 
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What was most important, he supplied what no one 
else had been able to give - an itinerary. Even Khanikov, 
the Russian explorer, had not come so far south. And in 
this letter of 19 August the Amir said that he had 
travelled this route himself and would supply a list of 
halting places between the Helmand and Herat Province. 
His list came promptly, a memorandum of halting stages 
between Chaki and Kuhsan, with notes on the water supplies 
at each, and the distances between. In his own hand he 
added 'The above is correct' • 1 Abdurrahman, of whom it 
was generally assumed by the English that he knew little 
of Western Afghanistan, in point of fact knew it very 
well, having learnt it the hard way when he fled across 
it in comparative destitution with the ex-Amir, his 
Uncle Azim, before the pursuing army of Sher Ali in 1867. 
This flight had brought him down through the wild 
country of Eastern Afghanistan and the Zhob valley to 
Pishin, then tribal territory, and south-west to Nushki, 
where he, seeking to reach the Helmand, reached Chagkai 
[Chaki], struck north, and crossed the Helmand at Palilik. 
He went northward towards Farah but then appears to have 
moved westward into Persian Seistan to Burjand and then 
north to Meshed. From Meshed he had travelled among 
'gipsy people', Turkmens on the Tejend, before he threw 
.himself on the mercy of his father's friend, the Khan of 
Khiva, at his capital, Urgunj, where the palace was 
guarded by sixty guns and gun-carriages, but all the 
gunners were negroes. 
2 before'. 
1Ibid., No.162. 
'I had never seen so many negroes 
2The Life of Abdurrahman, vol.2, pp.121-35, for these 
adventures. 
It appears to be true that he had never been to 
Herat itself, but knowing the country to the four points 
of the compass around it, he was probably well informed, 
much more than the English gave him credit for. At any 
rate, insisting they go on the western route, it was he 
who gave them the only itinerary they could get. The 
region of Western Afghanistan was quite unmapped, and 
further north towards the Amu, the map known as 'General 
Walker's' map after a Chief of the Indian Survey, was 
most inadequate. 
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In the Viceroy's Council reasons for the Amir's 
dislike of the proposed route via Girishk were discussed. 
H.M. Durand suggested that it might be because 'any 
friendly dealings with us make him unpopular with the 
fanatical party' • 1 But almost certainly he regarded 
its closer proximity to Kandahar as likely to be 
dangerous to the English party. 
On 24 August, the Amir communicated with the Viceroy 
to say that he had appointed Kazi Sa 1 ad-ud-din as his 
Agent with the Commission. 2 
Getting the Commission Under Way 
On 16 July Granville asked Thornton to inform the 
Russian Government that Major-General Sir Peter Lumsden, 
K.C.B., member of the India Council, Aide-de-Camp to the 
Queen, formerly Adjutant General in India, had been 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. September 1884, Nos 80-189, 
Council Discussion. 
2 Ibid., No.185. 
appointed British Commissioner1 and on 23 August 
Granville asked His Excellency to notify the Russian 
Foreign Office that Sir Peter Lumsden now had his 
instructions and would travel to the frontier via Poti 
and Baku early in September. A monitory 'hope on the 
part of Her Majesty's Government' was expressed that the 
Russian Commissioner would have similar instructions. 2 
The list of Lumsden's initial general instructions was 
sent him from the Foreign Office on 25 August, by which 
time many other matters concerning the Commission were 
already well under way. 
After having recapitulated the main historical 
outlines of the matter, the general instructions said 
that Her Majesty's Government was leaving him a 'large 
discretion in the discharge of the duties which he had 
undertaken', but pointed out that his primary duty was 
'to ascertain the true limits of the Afghan territory 
to which the Agreement of 1872-73 applied'. The first 
question would be to find the exact point on the Heri-
Rud from which the frontier line was to run and it was 
suggested that if Sarrakhs were inadvisable, then 
possibly Pul-i-Khatun might prove suitable. He was 
warned that there might also be difficulties with local 
Persian authorities in the vicinity of the Khombau Pass 
on one of the roads from Sarrakhs to Herat. He was 
warned about Penjdeh and his discretion here was being 
especially relied upon by Her Majesty's Government. Any 
unsuspected difficulty rising between him and his 
1 C.A., No.2, 1885, No.63. 
2 Ibid., No.83. 
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Russian colleagues, which could not be settled, was 
to be submitted to the Russians through the English 
Foreign orfice. Then he was given the list of his 
assistants, and instructions that on his arrival at 
Tehran he was, in consultation with the English 
Ambassador, 
to complete all necessary arrangements for 
telegraphic correspondence with this country 
and with India, and you will also take all 
necessary steps, before commencing the 
demarcation of the boundary, to establish 
good postal communications both with Tehran 
and with Calcutta. You will address your 
Reports to this Office, forwarding them under 
flying seal through Her Majesty's Minister at 
Tehran.l 
The assistants listed were: Mr A. Condie Stephen, C.B., 
C.M.G., Colonel C.E. Stewart, C.I.E., and Lieutenant-
Colonel Ridgeway. Captain A.F. Barrow, Bengal Staff 
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Corps, was to accompany him from England as Private 
Secretary and Aide-de-Camp. Nawab Mirza Hassan Ali Khan, 
C.I.E., was appointed his Native Attache. Of this list, 
only Lieutenant-Colonel Ridgeway was then in India. The 
English Party remained a small one. The main body of 
officers, political, intelligence, topographical and 
engineering, the medical and scientific members and the 
Escort, both officers and men, were to come overland from 
India. 
The leadership of the Indian Section was placed in 
the hands of Colonel Ridgeway. Had Durand wished it, it 
could have been in the hands of himself, Henry Mortimer 
Durand, a rising figure who had joined the Indian Civil 
Service in 1873 as Assistant Magistrate at Howrah near 
Calcutta. He had risen very rapidly since 1874 when he 
had been appointed Attache in the Indian Foreign 
Department during the six months' absence on furlough 
of the then Captain West Ridgeway. H.M. Durand was 
recognised as one of the real experts on Afghan affairs, 
and at this time he was Acting Foreign Secretary for 
the Indian Foreign Department, with the expectation of 
soon becoming permanent Foreign Secretary. He was 
actually offered the post of Leader of the Overland 
Party, but after considering it for two days refused. 1 
He saw to it however that his friend, now Lieutenant-
Colonel West Ridgeway, since 1883 official Under-
secretary to the Government of India, also an expert 
on Afghan affairs, and a veteran of the recent Afghan 
War, received the appointment. Throughout the duration 
of the life of the Commission, Durand was Ridgeway's 
champion and confidant. He was also to prove to be a 
sort of deus ex machina for the whole affair from 
beginning to end. 
There was obviously strong competition to be posted 
a member of this expedition. To be appointed to it was 
considered as something in the nature of a glorious 
adventure, a chance to meet the Russians at last, all 
the better that it was a chance to impress them in a 
friendly way, and the Afghans as well, with the greater 
glory of the British Empire, and a chance of danger and 
the need to be on the qui-vive, for this was only 
several years after the disaster of Maiwand and the 
1 Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p.137. 
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cruel triumph of General Roberts in Kandahar, and 
nobody quite knew what would be the temper of the 
Western Afghans. Almost the first draw-card for many 
was the word: Herat. 'Every officer of ambition and 
1 
spirit longed to be one of the chosen few'. So wrote 
Lieutenant A.C. Yate, and went on in his spiteful style 
to describe the 'ill-will and jealousy' which arose, 
asking 'Who a more suitable victwn for their chagrin at 
failure than those who have succeeded?' He probably 
exaggerated this ill-will, but there was plainly a great 
wave of applications with references which the 
petitioner had usually persuaded some senior to write on 
his behalf. A good deal of jockeying is apparent in 
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the discussions of the Viceroy's council, members of 
which themselves expressed a good many personal 
preferences, and occasional condemnatory remarks about 
other persons' candidates, as well as referring to letters 
and discussions from various interested parties in various 
sections of the military and civil establishment. 
In later chapters we shall meet many interesting 
and able people, Indian, Russian and Afghan as well as 
English, who contributed much to this extended Frontier 
Delimitation and Survey. At this stage we are concerned 
only with the initial appointment of the party from 
India, together with the related matters of salary, 
organisation, equipment, conveyance, route and so forth, 
which was in itself quite a logistical achievement. 
Appointments were being made by the end of June and 
1 Lieutenant A.C. Yate, Travels with the Afghan Boundary 
Commission: England and Russia Face to Face in Asia, 1887, 
p.l. 
throughout July and August. Some of the first officers 
appointed were Captain C.E. Yate, Captain E.L. (Ned) 
Durand, elder brother of H.M. Durand, and Mr R.H. Merk 
as Political Officers. Captain De Laessoe was appointed 
as Interpreter (French-speaking) and was soon engaged, 
12t 
as we have mentioned, in preparing background material 
for the Survey. The original choice of Survey Commanding 
Officer fell on a senior man, Major J. Hill, R.E., who 
was also to command the Military Detachment, but he 
became ill at Quetta and had to withdraw from the 
expedition in September, and on 16 September Major 
Thomas Holdich, just returned from English furlough in 
August and now on survey duty to the Zhob Valley, north-
east of Quetta, was brought down to take his place in 
the Survey. The senior military command was then given 
to Captain C.E. Yate. The other two Survey Officers were 
Captain St George Gore, R.E., and Lieutenant the Hon. 
M.G. Talbot. Captains W. Peacocke and P.J. Maitland 
were the Intelligence Officers. Dr Owen, a military 
surgeon with a considerable reputation as an opthalmic 
specialist was appointed Medical Officer to the Commission 
after some discussion as to the state of his health, he 
being known to be recuperating from fever. He was 
notified on 26 August by telegram that he could have 
three months' advance on his pay and an outfit allowance 
of 1,500 Rupees. It was decided that a second medical 
man was not required. Surgeon-Major Aitchison, C.I.E., 
was selected as Naturalist, for this was unknown country 
and the Commission had its scientific wing. He was to 
have an immediate allowance of Rs 1,000 for scientific 
equipment. The geologist was to be Mr Griesbach, an able 
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member of the Indian Survey, whose German nationality was 
considered no impediment. 
Linguistic ability was important. Several of the 
party, especially Ridgeway, C.E. Yate, Merk and 
Peacocke were well qualified and fluent Persian-
speakers. So especially was Colonel Stewart of Lumsden's 
party. Sergeant R.E. Galindo spoke fluent French, Arabic 
and Spanish. Captain Barrow was the Russian expert~ In 
addition to De Laessoe among the officers, Durand spoke 
excellent French. As to the experts in Asian languages 
other than Persian, the experts in Arabic, Turkic and 
Pushtu, they were to be found among the Native Attaches 
and other me~bers of the Indian Party. 
H.M. Durand considered Captain C.E. Yate an 
excellent choice. He had Afghan experience, knew 
Persian and would do well at any hard work. The same 
was true of Captain Ned Durand. He also considered 
Captain De Laessoe would prove invaluable. The Members 
of the Council agreed they knew nothing of Mr Condie 
Stephen and entered Mirza Hasan Ali Khan in his place. 
(From the final instructions to Lumsden already quoted, 
it appears that the English Foreign Office then appointed 
them both). A little later, H.M. Durand was able to 
report that Condie Stephen, actually secretary in the 
British Embassy at Tehran, was said to be a good Russian 
1 Scholar. In all, the Indian Party only included thirty 
Europeans. 
As to Colonel Ridgeway, H.M. Durand said of him: 
Colonel Ridgeway has had much experience of 
political work and has served with special 
credit in Afghanistan. He can speak Persian. 
But the strongest reason of all for sending 
him is that he knows the whole ins and outs 
of this Afghan frontier business better than 
anyone. He has thoroughly studied the 
correspondence, is acquainted with the views 
of the Government of India, and is trained in 
secretarial work. I think his services are 
indispensable.2 
As Leader of the Indian Party Ridgeway received at the 
end of August his official instructions from the 
Government of India: 
1 
You will understand that the entire responsibility 
for the progress of the party to its destination 
rests with you as Senior Political Officer, and 
you should take all needful precautions to avoid 
the possibility of any collision or embroilment 
with the natives of the country through which you 
travel. These precautions cannot be formulated, 
they must be adapted to the circumstances as they 
arise and therefore must in a great measure be 
left to your discretion •••• Supplied should be paid 
For nearly all this information on Personnel, my 
source has been almost wholly N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. 
September 1884, Nos 80-189, especially the very extensive 
Keep-Withs included. But some small amount has also come 
from A.C. Yate, and Sir T.H. Holdich, both of whom wrote 
narratives~ covering the early part of the Boundary 
Commission; and Central Asia No.2, 1885. 
2 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, Pros. September 1884, Nos 80-189, 
p.J. 
for liberally to the headman direct, in the 
presence of the Afghan Agent and Political 
Officer.I 
The work-horse of the expedition was a senior Infantry 
Officer with the Escort Party, Major Rind, 'It was on 
Major Rind, the officer in whose single personality were 
united the duties of Commissariat, Transport and Treasury 
Officer, that the brunt of preparations fell •••. 12 
The senior ranking officer of the escort was 
12~ 
Colonel Prinsep of the 11th Bengal Lancers. The Infantry 
Officers included Major Meiklejohn, Major Rind, Captain 
Cotton, Lieutenant Rawlins and Dr Charles. Captain Heath, 
Major Bax, Lieutenant Wright, Dr Weir and Dr Charles and 
Sergeant Manley were all members of the original escort, 
some of whom were to return to India with Colonel 
Prinsep when the Commission was reconstituted in 1885. 
Three clerks on the office staff, Messrs Clarke, Chapman 
and Marshall, completed the list of Europeans in the 
English Party. During its two years there only one or 
two English visitors arrived, chiefly Mr Finn, a British 
Consul from Resht in Persia, and a noted Asian traveller 
and political officer, Mr Ney Elias. The Times sent an 
artist, Mr Simpson, to accompany the Indian party, but 
after the fiasco on the frontier, he returned to England 
in January 1885. 
1 Included in Survey of India Correspondence Record D.D.N. 
Volumes, No.599, vol.JOJ2 (6) 80~90, N.A.I. Also N.A.I., 
For., Frontier, No.110, Simla, 10 September 1884, H.M. 
Durand's letter to the Revenue and Agricultural 
Department, enclosing copy of instructions to Ridgeway, 
No.2480 E, Simla, 28 August 1884, Secretary to Government 
of India to Lieutenant~Colonel J.W. Ridgeway. 
2 A.C. Yate, p.2. 
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There was some controversy as to the ideal size of the 
Indian party. At the start, some authorities feared 
that possible Afghan antagonism might necessitate sending 
a whole brigade. 1 The size of the English party as 
finally proposed was a shock to both the Russians and 
the Afghans, each of whom at various times offered to 
supply all the necessary escort for the British, at any 
rate on the frontier. Abdurrahman wished the total 
marching party not to exceed 600. It is a little hard 
to give the exact figure. For instance the figures 
given by A.C. Yate, Holdich, Sykes, and The Times 
correspondent all vary somewhat. A.C. Yate 1 s total, at 
Nushki, was 1,395 (thirty Europeans, 465 Indian escort, 
900 camp-followers and camel drivers). That of The 
Time~ correspondent, sent from Kwaja Ali on the Helmand, 
was twenty-five Europeans, 465 fighting men, 554 native 
followers, i.e., total 1,644, but he also lists 1,276 
camels and 744 horses, mules, etc., so that he has 
possibly included the hired Beluchi camel~drivers. Sir 
Percy Sykes, who later checked over all this history 
personally with Ridgeway and C.E. Yate, in both his books 
refers to the moving of 1,600 men and 1,600 camels and 
some JOO horses across Afghanistan. Holdich who wrote 
long after the event and was given to round figures 
writes: 
1 
2 
During the winter of 1884~85 there must have 
been between two and three thousand members 
of the British Commission in Turkestan, without 
reckoning the small army of local employees 
who served as couriers and agents in their own 
Courts.2 
Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p.137. 
T.H. Holdich, The Indian Borderland, pp.98-9. 
It is possibly best to adopt the figures given by A.C. 
Yate as a working estimate. 
To the British this party seemed almost the minimum 
possible for a given number of officers and men. To the 
Russians, used to small parties of highly adaptable 
Cossacks, it seemed unnecessarily large. And although 
it was quite a small military party, without a single 
piece of artillery, the Afghans are to be forgiven for 
failing to understand in the tense months before the 
Battle of the River Kushk that it was a strictly non-
participant force. How were they to know that a legion 
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of clerks, assistant surveyors, personal servants, grooms, 
cooks, bakers, couriers, washermen, wood-cutters, porters, 
ambulance-men, camel drivers and grass-cutters had simply 
to be disregarded as a fighting unit. Even the small 
party from England acquired several hundreds of followers, 
including postal sowars and Persian mule~drivers. It is 
these, perhaps, which add to the larger total supplied 
by Holdich. 
The 465 Escort consisted of something over 200 men 
drawn from the 11th Bengal Lancers and something over 200 
from the 20th Panjab Infantry. In this regard, one must 
not forget that the Indian cavalrymen, the ~rs, 
belonged to a class unaccustomed to manual labour, and 
1 they were usually allowed one syce to two ~rs. Some 
of the highly aristocratic and wealthy Native Officers 
had as many servants as they thought necessary and cared 
to provide for, within the same limits as the English 
officers. 
1 See C.E. Yate, pp.299~300 and 306. 
When one considers how small was the group of 
Europeans, it is not at all surprising to find that the 
choice of the Indian party, both regimental and special, 
without whom the party could scarcely have achieved 
anything, was made with an equal care, and the personal 
recommendations from their English superior officers and 
associates, which furthered the appointment of this man 
or that, were more genuinely heartfelt than cynical 
Lieutenant A.C. Yate had allowed possible in the case of 
the English officers. It is good to be able to report 
at the outset how high in the esteem of all who worked 
with them these chosen Indians remained over the two 
years which they spent in Western and North-Western 
Afghanistan. One should also recall that the name 
'Indian' was applied equally to the Afghans or Pathans, 
the frontiersmen, who, according to A.C. Yate, 'formed 
1 the greater part of the escorti. There were a number 
from the plains of Hindustan, but the Punjabis and 
Pathans were more numerous. There were almost no Sikhs, 
because of the enmity Afghans were known to feel against 
them. 
In the survey there were three native assistants 
'not one of whom', according to Holdich, 
1 
2 
had any really sound experience in the class of 
surveying which was wanted. It speaks volumes 
for the adaptability of the native character 
that they all distinguished themselves on lines 
that were practically new to them.2 
A.C. Yate, p.19. 
Holdich, pp.97-8. 
13~ 
There was Hira Sing, a Gurkha, one of Holdich 1 s usual 
sub~surveyors, who had previously terrified that rather 
inaccurate man with his machine~like mathematical 
accuracy. He turned into an equally able surveyor. 
quote his admiring superior: 
[Hira Sing now] found himself making a neck 
and neck race of it with Russian topographers 
of an advanced school, and usually winning {as 
they themselves expressed it) by the length of 
his snub nose. He was a Cossack when with 
Cossacks; a Mahometan dignitary when 
sufficiently isolated from Headquarters ~ and 
a bad Hindu at any time. He was all things to 
all men, and a most excellent servant to 
Government, except, perhaps, when there was a 
chance of a fight.I 
Elsewhere, Holdich gives a comic account of the same 
hillman becoming an inelegant but capable horseman in 
this land where the horseman, whether British or 
Turkmen, Afghan or Cossack, was king. 
Sharif, 1 gently and gentlemanly 1 o 
Next was Imam 
He commenced a career then which has taken 
him to many strange places since. He has 
been with Sawyer to Western Persia, in 
Southern Arabia with Theodore Bent, and in 
Eastern Africa with our British Boundary 
Commissioners; and he is now a sort of 
Surveyor~General to the Sultan of 
Zanzibar.o •• 2 
To 
The third was the Yusufzai, Ata Mohamed, 9 best of good 
fellows, keen and intelligent, but with very little 
experience as a topographer, and not too much as an 
explorer 1 • 3 
1 Holdich, p.98. 
2 Ib id. , p. 99. 
3 Ibid. 
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This expedition and its personnel gives one some 
insight into the curious glamour which the British Raj 
in the latter expansive part of the nineteenth century 
must have had for adventurous Asians to whom it brought 
these huge opportunities to travel far as soldiers or 
mirzas or technicians. One remembers especially in this 
connection the passage in C.E. Yate 1 s book where he 
quotes a letter of Merk's, describing how on the 28 May, 
1886, some members of the English party had their first 
view of the Amu Darya. 
The evening we arrived, some of us went down to 
the river, where I heard an old native officer 
of the 11th Bengall Lancers remark, 1 Long is the 
arm of the Sirkar,* for I have watered my horse 
in the Tientsin river in China, and to-day in 
the Amu Daria' .1 
lJL 
There were nine Native Attaches in the Political Section. 
They received a rate of pay comparable with that of an 
English military officer 1 although a very junior one. It 
is difficult to ascertain the exact social standing of 
the Native Attaches. They may have had a separate Mess 
but at most times in the field seem to have associated 
closely with the English officers. For example at 
Christmas 1885 1 Colonel Sir West Ridgeway gave a dinner 
party to Colonel Kuhlberg 1 s party. 1 ••• and a right merry 
evening we had. Twenty three of us sat down to dinner 
all told, 
. 2 
ten of us and thirteen of the Russians'. 
Amongst the ten of 1 us 1 were the Mirza Hasan Ali Khan 
1 C.E. Yate, p.229. 
* Sirkar, a Persian word with many meanings, here 'the 
government 1 , its commonest Indian connotation. 
2 C.E. Yate, pp.115-6. 
and the Kazi Mohamed Aslam Khan. An on another occasion 
Merk and Yate were guests at a dinner given by three 
, 1 
other Native Attaches. 
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Colonel Ridgeway and Major C.E. Yate were both much 
concerned with ironing out discrepancies of pay for the 
English clerks and the Native Attaches and in making sure 
of the recognition of the mirzas as 'Gentlemen'. The 
Nawab Mirza Hasan Ali Khan was the Senior and most highly 
paid of the Indian members. As far as social standing, 
his princely title was certainly recognised. The nine 
Native Attaches received pay in something the same range, 
that is somewherebetween a junior Captain and a Clerk. 
The following list is probably the complete list of 
Native Attaches: Kazi Mohamed Aslam Khan, Sirdar Mohamed 
Aslan Khan, Sirdar Sher Ahmad Khan, Ressaldar-Major 
Mohamed Husain, Ressaldar-Major Bahawaldin Khan, Central 
India Horse, Subadur Mohamed Husain, 2nd Sikhs, Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad, Khan Baba Khan and Jemadar Azizullah Khan. 
This latter Attache was the one by whom Lieutenant A.C. 
Yate seems to have been chiefly impressed. He had seen 
service in England, including two years in the service 
of the Prince of Wales; then he had fought for the Turks 
against the Russians in the 1877-78 Balkan Wars and had 
been decorated by the Turks for valour at Kars. Returning 
to India, he had become a Jemadar in the 5th Punjab 
Cavalry, and later joined the Punjab Police, whence he 
had been seconded to the Boundary Commission party. All 
the Native Attaches at times went in charge of small 
Political Missions to various localities. Another able 
l Ibid., pp.86-7. 
Indian, Allah Baksh, a former schoolmaster, was also 
promoted to this important work. 
The native military officers kept their own mess, 
and, in relation to the English officers, they had, of 
course, a non-commissioned rank. In relation to the 
ranks, the Ressaldars and Subadurs held rank equivalent 
to that of Captain, and the Jemadars to that of 
Lieutenant. In spite of their dependence on the Indian 
Section of the Party, and in spite of the genuine high 
esteem in which the English Officers held many of them, 
and the affection they felt towards them, it is a safe 
assumption that all the English shared the usual British 
military belief, that no Native Officer was really 
capable of commanding even as many as 200 soldiers. 
lJc 
Early in the discussions on the formation of the Party, 
there had been some talk of sending the English Officers 
of the Indian Party by steamer to Bushire and letting them 
go overland through Persia to the Heri-Rud. This led to 
a discussion on the route for the remaining Escort Party. 
At this stage, Durand said that if all the officers went 
by this route or even if they all came from Europe, he 
would still send the same Escort Party that was already 
chosen, except for added British cavalry, but that they 
could not send less than 100 Infantry and 100 Cavalry. 
He then added: 1 But no native officer would even command 
1 
a hundred infantry and a hundred cavalry' • 
As to the way in which the non-military Indian 
appointments were made, we may give one example. A 
certain Lieutenant J.R. Dunlop Smith wrote recommending 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Nos. 80-189, Secret Discussion 
on Personnel, p.15. 
for appointment his Persian coach 1 a Shirazi 1 Mirza 
Mohamed Khalil 1 who wished to obtain government 
employment and sought appointment to the Commission to 
further his chances in that direction. Dunlop Smith 
wrote: 
He is a most estimable fellow and has a really 
scholarly knowledge of Persian and Arabic. He 
has passed men for both the Persian Honours and 
Arabic High Proficiency. He does not know 
English.l 
Soon after, Merk wrote to inform Ridgeway that he had 
told the Mirza to hold himself in readiness. 2 He was 
duly appointed to the Staff of the Boundary Commission's 
Persian Office. Several of the Afghan members were 
particularly helpful to the Commission, but in at least 
one instance an Afghan member of the Boundary Commission 
Party fell into a position of personal danger and 
embarrassment, because of the political significance of 
his association with the English. When the Commission 
was finally wound up, one of the chief concerns of all 
the senior officers was to make sure that due rewards 
were received by all the native members of the Party, 
about almost all of whom the highest eulogies were sung. 
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H.M. Durand's was usually the final voice in all the 
preliminary discussions. For example, he flatly refused 
to consider a suggestion that the Political Officers 
should be given seniority over the others. He said the 
aim should be to make all the officers Ras comfortable as 
possible 1 • 
1 N.A.I., For. i Sec. F, Pros. Decembe~ 1884 1 Nos 202-85, 
K.W., No.12, p.J. 
2 Ibid., p.4. 
They will have rough hard work, a march of 
probably something like 3000 miles before 
they get back to India, cold and exposure, 
some danger, and no chance of medals or 
decorations or of fighting under respectable 
conditions.l 
What chiefly offends the modern observer of these 
preparations, brought up in a more egalitarian school, 
is that no one then questioned the discrepancy of the 
rates of pay between British and Native, so that even 
the most junior of the English clerks on the Commission 
earned about five times as much, with the exception 
mentioned, as the most highly educated or politically 
able Native. The same discrepancy traditionally 
occurred in the pay of the British and Native Officers. 
lJE 
To give an example, the Mirza Mohamed Khalil was appointed 
at Rs 40 per month, while the most junior of the three 
English Clerks, Mr E. Marshall, was appointed at Rs 172, 
8 annas per month. Ressaldar-Major Sirdar Mohamed Aslam 
Khan, with whom the utmost responsibility was lodged 
during the Boundary Commission's term on the frontier, 
received Rs 600 per mensem, and the other Native Attaches 
and highest ranking Ressaldars received salaries of about 
this scale. On the frontier, these salaries were found 
to be higher than the Russian equivalents. 
The Commission members received their usual salaries 
where applicable, plus a twenty per cent 'deputation 
allowance', which in some cases was marked 'specially 
sanctioned'. Special outfit allowances were also made 
in some cases. For instance, Dr Owen was informed by 
telegram on 26 August 1884 that his pay had been fixed 
1 ,-~ N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. December 1884, Nos 202-85, 
1~. W • , No • 18 • 
at Rs 790 per month and an immediate outfit allowance of 
Rs 1,500. Sirdar Mohamed Aslam Khan received an outfit 
allowance of Rs 500. The Military Escort also received 
this allowance of twenty per cent plus. The usual rates 
of Native military pay were as follows: (all per mensem) 
Sepoy (infantry) Rs. 24; Sowar (Cavalry) J6; N.C.O. 
(Infantry) 50; N.C.O. (Cavalry) 75; Jemadar (Infantry) 
150; Subadur (Infantry) 200; Jemadar (Cavalry) 200; 
1 Ressaldar (cavalry) 250, also JOO. 
At the start, H.M. Durand suggested that his 
brother, E.L. Durand, should receive Rs. 1,200, C.E. 
Yate, 1,000, Merk, six or seven hundred, De Laessoe, 
lJ~ 
600. He thought Ridgeway should receive Rs. 1,500 per 
month plus twenty per cent. At this time the standard 
value of the Indian Rupee was 2s.Od sterling. Therefore, 
for example, Captain C.E. Yate's monthly pay was about 
£25 sterling (1885 valuation). 
Lumsden received Rs.4,000 and an outfit allowance 
of Rs.JOO. As to the financing of this Expedition, the 
Indian Government was anxious to pay only half of the 
expenses, but the Home Government remained adamant, and 
all expenses had to be met by the Indian Government. 2 
A Special Logistical UndertakiE_g 
For any expedition of such a size going to such 
comparatively unknown parts for such an indefinite 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. December 1884, Nos 202-85, 
K.W., No.18, p.J. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. September 1884, Nos 80-189, 
No.188, Abstract of Telegrams on this matter. 
length of time, the basic amount of equipment would 
inevitably be large. But this was also in great measure 
felt to be a prestige expedition in which nothing was to 
be stinted. As Holdich describes it: 
The outfit of the Commission was on a scale of 
li·berali ty which left nothing to be desired. 
Tents such as had never before been seen in 
Turkestan, mess equipment and mess attendants, 
stores of wine and delicacies such as might 
serve the purpose of a series of royal 
banquets in the Turkestan wilderness were all 
provided •••• It was evidently intended that the 
English Commission should carry with it the 
prestige of India's wealth and luxury. The 
dwellers of Turkestan were to be impressed 
with the greatness bf it, and I think they were 
impressed-finally. But the cost of the impression 
was considerable, and the trduble of conveying the 
means of making it, from Quetta to the Bari-Rud 
was even more considerable. All the most bulky 
commissariat supplies - 'bhusa 1 , flour, etc., were 
found en route as we moved from point to point 
along the Afghan border, and thus our carriage was 
enormously reduced; but even so we wanted 1,600 
camels to convey us from the Helmund and place us 
on the banks of the Hari Rud, and for each of these 
camels something like a rupee per diem was demanded 
and paid.l 
H.M. Durand was of the opinion that the Escort should be 
especially well-armed to impress the Russians as well as 
the Afghans. He maintained that 'for the look of the 
thing they should be as well ~rrned as possible' • 2 But 
Ridgeway maintained that they should keep their usual 
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arms, and that is probably how the matter finished. Apart 
1 Holdich, pp.99-100. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. September 1884, Nos 80-189, 
p.15, Secret Discussion on Personnel. 
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from small-arms, and the usual commissariat requirements, 
this expedition had to carry quite a big Toshakhana 
(Treasure) a large part of which, according to A.C. 
Yate, was in Russian gold roubles which were known to 
be acceptable currency throughout Central Asia. It also 
included a large number of suitable gifts such as 
handsome rifles, a large telescope, a diamond-mounted 
watch, full-dress officers' swords and belts, and so 
forth. Apart from this sort of Toshakhana item, one of 
the favourite gifts was a horse. The Amir's 
Representative, the Kazi-Sa 1 ad-ud-din, for instance, was 
presented at first meeting with a handsome Waler. When 
they were returning through Kabul, among the numerous 
gifts to the Amir were 'two valuable Arab horses for the 
1 Amir and a Waler for each of the sons'. 
The office equipment considered necessary, including 
a reference library of all available material on the 
region in several languages, made a considerable item. 
Then there were medical stores, and a quantity of 
ambulance material for the party, as well as the Escort's 
separate Ambulance unit. They carried, for instance, 
some uncomfortable contraptions known as Moseley Crates, 
which were special camel-saddles for transporting the 
sitting sick. The personnel included a good number of 
stretcher-bearers. 
As to foodstuffs, Holdich's paragraph quoted above, 
and the many passages in C.E. Yate's book on entertaining 
the Russians, suggest that there was no shortage of 
1 C.E. Yate, p.J60. (It is to be hoped all Australians, 
even Victorians, will realise how highly prized were the 
Walers on this expedition). 
luxuries. Flour was carried at first, but later bought 
in North-Western Afghanistan, as were most meat and 
vegetable supplies. The allowed daily ration for 
Europeans was as follows: meat, one lb., bread, one lb., 
or biscuit, twelve oz., vegetables (green) one lb., 
preserved potatoes two oz. or compressed vegetables, one 
oz., rice, four oz., sugar 2f oz., tea, five-sevenths oz., 
salt, two-thirds oz., and firewood, three lbs. The 
Native ration was varied somewhat from group to group, 
according to their customary eating habits, and on the 
whole they seem to have been fairly fed. 
The Afghans being on home territories probably 
procured the diet they were most accustomed to. One 
reason traditionally advanced for the lower rates of 
military and civil pay to Indians (as now to Papuans) was 
that they could live more cheaply than Europeans because 
they were in their natural habitat. The Afghan 'Disaster' 
of 1841-2 had made it clear that a lower standard of diet 
and a poorer sort of clothing might allow for Indian 
survival in the plains of India but it did not allow for 
survival at all in the rigorous Afghanistan winter. On 
the present occasion some trouble was taken to ensure 
sufficient warm attire, as well as adequate food. C .E. 
Yate comments on the 'liberality of the Government of 
India in the way of free issues of warm clothing' and 
praises the good sense of having included so many Pathans 
in the Escort, for the Indian did not like heavy boots, 
and was always too ready to divest himself of his heavy 
clothing when in camp and so was more likely to suffer 
chills. He remarks that the blanketing coats and 
trousers served out on their leaving India were no 
protection at all against real cold 1 and goes on to 
praise the heavy 1 barak 1 cloth which they had since 
purchased in the Herat district. 
The troops like barak clothing and look well 
in it, and any little extra cost in the price 
is more than covered by the money which was 
wasted in the issue to our meni with the so-
called Indian warm clothing, of flannel 
waist-belts and chest-protectors, neither of 
which were appreciated or understood, and 
were rarely or never worn, whereas a double-
breasted barak* coat answers every purpose.l 
Although care was taken over rationing, there were 
unforeseen mishaps, as for instance, on the march towards 
the Helmand, when once, for some unstated reason, there 
were not enough sheep procured and the meat ration ran 
out. A group of Beluchi camel-drivers, mutton"-ea ters 
to a man, were issued with the usual ration of flour, 
dal and ghi, which they threwdown at the feet of the 
issuing Commissariat man as a gesture of contempt at the 
meatless ration. Young Lieutenant A.C. Yate, who really 
was an unspeakable Englander, wrote of this occasion: 
A good sound flogging would have been the best 
reply to such insolence, but such behaviour is 2 truly worthy and characteristic of the Oriental. 
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This same young gentleman did not at all hold the general 
opinion of the superior nature of the Boundary Commi.ssion 
Commissariat. He complained 
1 C.E. Yate, pp.66-7. 
2 A.C. Yate, p.61. 
* barak, a close thick woollen material of local 
manufacture. 
I hear there is a rumour about that this 
Commission is fitted out with unprecedented 
splendour and luxury; indeed I have seen 
some allusions to this effect in the press. 1 The sooner that idea is abandoned, the better. 
He was chiefly incensed that there was no supply of ice 
for the Escort at Quetta. 
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The tents of those days were also a heavy piece of 
equipment. There were various types. The largest single 
tent seems to have been the Field-Officer's Kabul Tent, 
one of which 'had been ordered from the Elgin Mills for 
Dr Griesbach' • 2 It had an outer fly extended to the 
ground, with bathroom, and weighed 150 pounds. Captain 
I 
Yate complained about his 'small Kashmir Swiss-cottage' 
and said it was poor protection against the sharp winds 
of Badghis. Later on, after a season on the frontier, 
he reported that new tents had arrived in the 'very nick 
of time' in December 1885. The men's tents had stood up 
badly to the rough climatic conditions, and it was found 
that the bathrooms of the officers' Swiss~cottage type 
tents were unsuitable as they tended to blow away in the 
strong winds. He reported that on the whole officers' 
tents had lasted better. For hard marching, he said, 
and for warmth at night nothing could beat the Kabul 80~ 
pounder, but for long encampments the Kashmir tent was 
better. It was only one Persian mule-load, 'say three 
l Ibid., p.2J. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. December 1884, Nos 202-85, 
K.W., No.12, p.2. 
1 
maunds in weight', much cooler in summer, and could be 
sewn and felt-lined in winter. At the Bala Murghab 
encampment a number of local kibitkas had been brought 
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to house many of the men during the worst cold, and these, 
although expensive, were left for the Afghans soldiers 
when the party moved on to Charshamba. Another item which 
had to be carried in numbers was the mussuck, the 
characteristic water-carrying vessel of the East, a sheep 
or goat skin, skilfully skinned and sewn where necessary, 
which when not in use had to be kept thoroughly greased 
and covered from the sun with straw. 
A single object, according to A.C. Yate, proved to 
be 'one of the most intricate cruces that is at present 
taxing the ingenuity of the transport officers of the 
Mission'. It was how to carry the flag-staff to the 
frontier. 2 This was a solid structure in three pieces, 
each about fifteen feet long. In addition it had its own 
bulldog to guard it. He appears to have been only one of 
many dogs which accompanied the party, hunting-dogs, 
terriers, and pets, another reminder of the times. There 
was always room for a foot-sore dog on a mule or camel-
pack. When the expedition was assembling, the bulky 
nature of some of the scientific equipment came under 
1 Maund, like our Bushel, is a measurement of bulk rather 
than of weight and so varies from substance, as well, no 
doubt, as from place to place, and so is a thoroughly 
complicated term. It varied from twenty five to eighty 
five and even up to 100 pounds. In modern rural 
connotation, a bale of lucerne hay dried out to about 
forty lbs. weight might be comparable to a maund. But 
as a term of measurement even C.E. Yate and Holdich seem 
to have had different estimates. 
2 A.C. Yate, p.15. 
criticism, especially some of the large cases belonging 
to Surgeon-Major Aitchison, the naturalist. The total 
of these required fifteen camels to carry them. Some 
cases held scientific stores. Referring to these, 
Lieutenant Yate hoped, in his friendly fashion, that if 
'Beluchi freebooters' were to open them 'they might be 
tempted to try a meal of arsenical paste' • 1 The empty 
specimen cases were much sought after by Beluchi camel-
drivers as impressive-looking loads which left their 
camels in fine condition after a long march. 
Magnesium wire lighting was brought along to 
illuminate the camp-lines, but it could not stand up to 
the Afghan winds. There were quite a number of other 
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objects the usefulness of which was later queried by such 
observers as C.E. Yate and Holdich, who were on the 
frontier the whole time. One piece of camel-loading which 
Yate especially criticised was the large dough-mixing 
cauldrons, two of which made a load for a camel. This 
was because he found, as all travellers do, that fresh 
Afghan bread was delicious and everywhere procurable. 
He especially criticised the huge number of camp-
followers, such as the many grass-cutters who had been 
brought to cut foider in a land where for much of the 
year there was no grass, and where it was the custom of 
the country to sell stored hay and grain in quantities 
in the local markets. But in many cases these 
~riticisms were merely acts of being wise after the 
event. It had not been known to what extent local bread 
or fodder might be procurable; and the Indian 
l Ibid., p.9. 
Commissariat organisation had been built up over many 
years and was probably somewhat rigid. If they were to 
equip a large party, then they would do so as they knew 
how. 
The assembly in the railway yard at Rindli took 
place during August. There the work of aggregation went 
on. It is vividly described by A.C. Yate, and the sheer 
bulk of as-yet unstowed materials was a matter of 
amazement to the onlookers. For weeks the railway yard 
was a mass of crates, bundles, heaps, flies, sandflies, 
tethered protesting camels, shunting trains, and persons 
engaged in moving or checking stores. 
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The members of the Indian party, collected from 
various parts of the sub~continent, had entrained at 
different periods of time and many different places but 
all must finally have come up or down the railway on the 
Eastern plain of the Indus to the junction at Sukkur, and 
then across the Indus through Jacobabad to Sibi, the then 
terminus, where a short branch~line brought them to 
Rindli, south of the Bolan Pass, which led North to 
Quetta. Most of the Escort Party was encamped near 
Quetta, but the Transport Section worked at Rindli under 
Major Rind. 
We have already seen how at the beginning of August, 
while the Amir was only being asked to allow the Indian 
Party to go by the Western route, Sandeman in Beluchistan 
had been asked to provide 300 or 400 good camels. The 
number required was increased and on 24 August Sandeman 
sent a telegram to H.M. Durand that he had been able to 
1 
arrange for 1,100 camels. This work had fallen mainly 
on Mr Barnes, the Political Officer at Quetta under 
Sandeman. Barnes was to assist the Party and Escort 
until they reached the Helmand. As The Times 
correspondent put it, the Party got the •service of 
every quadruped within reach of Sir Robert Sandeman's 
2 long arm'. 
The quest for camels for sale, and for camel-
14E 
owners with camels for hire, with or without drivers, and 
for camel-drivers, was one of the old, old problems of 
the European on the move in the Middle East or Central 
Asia. By this time the Russians and the English were 
equally well aware of the guile which would confront 
them. No gipsy ever had such art in selling a horse as 
the camel-men knew to sell a defective camel to a 
Feringhi. There is a long section in Grodekov's The 
War in Turkumania which deals with this matter and the 
processes which the Russians had developed in acquiring 
the use of the ship of the desert in sufficient numbers. 
It is most amusing reading, but it was very much 
essential text-book stuff for any organiser of an 
expedition. For once, A.C. Yate 1 s uncharitable turn of 
phrase is probably no less than true. He speaks about 
the 'hoodwinking and scrim-shanking games of the camel-
drivers'. The chief Beluchi camel contractor was' Sirdar 
Azaf Khan, and he at least produced the camels, but many 
of them were of indifferent quality, many were young and 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, September 1884, Nos 80-189, 
No.168. 
2 The Times, 18 November 1884, p.13. 
untrained, worst of all were the 'flighty young females' 
Quite soon many of the hired Beluchi camel-drivers were 
to desert, not wishing to go so far from home, and even 
earlier camels began to go astray, sometimes with their 
load as well. But it was the camels which made possible 
the safe crossing of the desert and allowed for forced 
marches, for camels alone could carry enough water-
filled mussucks. In Herat Province the camel was partly 
replaced by the large Persian mule, whose strength quite 
surprised those who had only previously used Indian 
mules. 
The March 
Most of the Political and Survey Party and some of 
the Escort were already waiting in the more orderly 
atmosphere of Quetta, which since 1878 had been being 
built into a British military and administrative centre 
for Beluchistan, and, although, as Holdich describes it, 
it was still largely of mud-brick construction, there was 
already the Quetta Club, avenues of you4!poplar trees 
and other sights acceptable to the party of officers which 
was so soon to lose itself in what they believe to be the 
totally un-Europeanised world of Western Afghanistanc 
In point of fact, once they crossed the Helmand desert, 
they found themselves back in a region of identifiable 
Euro-Asian vegetation. 
At last the Transport Section at Rindli was ready 
to join the Quetta party" On the morning of 9 September 
the last string of camels filed out of the railway yard 
at Rindli and set off on the several day's journey through 
15( 
the Bolan, a long but not especially hazardous Pass througl 
the Central Brahui Range to Quetta, 
One of the problems of the first few days of march 
was that of speeding up the loading of camels" On the 
first day loading started at 2 p.m. but the complete 
train was not ready until 7.30 p.m. The next day it was 
ready by 5 p.m., and after a week's practice the last 
camel was ready by 4 o'clock. 
In Beluchistan they marched through the first part 
of the night. The September day-time heat of these hot 
dry mountains of Northern Beluchistan is very severe. 
Although most of the route from Quetta westward to 
Nushki was through country of 3,000 or 4,000 feet 
elevation, the latitude is approximately that of Lake 
Eyre in our part of the world and the early Autumn heat 
was intense. Later on, on the way to the Helmand, they 
changed over to the age-old caravan practice of breaking 
camp in the earliest hours of morning. 
The whole party was divided up into three echelons, 
with a small advance party which Mr Barnes took on to 
find camps and organise fodder and water arrangements. 
No mention has yet been made of the fodder requirements 
of the transport animals. As coal to the steamer, as 
petrol to the motor, so was 'bhoosa' - baled hay of any 
kind - to the camel, horse or bullock. 
without which they could not run. 
It was the fuel 
1 Yate records 
that it took 200 maunds of grass or bhoosa to fill one 
day's requirements of the entire mission., This might 
1 A.C. Yate, p.J8. 
be estimated as the equivalent of about 200 bales, or 
about five or six tons in weight. In addition, oats, 
barley and other grains were transported for the horses, 
In a region where there was so much arid land, the 
regular supply of fodder for such a party was a very 
difficult matter. 
The third echelon contained 662 camels carrying 
heavy baggage, guarded by a company of the 20th Punjabis, 
mounted two to a camel on riding-camels, and by a 
detachment of cavalry. This echelon was under the 
command of Captain Yate, and he was assisted by Captain 
Cotton of the Escort and the Native Attache, Ressaldar-
Major Bahawaldin Khan. Lieutenant Yate accompanied his 
elder brother. The Lieutenant was not an official member 
of the Party. He had applied for permission to accompany 
it while on furlough from his regiment. Questions had 
earlier been asked about this in the Viceroy's Council, 
and no reason had been seen why he should get an outfit 
allowance, or twenty per cent service allowance, as he 
was unattached and was going along as a Newspaper 
Correspondent. No one then foresaw that the younger man 
was to become a lively journalist given to making 
unguarded political comments about British and Russian 
relations in Middle Asia which made his book far more 
widely read than his brother's better one, and at times 
leaves one wondering why the book, or the articles in 
the Pioneer on which it is based, had not been severely 
censored prior to publication. 
Water was a continual problem; the autumn would see 
all normal reserves at their lowest, and this party was 
a large one. Of the route through Beluchistan, Holdich 
wrote: 'There is water in these valleys, but it is 
' 
frequently salt water, and it leaves a leprous white 
edge to its trickles in spite of its deceptive 
1 
clearness' o Captaip Yate had engaged in Quetta, as a 
personal servant and 'a man likely to be useful', a 
person who spoke Persian, Pushtu, Turkic, Hindi, and 
some English, and who was very well acquainted with all 
Afghanistan. At every well, this enterprising fellow 
unwound his pugree and using it as a rope lowered a 
drinking-vessel to the water and tasted ito Of 220 
water-samples procured in this way, only three were good 
drinking watero 
One of the reasons for going west through 
Beluchistan at least as far as Nushki was that they had 
the protection of 'Sandeman's strong arm' o The other 
was that North of Nushk~ the Kandahar Registan (Desert) 
had narrowed and the crossing to the Helmand could be 
made with few waterless camps. A proposal to push the 
party through by forced marches with a small party of 
cavalry via Nushki directly to Rudbar on the Helmand was 
made by Colonel Ridgeway. In Council HoMo Durand 
15~ 
favoured this route but said at the same time 'All claims 
advanced by the Afghans must be carefully weighed, and 
accepted or rejected for a good cause'. By telegram on 
6 September Ridgeway was given permission to communicate 
directly with the Kazi. 2 It turned out that the Amir 
had intended them to strike the Helmand still further 
west from Chaki [Chaghai] and the Kazi, when communicated 
1 Holdich, PolOJ. 
2 N.A.Io, Sec. F, October 1884, Nos 1-71, No.3. 
with, firmly supported his master's preference. On 28 
September Ridgeway, as Chief Political Officer, wrote 
to the Kazi, whom he was not to meet for another few 
days: 
I therefore think you are mistaken, but at the 
same time I fully appreciate your loyalty to 
his Highness, and your anxious desire to carry 
out his instructions to the letter. In this 
duty I will always endeavour to help you.l 
This was the first of many disagreements between the Kazi 
and Ridgeway, and on this occasional Ridgeway gave way, 
and took what was almost certainly the more favourable 
although longer route through the Naro Hills for 150 
miles due westward from Nushki to Chaki. This was a 
region of obscure tribal boundaries, but the Naro Hills 
were later to become the boundary between Afghanistan 
and Beluchistan. From Chaki they began their Northward 
march to the Helmand. The Times correspondent describes 
their march by moonlight over the desert north of Chaki, 
'the line of camels extending over seven miles' • 2 By 
this time 'they had made their change over to morning 
departures~ 'Reveille' was at 1.30 a.m., 'boot and 
saddle' at 2.30 a.m. and they marched until 10 a.m. 
Camel troubles continued. Already in the Bolan 
Pass a certain number of loaded camels had bolted, never 
to be seen again. As the echelon left Chaki many of the 
Beluchi hired camel-drivers deserted, and although they 
were ultimately replaced by Afghans, there was a period 
1 N.A.I., Sec. F, October 1884, Nos 307-60, No.316. 
2 The Times, 12 December 1884, p.13. 
when too few drivers had too many camels; and camels 
with broken nose-strongs could not be recaptured in time 
to prevent their bolting or interfering with other 
camel-lines. The usual plan was that one surwan looked 
after five camels. 
Holdich's description of this march to the Helmand 
is well worth recording: 
Thus we journeyed on, our nightly caravan of 
camels jolting and swinging itself along the 
route, till we reached the last stage of the 
desert journey which intervened between the 
foot of the Naro hills (where water was to be 
had at intervals) and the Helmund. Here were 
nigh upon sixty miles of sheer desert to be 
crossed without a drop of water; and th~s was 
practically the only serious difficulty of that 
route. We took it in detachments, water for 
each detachment being sent half-way in skins, 
on camels. This was just enough for a drink, 
but no more. Across the last glaring, sun-baked, 
cracked and shrivelled sixty miles of desert we 
encountered no great obstacle of sand •••• A mile 
or so short of the Helmund we dropped down from 
gravel-strewn flats into a gully which led to 
the refreshment of green pastures by the river-
banks. l 
Night marches for so large a party were guided by fires 
lit by scouts at conspicuous points on the route. Even 
so, sometimes sections became lost for a time. At Kwaja 
Ali, where they reached the Helmund on about 1st 
October, they rested and made the acquaintance of the 
Kazi Sa-ad-ud-din. First impressions appear to have 
been favourable. The Times correspondent reported that 
he was good looking, pleasant, with gentleman-like manners, 
1 Holdich, pp.105-6. 
was about forty, very intelligent, and with a special 
interest in geography. He had a few tents and about 
fifty carefully selected followers. Ridgeway described 
him as 'friendly, frank and well-disposed' • 1 But there 
were, nevertheless, certain causes of friction. The 
main one was the size of the party. The Kazi was well 
aware that the Amir wished the party to be limited to 
about 600, and that Ridgeway at Nushki had hoped to 
reduce it to 900, and here was a party of about 1,500 
souls. Ridgeway also mentions at this time that no 
firm arrangement had been made with the Amir about any 
named quantity of supplies. Naturally the Amir would 
expect to supply 600 and not 1,500. The whole party 
proceeded westward down the river to Rudbar, and by 9 
October Ridgeway reported that extra camels had been 
obtained for the Kazi 'and no follower need walk' • 2 But 
on 16 October the Kazi, who was very ill at the time, 
received a letter dated 28 September from Abdurrahman 
disclaiming responsibility for so large a party, and he 
immediately demanded the immediate reduction of the 
party to 600 and threatened to stop all supplies until 
this should be done. This time he yielded to Ridgeway's 
persuasions. Meanwhile, at the Indian end, the Viceroy 
had intervened on 4 October by sending a kharita to the 
Amir about his attitude in 'so serious a matter 13 and 
pointing out how necessary the large party was for joint 
English-Afghan prestige. 
15: 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, October 1884, Nos 307-60, No.308. 
2 Ibid., No.345. 
3 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, October 1884, Nos 220-61, No.259. 
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From Rudbar they went three more marches down the 
southern bank of the Helmund before crossing it at 
Ashkarik near Chaharburjako They then followed a route 
through the lagoons and reed-beds of the Hamun to the 
twin town of Lash Juwain. During this part of the 
journey Captain C.E. Yate made contact with the primitive 
inhabitants of the Hamun reed-beds. 1 From Lash Juwain 
they were going through country which had been traversed 
and described by the Russian explorer Khanikov, who had 
come down from Herat and Farah and crossed into Persian 
Seistan in 1858, but the only accurate itinerary was that 
provided by Abdurrahman himself. 2 Their route took them 
about forty miles to the west of Farah, and they were 
surprised to find that the country was far from desert, 
and that where irrigation was possible, as in the 
orchard and commercial centre of Anardara, the villages 
and towns were prosperous. 
Already north of Helmand they had been joined by a 
small escort of Afghan regular infantry and when on 14 
November they at least reached Zindajan on the Heri-Rud 
thirty miles west of Herat, the Governor of Herat came 
to meet them. One and all they were enchanted with the 
beautiful and fertile valley of the Heri-Rud. Lieutenant 
Yate was particularly entranced by the 'perfect little 
beehive 13 of the village of Pahra, nearer to Herat, with 
its narrow alleys among the mud-domed cottages crowded 
within its fortress wals. He also commented in his 
1 Holdich, p.109. 
2 A.C. Yate, p.65. 
3 A.C. Yate, p.136. 
usual style on the friendliness of the people: 'I must 
say that the hatred of the Ferangi and infidel 
attributed to these people is veiled under a strangely 
impenetrable mask of mock friendliness 1 • 1 Other 
observers found the friendliness of a more genuine 
variety and indeed for some months the people of Herat 
province had been living on rumours, and people were 
withholding commodities from the bazaar in the hope of 
making a handsome profit from the British. 2 
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A.C. Yate had been particularly impressed when the 
Kazi, hearing that Ned Durand's fine Waler had been 
'lost', imposed a neighbourhood fine of 2,000 rupees, 
should the horse not be returned promptly, and it was.3 
He had earlier had the grace to record: 'The Mission has 
every reason to be satisfied with the arrangements made 
by the Amir and for the general friendliness and 
willingness to aid shown by his officials' • 4 At Zindajan 
there was a very friendly meeting and Colonel Ridgeway 
was asked by the Governor of Herat to review the Afghan 
troops. The Indian Party then went on to Ghorian nearer 
the Persian frontier and then still further down the 
Heri-Rud till it began to turn northward at Kuhsan. 
Here they made their camp on 19 November, to await the 
imminent arrival of Sir Peter Lumsden's party, and the 
less certain arrival of the Russian party under General 
Zelenoi. 
l Ibid., p.141. 
2 C.A., No.2, 1885, No.143, Inclosure, Consul Finn to 
R. Thomson. 
3 A.C. Yate, p.141. 
4 Ibid., p.87. 
As to the Indian Party's successful transit of 
South-Western Afghanistan, the last words are with its 
participant, Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich, looking back 
on it from 1901 when he published his book, The Indian 
Borderland, 
That march to Kushan ••• included 226 miles of 
desert and 540 of foreign territoryo The 
average length of the day's march was eighteen 
miles ••. and on two occasions distances of 
fifty-eight and sixty miles were covered within 
thirty-eight hours. This reflects great credit 
on the infantry escort ••• who always had heavy 
guard and other duties to attend to. For six 
days running they averaged twenty two and a 
half miles per day. We entered the Herat valley 
with about 500 fighting men, 700 followers, and 
1,800 camels, and Colonel Ridgeway issued his 
farewell order and reported the arrival of the 
Indian Section of the Commission at Kuhsan on 
November 19th. It was a march of which he 
might very well be proud, and is probably still 
a record in frontier marching.I 
The Arrival of the English Party 
To return to the English Party. On 28 August, Sir 
Peter Lumsden had written from London to the Amir 
expressing his pleasure at his appointment and recalling 
the kindness of Dost Mahomet to himself when as a young 
man he had lived in Kandahar. 2 He said: 'I cannot 
1 Holdich, p.110. 
l5E 
2 See Bellew, Dr H.W., Journey of a Political Mission to 
Afghanistan in 1857, under Major, later Colonel, Lumsden, 
with an account of the country and people; with 8 
illustrations, London, 1862. Sir Peter Lumsden, a 
lieutenant at this time, had accompanied his elder brother, 
and provided the crude but informative sketches which 
illustrate the book. If anyone wishes to learn about the 
rigours of Afghan life in 19th century Kandahar during a 
period of famine, epidemic, poverty and political unrest, 
let him read this book. 
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forget the friendship of many years which existed between 
1 your grandfather and my brother'. He then left London 
on 4 September with his small party. Travelling 
comfortably by express train across Western Europe and 
Russia, he reached Odessa, where on 9 September he 
requested the British Consul to telegraph Granville that 
his party could probably not reach Sarrak.hs before 
November 'in consequence of the distance which the escort 
2 has to traverse'. By 16 September he was in Tiflis 
meeting the Governor-General of the Caucasus, Prince 
Dondukov-Korsakov, and also General Zelenoi, who had 
returned from the German spa where he had been at the 
time of his appointment and was settling his affairs in 
Tiflis before he went to St Petersburg to receive his 
instructions as Russian Boundary Commissioner. Here the 
British Commissioner got a very strong warning from 
Dondukov-Korsakov that the Russians had not yet finished 
their occupation of Turkmen territory and hence were not 
ready to proceed with the Boundary Delimitation. He 
sent a telegram to Granville: 
1 
2 
At an interview to-day Governor-General 
unofficially laid stress on delay of work 
of Commission being essential to Russia, 
and referred to difficulty of fixing point 
of departure, maintaining that the Heri-Rud 
mentioned in Clarendon Agreement only referred 
to stream south of Zoorabad, north of which it 
became Tejend. This was refuted. He also 
mentioned rumoured intention of Panjdeh Sariks 
migrating to Yulatan in the event of Afghan 
troops advancing. Russian Commissioner, who 
was present, starts for St Petersburg to-morrow 
C.A., No.2, 1885, No.161, Incl.I. 
Ibid., No. 91. 
to receive final instructionso I named 7th 
Nov (NoS•l as date of Commission reaching 
Sarrakhso 
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By 22 September he was in Tehran, where he spent 
nearly two weeks with the British Ambassador, Mr Thomson, 
marking time for the Indian party which was hardly out of 
Beluchistan. On 2 October, he left for Meshed 
'accompanied by a Mehmandar and an escort of Persian 
2 troops'. His route took him through the ancient towns 
of Shahrud and Nishapur and he reached Meshed on Jl 
October, and New Sarrak.hs on the left bank of the Tejend 
on 8 November. From here he sent a courier on the 
following day with a long telegraphic despatch which 
Granville received on the fifteenth. Meanwhile on the 
twelfth Granville had sent him a letter reporting the 
Russian Foreign Office advice that Zelenoi would not be 
on the frontier until January. This still referred to 
Sarrak.hs as the meeting place. It has not been possible 
to ascertain at what stage Sir Peter must have been 
informed that the Escort party would be stationed well 
within Afghanistan territory far to the south of 
Sarrakhs. His telegram from Sarrakhs of the ninth 
contained somewhat ominous information: 
1 
2 
I arrived here yesterday. Weather very fine, 
and no reason why work of the Commission should 
not have been proceeded with. Afghan officer 
with 100 horsemen joined me here, corroborat±ng 
reports that Cossacks had been pushed forward 
and apparently permanently located on right bank 
of the Heri-Rud opposite Pul-i-Khatun, and he 
further informed me that Russians had been 
Ibid., No. 94. 
Ibid., No.102. 
stopped by Afghans attempting to clean out springs 
on Badkis road to Herato Governor of Akhal, who 
has been at Old Sarrakhs for three days with 
Colonel Alikhanoff, made arrangements to leave 
for Merv this morning without meeting me. I sent 
Mr Stephen to inquire whether these troops had 
advanced forty miles beyond Sarrakhs by the 
Emperor's orders and to point out possible 
conflict with Afghans by infringement of 
Agreement of 1873, and probably grave results. 
General Komaroff replied that Prince Dondukoff 
had ordered the advance of the Cossacks to Pul-
i-Kha tun as an outpost, but denied that Russians 
had visited other portions of Badkis, though 
admitting that a surveying party had been sent to 
Yulatan with instructions not to go further than 
Kushkol 
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Lumsden was very sure he had been insulted by the Governor 
of Akhal, General Komarov. Two subsequent telegrams from 
Lumsden to Granville reveal that he was ready to take a 
strong line with the Russians and indeed had already been 
a little indiscreet in his language at such an early 
stage. He reported having informed Colonel Alikhanov 
that the 'Russians had overstepped the line of 
demarcation'. He had also mentioned to him 'aggressive 
action' on the part of the Russians in sending 'officers 
and emissaries into Afghanistan 1 • 2 Having been 
courteously received by the Persian Governor of New 
Sarrakhs, and escorted by the Persians up the Western 
side of the Heri-Rud, Sir Peter Lumsden reached Kushan 
and took over from Ridgeway on 19 Novembero On 14 November 
a cautionary telegram was sent him from Granville at the 
1 Ibido, Nool27. 
2 Ibido, No.128. 
Foreign Office advising 'extreme caution' in his 
1 
movements until General Zelenoi's arrival in January. 
The Russian Party 
In view of all the efficient paper-work and 
preparation of time-tables which had been going on in 
the Foreign Offices in London and St Petersburg and in 
the Indian Foreign Department, it was indeed 
regrettable that the Russian Section of the Boundary 
Commission failed to arrive on the frontier in November 
1884. Its composition had been known for some time, and 
however much the higher English Party personnel knew 
that it might be delayed for a long time, there seems to 
have been a prevailing hope among junior officers that 
it would soon appearc The explanation that General 
Zelenoi was ill was followed by the explanation that the 
Cossack troops were going into winter quarters. And 
this in its turn was followed by the genuine diplomatic 
delaying demand from Russia that the northern and 
southern limits of the area to be examined by the 
commission must be defined before the work of 
demarcation could begin. At any rate the Russians did 
not appear. 
As long ago as 27 July, Thornton had written to 
Granville telling him of the probable appointment of the 
Russian Commissioner. 
His Excellency (De Giers) also told me, 
confidentially, that he had suggested 
l Ibid., No.lJl. 
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"'' General 'Jelenoi to the Emperor, as the 
Russian Commissioner, and His Majesty, 
as well as the Minister of War, had 
acquiesced in the suggestion, but that 
it was not known yet whether the General 
would accept the appointmentcl 
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The Russians considered General Zelenoi would be an 
excellent team-mate for the English Commissioner, as he 
had had previous experience on Boundary Commissions on 
the Turkish frontier, in which he had worked harmoniously 
with English officers. Somewhat later, M. Lessar, a 
railway engineer of French origins who had by degrees 
become the leading Russian explorer of Transcaspia and 
the chief exponent of the ethnographical theory of 
colonisation with which the Imperial Russian Geographical 
Society had been preoccupied over some years, began to be 
mentioned as a possible Assistant Commissioner. The 
English interested parties were rather relieved that 
Colonel Alikhanov was not mentioned as a member. It was 
2 
not until 28 September that Thornton was able to send 
news that M. Lessar, who had previously declined on the 
ground of ill-health, was to be Assistant Russian 
Commissioner. Colonel Kuhlberg was named as Chief 
Geodetist, and M. Ivanov, another well-known Russian 
Central Asian explorer, was to be geologist. Colonel 
Alikhanov would not be attached to the Commission but 
was to remain controlling officer of the district of 
Merv. With the exception of General Zelenoi, the other 
three duly took their place on the Commission when it 
1 Ibid., No.72o 
2 Ibid., No .. 101. 
was finally re-established after the spring and summer 
crisis of 1885. 
The English Party's Winter Sojourn in Herat Province 
Almost as soon as he reached Kuhsan, Lumsden set 
off with Ridgeway and other officers across Badghis, a 
nine days' journey, to look at the Penjdeh trouble spot 
where the Sarik Turkmens, who had driven out their 
Herati governor, were now since June being disciplined 
by a body of Afghan soldiery and a military governor 
appointed by the Amir. The energetic Survey Officers 
were already hard at it covering miles of country in 
increasingly wintry weather. The Political Officers 
and the Native Attaches of the Polticial Section, 
parcelling out the main regions of settlement among 
themselves, were becoming acquainted with and noting 
down the relevant facts about the inhabitants. But much 
of the camp, especially sections of the Military Escort, 
and the camp-followers, stayed at Camp Kuhsan, with time 
on their hands. 
The busiest part of Camp Kuhsan was undoubtedly 
the Hospital and Dispensary in the enthusiastic hands 
of Dr Owen. A.C. Yate records that in the first ten 
days of 1885, Dr Owen had 500 patients, quite a number 
of whom remained as 'in~patients'. He had a good 
reputation as an eye surgeon, and during his long time 
on the frontier performed a great number of operations 
for cateract. He was obviously a progressive man, and 
sent by telegram for a supply of the new pain killer, 
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cocaine, 1 from London. He travelled quite extensively 
throughout the region and on some days seems to have 
treated a great number of patients. At least once he 
fell foul of the jealousy of a native hakim. 
The camp halted a day on purpose to allow Dr 
Owen to operate on the eye of the Sheikh-ul-
islam. But professional jealousy, or political 
intrigue, or something, intervened; and before 
the appointment time, the private Hakim of Kazi 
Sa'ad-ud-din .•• had carried the day and persuaded 
the old gentleman not to undergo the operation.2 
When the Commission terminated and the matter of rewards 
for good service came up, Ridgeway spoke especially 
highly of the good work done by Dr Owen in promoting the 
English image by his medical skill. 
As to the Survey, and the political and military 
problems which confronted this strictly peaceful British 
Boundary Commission Party and raised great tensions and 
problems for the senior officers such as Lumsden, 
Ridgeway and their immediate assistants, these are 
matters which will appear in later chapter. 
In these winter months, there followed a 'weary 
wait', as Holdich calls it, 3 in the big camp on the 
banks of the Heri-Rud and then at Bala Murghab. 
1 
2 
3 
The temperature is falling and the skies are 
clear here in November. The lines of poplars 
which thickly edge the Hari Rud had turned 
yellow and red: the wheat and ba~ley fields, 
where they existed, were brown a6d hard; and 
A.C. Yate, p.228. 
C.E. Yate, p.14. 
Holdich, p.110. 
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over the dash if the little dried stubs of 
wormwood had no green about them, and the 
dried stalks of asafoetida and thistle 1 
stuck out aggressively from the groundo 
(* arid flats) 
The weather, though coldj was very exhilarating, real 
huntsman's weather, and there was plenty of pig and 
pheasant shooting. 
The early morning found us in the saddle, 
and about ten we might usually be found 
ooowith a table spread on the sloping 
sand bank ••• and a breakfast ready such as 
only a Persian (or an Indian) cook can 
prepare without the accessories of a 
kitchen.2 
On his return from Penjdeh, Lumsden removed the camp 
from Kuhsan to Bala Murghab, an old fortress town on 
the Murghab. Here they wintered, spending endless 
time shooting pheasants on the irrigation canals 9 and 
vying with one another, those who had the chance to 
go up among the Sariks, to buy the admirable carpets of 
the region, which is where many of the best 'Bokharas' 
have always been made. Notwithstanding, time hung 
heavily on their hands on many days when the weather 
kept them to their tents. 
1 
2 
Thick clouds gathered in solid banks on the 
Tirband-i-Turkestan •. The grey outlook 
changed rapidly to gleaming white, as snow 
lay soft and deep on mountain and valley. 
The bare skeletons of the few fruit-trees 
that lived their chequered lives about the 
mud-walls of the old mud-town of Bala Murghab 
Ibid., p.112. 
Ibid., p.119. 
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were picked out in permanent white filagree; 
and we lined ou• tents with felt, and built 
impromptu stoves and made what cheer we could 
out of the situation.l 
Apart from pheasant shooting, winter life at Bala 
Murghab was enlivened by tennis (they had two courts)i 
horse-races for locals, as well as English and Indian. 
A 'Derby' was won by Captain Ned Durand 1 s Arab, and his 
Waler in the second place. Griesbach, the geologist, 
and the various survey parties and political parties 
returned with plenty of good stories about their 
adventures. Photography and sketching took up some of 
the ~fficers' time. Camel-fights were enjoyed by all. 
The camel-fights were but sham and meretricious 
engagements. The ferocity with which the huge, 
hairy, bubbling animals rushed at each other 
were but a poor criterion of the damage that 
resulted from the fight •.•• The smallest camel-
boy could separate the two, and the game was 
never played out •••. 2 
Only the Hindus really suffered, as they moved about the 
camp in their preferred camp attire, pyjamas and unshod 
feet, cold accentuating their isolation in a Moslem 
world. But there was scarcely any illness in the camp 
at Bala Murghab. 
In early February, because of the growing tension 
between Russian and Afghan 7 it became advisable to move 
the main body of this non-combatant force well away 
from the possible military danger spota They were taken 
1 Ibid., pp.121-2. 
2 Ibid., pp.123-4. 
back to make camp near Gulran, the furthest western town 
of any size in Badghis, near to the Persian frontier, 
across which they could be quickly withdrawn if the 
threatening trouble should mount to a crisis. The 
crisis was well on its way. 
16 
CHAPTER V 
WHY THE RUSSIAN COMMISSIONER WAS LATE 
'The War in Turkumania 11 
The Russians had long had trouble with the Turkmens. 
Russian merchantmen sailing near the eastern shores of 
the Caspian had met them as pirates, and the Turkmens of 
Mangishlak frequently raided their neighbours, the 
Kazakhs ('Kirghiz' to the Russians of the time) who 
inhabited the 1 Kirghiz Steppes' north-east of the 
Caspian, people long kept under the Russian eyeo 
The weakness of eighteenth century Persia and 
Russia's struggle with that realm in the latter 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, first to 
establish her hold in the Caucasus and then to achieve 
control of the Southern Caspian, encouraged the Turkmens 
of South-western Transcaspia, the Gokhals and the Yomuts, 
to make inroads on Persia, and the Sea Yomuts engaged in 
uncontrolled piracy in the shallow sea, retiring to 
secret retreats among the shoaling waters of its south-
eastern corner. 
By the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828, Russia 
established complete dominance on the sea at the expense 
of Persia and set about disarming the pirates. From 
1 This is the title of the notable book written by Majc-
Gen. NoI. Grodekov, General Skobelev 1 s second-in-command 
in the Akhal-Tekke campaign of 1881. I have used it 
largely in this section of the chapter. 
this time Russian interest in Transcaspia increased, and 
the first Russian foothold on the north-eastern shore of 
the Caspian was a fort built in 1834 but soon moved to 
a more suitable site and named Fort Alexandrovsk. It 
never flourished. After the disaster which overtook 
General Perovsky's large army in the winter of 1839 when 
he was crossing the Ust-Urt on his march towards Khiva, 
the north-east side of the Caspian was avoided for 
another twenty years. In 1840-42 the Yomuts in the 
south near the Persian frontier were taken under Russian 
1 protection 1 • Actually 9 from time to time after the 
Treaty of Turkmanchai, various Yomut chieftains had made 
approaches to the Russians, asking for supplies of 
Russian wheat, for help in building a port, and such 
matters, but prior to 1840 the Russian Government had 
always declined to help. 
At last, in 1858, Prince Gorchakov, writing to 
Alexander II, suggested the time was ripe for a military 
expansion into Transcaspia. 1 In the 1860s, Nur Verdi 
Khan, an unusually able Khan of the Akhal Tekkes, 
Turkmens living in the long fertile oasis watered by 
streams from the northern slopes of the central Kopet 
Dagh, defeated the Persians and began to establish a 
centralised control over the Tekkes. In the 1870s, 
already an old man, he was to be the chief protagonist 
of the Russians. It was partly this possibility of 
growing strength among the Turkmens which made the 
1 Akad. Naouko Turkmenskoi SSR/Inst. Ist. Arch. Eth. 
Russkovo-Turkmenskiye Otnosheniya v. XVIII-XIX v.v. (Do 
prisoyedineniya Turkmenii k Rossii. Sbornik Arkhivnikh 
Dokumentov). Ashkabad, 1963, No.329. 
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Russians decide to build the port and military base of 
Krasnovodsk, begun in 1869. In 1870 Colonel Stolyetov 
made a wide survey of much formerly unknown Transcaspian 
territory. A southern port was also made at Chikishliar 
with a view to making it a base to store military 
equipment for a later expedition against the Tekkes. 
The fall of Khiva to the Russians in 1873 was a shock to 
the Turkmens and from then on there was always a certain 
difference of opinion amongst different groups over 
'what policy to pursue towards the Russians•. 1 In 1873, 
for example, one Tekke leader wrote (to the Russians, 
it is true) 
I think it my duty to point out and assure you 
that till the flag of the White Tsar flies over 
the land of the Tekkes, there will never be 
peace and order.2 
Yet, at the same time, deputies from Merv forbade the 
Tekkes of Akhal to communicate with the Russians. 
In 1874 Transcaspia, which had first been under 
the military control of the Governor-General of 
Turkestan, was made a separate military region under the 
command of Major-General Lomakin. Grodekov 1 s account of 
the events that follow is extremely interesting: 
1 
In the beginning of 1878, ~ rupture with 
England was imminent, it was decided to 
strengthen the forces in the Trans-Caspian 
Military District and to send a force of 
sufficient strength to Akhal and towards Merv 
•••• In consequence, however, of the agreement 
with England at the Congress of Berlin, tµe 
Grodekov, The War in Turkumani~ vol.I, p.72. 
2 Ibid. 
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Emperor ordered these movements to be suspended, 
the force concentrated at Krasnovodsk for this 
campaign being ordered to confine its action to 
local objects, and to the assurance of 
tranquillity in the country.I 
17 
At this stage 9 the Russian ambassador at Tehran, Zinoviev, 
proposed to a Special Committee at St Petersburg early 
in 1879 that the first step should be the occupation of 
Tekke territory. 
At their meeting, it was stated that, as long 
as nomad tribes, under no control, and owning 
no superior, wandered in Turkumania, peace and 
tranquillity would not be ensured in it, and 
the Southern frontier of the Transcaspian 
territory could only be considered as firmly 
established when it was conterminous with the 
limits of countries which recognised 
international treaties.2 
The committee recommended the following procedure, 
first!~ in the spring of 1879 to form a force sufficient 
to conquer the Akhal-Tekke oasis, keeping it at a place 
called Chat, secondly, to occupy the line of the Uzboi 
channel, the old bed of the Amu when it formerly 
disembouched into the Caspian, and keep it safe for 
caravans. Merv was to be left unoccupied. 
1 
2 
The occupation of Merv ••• would be a disadvantage 
to us both from the political, and especially 
from an economic point of view. A movement from 
Akhal is therefore not only strictly forbidden 
but the chief duty of the Commander of the 
Expedition will be to avoid, by every means in 
his power, giving cause for further advance into 
Turkuman territory •••• The line of operations is 
Ibid. , p. 77 • 
Ibid., p.81. 
not to traverse any Persian territory, even 
with the consent of that country •••• ! 
When not fighting in skirmishes, the Turkmens preferred 
to fight in sallies from a mud-walled fort of large 
size, situated for preference on a mound, with a deep 
well in it, and accommodation for all their families. 
They frequently used the ancient Scythian trick of a 
feint flight of horsemen to lead their adversary into 
a surprise nest of other fighters. Even at this time 
they were largely armed with bows and arrows. 
In 1879 Russian forces had been landed at the new 
port of Chikishliar, a de~olate port on shallow water of 
which the Commander-in-chief, General Lazarev said: 
'Here at Chikishliar is our school of patience' • 2 At 
last the Russians began to move to Chat, according to 
plan, under General Lazarev 9 General Lomakin, the 
Governor, accompanying them. They moved eastward 
17.3 
towards Geok Tepe, the chief military position in the 
Akhal Tekke oasis, and Lazarev died suddenly. This meant 
that Lomakin took over the command, in itself a disaster 
as his capacity and integrity were both wanting. The 
advancing Russians met with some success until they came 
to the Geok Tepe villages and drew up below the fortress 
Yang-i-Shah on the mound of Denzil Tepe, where, except 
for those who had shut themselves up at Ashkabad, all 
the people of the Oasis were enclosed. After several 
attacks and skirmishes, Lomakin 9 s considerable force 
suffered losses which greatly surprised the Russians and 
1 Ibid., pp.81-2. Resolution confirmed by Alexander II, 
Jan. 23, o.s.1879. 
2 Ibid. , p. 8 5. 
led to a military enquiry after they had withdrawn to 
Chikishliar. Lomakin was replaced and his successori 
General Tergukasov, found a shocking situation. He 
171.i 
found guns worn out, ammunition scarce, hospital stores, 
warm clothing and tents almost non-existent, scurvy 
widespread, camels dying by dozens daily, postal services 
disorganised, chaplains in short supply, common soldiers 
and camel-men unpaid for months, numbers of Cossacks 
employed by officers as private servants. And, worst 
of all, half of the sixty Staff Officers who went with 
Lomakin to Geok Tepe, had been on 1 special service 1 , 
that is, they had no business there at all, but were 
drawing a full service allowance and using up numbers of 
baggage-camels. 
Such a shameful defeat and su,ch a shameful situation 
alike called for a second Russian expedition against 
the Akhal Tekkes. Knowing that reprisals would follow, 
the Tekkes strengthened their great fortress and Nur 
Verdi Khan looked for allies from Merv. The Mervi sent 
4,000 horsemen and the Sari.ks promised help. The old 
Khan died at this time o 
General Tergukashov drew up a plan to occupy late 
1880 and all 1881 so that by 1882 it would be possible to 
take Geok Tepe. From there, the Russians would spend 
the whole of 1883 occupying the Akhal Oasis. The 
General emphasised the need for speeding up the building 
of the railway from Krasnovodsk at least to Kizil Arvat. 
He retired from illness before the first part of his plan 
could be carried out and was succeeded by General 
Muraviev as Military Governor, but the campaign was put 
into the hands of a meteoric fi.gure 9 General Skobelev, 
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hero of the 1877-78 Turkish war. He attended 
consultations of the Army General Staff which had already 
been working out plans for the defeat of the Akhal Tekkes. 
He quashed the plan of the Assistant Chief of Staff at 
Orenburg 9 that the attack should come down through Khiva 
and Bokhara and occupy Merv before the Akhal Tekke Oasis, 
and insisted that the original plan should be speeded 
up. He agreed the railway was necessary, but insisted 
that adequate camel transport was the first requirement. 
Persia was by no means reconciled to her Northern 
neighbour, however much she appreciated the comparative 
respite from Turkmen raids, and for thi.s reason the 
Persians at this time were willing to receive four 
Deputies from Merv 9 but neither party was able to make 
a settlement to ensure the mutual safety of Khorassan 
and Merv, but the Deputies promised that they would not 
support the people of Akhal in the event of Russian 
attack, but would never refuse them sanctury if they 
sought it, as the people of Merv could not forget the 
Akhal Tekkes were their blood brothers. 
General-Adjutant Mikhail Dmitrovich Skobelev, 
temporary Commander of the 1880-81 Expedition against 
the Akhal Tekkes, who rode a new white horse every week, 
who went to battle in a dazzling white uniform, who said 
to his protesting doctor in an open space before Geok 
Tepe: 1 I wonRt be wounded. The bullet still hasn 1 t been 
1 
made which can destroy me.', was one of the worldus 
genuine fire-breathing men of war. His courage in battle 
1 Russkaya Starina, volo51, p.220, Vospominan~vracha 
o M.D. Skobeleva 2 1880-1881. 
was uncanny, he even 1 ate better' before an engagement. 
He inspired his men with courage and his enemies with 
terror. The Turkmens had a nickname for him 9 Blazing 
Eyes. 
He was also a brilliant organiser. No detail of 
the forthcoming campaign escaped him, and when once 
more the Russian army drew up before Denzil Tepe, the 
Turkmens were doomed. On 24 January, 1881, his army of 
8,000 stormed the fortress in which were gathered 18,000 
Tekke families with an estimated 25,000 fighting-men. 
As the fortress was taken 9 men, women and children 
rushed out, and it was estimated that some 20,000 
Turkmens were slaughtered. The Russian losses were 
trifling; they admitted to 200 dead. This holocaust was 
in line with Skobelev 1 s belief that such an initial 
pacificatory act would save much trouble later. As 
Grodekov quotes him, he said: 
For every drop of Russian blood spilt, I 
will make a river of the enemies' blood 
flow.l 
And again: 'Do not forget that in Asia he is master who 
seizes the people pitilessly by the throat and also 
. th . . . t . 1 2 H 1 . d imposes upon eir imag1.na ion. e a so sai : 
'Victories in Central Asia are bloodless in proportion 
to the strength of the artillery' • 3 He believed: The 
principle to be followed is that of power, and not of 
4 
mutual agreement. But he did say: 1 I wish to finish 
1 Grodekov, The War in Turkumania, vol.I, p.307. 
2 Ibid., p.344. 
3 Ibid., p.142. 
4 Ibid., p.306. 
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the war quickly so that the peaceful inhabitants may 
resume their agriculture and trade' • 1 This strange man 
embarrassed his government by an anti-English on-to-
India speech at a banquet in Paris in the latter part of 
1881, and was asked to return home. Even in the field he 
had often been ill and had had premonitions of death. 
Now his premonitions continued, and h~ died suddenly in 
June 1882 after a visit to St Petersburgo 
remained a military legend. 
But he 
After the fall of Geok Tepe there could be no new 
large-scale war from the Turkmen side. Too many Turkmens 
saw that it was better to side with this dreadful enemy 
and get the benefits of the White Tsar's government than 
perish before his guns. Soon afteri Captain Naziroff 
made a survey of the roads to Merv, and in 1883 1 Colonel 
Alikhanov, himself a Moslem from the Caucasus, went in 
disguise to Merv in the Russian merchant, Muchine's, 
caravan. In due course, after this piece of secret 
diplomacy, Deputies from Merv began to come and seek 
help from the Russians at Ashkabad, instead of seeking 
it from the Persians. Whatever might be believed in the 
English and other Foreign Offices of Europe, there would 
be no more independent future for the Merv Oasis, any 
more than for the Akhal. On 28 February 1884, the Merv 
Deputies came to Komarov at Kari-Bend on the edge of the 
oasis and offered their submission. 
'Monsieur Lessar 1 
Up to the time of the occupation of the Akhal Tekke 
Oasis, the expressed Russian aims in Transcaspia were 
1 Ibid. I p.307. 
confined to two objectives, one, political, with an eye 
on the British forward movement from India, the other,· 
administrative, the total pacification of the Turkmens. 
As to the latter one may cite General Lazarev's ~ 
Proclamation to the Tekkes of Upper and Lower Akhal of 
June 1879: 
My object is neither plunder, nor destruction, 
no'.r bloodshed, but the restoration of peace in 
your steppes, the opening of uninterrupted 
caravan routes •• ooThe troops entrusted to me 
by my emperor will shortly come •• o.For you, on 
your being accepted as Russian subjects, the 
time will have arrived to cease your brigandage 
and cruelty, and to take to peaceful pursuits, 
to agriculture, cattle-breeding and tradeo•o•You 
will be allowed to take service in the Russian 
sotnias •• o o 1 
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That a complete change took place in the Russian 
attitude towards the Turkmens and that we find them 
obsessed with the idea of uniting the Turkmen tribes 
under one Russian control is due, in a very large degree, 
to the extensive travels among the Turkmens and 
consequent writing and lecturing about them of one man, 
2 Pavel Mikhailovich Lessar, an engineer. Arriving in 
1 Grodekov, The War in Turkumania, vol.II, pp.511~2~ 
2 P.Mo Lessar, b.1851, of French origin but Russian 
upbringing and education, had achieved recognition by 
his work as a railway engineer when he built a military 
bridge over the River Prut during the 1877-78 Balkan War, 
and by the publication in 1879 of a book entitled, 
Military Railway Construction of the Russian Army during 
the 1877-78 Campaign. During the Boundary Commission, he 
achieved great diplomatic success in London as a special 
pleader of the Russian case in relation to the Turkmens. 
After taking part in the St Petersburg discussions which 
concluded the Commission's work in 1887, he seems to have 
{continued on p.179) 
Transcaspia in 1880 to take part in surveys to establish 
the routes of future railways 9 he soon became primarily 
an explorer and spent three energetic years thoroughly 
acquainting himself with the geography and ethnography 
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of the whole of South-East Transcaspia and its frontiers 
into Khorassan and Northern Afghanistan. Ethnography, the 
scientific description of the various races of mankind, 
was at the height of its fashion as a scientific study in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century, and it much 
absorbed the members of the politically influential 
Imperial Russian Geographical Society, who saw the whole 
of Central Asia as an important field for ethnographic 
work. Lessar quickly won the esteem of the Society and 
the reports of his conspicuous journeys are to be found 
in the 1882-1884 files of the Society's Izvestnik. These 
were usually fully reported in the Russian press and 
duly abstracted and translated for the English Embassy 
in St Petersburg by Mr Michell, whose well-known 
1 abstracts 1 from the Russian press of those years are 
invaluable to the student of this diplomatic history. 
Lessar 1 s first extensive penetration of the South-
East took place in the autumn of 1881 when he took a 
survey party from Ashkabad across the northern foothill 
1 
country of the Kopet Dagh eastward to Sarrakhs. He 
(footnote 2 continued from p.178) 
exchanged exploration for the diplomatic service. He 
was briefly Russian Consul at Liverpool and then became 
a member of the Russian Diplomatic Service, stationed 
at Constantinople. 
1 C.A. No.1 9 1884, No.41, Inclos. July 13, 1882, 
Michell's translation of a long report in Inval~de 
Russe of June 18 (30), 1882. 
lSC 
found Sarrakhs occupied by 700 Persian soldiers who 
seldom dared venture outside the fortress area and indeed 
even all the farming was carried on within the extensive 
1 
area enclosed by the fort. He followed the Heri-Rud 
valley down some way, reporting it suitable if cleared, 
for the construction of a cart-road; he also kept his 
mind on the possi.ble future construction of a railway 
in that areao He returned to Ashkabad via Meshed. 
In May of the next year he again visited Sarrakhs 
and found that the country was much more subdued. 
Whereas, in 1881 9 travellers had moved in groups and 
followed secluded mountain-paths, he now met 'single 
2 
unarmed travellers mounted on mules or even on foot 1 • 
He found the same tranquillity when he entered Khorassan. 
He reported that many Tekkes were migrating from Merv 
to the Atek (the northern slopes of the eastern Kopet 
Dagh) and he was now very interested in the matter of 
equitable water-distribution in Asian agriculture. He 
began to interest himself in and gain much information 
about the country between the Tejend ( 1 Heri Rud' is still 
used by him) and the Murghab, but he found his guides 
very unwilling to let him across the river to its eastern 
bank. He believed that most of this country had never 
been seen by Europeans. 
Along the Murghab and south of Merv the 
following Saryk settlements occur:-
Yulatan, Penjdeh and Bala-Murghab. Beyond 
1 This was not uncommon. The extensive outer walls of 
a place like Balkh suggest that even this famous city 
had much of its best farm~lands, and not only housing, 
inside the walls. 
2 C.A. No.l, 1884, No.55, Inclos. 
this, southward 9 the Djemshidis and Teimuris 
occupy the slopes of the Paropamisus. West 
of the Murghab 9 and as far as the Heri Rud 
there is not a single inhabited place. All 
the forts along the Kulik*are in ruins and 
abandoned by the inhabitants. The road from 
Merv to Herat was described by Shakespear 
and Abbot 9 who travelled it in 1840 and 1841. 
No information existed respecting the country 
between the Kulik and the Heri Rud: no European 
traveller had ever visited it.l 
He found that a state of hostility existed between the 
Sariks of Penjdeh and the Mervis 9 and both plundered 
the Jamsh.idis and Teimuris as well as the settlements 
of Northern Afghanistan and Khusan. But by this time, 
he was told 9 the Sariks were the only people who 
pillaged openly. Lessar had mostly Aleili Turkmen 
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tribesmen in his party 9 and they assured him their 
present immunity from attack was only due to the presence 
of Russians. 
He finally insisted on crossing the river and 
travelled east of it through the salt-well region of 
Kungrueli, where he found two roads led south to 
Afghanistan, one through Ak Rabat and one to Kyzyl-
Bulak. He found the passes over the Borkhut mountains 
quite easya He came to the first Afghan settlement of 
Khusan 9 and so entered country already known to Russian 
and English travellers. He had particularly noted the 
good water supply at Ak Rabat and the convenience of 
the road from there to Herat, a distance of about 380 
versts (253f miles). At Khusan he entered Afghan 
territory. 
* Unidentified. Kulik = Kushk? This would be a possible 
mistake in Russian handwriting~interpretation by a 
typographer. 
l Ibid. 
On our approach the guard at the gates 
displayed no hostility but great astonishment. 
When we explained to them by what route we 
had arrived their suprise was greater still, 
that road being inaccessi.ble to the Afghans 
even to the present day.l 
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The Khan of Khusan treated him politely and sent him to 
the large town of Ghorian, where he was annoyed at having 
to be detained two days while word of his visit was sent 
to Herat. Then he left for Meshed and found the Persian-
Afghan frontier showing much evidence of the uexploits of 
2 those miscreants (Merv and Saryks).u Passing through 
Taebad (to-day the Persian Customs town on the road from 
Meshed to Herat), he visited Khaf, the 1 headquarters of 
Colonel Stuart, the English Agent at Herat 1 • 3 Before 
returning to Sarrakhs 9 he acquainted himself more 
closely with the Persian side of the river near Turbat-
i-Sheikh-,Jam and on the river at Zoorabad he found a 
large settlement of refugee Salor Turkmens, who expressed 
the greatest devotion to Russia, which vdi.d not, however, 
prevent them from charging very high prices for everything 
.4 
I procured from themu. From Zoorabad on his way back 
to Sarrakhs, he passed through Pul~i-Khatun, a name to 
become familiar to diplomats in 1884 and 1885. 
Towards the end of the summer of 1882 he set off 
again to re-examine all this part of the country. He 
left Ashkabad and went through much of the Persian 
1 Ibid. 9 No.58, Inclos. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
frontier country before he came to Meshed and then, 
again crossing the Heri Rud at Zoorabad, began his 
important exploration of the Badghis, traversing it and 
following the Murghab down to Merv, then returning to 
Sarrak.hs. This was a most important journey because he 
had much to say on his return of the bad relations 
existing between the Sariks of Penjdeh and the Tekkes 
of Merv. As Lessar found it, 
The best proof of the ineptitude of the Tekes 
of Merv for dealing with matters of common 
interest is afforded by their attitude towards 
the Sarak.hs (Sariks)~ who 1 notwithstanding their 
small numbers, terrorize the whole Merv oasis~ 
and render almost impossible all trading relations 
between it and the neighbouring countries. The 
Tekes have only to combine and Penjdeh woul.d cease 
to existo Instead of doing this 9 they send out 
marauding parties of four or five men, who, 
approaching the Sarak.h settlements by stealthi 
carry off women and children and also cattle. 
Thus Lessar drew the attention of the good Russian 
Hercules to another small Turkmen stable •••• 
After this expedition to Badghis and Merv 9 he 
returned to Russia to restore his health which was 
shattered after the rigours of his three years of 
exploration. In December 9 1882 9 he returned to Ashkabad, 
leaving a mass of notes to be prepared for a paper for 
the Geographical Society, but the map he was preparing 
was still not available. It was reported that the main 
object of his journeys already reported in the press 
had been 1 to explore the roads leading southwards from 
2 Ashkabad 1 • He had intended to explore again from 
1 Ibid., No.151, Incloso 
2 Ibid., No.SJ. 
February 1883 but he did not undertake any major 
expedition until the end of the year. He became 
interested in the channel known as the Uzboi 9 the 
depression which ran south westerly across Transcaspia 
from the lower Amu near the Aral Sea to an arm of the 
Caspian south of Krasnovodsk. He wrote a letter to 
'Golos' in February giving it as his considered opinion 
that the project of joining the Amu to the Caspian by 
diverting waters into this channel was impracticable 9 
although there was every reason that an ordinary canal 
for navigation and irrigation could be constructed but 
that its excessive cost would put it out of range for 
a long time into the future. 1 The Kara Kum Canal 9 the 
u.s.s.R. fulfilment of this nineteenth century hope 9 is 
now bringing the waters of the Amu already beyond 
Askhabad, and 9 as Lessar foresaw 9 it is an ordinary 
canal, the cut from the Amu being near Karki far to 
the south of the Uzboi channel and not far from the 
frontier of Afghanistan. 
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His major expedition of 1883, in company with a 
mining engineer and a military officer, took him across 
the central Kara Kum to Charjui on the Amu 9 a preliminary 
exploration for the future railway to Bokhara and 
Tashkent. 
After this he returned to give an address to the 
Geographical Society later in 1883. His subject was the 
Kara Kum desert and steppe but more clearly than 
anything else it justi.fied the Russian belief that in 
1 Ibid. 9 No.87 9 Thornton to Granville 9 St Petersburg 9 
5 Mar. 1883. 
their role as pacifiers of the Turkmen steppes, they 
must chase the Turkmen tribes to their remotest lair. 
Lessar brilliantly described the unrest of south-
eastern Transcaspia and the disturbance which overflowed 
into Persian 9 Afghan and even Bokharan territory. He 
summed up this portion by saying that the northern part 
of the Kara Kum was completJ1pacified 9 that the central 
.A 
portion, the direct route between the Akhal Oasis and 
Khiva was still not entirely safe, then he went on: 
The southern portion, i.e., the route from 
Atek and Khorassan to Merv, and further to 
Bokhara 1 remains very much in the same 
position as heretofore, that is to say, 
danger abounds everywhere.l 
His concluding paragraph inevitably pointed to the need 
for Russian control of the whole Turkmen people: 
In the opinion of the Tekes the conquest of 
Merv will complete the pacification of the 
region; the importance attached to this point 
in Central Asia is so great that its 
possessor will be able to command the whole 
country as far as the mountains; the Ersaris, 
pressed on one side by the Russians, and on 
the other by the Bokharians, will have to 
submit to the new order of things; whilst 
the Saryks need not be taken into account; 
this insignificant tr.ibe have only hitherto 
been able to maintain an independent existence 
owing to the disorder which exists in Merv.2 
If, as happened later on Lessargs proselytising mission 
to England in 1885, many of the members of that 
phlegmatic nation found his pro=Russian arguments 
1 Ibid., No.168, Inclos. Abstract from Novoye Vremyia, 
30 Dec. 1883/9 Jan. 1884. 
2 Ibid. 
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irresistible, it is hardly to be expected that he would 
succeed less well at home with an audience all anxious 
to take the road he showed themo From this moment the 
Russian way was south, up the Murghab and to the 
mountainso 
18( 
The Russian 'forward policy' in Transcaspia was 
much aided by the arrival in Transcaspia on 28 March, 
1883, of Lieut.~General Alexander Vissarionovich Komarov, 
sent to replace the not very forceful first Military 
Governor of Transcaspia, General Rohrberg, who had been 
unable to prevent extensive alaman raids in 1882 and 
18830 The new Governor had served in the Caucasus 
since 1856 and was held in the highest esteem by Prince 
Dondukov-Korsakov, the Military Commander-in-Chief of 
the Caucasus, who at all times gave his General 
absolute supporto 
A man unusually si.mple and unpretentious, 
with an iron will and great clarity of mind, 
General Komarov is the true officer type of 
the old Caucasian School.l 
This 'iron will' made Komarov a formidable figure 
on the Russian frontier, especially as, with Dondukov-
Korsakov1s backing, he believed in acting first and 
informing the War Office later. His achievement was 
not only military but scientific, and his interests 
quickly drew Lessar devotedly into his orbit. Komarov, 
too, was an ethnographer, and also a keen archaeologist 
who had collected for museums much in this field in the 
Caucasus, and had also published a good deal, He had 
1 Russkaya Starina, Nool41, Maro 1910, Bai na Kushke, 
po647. 
previously been Chief of the Military Education Section 
of the Army of the Caucasusc He quickly made his 
presence felt in his new sphere of worko 
The Turkmens of the Rivers 
One of Komarov's first acts on arriving in Ashkabad 
was to make a personal visit to the still restless 
Russo-Persian frontier along the north of Khorassan, the 
Russo-Persian Boundary Commission to delimit which, had 
so strictly excluded the English in 1882, and for which 
General Zelenoi had been the Russian Commissioner during 
the preliminary stages in 1881. On Komarov's tour of 
the frontier he made as many friendly contacts as 
possible, visiting even the smallest Persian and 
Kurdish Khans in secluded forts in the valleys of the 
Kopet Dagh. It also happened that the Shah was visiting 
Khorassan at the time, and Komarov sent an escort 
complete with two Russian Military Bands to welcome him 
to the frontier district, and waited on him personally 
near Meshed (thus gaining an excellent opportunity to 
study the roads in this part of Persia). The frontier 
at once became quieter, and he was able to turn his 
attention to Merv. He considered Merv especially 
important to Russia as a strategical point, chiefly 
because of its posi ti.on as a link between the old and 
new regions of Russian Central Asic. 
After Lessar's visit to Sarrakhs, the Salors of 
18 
the region had soon sent a deputation to Ashkabad seeking 
Russian protection, and the granting ~f this gave Russia 
a technically valid claim to interest herself in the 
Tejend above the oasis. When Merv submitted, Prince 
Dondukov-Korsakov sent a special message to the Sariks 
of the Murghab to the ef'fect that all the Sarik peoples 
would gladly be accepted under Russian protection. The 
first to accept this offer were the people of Yulatan 
who came under Russian protection in April, 1884. 1 
A la suite de cette decision, des tribes 
plus eloignees de race turcomane nous 
firent egalement parvenir des declarations 
analogues. 2 
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Thus, before the end of April~ the final Russian thrust 
into Turkmen territory had brought Russian influence to 
the vall.eys of the Tejend and the Murghab, both of which 
rivers had their upper courses in Afghanistan. A Cossack 
post was soon at Imam Baba on the southern edge of the 
Yulatan settlement. Lessar had been impressed by the 
emptiness of Badghis and had passed through Penjdeh just 
at the time when the Afghan Governor, Mir Osman of 
Andkhoi, had gone to Herat to report his inability to 
make the Sariks pay up 0 So the Russians had evidence 
at this ·time, fromLessar 1 s vi.sit there of March 18843 
that there was nothing, including Afghan claims of 
ownership, to prevent the Russian occupation of Penjdeh. 
The situation on the Tejend was somewhat different. 
Here was a region of indeterminate ownership, a trouble 
spot on the extreme north-east of Persia, but not 
1 Masson and Romodin, I~tori~fg:hanistana,, vol.2, p.285. 
2 Afghanskoye Razgran!.£heniye ~ Peregovorirf.~ Me zhdu Ross ii 
i Velikobritanii 1872-85, p.25 [hereinafter referred to 
~.R.P. ]. 
3 On this trip he visited Pul-i-Khisti, the old bridge 
over the KushJf. 
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inhabited by Persians and now almost disclaimed by the 
Persian government. It was very disturbed and the 
source of alaman raiderso Lessar had reported on the 
weak garrison of the Persian fort on the right bank of 
the Tejend, near Old Sarrakhs, which was known as 
Ruknabado In May 9 1884, Komarov decided the time had 
come to order all the Persians to return to New Sarrakhs 9 
bluntly informing the commander that as the right bank 
was now under Russian protection 9 the Russians would 
maintain order there, and he placed a sotnia of Cossacks 
at once in Ruknabado Komarov acted on his own 
responsibility and Prince Dondukov Korsakov approved his 
further intention to send an expedition south along the 
Tejend to Zul.fikar, then east to Kungreuli 9 and Ak Rabat 9 
points which, thanks to Lessar, it was clear were 
necessary to be contained within the Russian limits. It 
was at about this stage that word came to General 
Komarov that the Anglo=Russian Boundary Commission had 
been agreed upon, and was intended to start in the 
autumn of that year. From the Russian point of view, 
the situation became severely aggravated by the Afghan 
military occupation of the Pen,jdeh Oasis which took 
place in June at the direction of Adburrahman. 
Les conditions ethnographiques, qui, dans 
notre pensee, pouvaient seules fournir a 
la determination de la frontiere une base 
snlide et rationelle, etaient egalement 
violees. 2 
1 
1 Abdurrahman 9 according to the op.inion of several 
Afghan historians with whom I discussed this, acted in 
this matter on his own sole initiativeo He was not 
acting on any pressure or suggestions from England, _ 
al though he had the promise of' Ripon, renewed by Dufferin, 
that he could rely upon the British. 
2 A.R.P., p.J7. 
The Russians pointed out, retrospectively, that 
Abdurrahman did not possess a very clear notion of the 
limits of his possessions 9 and that he should have 
reali~ed that his security did not rest upon any 
extension of territory but upon an amicable entente 
between England and Russia on the base of their 
respective interests. This was done in the Blue Book 
published in 1886 quoted above 9 which took the Russi.an 
side of the Boundary question up to the Protocol of 
September, 1885, the beginning of the functioning of 
the Joint Boundary Commission. The Afghans must clearly 
be made to withdraw from this Turkmen rive:r~land. 
Meanwhile, only three months remained before the 
Boundary Commission might be expected to arrive. 
The Advance of the Murghab 
There was no English doubt that the present 
inhabitants of the Penjdeh Oasis were Sarik Turkmens. 
The question which interested them for their Afghan 
proteges was: To whom did the inhabitants of Penjdeh 
owe allegiance? 
Colonel Stewart, who had reported on 13 February 
1884, that Mir Osman Khan had returned in despair to 
Herat and that Penjdeh was now under the orders of 
Yalantush Khan, Jamshidi 9 who occupied Bala Murghab, 
wrote in his Report of March 19 that Penjdeh had always 
been an Afghan dependency iever since Afghanistan 
became a kingdom 1 , 1 and gave the names of a list of 
l C.A. No.2, 1885, No.29, Inclos. 
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Deputy-Governors of the Oasis appointed from Herat, 
going back some fifteen or sixteen years 9 that is, well 
before the time of the Granville-Gorchakov Agreement of 
1872~3. A little later, he reported that when Lessar 
had vis.ited Pul-i~Khisti, the old brick bridge over 
the Kushk, the Sariks there had told Lessar they were 
Afghan subjects and they had then written to Yalantush 
Khan asking that, someone in authority should be placed 
at Penjdeh and asked him to draw the Amir 1 s attention 
1 to the matter. It :is possible that the Sariks 1 
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request may have been the prime cause o.f Afghan troops 
reaching the area in June, together with the appointment 
of General Ghaus~ud-din as Military Governor there. In 
the meantime, the Russians agreed in July that the Sariks 
of Penjdeh had indeed pai.d money to the Afghans, but 
th~y had enjoyed complete freedom and the money had been 
paid only .for the right of agisting f'locks on Afghan 
territory, 2 whereas Stewart in his Report of 19 March had 
stated previously that whenever the Afghan Government had 
been strong, the Sariks had paid a regular tax. 1 What 
they have paid has varied; sometimes it has only been a 
few hors~ .but th,ey have always allowed their liability 
to pay a l.and tax of 2t per cent of their agricu.ltural 
product and one in forty of their cattle 1 • 3 
In October, Komarov rece.i.ved ins true tions that he 
was to advance his post on the Murghab to Tash Kepri 
1 Ibid., No.47, Inclos. No.2, Stewart to the Secretary 
to the Governmetjt of India, Meshed, Ap.19, 1884. 
2 ~· 
A.,R.P., p.35. 
3 C.A. No.2, 1885, No.29, Inclos. 
[Pul~i~Khisti] in the event of Afghan military measures 
being stepped upo In late October the advance Af'ghan 
post was moved to Sari Yazi half way down towards the 
Russian post at Imam Baba (Hazrat Imam).* This was the 
signal for a Russian advance. 1 We had to keep order in 
the steppes and we real.ised that the progressive approach 
of Afghanistan, itself suffering from weak internal 
government 9 consti.tuted a menace to the orderly regime 
we were establishing 9 .l In early November the Governor 
of Herat reported that the Russians had come a long way 
south from Hazra t Imam and had planted fl.ags which had 
then been found and struck down by an Afghan 
reconnoitring party who then returned to their post 
forty miles below Penjdeh. The Russians had returned to 
Sandak Kushan ten miles north of Sari Yazi.J.. The Afghan 
General now firmly believed that the Russians int~nded 
to come to Pul~i~Khisti and he himself' made an advance 
at this stage to the fronti.er of the oasis, probably to 
* For diagram of places on the Murghab, see Appendix C. 
1 A.R.P., p.57. 
2 Most of these names of places of strategic importance 
on the Murghab were the names of small alluvial plains 
at i.ntervals along the river rather than of necessarily 
inhabited or fortified places. From Yulatan southward 
the chief names mentioned on the Murghab are~ Imam Baba 
{Hazrat Imam) 9 Sandak Kushan 9 Sari Yazi, A:imak Jar 9 Urush 
Doshan, Yarim Ta pa (fort) 9 Kizil Ta pa {mound on left bank 
at junction of Kushk wr~th Murghab) 9 Pul~i~Khisti (Tash 
or Dash Kepri), (old b'°r'~'6°k bridge over Kushk near its 
confluence with the Murghab) 9 Ak Tapa (Ak Tepe) a little 
south of the confluence, nearer the left bank of the 
Murghab than the right bank of the Kushk. On the left 
bank of the Murghab a little above Ak Tepe was a small 
village, Deh Dogah 9 and above that again 9 on the right 
bank, was the largely deserted fortified village of Old 
Penjdeho 
a place called Kala Birun (Sari Yazi was merely an 
advance post). He now asked the English Commissioner 
if he might repulse the Russians. Lumsden sent him 
l 
word that there was no danger. Lumsden and Ridgeway 
were both certain at this time that the diplomatic 
situation between England and Russi.a would be suffici.ent 
to prevent a frontier outbreak. On 20 November the 
fears of General Ghaus=ud=din were very nearly realised. 
Komarov and Colonel Alikhanov had joined forces at Imam 
Baba and had advanced to Aimak Jar about 40 miles from 
the Russian base and 12 from the edge o.f Penjdeh where 
the Afghan General was posted with two guns, 400 
regularly infantry and about 1.00 cavalry. Komarov 
returned north but Alikhanov asked f'or an interview. 
Ghaus·-Ud=din did not like the tone of the Colonel is 
letter and replied that the latter should have correctly 
made the request from Imam Baba before he came into 
Afghan-occupied territory. The .letters, which appear as 
inclosures in No.179 of C.A. No.2, 1885, show the 
tension which al.ready existed on the Murghab, and the 
dangers of a s1tuat.i.on wherein opposing military leaders 
in close proximity are already addressing one another as 
liars and rogues. As the Afghan newswriter at Pen,jdeh 
reported, the letter of Alikhanov was 1 very objectionablei. 
The Russians advanced somewhat. The Afghan general had 
already sent to Maimana, Bala Murghab and Maruchak for 
rei.nforcements. On 22 November usome 200 infantry 
soldiers arrived in Pan,jdeh, and several men took off 
their hats and danced in front of them with drawn swordsu 
l C.A. No.2i 1885~ No.162, Inclos. No.10. 
through joy. They were glad that they were going to 
1 become Ghazis next day 1 • Alikhanov, however, had 
decided to retire, but he was reported to be assembling 
stores at various points on the Murghab. Lumsden at 
this very time was writing to the Kazi: 'It is however 
impossible that Russian soldiers should attack an 
2 Afghan garrison in time of peace 1 • Nevertheless in 
the following week with about fifty in his escort, he 
came to see Penjdeh for himself, The Afghans received 
strict instructions not to provoke any military action 
from the Russians. The Afghans believed the Jamshidi 
khans were untrustworthy and were courting the Penjdeh 
Sariks. Lumsden stationed first Colonel Ridgeway and 
then Captain C.E. Yate as English Officers in an advisory 
capacity and both seem to have done their very utmost to 
act as counsellors. Dr Owen won goodwill for the English 
by his medical work in the oasis. It was an invidious 
position for the English officers because in no case 
could they promise any help, and they were in the 
position of being the 1 friends 1 of both parties. 
Towards the end of January 1885 Lumsden decided to move 
the Commission party to Gulran so that if a real crisis 
occurred they could more easily retire to neutral Persia. 
The move to Gulran was made in February. 
At the diplomatic level the Russians continued to 
insist on the exclusion of Penjdeh from the Zone for 
Demarcation3 and to complain about the Afghan advance 
1 C.A. No.2, 1885, Nocl80, Inclos. No.4. 
2 Ibid., Inclos. No.J. 
3 C.A. No.4, 1885, Nool, Kimberley to Viceroy, Feb. 7, 
1885. 
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post at Sari Yazi, On 9 February a hundred Russian 
cavalry threatened to attack the post and then themselves 
occupied Aimak Jar three miles southo At this stage 
Lumsden insisted that the Afghans should withdraw to 
Urush Doshan and that the Russians should be informed 
that any further Russian attempt to come further south 
in the direction of Ak Tepe would be resisted by force 
by the Afghanso Alikhanov now returned to the Murghabo 
While professing to have friendly feelings towards both 
English and Afghans, he wrote to Lumsden~ 
Whether you approve of it or not, my orders 
are that Russian troops should occupy the 
country as far as Pul-i-Khisti; once established, 
there, they should neither go nor fight. I must 
carry out my orders.l 
Lumsden reported that Ridgeway was doing his best at 
Penjdeh but the situation was very strained and the 
attitude of the Sariks was doubtfulo At this stage, 
Alikhanov established an advance post of 30 militia on 
the mound of Kizil Tepe near Pul-i-Khisti. On the same 
day on which Lumsden reported the communication from 
Alikhanov above quoted~ he sent another brief telegram 
to Granville which was to confuse the issue. Having 
heard from Ridgeway that the Afghans had withdrawn to Ak 
Tepe and that the Russians were moving down from Urush 
Doshan and that a Russian officer and four men had been 
allowed to look at Pul-i-Khisti and had then withdrawn, 
he sent a second telegram: 'Russian troops to-day 
occupied Zulfikar Pass, Ak Rabat and Pul-i-Khisti 1 o2 He 
1 C~A. No.2, 1885i No.202, Lumsden to Granville, Feb. 
22, 1885. 
2 Ibido, No.203. 
made the same confusion some days later referring to 
Pul~i=Khisti 1 where the Russian outpost now is 1 • 
ThLs was on 4 March and already there were some 
Russian stores at Kizil Tepe, a mound about a m.ile 
downstream from the bridge and overlooking the Murghab-
Kushk confluence. The Russians had already announced 
that they would take the Afghan mound of Ak Tepe and 
Ali.khanov threatened to drive off 60, 000 Penjdeh sheep, 
no doubt as a reprisal to the Sariks i.f theydid not 
openly offer submission to the Russians. Considerable 
Afghan reinforcements came but they were miserably armed 
while the Russian and Turkmens alike had breech=l.oaders. 
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On 13 March Gladstone reported to the House of 
Commons that there was no further advance on either side. 
On 16 March, de Giers expressed great surprise about 
rumours referred to him by Thornton that Komarov had 
asked permission to attack, nor could he believe that 
Alikhanov would write a letter to incite the Sariks of 
Penjdeh to drive out the Afghans. By mid-March the 
final Russian advance was wel.l under way. An additional 
1,500 infantry were reported to have arrived at Hazrat 
Imam1 to join the 1,100 who were already there under 
Komarov. On 16 March a portion of the Turkmen 
detachment already at Kizil Tepe had attempted to get 
.through Afghan entrenchments but were driven off. On 
24 March Lumsden reported to Granville that Ridgeway 
had come back to Gulran and Yate was at Penjdeh. Under 
instructions from the British Foreign Office sent on 27 
1 ' The$e were two columns, one from Ashkabad and one f'rom 
Samarcand, the Turkestantsy. 
March Thornton saw De Giers on the need for putting an 
end to the excitement, and on 28 March Thornton replied 
from St Petersburg that de Giers was firmly of the 
opinion that if the Commissioners could meet immediately 
it might allay the present excitement. He was of the 
opinion that General Komarov could be sent immediately 
from Ashkabad, in place of General Zelenoi, to join 
Lumsden and that Zelenoi could follow later. 
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De Giers did not know that not only was Komarov not at 
Ashkabad but that he was about to end the excitement at 
Penjdeh in his own way. The long-feared clash between 
Russian and Afghan took place on the early morning of 
30 March. News was sent by Sir Peter on 29 March of 
the imminence of the conflict and on the thirty first 
he sent on a report from Merk that he had heard firing 
from the direction of Pul-i-Khisti for one hour and a 
half, and on 1 April he sent a preliminary report 
received from Yate. None of this was destined to reach 
London until 7 April. But on 6 April Thomson 
telegraphed from Tehran to say that telegraphic 
communication between Meshed and Tehran had been 
interrupted. The same spring snow-storms which had 
brought the lines down between Meshed and Tehran had 
also affected the Russian communications. In St 
Petersburg, as in London, no news of the battle at Pul-
i-Khisti [or Tash-Kepri] was received until 7 April. 
CHAPTER VI 
TIME OF CRISIS 
The Battle on the Kushk 
The great prestige enjoyed by Russia all over 
Asia at the end of the nineteenth century was 
largely due to her moderate and enlightened 
policy in the conquered regions, for which 
General Kaufman was directly responsible. It 
was enhanced by the successes of his armies, 
and especially, by the victory gained by 
General Komarov over the Afghans, supported 
by the British at Tash Kepri. This victory 
dealt a severe blow to Britain's prestige, and 
her attitude was one of well-nigh overt 
hostility when Russia advanced her frontiers 
to Sarakhs on the Persian border, and the 
Kushka Pass, facing India, on that of Afghanistan. 
After these campaigns, which ended Russian 
penetration into Central Asia, an era of peaceful 
development and progressive improvement in the 
life of the native population descended upon the 
land.l 
This quotation is from the reminiscences of a noted 
Tsarist administrator sent in 1908-09 to study evidence 
of official mismanagement in Russian Central Asia. The 
reminiscences of his extensive travels were written from 
memory in Germany where he had taken refuge from the 
Revolution, and were first published in German in 1922~ 
but the above quotation taken from such a source helps 
to explain the importance, in Russian eyes long after 
the event, of this comparatively small frontier clash. 
1 Count Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, pp.lJ-4. 
It was the final armed action in consolidating their 
control over the Turkmen tribes of Transcaspia. It was 
the only accession of territory during the reign of 
Alexander III, and 'it upheld the lustre of Russian 
(Tsarist) arms in Asia for the last time' • 1 To this 
day, Kushk Post, the terminus of the Murghab Railway, 
somewhat south of Tash Kepri (Pul-i-Khisti), remains 
the southernmost tip of the U.S.S.R. 
The encounter at the bridge was brief, but 
definitive. 'The unfortunate Afghans considered 
themselves able to drive the Russians back to Merv if 
attacked' • 2 c.k. Yate later told Sykes that even up 
to the evening of the 29 March he believed the Russians 
were bluffing and would not disobey the order of their 
Government. 3 Only the Russian Military Command at 
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home, and more especially their able men on the frontier, 
the General, and Colonel Alikhanov, Governor of Merv, 
knew that victory over the Afghan on the Murghab was 
inevitable, because it was essential to their plan, 
and if the bridge was not occupied at the end of March, 
then the occasion for another attack must be made to 
arise. Students of modern Soviet history are prone to 
overlook this strongly doctrinaire streak in Russian 
thought, whether military or political, something basic 
to Russian character and not just part of the acquired 
discipline of Communism. 
1 Ibid., p.149. 
2 Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p.143. 
3 Ibid. 
Although theorists would have liked Russia to 
occupy more of the Turkmen, Jamshidi and Hazara lands 
and make a clearly scientific boundary, fulfilling both 
geographical and ethnographical requirements, along the 
crest of the Paropamisus, Komarov had stated months 
before that he would not go south of the river Kushk. 
And the victory over the Afghans, who insisted on 
occupying Ak Tepe and holding the bridge, was the signal 
that he had achieved just that. 
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To the few Englishmen on the spot the clash was a 
matter of keen personal interest. Yate and Ridgeway in 
particular, who had been in such close contact with the 
Afghans, Jamshidis and Sariks, felt bitterly the position 
of having to restrain other soldiers than their own 
brought face to face with a determined and powerful foe. 
In mid-February, for example, Ridgeway had written to 
H.M. Durand, in bitterness of spirit, saying that if he 
were in a position to promise the Sariks permanent 
British officers, he himself could raise them and they 
would join against the Russians to save Penjdeh. He saw 
Herat already lost and the Amir alienated 'unless a bold 
game were played'. He suggested that the Commission Party 
should be sent to Meshed and the Escort brought to the 
Murghab ' •.• if all this were done at once, all might be 
saved; if nothing is to be done, I should not be here 
necessarily deceiving the Afghans and the Sariks' • 1 
Holdich, writing long after the event, also wondered if 
the small English force on the frontier, had it been 
used, might not have turned the tide in Afghan favour. 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. June 1885, Nos 518-74, 
No.537, Ridgeway to Foreign Secretary, India, 21 February. 
But had it done so at that time, it might well have 
proved the spark to fire the tinder for that mighty 
conflagration that never came to pass, a full scale 
English-Russian war in Asia. 
From the English end this clash has been frequently 
described, chiefly in the official reports of Lumsden 
and Ridgeway; in the account of A.C. Yate who had it 
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from his brother, the chief English participant in the 
affairs of Penjdeh, in his History of Afghanistan and his 
Life of Sir Mortimer Durand by that most earnest stµdent 
of Afghan and Persian affairs, Sir Percy Sykes, who noted 
that he discussed the whole thing with both Ridgeway and 
C.E. Yate: by Holdich who was also on the frontier; and 
since these contemporaries, by more recent historians 
such as Fraser-Tytler in his History of Afghanistan 
(1950), Dilip Kumar Ghose in England and Afghanistan 
(1960), and numerous others. 
After the campaign General Komarov made a detailed 
report which later appeared in the Russian press and so 
found its way into English records. The chief published 
Russian account of this campaign on the Murghab, also 
based largely on Komarov's reports, is a long article 
written in 1910, to celebrate the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the battle, which appeared in two issues 
of Russkaxa Starina, a leading historical journal of 
Tsarist times. 
The abridged account of Komarov's report, as it 
appeared in the Russian press, was referred to Lumsden 
who criticised it hotly on a number of points. At this 
t th f t . 1 . . f . 1 s age ey are o no par icu ar s1gn1 icance. But in 
the inflamed mood of the English and Russian public and 
press at that time, they were extremely important. 
According to the twenty-fifth anniversary account, 
early in 1885 Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, Commissioner 
Lessar and representatives of the Ministries concerned 
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had met in St Petersburg to discuss the London counter-
proposals to the Russian suggested northern and southern 
limits to the zone within which the line of demarcation 
should be drawn. The English declaration that all south 
of a line from Daulatabad on the Tejend to Imam Baba on 
the Murghab was unquestionably Afghan territory so annoyed 
the Prince that he declared that the Russian frontier 
should be at Zulfikar or south of it and along the Bo.rkhut 
mountains, the Kushk River and south of the Penjdeh Oasis. 
He was able to obtain an Imperial Resolution ordering 
the increase of activity in the Murghab region, stopping she 
of offending England, and this advice was sent to 
Komarov forthwith, the Prince privately advising the 
General that he had the full confidence of the Prince and 
the Tsar. Tash Kepri was to be the last point of Russian 
advance up the Murghab river system. Already by the end 
of February Komarov had an advance post at Kizil Tepe 
when he got word that he must not advance, but consolidate 
his position, because the occupation of Penjdeh could 
lead to a rift with England. He was told that if, 
however, he had already occupied Penjdeh or any place 
south of Zulfikar then he must act with caution and 'in 
1 See Appendix D. 
1 
concordance with the dignity of Russia'. On 10 (22) 
March the Russians reconnoitred the left bank of the 
Kushk right down to Tash Kepri, only observing small 
Afghan sentry posts and 'half a sotnia of infantry on a 
hiXlock digging a trench' • 2 Several nights later they 
established a bivouac a little below Kizil Tepe without 
arousing the Afghans in their camp on the right bank. 
By order of Komarov a raft was built of empty casks for 
crossing the Murghab. On the 14 (26) the Russian 
Captain Zakrejevsky had a meeting at Tash Kepri with 
Captain Yate by arrangement. Yate had with him Captain 
De Laessoe and Dr Owen, several Afghans and two Indians. 
The conversation was in French, for which Yate had to 
depend on De Laessoe to interpret. Yate reminded 
Zakrejevsky of the English-Russian Agreement and said he 
wished to see the status quo preserved among the Penjdeh 
Sariks. Zakrejevsky said he could only speak quite 
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unofficially, but the Russians had no intention of 
attacking the Afghan force. Next day Yate sent him a 
telegram received from Lord Granville, dated 17 March, 
which stated that the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs had informed the English Ambassador that the 
Russians would not advance their present posts if only 
the Afghan did not advance theirs or attack, or if 
nothing unforseen occurred such as an outbreak among the 
Sariks. On 16 (28) March, Komarov asked Zakrejevsky to 
reassure Yate that he would not attack if the Afghans did 
1 
'Boi na Kushke' in RusskaJa Starina ( vol.141, pp. 644-64 
and vol.142, pp.26-44, 1910 is the source of this account 
of the battle. 
2 •t op. Cl • 
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not advance, but that the latter must move back their 
posts on the left bank because if they insisted on moving 
them opposite the Russian posts on the right bank he 
could not answer for their safety. According to this 
account, the very day of the Russian arrival,at Kizil 
Tepe, the Afghans had begun to advance their forward 
posts towards the flank of the Russian bivouac on the 
left bank of the Kushk. The Afghans had held and 
threatened a Cossack and sent him back with the message 
'Afghans are always ready to meet the enemy with their 
weapons in their hands'. The daring of the Afghans grew 
all the time. When they came within earshot of anyone 
they called out 'It's not Mervstsi, it's not Turkmens 
against you here, but Afghansl Get out of here, or we'll 
thrash you, just as we have various times thrashed the 
Englishl 11 
On the evening of Tuesday, 28 March, Yate sent word 
to Zakrejevsky that the Afghan leader, when complained 
to about the Afghan forward movements, had replied that 
the advance movements of Russian parties had rendered it 
necessary to place Afghan observation posts, and suggested 
another meeting on the following day. Meanwhile Russian 
prestige was falling in the oasis and the Khans admired 
the bravery of the Afghans. The Russian officers 
pretended to be busy but they, too, were downcast. 
Only Komarov remained calm. 'With inimitable sang-froid 
and a smiling countenance 12 he studied the Afghan posts. 
He was certain that the Afghan temperament would drive 
them to begin the attack within a few days. Nevertheless 
1 Op. cit. 
2 Op. cit. 
he was still willing to seek a peaceful solution and 
agreed to a further meeting between Zakrejevsky and Yate 
on the 17 (29). He sent about the same time a letter to 
the Afghan Naib-Salar ordering him that very evening to 
withdraw all his line on the right bank back to their 
former positions on the Kushk so that Afghan posts on 
the Murghab would all be above the Kushk junction, 
without further discussion. Zakrejevsky wished to 
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meet an Afghan leader as well but Yate told him the 
Naib-Salar had ordered all the Afghan leaders to remain 
with their people on that day. He asked Zakrejevsky to 
state just where the Afghan posts had been on the day of 
the arrival of Lord Granville's telegram (17 March) as 
this was as far as they could be legally asked to retire. 
Zakrejevsky said he knew that on that day the Afghans had 
actually occupied posts on the left bank of the Kushk 
but they had been very small posts, and the Russians had 
also been moving towards the bridge at that time. Now 
that the Russians had got to the Kushk they would not 
give it up and believed they had the right to occupy it 
oh the basis of Lord Granville's telegram. Yate asked 
him at what point the Russians were aiming and Zakrejevsky 
replied he was not fully empowered to answer, but that 
his General was determined to put a permanent barrier 
between the two opponents and for this reason the 
Afghans would have to leave the left bank. Semevsky, an 
official in the Caucasian Army High Command, who 
understood English very well, was amazed when having 
heard Yate and the others agree not to concede it, he 
heard the translator explain in French that Captain Yate, 
not having any control over the Afghan leaders, would do 
• 
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what he could to get them to do all that Komarov required. 
~earing this report, Komarov decided the situation must 
be brought quickly to an end. At 8 p.m. that same 
evening, he called all the heads of the Murghab force 
together and ordered them to attack the Afghan on the 
following morning (18/30 March). At 10 a.m. he received 
a reply from the Naib-Salar saying that he had 
instructions from the Governor of Herat to discuss all 
matters with Captain Yate and that he had sent on the 
General's letter to that officer. Yate had seen that 
letter before he had had his interview with Zakrejevsky. 
The Naib-Salar said he must obey the Amir but was willing 
to take up the matter with General Komarov so that 
disagreement should not arise from such trifling matters, 
Komarov saw that this letter confirmed his opinion about 
the necessity for making a• attack, but he once more 
wrote to the Naib-Salar that it was not merely a question 
of making small changes, and he had to affirm the 
seriousness of his previous letter. He said the choice 
of enmity or friendship remained with the Afghans. In 
the morning, leaving fifty men in the Murghab camp, the 
Russians formed three columns, all in position by 4 a.m. 
at Kizil Tepe. 
The Afghans took up their main forward position at a 
mound on the left bank of the Kushk, approximately twelve 
hundred horse with at least a company of foot on their 
flanks, with four guns in emplacements. More to the 
right and several paces behind, on the left bank of the 
Kushk, were stationed several companies of regular 
infantry and three guns all in emplacements. The rest of 
the Afghan force took up position in front of its camp 
on the right bank of the Kushk. Nearly 200 men were 
stationed all the time on the right bank of the Murghab. 
In addition a block of cavalry under a Jamshidi, 
Yalantush-Khan, protected the Afghan camp from an 
expected attack by Sariks. Soon after five o'clock, the 
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Russian cavalry, taking the most direct route, reached 
the mound and advanced to within 500 paces of the Afghan 
cavalry, halted and awaited the arrival of the 
Turkestansty still about a verst away. Komarov ordered 
the Mountain Half-Battery to join them and ordered the 
Transcaspian battalion from Kizil Tepe to advance to 
protect the cavalry. Neither side had yet fired a shot. 
With dawn, the advance parties of both sides joined their 
own forces. Komarov sent a party of djigits to watch 
the Afghan right flank but on the left he placed a post 
of Cossacks on Yarvim Tepe. At 6 a.m. the Turkestansty 
took up their position with the Half-Battery. The Naib-
Salar now rode up to his cavalry and greeted them with 
the words 'Shout for the Glory of Allah'. 'Then the 
Afghans gave three short cheers and cried they would 
1 fight in the name of the Lord'. Alikhanov, realising 
the Afghans were about to attack, hurried to move forward 
his Cossacks and djigits armed with guns, and. closed up 
round the horses those armed only with sabres. Komarov 
ordered his men only to answer, not to open fire. The 
Afghans still paused a little. Then several minutes 
after the Naib-Salar had ridden out, there came the first 
sound of firing. When Esaul [Cossack leader] Falchikov 
reported to Alikhanov that a Cossack horse had been 
wounded, the Russians opened fire. Then the Afghans 
1 Op. cit. 
replied with strong artillery and rifle fire all along 
their line. The strength of Russian fire was a great 
shock to the Afghan cavalry but they rallied against it. 
About 300 of their horse turned to strike in the rear. 
Against a second Afghan detachment, Alikhanov directed 
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a sotnia of Merv militia and all the rest directed their 
fire against the Afghan. Such murderous fire overwhelmed 
them and in disorder they turned towards the river Kushk. 
Huge masses of Afghans began to assemble on the river 
bank. They had already sustained heavy losses from the 
fire of the Turkestantsy. At one stage only a few horse 
from one sotnia, with Ensign Baba-Khan at their head, 
hacked their way into a line of Afghans. Alikhanov 
cried 'Fight or die' whereupon the whole sotnia threw 
itself in with its swords. Turkestantsy fire drove the 
Afghan defenders of the mound away quickly and the four 
guns were left in Russian hands. The Afghans' left front 
line could not endure the bayonet attack and fled to the 
banks of the Kushk leaving in Russian hands three guns 
and a flag - they left behind a great row of dead. With 
continuing artillery fire from Ak-Tepe the Afghans once 
more began to attack, more to the right of their main 
camp on the left bank of the Murghab. However, increased 
Russian fire drove them off in utmost confusion, 
abandoning all hope. Komarov did not order a follow-up, 
it being his intention only to hold the left bank of 
the Kushk. He called a halt to his forces in Penjdeh, 
refrained from camping overnight near the Afghan camp and 
returned to the former bivouac. A guard was placed at 
Ak-Tepe. It was advisable to move camp as there was still 
some firing from Afghans in tents and under the arches of 
the bridge. Although the main body of Afghans were not 
pursued, their confusion appeared complete. There were 
corpses everywhere; many were in the swift flowing river. 
The Djarneil [Afghan General] admitted losses of 1,000 
killed and of the fugitives, more than half were wounded. 
The Afghans also lost several senior officers and the 
Naib-Salar himself was wounded. They left in Russian 
hands all their artillery, munitions and stores, the 
flags of two infantry battalions, drums, camels and much 
apparel and so on. The Russians took twenty-four 
prisoners on the field of whom seventeen were wounded. 
These prisoners spoke of the role of the English and also 
of the Afghans' request for 1,000 Sarik riflemen, to 
which they had only received an answer on the day of 
battle. Komarov described it as an exemplary victory 
for all ranks. He himself was constantly under fire and 
conspicuously cool. During the struggle at Kushk, 
Russian losses were one under-officer from the Murghab 
company, seven soldiers from the Transcaspian Regiment 
and one djigit from the native militia, and two wounded. 
At the conclusion of the affair, Yate wrote two 
letters to Zakrejevsky one offering help from Dr Owen if 
required (which was ignored) and one asking for a safe 
convoy. Komarov sent Zakrejevsky with three officers 
and djigits to Penjdeh to offer Yate convoy and 
protection. When they got to the aul where Yate had been, 
he was no longer there. 
Komarov was informed that the main body of Afghans 
had fled in the direction of Bala Murghab and another 
group towards Kala-i-Mor to Herat. Scouts reported that 
not only the Sariks but also the Afghans were indignant 
with the English. Many fugitives perished from hunger 
and thirst. The Afghans' position was desperate; the 
frosts were severe; all their warm clothing had been 
left in the camp on. the banks of the Kushk. At Komarov's 
direction the Sariks willingly buried the Afghan dead. 
On the 26 March Komarov wrote to the Naib-Salar saying 
he would restore the wounded prisoners on their 
recovery and that all the dead Mussulmans had been given 
decent burial. He said he had no intention to go 
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further and had no more hostile aims against the Afghans. 
Colonel Alikhanov, talking to Sir Michael O'Dwyer in 1896, 
said of the opening of the battle: 
The Afghans were mounted on stallions, which were 
restless, and one of the Afghan carbines went off 
by accident or design and wounded one of the 
horses of the Cossacks. An officer rode up and 
reported this to me, and I replied 'Blood has 
been shed and we must now get to business •... ' 
He also said: 'The Afghan infantry fought like men, 
firing as they retired' • 1 
Aftermath of Battle. The Penjdeh Crisis 
Abdurrahman and the Attitude of the~hans 
The diplomats should have been more grateful than 
they knew to the Amir himself. Apart from them, he, 
almost alone, appears as a peace-maker in the undoubted 
crisis which followed when the news of the Kushk battle 
got into the press on and after 7 April. It so happened 
that at ~his very time the Amir was on his first visit 
to the Viceroy and was being magnificently entertained 
1 Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p.144. 
by him at Rawalpindi, where, in spite of torrential rain 
at intervals, a programme of combined Oriental and 
Victorian British splendour had been prepared to entice 
and also to honour him, for Dufferin, ever since his 
period as ambassador in St Petersburg, had been a keen 
student of the capacity of Abdurrahman. Perhaps in it, 
too, there was a little of soldierly homage to the 
Afghans themselves. Before news of the encounter broke, 
the Amir had already expressed his indifference to the 
fate of Penjdeh. 
On 4 April, the Viceroy reported by telegram to the 
India Office: 
Today I discussed the Boundary question with the 
Ameer. He seemed indifferent to the retention 
of Penjdeh. He stated that he could not tell 
which side the Sariks would take. If they were 
faithful to Islam, they would send their wives 
and children and possessions into Afghanistan. 
Unless they did so they could not be expected to 
fight for him. They were wealthy but he could 
get no tribute from them. He appeared to me to 
consider Maruchak as the defensible frontier of 
Afghanistan, though desirous of carrying his 
western frontier as far north as possible. The 
only localities to the retention of which he 
attached vital importance were the Pass of 
Zulfikar, Gulran and Maruchak. 1 
At Rawalpindi, the Amir was amused, and impressed, 
and all was going swimmingly when the news of the defeat 
arrived. 
1 
The Amir took it very coolly. We received the 
news about dinner-time one evening, and I drove 
at once to tell him of the slaughter of his 
C.A. No.4, 1885, No.3, Viceroy to Kimberley, telegram, 
4 April 1885. 
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people and the wounding and death of his 
general. 1 He begged me not to be troubled. 
He said the loss of two hundred or two 
thousand men was a mere nothing, and, as for 
the general, that was less than nothing. 
There were lots of generals in Afghanistan. 
Afterwards he pretended to take the business 
as an affront only to be wiped out by the 
blood of many thousand Russians; but his 
first feeling was certainly one of 
indifference.2 
This is as may be. Durand would certainly have been the 
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person to have seen most of the Amir's outward reactions, 
but, after all, at this moment Abdurrahman had the 
obligations of a guest, and as a man experienced in 
statecraft he knew how to conceal his feelings when 
advisable. Having been so precipitate in sending an 
armed force to occupy Penjdeh in June, he must have set 
some store by it as a matter of prestige, but at this 
stage he continued to maintain an attitude of 
indifference about its loss. He had set his heart on a 
frontier, and only the British, however empty their 
promises, could help him bargain with the Russians. He 
had already settled for Maruchak as his northern bastion 
against the Russian-dominated Sariks. Therefore he 
belittled the loss at Pul-i-Khisti and played up British-
Afghan friendship. He let it be known widely how well he 
had been treated at Rawalpindi, and saw to it that the 
right notice about the G.C.S.I. he had received there was 
announced in all the Mosques. 
1 The Naib-Salar, Timur Shah, was badly wounded but it 
has not been ascertained whether he died, and General 
Ghaus-ud-din certainly was active some years after this 
event. 
2 Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p.146. 
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There is no doubt that the English party on the 
frontier was for a while very afraid of the treatment 
which their members might receive at the hands of defeat-
embittered Herat soldiery, and for a while British 
prestige in this region was undoubtedly lowered, but 
probably not as much as General Komarov believed. Due 
partly, no doubt, to the strong line taken by the Amir, 
and partly to the good relations which had been 
personally established between members of the English 
party and the local population, it is clear that, from 
the time of the re-establishment of the Commission at 
1east, in September, less than six months after the 
battle, there was no particular animosity, and a good 
deal of friendship towards, the English on the frontier. 
The Afghans, Heratis and Uzbeks of Maimana, as well as 
many of the Jamshidis, who were now a permanently divided 
tribe, followed the Amir and preserved their chief 
antipathy for the Russian potential invader. 
The Amir maintained his low-key approach to the 
loss of Penjdeh while the crisis was on but in later 
years he spoke of it in quite another fashion and the 
following passages from his Autobiography are very much 
to the point: 
1 
My going to visit Rawal Pindi was a very sore 
point with the Russians. One of the chief 
reasons for my going to Rawal Pindi was to 
contradict these false statements,l and to 
show the Russians that I was a friend of the 
British •••• For the above mentioned reasons and 
perhaps also for the usual habit of Russian 
policy to move towards the East, one detachment 
About the supposedly inimical relations of Abdurrahman 
and the British in 1880. 
of the Russian army advanced towards Panjdeh. 
Having foreseen tbis danger, I considered it 
advisable to send a strong force to keep the 
Russians from entering and taking possession 
of the town of Panjdeh •••. But the more I tried 
to impress on the English Government that it 
was of vital importance ••• the less notice was 
taken of my appeal. The answer I received from 
them was: 'Whatever place is in the possession 
of the Afghan army, the Russians dare not touch 
it'. Not only that, but the assurances of the 
British as to the safety of Panjdeh went so far 
to comfort my mind, that the 21st of November, 
1884, Sir Peter Lumsden wrote to me that he 
would see that no fighting took place between 
the Russian and Afghan armies •••• Up to this 
moment (March 29, 188~) the English officials 
of the Mission and their soldiers had given every 
assurance to the officials of my army that Russia 
dare not attack them so long as they did not move 
from their station; and, further, that if the 
Russians attacked, it would be a breach of the 
Conventions existing between the Powers for which 
they would be called to account. My General, 
named Ghaus-ud-din, who was strictly instructed 
by me not to do anything contrary to the advice of 
the British officers of the Mission, being satisfied 
by the promises of the English officials, remained 
in his position. 1 
He goes on to underestimate the size of the Afghan army at 
Pul-i-Khisti and overestimate the number of English who 
'fled towards Herat' and continues: 
This cavalier treatment by the English has had 
the effect upon the Afghan nation of minimising 
the English prestige until the present time. I 
have tried hard to assure my people that Mr 
Gladstone was at that time the Leader of the 
Liberal Party, which was then in power, and that 
this was the reason why such a weak policy was 
adopted, otherwise the English would have made 
1 The Life of Abdurrahman, vol.l, pp.242-4. 
the Russians pay for their wrong-doings •••• So, 
according to the proverb, 'forewarned is fore-
armed', we should have made different arrangements, 
if we had known that the English did not intend 
to keep their promises. 
It would have been an easy matter, from the month 
of December, to the JOth March, for the Afghan 
army to have reached Herat for the protection of 
Panjdeh, though there was no need to send an army 
from Kabul, there being a sufficiently large 
Afghan force stationed at Herat and Turkestan •••• ! 
was at Rawalpindi ••• and on the very eve of Lord 
Dufferin giving me assurances on British support 
in the event of Russian aggression upon Afghan 
territory, the news of the Russian aggression and 
taking of Panjdeh was sent to me by Lord Dufferin 
himself. But I was not a man to get excited, and 
therefore took the matter calmly as a lesson for 
the future.l 
2J 
Mir Munshi Mohamed Khan, who edited and probably 
wrote much of the second part of Abdurrahman's 
Autobiography at the latter's direction, adds here a 
fascinating footnote to the effect that in 1895 he had 
the job of interpreting at a meeting between Curzon, tha:i 
Viceroy, and the Amir during which 
1 
2 
the Amir mentioned the Panjdeh incident, speaking 
strongly and bitterly, though under the veil of 
humour. Curiously enough, Mr Curzon answered that 
it was not his government that was in power at the 
time, but the Liberal Government of Mr Gladstone. 
The Amir laughed heartily, saying: I am sorry that 
I am not a prophet •••• One of the Amir's favourite 
sayings is that the cleverest thing in the British 
Constitution is the arrangement whereby there is 
always one party or the other to put the blame 
upon when mistakes are made.2 
Ibid., pp.245-6. 
Ibid., p.246. 
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Lord Dufferin reported the Amir's reactions to the affair 
at Pul-i-Khisti as follows: 
Same evening I received news of Russian attack 
on Penjdeh, and communicated it to the Ameer, 
who showed less emotion than might have been 
expected. He declared his determination to 
resist to the utmost any invasion of Afghan 
territory. He has since held similar language 
and while most anxious to avoid war and arrive 
at an amicable settlement with Russia on 
boundary questions, he asserts that his people 
will fight desperately in defence of their 
families and country. I have promised him aid 
in arms and ammunition and possibly money, should 
war break out shortly between England and Russia. 
In the event of certain contingencies, the basis 
of a satisfactory understanding with regard to 1 
our future action was laid before his departure. 
The crisis at home 
Because of the interrupted telegraphic service, it 
was not until 10 April that the 'latest Intelligence' in 
~Times put before the public Lumsden's communication 
of 3 April from Gulran, giving early news of the battle, 
and also under the date, 9 April, the official news of 
it from St Petersburg. Gladstone had broken the news, 
based on the Russian communiqu~, to Parliament on the 
evening of the ninth, and stated that the Russians had 
been asked for further information. The Times of the 
eleventh was able to give a much fuller account. For 
the next two weeks both English and Russian papers, and 
also European papers, were greatly taken up with news of 
the conflict. General Komarov became Enemy No. 1 in the 
English papers, and when his account of the battle was 
1 C.A. No.4, 1885, Viceroy to Kimberley, telegram, 13 
April 1885. 
sent to Lumsden and the latter send back a reply 
attacking Komarov's version on quite a number of 
pointsi the national fury of both nations reached a 
pitch. Both the Emperor and the Queen believed that 
their countries had been so affronted that war could 
be the only means of restoring national honour. By 
the fifteenth, The Times editorially was taki.ng a very 
strong line: 'It is for Russia, as we have said 9 to 
purge herself of her of:fence by withdrawing her forces 
1 
and by recalling General Komarov 1 • Nevertheless, 
Granville, Kimberley, de Staal and 'Monsieur De Lessar' 
had met on the 13 and 14 in London and continued 
discussion as to the proposed boundary line, and on the 
14 9 Granville reported to Thornton: 
Nothing was said directly, in the conversation 
in which M. Lessar took part, as to the mode 
of dealing wi.th Penjdeh, but it was 
confidentially hinted, by Lord Kimberly to M. 
de Staal, that concession as to Penjdeh was 
not impossible if the rest of the line was 
settled according to our wishes.2 
Apart from this determination on the part of the 
diplomats td preserve continuity to the last possible 
moment, two other policies evolved during April. One 
began with a rumour, the suggestion that England and 
Russia might resort to international arbitration. And 
the other, as far as the public was aware, came with 
dramatic suddenness in Gladstone's moving speech to the 
House of Commons on the evening of 27 April, during 
1 The Times, 15 April, 1885, p.9. 
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2 C.A. No.4, 1884, Granville to Thorntoni 14 Aprili 1885. 
which he asked the House to vote a sum of eleven and a 
half millions to be available in case of war with 
Russia. The voting of this sum for such a purpose had 
an immediate effect in calming public fears and in its 
first effect gained a great deal of renewed public 
support for the Gladstone Government. H«::l also astounded 
the public and made them realise how seriously he 
regarded the Russian affair by announcing that the great 
bulk of British troops in the Sudan would immediately 
be transferred to India. Although it has been suggested 
by at least one of his biographers that the Penjdeh 
Crisis thus solved the Sudan crisis for Gladstone by 
allowing him to withdraw troops honourably from the 
danger spot of the Sudan to the security of India, one 
21. 
is interested to find that the same matter had arisen 
during discussion about measures in the event of possible 
war with Russia over the Afghan Frontier question which 
had been taking place at Cabinet level in March before 
the Penjdeh crisis came to a head, and that the 
suggestion of withdrawing troops from Africa had been 
made by Sir Charles Dilke. 
This Cabinet roundrobin discussion and 
correspondence had taken place following the receipt 
on 21 March of a telegram from Dufferin who wished to 
have full information about the part England would play 
in the event of a Russian inroad into Afghanistan, so 
that he could have thorough discussion with the Amir, 
due to arrive at Rawalpindi within a few days. In 
this Cabinet correspondence, Kimberley for the India 
Office said he was not in favour of sending a great 
force to Herat but that he was in favour of building up 
the strength in India, but, that if Russian troops 
crossed the Afghan frontier this would be a casus belli. 
Granville and Gladstone agreed with him, although 
Gladstone guilefully observed that while Herat was 
Afghan territory, it was 'not precisely and properly 
Afghan'. Rosebery believed the only peaceful way out 
of the crisis was by a display of firmness and that 
the Russians were even less ready for war than the 
English. A telegram was sent to Dufferin on 25 March 
informing him that an attack on Herat 'will mean war 
between us and Russia everywhere, and the Amir must 
leave us to fight the battle in the way we think most 
likely to secure success'. They decided that the Amir 
must do the best he could with Herat by himself, but 
Dufferin was asked what reinforcements he needed in 
India. In this discussion by correspondence, Sir 
Charles Dilke added his note on 23 March: 
The only way of avoiding war is to lead the 
Russians to believe that we are in earnest. 
I doubt if they will think so as long as we 
go on with our preparations for going to 
Khartoum. The possibility of making the 
Suakin railway now seems more remote than 
ever. I should use grave language with regard 
to Russia;- send the Suakin force to India 
only holding the town as a post against the 
slave trade,- order Wolseley to India, and 
bring the Kbrti force down to the best 
Egyptian frontier.I 
So it seems probably that Gladstone's 'surprise' 
announcement of 27 April may well have been the 
1 Rose Louise Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, 
1884-1892 1 Appendix 2, British Cabinet Correspondence 
and Memoranda relating to Herat, 1885 9 p.230. 
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brainchild of Dilke a month before. This strong line 
from their a.Q_mired friend, England's great Liberal 
statesman~ the English Prime Minister, may well have 
had a sobering effect on the Russians as it had a 
stimulating one on the British public, but within the 
next week or so (in debate on 4 May) it was violently 
attacked by Randolph Churchill and then by other 
Conservative speakers. Churchill saw the whole thing 
as a political move on the part of Gladstone to sell 
British honour in Africa for the sake of preserving 
his own influence in English politics. A little later 
too, after 11 May i when the fronti.er negotiations had 
been renewed, other Conservatives complained that the 
Liberals had weakly avoided the opportunity of at last 
meeting the Russians face to face in conflict at a 
time which might well have been unfavourable to that 
nation. In spite of the effect of his April speech on 
the Penjdeh excitement, Gladstone's responses in the 
House at this time give the impression that he was 
really very uninformed about the frontier crisis. 
The other question, that of Arbitration, is quite 
an interesting one. The Times of 13 Apri.l had carried 
an unconfirmed report from Rome that Prince Bismarck 
was ready to arbitrate, but on the fifteenth it 
disapproved of a speech of Lord Rosebery's at 
Manchester in which he had suggested this same 1 remedy 
for international quarrels 1 • The British deci:=:>ion was 
to resort to Arbitration. The Secretary of State 
informed the Viceroy that a London proposal had been 
made to Russia 
2;;; 
to refer the question to the judgement of the 
head of a friendly state to decide whether 
Russia or Afghanistan departed from the 
agreement of March 16 9 and how the incident 
can be closed in a manner consi.stent with the 
honour of Great Britain and Russi.a .1 
This proposal was made by Granville to M. de Staal on 
24 April2 in a conciliatory letter. Next day de Staal 
said he feared that his Government could not accept i.t 
as 
the Emperor and public opi.nion in Russia both 
attached such importance to the point of 
military honour. Even if an enquiry were 
admitted 9 the Head of State to whom Russia 
would undoubtedly turn as a natural choice 9 
the Emperor of Germany 9 would not undertake 
the task.3 
Granville replied that if both governments asked the 
Emperor of Germany 9 it woul.d be very d.ifficul t for him 
to refuse. 
1 
By 28 April M. de Giers informed M. de Staal 
His Majesty sincerely partakes of the wish 
of the English Cabinet to maintain friendly 
relations between the two countries, but 
does not think that this result can be 
arrived at by multiplying the evi.dence upon 
a mi.li tary i.nciden t which has been made 
sufficiently clear. Moreover 1 the Emperor 
could not admit of anything.like an enquiry 
into the acts of General Komarov, as he 
considers himself the sole judge.of their 
N.A.I., For. Sec. F, July 1885, Nos 125-207, No.187, 
25 April. 
2 C.A. No.5, 1885, No.63. 
3 C.A. No.5, 1885, No.69 1 Granville to Thornton, 25 
April. 
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conformity with his orders ••.• It is therefore 
only between the two Governments that there 
can be any misunderstanding in the interpretation 
of the arrangements agreed upon.l 
By 1 May, the British accepted the Russian proposal for 
the neutralisation of Penjdeh and on the same day the 
Tsar expressed his willingness to refer to a foreign 
sovereign 'the misunderstanding which may have existed 
as to the interpretation of the agreement between the 
two Cabinets, if there remained any doubts or 
differences of opinion' • 2 On 4 May, having talked with 
the Queen, Granville was able to equal the noble 
condejscension of the Tsar: 
1 
It has at no time been the desire of Her Majesty's 
Government to see gallant officers on either side 
put upon their trial; but the differences between 
the two Governments which arose out of the 
engagement at Ak Tepe rendered it necessary to 
provide means for a settlement consistent with 
the honour of both. Her Majesty's Government have 
now, on the receipt of the telegraphic despatch of 
the 1st instant from St Petersburgh, the 
satisfaction of finding themselves able to adopt 
the arrangemept agreed to by His Majesty the Emperor, 
namely, that in respect to any misunderstanding which 
may have arisen in the interpretation of the agreement 
between the two Cabinets, if there shall still be 
found to subsist doubts and divergences of 
appreciation, the case shall be referred to the 
judgement of a Sovereign enjoying the confidence of 
the two Governments 
Her Majesty's Government are willing, accordingly, to 
adopt the language of the despatch as the basis of 
future proceedings, and to resume at once in London 
the negotiation for the main points of the line of 
delimitation ••.• 3 
C.A. No.5, 1885, No.77 (de Giers to de Staal, St 
Petersburg, 28 April). 
2 Ibid., No.85, de Giers to de Staal. 
3 Ibid., No.87, Granville to de Staal, May 1885. 
This suggested reference to an Arbitrator was a 
nice piece of pacificatory diplomacy. The news of the 
agreement of the two powers to adopt it was what was 
significant in that moment of crisis, and it did much 
to reduce the tension. After that, the machinery by 
which it was decided who would arbitrate, and when, 
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moved at a more leisurely pace. Not until late in July 
did the British Minister at Copenhagen approach the 
Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs to enquire if his 
Danish Majesty would undertake the duty of arbitrating 
over Penjdeh, to which in a few days the latter signified 
his willingness. The English Minister at Copenhagen's 
report of his first interview on this matter with the 
Danes must be a classic example of the diplomatic 
approach. When the Englishman paid his visit to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the latter was friendly but 
deliberately not in the mood to discuss politics. So 
next, the Englishman visited the Director-General of the 
Department, who immediately himself broached the matter 
of arbitration over Penjdeh. 
Englis~ Minister reported: 
Writing to Salisbury, the 
1 
I said I had no doubt that your Lordship meant 
that a conciliatory disposition shown by Russia 
in regard to the frontier delimitation would 
induce Her Majesty's Government to meet the views 
of the Russian Government as to arbitration, but 
that it would be no use to take up the latter 
question with any intention of handling it 
immediately unless Russia evinced a genuine 
anxiety to come to a satisfactory arrangement 
upon the more urgent points in dispute. M. Vedal 
said that he now understood the position excellently, 
and was quite of the opinion that I attributed to 
your Lordship.l 
N.A.I., For., Sec. F, October 1885, Nos 388-700, Her 
Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen to Salisbury, 20 July 
1885. 
The Arbitration did not take place at once, probably 
because of the very serious Anglo-Russian tension over 
Zulfikar which continued up to the London Protocol of 
10 September. This protocol covered so much ground and 
put the two signatories in such an amiable frame of mind 
with one another, that there was no need to re-open the 
Penjdeh matter and the proposed Arbitration was allowed 
to lapse. 
Sir Peter returns home 
Even before the collision at Penjdeh, the position 
of Sir Peter Lumsden had been an unhappy one, He had 
perhaps not been the man for the job, already old for 
the rigours of the frontier, certainly intransigent in 
his attitude towards the Russians, without the capacity 
which Ridgeway, C.E. Yate, Merk and others showed in 
their relations with the tribesmen as well as with 
Afghan officials. He also quite soon annoyed Dufferin 
who noted in him 'a tendency to act hastily' • 1 But apart 
from his own unsuitability, he had justifiable complaints 
concerning neglect from the Foreign Office, and the 
inefficiency of the Meshed telegraph. He trusted 'Her 
Majesty's Government will lose no time in sending me 
instructions 12 and on 22 February reported 'the position 
is very strained, and demands immediate orders' • 3 
Ridgeway, as we have shown before, was also highly aware 
of the inaction at this time and said it was time to 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. June 1885, Nos 518-74, 
K.W., p.4. 
2 C.A. No.2, 1885, No.195, 12 February, .1885, 
J Ibid,, No.202. 
'play a bold game'. 
25 February: 
Lumsden wrote to the Viceroy on the 
The Amir's representative has officially 
complained that owing to our indecision 
the Russians have succeeded in occupying 
considerable portions of the Amir's territory 
•••• He states that even now, if permitted and 
advised, they could drive back the Russians even 
to Merv, as the Turkomans are prepared to rise. 
They demand instructions which I am not empowered 
to give. Matters are most critical ••• I again 
appeal ••• for positive instructions.l 
The Kazi and the Governor of Herat both asked Lumsden 
for instructions, and all the unfortunate Commissioner 
could get from the Secretary of State in London at this 
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2 time was to 'press the Afghans strongly not to advance'. 
Most revealing of all with regard to the situation on 
the frontier is perhaps the desp.rate letter which 
General Ghaus-ud-din sent to the Kazi, who then forwarc;led 
it to Lumsden on 1 March. 
1 
For the sake of God and the Prophets do not be so 
inconsiderate. Although troops have reached this 
from Ashkabad, still I cannot even get a reply 
from Gulran. I inform you that they are coming 
here to fight .•.• While you are negotiating for 
the settlement of the boundary, the enemy has 
occupied three stations in your country. As 
soon as the Russian troops are in Pul-i-Khisti 
the Sarakh tribe will get out of hand, and we 
cannot then obtain supplies. We shall be ruined 
by our own hand.3 
N. A. l. , For. , Sec. F, Pros. June 1885, Nos 518-74, 
No. 541. 
2 Ibid., No. 550. 
J Ibid., No.558. 
The Granville-de Giers diplomatic line certainly 
impeded the Englishmen on the frontier, but one cannot 
help wondering if the inactivity there was not in part 
helped by Lumsden's own lack of enterprise. In February 
and March, having retired to Gulran and left the 
dangerous Penjdeh work to Ridgeway, he partly then lost 
the authority which he should have exercised, and took 
on the function largely of an intermediary official 
between the Foreign Office and the Frontier, and made 
complaints, but no particular fight, against the 
dilatory men at home. 
When news came of the Afghan defeat he had had 
enough of the Frontier position. On 15 April he sent a 
telegram to the Viceroy asking him to send it on to the 
Foreign Office: 
It is quite impossible for this Mission to 
continue in its present equivocal position. 
If we do not lead the people they will turn 
against us, and Russia's object now is to 
bring this about •••• Under these circumstances 
there is no other course than getting Her 
Majesty's Government to request Russia at 
once to accept a boundary.I 
Sir Peter's idea of the boundary was that it should run 
from Jho~j~well to the North of Ak Rabat and then 
north and east to Sari Yazi, which was far north of 
anything the Russians were likely to accept after their 
recent victory. He regarded the sending of English 
troops to this part of the wo.rld as the only thing which 
might make Russia hesitate before committing herself to 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. July 1885, Nos,125-207, 
No.155. 
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a Central Asian campaign. He was not prepared to 
contemplate any more southern boundary than the one he 
mentioned. On 24 April he had sent a despairing telegram 
to the Viceroy 
Your Lordship seems scarcely to appreciate the 
fact that the Russian army is at Pul-i-Khisti and 
a Yulatan Turkoman, nominee of Alikhanov, supreme 
in Panjdeh •••• I have sent Stephen home with 
reports on Panjdeh affairs, and really to inform 
the Foreign Office of the position which they 
cannot understand.l 
Such a telegram to authority was obviously the work of a 
desperate man. It is not surprising to find that on the 
very next day he telegraphed Granville: 
If reports that settlement has been effected with 
Russia are true, I respectfully submit the 
necessity of fixing definite Afghan limits at 
home, instead of leaving the demarcation to any 
Commission. This to be done at once from the 2 
reports and maps in your Lordship's possession. 
Granville replied to this on the 13 May that things were 
still not at a point where negotiations would reopen 
but due weight would be given to his suggestion and he 
would be informed immediately of such a development. 
On 26 April the Viceroy sent a telegram to Lumsden 
which must have been distressing to him. The Viceroy 
said that he had been prepared to throw in a garrison 
of eight or ten thousand British troops into Herat if 
required but that both his military advisers and the 
Home Government had been against it. He also said that 
1 Ibid., No.177. 
2 C.A. No.4, 1885, No.14. 
he was sending up heavy guns and breech-loaders to Herat 
but that he did not see how Sir Peter's previous 
suggestion that armaments should be distributed through 
him could be complied with. This led to Lumsden's 
telegram of 2 May to the Viceroy: 
I had no intimation whatever of the view of 
Her Majesty's Government. Under the 
circumstances, it would be out of the 
question my having anything to do with the 
distribution of arms, which forms but one 
fraction of a general project. It appears 
to me that my residence here can only now be 
detrimental, as any action I may possibly 
[take?] must either clash with the Amir's 
interests or the views of Her Majesty's 
Government. The general opinion here is 
that we and the Russians understand each 
other; that the boundary question is a farce 
to blind the Amir.l 
On the Jrd he again sent to the Viceroy2 a distressed 
tele'gram saying that the Commission was getting positively 
no information of the position of affairs at home except 
through India and judging from press telegrams and rumours 
he believed war must be imminent and that there were only 
two courses for him, either to cross the Persian 
fro8tier or to get back through Afghanistan. One can 
understand the humiliation felt by Lumsden and his 
officers. Their soldiers' honour was very much at stake, 
because they had been sent there to save the Amir's 
country from the possibility of Russian occupation and 
English military backing was now no more than a broken 
promise. Lumsden had already had the onerous duty of 
1 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, Pros. July 1885, Nos 208-36, No.209. 
2 Ibid., No.214. 
writing personally to the Amir to explain that the 
British had been unable to help beyond the weeks of 
pacification in Penjdeh. Lumsden said the Afghan and 
British interests were obviously the same and he besought 
1 the Amir to look to the bad state of Herat defences. 
At last on 4 May, a telegram was despatched from 
London ordering him to come home at once, bringing 
Colonel Stewart with him and leaving Ridgeway in 
temporary charge of the Commission. On the same day the 
Viceroy was also informed that negotiations would begin 
again at once. The communication of the 4 May overlapped 
with another telegram Lumsden had sent to the Viceroy on 
the fifth: 
Apparently Your Lordship agreed that it is 
undesirable for this Mission to meet Russian 
officers; under the circumstances I recommend 
that it should be broken up at once and return 
to India.2 
On the eighth he was able to telegraph the Viceroy that 
he was leaving at once for London and handing over 
command to Ridgeway 'in whom all have confidence' . 1 
So once again the Commission was waiting on the 
frontier for the Russian Commissioner to appear. It was 
to wait almost five months. Some criticism should be 
made of Lumsden 1 s geographical error in his telegrams of 
22 February already mentioned, 4 and 1 March, when he 
1 Ibid., No. 212-3, 1 May. 
2 Ibid., No.223. 
3 Ibid., No.236. 
4 See Chapter V, p.195. 
referred to Pul-i-Khatun instead of Pul-i-Khisti, and 
both in any case were inaccurate, 1 and worst of all on 
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7 March when he informed Granville that Colonel Alikhanov 
'through the Yulatan picket at Pul-i-Khisti• 2 was doing 
all he could to threaten the Sariks of Penjdeh that he 
was about to advance. On this latter occasion it is clear 
that Lumsden meant that the Russian pickets occupied Kizil 
Tepe not a mile from the bridge, and he afterwards 
explained that he had done this to reduce the complication 
of unfamiliar names. At this distance in time and space 
it may not appear a very serious error but from a military 
and strategic viewpoint it was grossly misleading as it 
gave the Russians the chance to claim that there had been 
no English protest when it was supposed that they already 
were at the bridge without having had to contend for it. 
How serious it was considered may be seen in Ridgeway's 
demi-official letter to his friend, the Secretary of 
the Indian Foreign Department, H.M. Durand: 
1 
2 
3 
I see that I am being attacked for allowing the 
Afghans to fight at Panjdeh, and, no doubt, I 
shall also be attacked for the false position 
they were in~ and, when the arbitration goes 
against us, for the mistakes which induced Her 
Majesty's Government to enter in to the 
agreement on March 13,3 under the impression 
that the Russians occupied Pul-i-Khisti. My 
memorandum of 16 April sent privately to you 
about 20 April proves that I am not to blame. 
My policy at Panjdeh was that the Afghans should 
not yield to bluster, or to mere demonstration 
C.A. No.2, (1885), No.216, Lumsden to Granville. 
Ibid., No.223. 
See C.A. No.2, 1885, No.226, Granville to de Staal. 
or even to an attack by cavalry, but that they 
should retire as soon as the Russians advanced 
in earnest with infantry and guns. 
Regarding Pul-i-Khisti, General Lumsden will be 
the first to acknowledge (if he thinks of it) 
that the mistake was not mine. He has my letters 
persistently, consistently and ••• lucidly 
explaining that the Russians had never held Pul-
i-Khisti and that it was absolutely necessary to 
negotiate the evacuation of Kizil Tepe, which was 
held by their Yulatan Sariks. I pointed out that 
if this was not done, the Russians would themselves 
advance there and then the Afghans must fight or 
retire. When I learnt that the mistake regarding 
Pul-i-Khisti had been made, I twice at least asked 
that it might be corrected, but, on my return to 
the Commissioner's camp on 24 March, I found that 
no such action, had been taken. I am quite content 
if the Government of India know the truth, but if 
charges such as those already made against me in 
the Press have a tendency to crop up, I shall be 
very glad if the truth remains in secret in the 
Foreign Office.l 
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During the following troubled months, Sir Peter Lumsden 
was on call at the India Office and persisted in his now 
unreal claim that the Afghans must have the northern 
frontier which he had outlined just before he left Gulran. 
The Crisis on the Tejend. What was Zulfikar? 
After the crisis, the Russian Government, through de 
Staal, had approached the British about the temporary 
neutralisation of Penjdeh, defined as reaching in its 
southern limit a point on the Murghab a little north of 
Maruchak, that is, the point at which the Russians as 
early as January 1885 had said they wished the frontier 
1 . 
N.A.I., For., Sec. F, July 1885, Nos 288-366, K.W., 
No.2, Ridgeway to Durand, 29 May 1885. 
to cross the river. The British agreed after suggesting 
very slight modifications, and on 11 May Granville had 
been able to notify the new Acting Commissioner, Colonel 
Ridgeway, that Penjdeh was neutralised pending the 
settlement of the frontier question. The situation on 
the Murghab was thus eased, and as the Amir had already 
expressed his willingness to exchange Penjdeh for 
control of Zulfikar, Maruchak and Gulran, and the 
1 Russians in London had agreed to this on 7 May, the 
1 C.A., No.4, 1885, No.27, Inclosure. This tentative 
proposal signed in London by Currie for the Foreign 
Office and Lessar for the Russian Ambassador, and 
forwarded to St Petersburg in the full expectation of 
both parties that it would be ratified, reads: 
The frontier will start from the Heri Rud a little 
to the north of the point marked 'Zulfikar Pass' on 
the map attached to the Protocol,* leaving that pass 
to the Afghans. Thence it will pass between Ak-
Robat and Souma-Karez and will run to Islim, where 
it will pass to the right bank of the Igri-Gue~, and 
leaving C;h.emin-i-bed outside the Afghan frontier, it 
will follow in the same manner the crests of the hills 
bordering the right bank of the Kushk as far as Hauz-
i-Khan. Thence the frontier will follow almost a 
straight line to a point on the Murghab to the north 
of Maruchak, so as to leave Maruchak and its dependenciE 
to Afghanistan. 
Thence the line of demarcation will follow the crest 
of the heights which border to the north the valley 
of the Kaisor, and to the west that of the Sangalak 
(Ab-i-Andkhoi), and will run to Khoja Saleh on the 
Amu-Daria, leaving to Afghanistan the cultivated lands 
of Andkhoi, together with the pastures in the 
neighbourhood of those lands, of which the inhabitants 
of Maimeneh and Andkhoi were in possession at the 
period of the. occupation of Merv by Russia. 
signed Foreign Office, 7 May 1885. P. W •. Currie, Lessar. P. 
*This map is included in C.A. No.4, 1885. 
situation looked very hopeful indeed and the diplomats 
in London and St Petersburg were optimistically at work 
on a Protocol sent to St Petersburg on 7 May. This 
document caused a new and delaying doubt suddenly to 
obtrude itself on the Russian mind. A problem of 
topographical inexactitude was to cause a long delay to 
delimitation and another period of tension between the 
two powers. The problem was: Just what was Zulfikar? 
and this would decide also where it wa.s. On the map 
prepared by General Petrusevich in 1880 and published in 
1881 the name 'Zulfikar' was inscribed on the Persian 
side of the Heri-Rud. In the map finally prepared by 
23:; 
Lessar and in the Russian staff maps of the time it was 
modified to appear as a town or village also on the left 
bank of the river. The name was then found also to belong 
to a ruined tower on the right bank. Both parties were 
now becoming aware that the name 'Zulfikar' also belonged 
to a long pass through rough ranges on the right bank of 
the river, but no one as yet had an adequate map. The 
Russians feared that without such a map they might be 
giving to the Afghans the mouth of the best access from 
the Heri-Rud to Ak Rabat and so across to the Kushk. 
As will be remembered, the journeys of Lessar in 
1881 and 1882 had shown the Russians that the Tejend 
was not only occupied by Turkmens but that its middle 
portion from Sarrakhs south towards Afghanistan was a 
particularly unsettled region asking for Russian 
administration. Komarov took possession formally of 
the right bank in April 1884 and set about organising 
the Turkmens, especially the Salors whom he encouraged 
to settle at Sarrakhs. In June as has been mentioned he 
precipitately ordered the Persian garrison at the fort 
of Ru.knabad to cross the river back into Persian 
territory, saying that henceforth the right bank was a 
Russian responsibility. 
We have already seen that the Russians were in 
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full occupation of Sarrakhs when Lumsden passed through 
there in October 1884 and soon after he left, a strong 
Russian force moved south to Pul-i-Khatun. The Amir 
protested about this to Lumsden in November without 
result. The Russians in St Petersburg quoted Sir Charles 
1 MacGregor's book to prove that the north-west frontier 
of Afghanistan really began eighty versts south of Pul-i-
Kha tun and about ten versts south of Zulfikar and ran 
eastward from the river along a chain of heights on 
which were watch-towers. Later on MacGregor was asked 
to interpret his book for the Indian Foreign Department 
and said that he had not said anything at all about 
boundaries but merely that the heights here, as in many 
other places in Khorassan, had watch-towers built for 
the same purpose. In January 188f' Prince Dondukov-
Korsakov had ordered Komarov to move south on the Tejend. 
By 12 February a report reached Lumsden from the Afghans 
that a force of 150 Russian cavalry had reached Zulfikar 
and were now facing the Afghan outpost there, and 
refused to retire unless forced. De Giers protested to 
the English when he received news that the Afghan 
governor of Kuhsan was intending to bring a force to 
1 MacGregor, Col. C.M., C.S.I., C.I.E., Narrative of a 
Journey through the Provinces of Khorassan and the North 
West Frontier of Afghanistan in 1875, London, 1879. 
attac~ the Russians at Zulfikar, but by the time his 
protest arrived, the Afghans had also received orders 
to avoid starting a conflict. On 24 February 1885 the 
Russians refused to withdraw from Zulfikar but agreed 
to ask their force to refrain from contact with the 
Afghans. So the situation on the Heri-Rud remained in 
an inactive state during the next two months of 
diplomatic and military tension on the Murghab. 
The Draft Protocol of 7 May from London, however, 
crossed with a Russian communication to de Staal which 
pointed out that owing to the incompleteness of Russian 
knowledge about the geography of the two rivers, an 
agreement in London could only relate to the main 
points and that the details would still have to be 
settled by the Commission in the field. 1 The tentative 
agreement made on 7 May was announced to Parliament 
only on the eleventh, and, on the twelfth, M. Lessar met 
Lord Kimberley by appointment at the Foreign Office to 
discuss the St Petersburg response to the Draft 
Agreement of the seventh. The first point raised was 
of Zulfikar. The Russian Government desired a more 
exact definition of 1 Zulfikar Pass'. It was agreed, 
after some discussion that it might be defined as the 
1 Zulfikar Pass' marked on the English maps. 2 The Draft 
of the seventh was modified to this effect. M. de Staal 
sent a Memorandum to Granville on the twenty-first 3 
incidentally blaming the Afghan occupation of Penjdeh 
1 C.A. No.4, 1885, No.21. 
2 Ibid., No.27. 
3 Ibid., No.29. 
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for having prevented the 'investigation of the territory 
to be delimited' and suggesting that after 'a little 
north of Zulfikar', the line should then 'follow the 
crests of the heights which border the valley of the 
Heri-Rud in an easterly and southerly direction (it was 
not specified how far) before proceeding towards Ak 
1 Rabat'. This of course almost isolated Zulfikar from 
Afghanistan and made nonsense of the English intention 
of preserving Zulfikar for the Amir, and next day 
Granville's memorandum to de Staal pointed out that such 
a line would deprive the Afghans of the passage left to 
them in the previous agreement (7 May) and suggested a 
further alteration, namely, that after 'north of 
Zulfikar' should read 
will follow the crests of the heights bordering 
on the north of the pass which runs from the 
Heri-Rud eastwards, so as to leave 'to Afghanistan 
the command of both ends of the pass in question.2 
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It will be recalled that a telegram had been sent to 
the Viceroy on 4 May asking him to assure the Amir that 
Russia was willing to exchange Penjdeh for Zulfikar. In 
the midst of all this much less final discussion, a 
telegram was sent by the Viceroy on 23 May and received 
on the same day, to say that the Amir willingly accepted 
the line described in the telegram of 4 May. 
May de Giers replied to de Staal: 
1 
2 
Being desirous of a prompt solution and 
avoiding misunderstanding with regard to 
Ibid., No.29. 
Ibid., No.32. 
On 16 (28) 
Zulfikar, we are ready to abandon to the Afghans 
the defile which, starting from the Heri Rud, 
crosses the first range of heights, in such a 
way, however, as not to cut and interrupt 
Russian communications.l 
This concession by de Giers was communicated by Thornton 
to London on 29 May, and other matters such as 
Ridgeway's agreement that, as the Russians wished, the 
escort be limited to 100 fighting men, were beginning to 
take shape. Zinoviev, the head of the Asian Section of 
the Russian Foreign Office, Thornton and de Giers had 
already begun discussing the necessity for migration of 
tribesmen after the frontier was fixed. But the English 
diplomats had been reckoning without their Russians. On 
5 June de Staal communicated to Granville a cryptic 
telegram from de Giers sent on the previous day: 
Thinking it our duty to insist upon the integrity 
of our communications, we are of the opinion that 
the task of conciliating this principle with the 
conditions to which Her Britannic Majesty's 
Goverqment would wish to subordinate the cession 
of Zulf:ikar to Afghanistan must be left to the 
Commission.2 
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This certainly had.been the Russian opinion earlier but 
coming again now as a second opinion to the amiable 
dis~ssions of the previous two weeks, it was a 
disappointment to English diplomacy. As Granville wrote 
to Thornton about it on 7 June, 'it left the whole matter 
open 13 and for the next two and a half months the Zulfikar 
matter rose to crisis proportions. Why the change in 
1 Ibid., No.42. 
2 Ibid., No.55. 
3 Ibid., No.57. 
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Russian conciliation took place may be due to the more 
active entrance of Zinoviev into the present discussions, 
but what is possibly more likely is that Alexander III 
himself decided to take a firmer line, as he had just 
been studying the English Memorandum of 22 May very 
1 
closely. Alexander III possibly did not understand 
how little was to be lost by the suggested agreement and 
he appeared to have been much angered by the British stand 
over Penjdeh, and he possibly ordered de Giers to 
undertake this rescissive movement. 
On 10 June de Staal notified Granville that the 
Imperial Government 'could not permit the integrity of 
Russian communications in these parts to be subordinated 
2 to the convenience of the Afghans', 
It was just at this rather crucial moment in 
British-Russian relations that the Gladstone Government 
was defeated on an unrelated, domestic issue and in the 
new government, the Marquis of Salisbury was both Prime 
Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. One 
of Granville's last official acts was to assure de Staal 
that he would pass all information on to his successor, 
and to stress that 
1 
2 
J 
the limit of our demand is to secure Zulfikar 
to the Afghans in exchange for Panjdeh, which 
arrangement you were authorised by the Emperor 
to agree to on the 16th April.3 
Ibid. , No.48. 
Ibid., No.59. 
Ibid. , No.60, 11 June. 
The Viceroy, having received a copy of Granville's 
telegram to Thornton about the Russian government's 
decision to throw Zulfikar back to the Boundary 
Commission, explaiiled h:Jw difficult it would be now to 
explain this cbange to the Amir. This difficulty was 
later used with effect as a talking-point to modify the 
Russian view. For this reason it is quoted here, under 
the date of 13 June (telegraphed): 
As I have already informed the Amir, on the 
strength of your telegram of 4th May, that 
his frontier would be drawn north of 
Zulfikar as well as north of Maruchak, and 
as he has made a corresponding announcement 
to his Sirdars, it would be difficult for 
this Government to acquiesce in any 
modification of that line in a sense adverse 
to interests of Amir without his consent. 1 
The Viceroy also hoped that the general terms of the 
arrangement which had been stipulated for on behalf of 
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the Amir would be scrupulously maintained. 2 The Russians 
made the first approach, a cordial one seeking 
continuation of negotiations, to Thornton on 25 June, and 
on the twenty-seventh Salisbury wrote to Ridgeway 
informing him that the negotiations had been 'arrested by 
a difference of opinion as to the Zulfikar p~ss' , 3 
giving him the gist of the two claims and asking him, 
after careful consultation with his officers, to telegraph 
the results to the Foreign Office. On 1 July, as 
Salisbury reported to Thornton on the same day, he held 
a talk with de Staal over 'pending negotiations respecting 
1 Ibid., No.63, Inclosure. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., No.65, 27 June. 
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Afghanistan' and urged upon the Ambassador the importance 
of expedition, and expressed a hope that it might be 
possible to draw the line in London. He feared that delay 
might bring about accidental collision between the two 
countries. Salisbury stated in the House of Lords on 6 
July that negotiations were about to be resumed and 
this led to the appearance of a conciliatory article in 
the official Journal de St Petersbourg of 8 July. 1 
Nevertheless the situation continued dark, with both 
diplomacies in an intransigent mood until in the Journal 
de St Peterbourg of 5 (17) July an article, which 
Thornton saw as obviously inspired, referred to two 
matters, firstly, that which Salisbury had already 
mentioned to the House of Lords, the predicament of the 
British Government, which, on the strength of the promise 
of the Russian Government of 4 (16) May, had assured the 
Amir that Zulfikar belonged to Afghanistan, and, secondly, 
that the map of the Heri-Rud recently made by Captain 
Maitland available. 2 On JO July de Giers informed was 
Thornton that the Russian map of Zulf ikar and vicinity was 
now also on its way to St Petersburg. 3 On the same day 
de Giers sent to de Staal a complete history of the 
Zulfikar affair to put before Salisbury, first of all 
explaining that the telegram of 4 (16) May had not 
necessarily referred to the whole pass, and expressing 
surprise to Lord Salisbury at the way he insisted on 
interpreting this. He pointed out that on General Walker'E 
map, the only one available at the time, the name 
1 Ibid., No.74, Inclosure. 
2 Ibid., No.80, Inclosure. 
3 Ibid., No.84. 
Zulfikar was given to a place on the left bank of the 
Heri-Rud and so outside the area under discussion, and 
the name had since been applied to the right bank where 
the Russian post was. The Russian Cabinet thought this 
was the only part referred to. It was only on receipt 
of the English telegram of 4 May that the Russians 
understood that the whole Zulfikar Pass was intended. 
Nevertheless the Russian attitude was now very 
conciliatory, and they awaited the arrival of the new 
Russian map. Salisbury appreciated the conciliatory 
tone of this communication and asked Thornton to tell de 
Giers that the English Government awaited further 
Russian proposals. On 5 August a telegram of primary 
importance was received from Ridgeway, dated 2 August. 
It read: 
Captain Maitland, who is the only member of the 
Mission who has examined the Zulfikar Pass, 
writes to us from Daulatyar that provided 
Russians are kept away from Karez Elias, the 
possession of the western of the two defiles 
forming pass will be sufficient for Afghan 
interests.l 
On 19 August news about the Russian map of Zulfikar 
2 
was telegraphed from St Petersburg to M. de Staal and 
the next day Lord Randolph Churchill, now Head of the 
India Office, reported to the Viceroy that the Russian 
map agreed completely with Maitland's, and showed two 
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separate defiles, 'The defile of Zulfikar is composed of 
two parts which traverse successively two chains of 
1 Ibid., No.88. 
2 Ibid., No.94. 
heights almost parallel with the Heri-Rud .••. 11 The 
Russians could be left the two eastern exists. On 24 
August Salisbury was able to transmit to Ridgeway a 
copy of the new Russian proposal respecting Zulfikar, 
the substance of which he had already sent by telegram. 
On the twenty-ninth Ridgeway's approval was obtained. 
Maitland declared it was the western and not the eastern 
defile which bifurcated, but the important fact was that 
there were two defiles, one for each. On 3 September 
Lumsden from the India Office stated his old opinion that 
Shor Tepe, north of Pul-i-Khatun, was the only correct 
western end of the frontier, but no one listened to him. 
On 3 September, Her Majesty's Government informed the 
Russian Ambassador that they would accept the Russian 
proposal as contained in the telegram of 20 August and 
the maps of 24 August, with a minor stipulation that 
the frontier line should nowhere approach the scarp of 
the western defile nearer than 1,000 yards. 'This being 
agreed to, I should hope that M. Lessar should start at 
once'. On 4 September de Staal and Lessar called at 
the Foreign Office and said they could agree to the 
1,000-yard suggestion without reference to St Petersburg. 
, 
The Russians would have liked the new Commdssion to have 
established camp at Penjdeh and worked back towards 
Zulfikar but did not insist, and it was decided that 
the Commission should meet at Zulfikar within two months 
of the date of signature, and that its escort could not 
be increased beyond 100 fighting men without the agreement 
of the two commissioners. The office of Senior Assistant 
l Ibid., No.95. 
Commissioner was dropped. Mr Condie Stephen, O.B.E., 
C.M.G., was written to that his services would not now 
be required and he returned to his Second Secretaryship 
at the British Embassy at Tehran. The London Protocol was 
duly signed on 10 September, and the delayed Commission 
was ready to begin work. 1 
On the Frontier, April-September 1885 
The strain of this long period of tension to the 
men on the frontier, British, Indian and Afghan, is 
clear in the letter written by C.E. Yate from the British 
Commission's camp on 14 September, in which he writes of 
the relief felt at the positive news that had just 
arrived that the Protocol for the re-establishment of 
the Joint Commission had been signed on 10 September. 
At last we have heard some definite news, and 
we know how that peace is declared ..•. Glad, 
indeed, must the Afghan authorities be to 
think that their rule at Herat is to be granted 
a fresh lease of life, and still more glad are 
all our men and followers to think that at last 
there is a chance of getting back to their 
wives and families •••. Now all is hope again. 
Something has been settled; something has to be 
done, and all are ready to be up and doing. It 
is not only the inaction, but the uncertainty 
and want of some object in life, that has told 
so heavily on us all during the past five months 
of weary waiting; and now all are anxious to be at 
work again ..•. The camp will probably be shortly on 
the move down the valley in the direction of 
Kuhsan, where we shall be conveniently situated, 
both with regard to the telegraph office at 
1 See Appendix E. 
Mashhad and to Zulfikar ••. the same camping-ground 
where we joined Sir Peter Lumsden just ten months 
ago, little thinking then what was before us.l 
One of the chief preoccupations of Colonel Ridgeway, who 
had now been made Commissioner and given a knighthood, 
was the matter of the vulnerability of Herat. This was 
especially so if the Russians could get access to 
Afghanistan through Khorassan, and diplomatic steps were 
taken over this. It was drawn to the attention of the 
Shah by Thomson, the English Ambassador, that some 
Russians had been traversing Persian territory on their 
way to Pul-i-Khatun and Zulfikar2 and in due course a 
protest was made to the Russian Foreign Office by the 
British acting on the Shah 1 s behalf. De Giers assured 
Thornton that the Atek was not Persian but Turkmen 
territory and that the Russians were just as interested 
in the integrity of Persia as the British were. 
Lumsden had been unable to get permission for his 
officers to inspect the fortifications of Herat and 
this had been taken up by the Viceroy. In a Kharita to 
the Amir dated from Simla, JO April, the Viceroy pointed 
out that although war with Russia had not broken out over 
Penjdeh, there was still no guarantee of peace, and then, 
having listed the amount of military equipment which was 
already on its way to Afghanistan from India, and stated 
that ten lakhs of rupees were to be sent at once to the 
Kandahar border, he mentioned that the Governor of Herat 
had 'not allowed Lumsden into Herat, and offered the Amir 
1 C.E. Yate, Letters from Northern Afghanistan, pp.4J-4. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. October 1885, Nos 388-700, 
No.503, Thomson to Salisbury, 17 July. 
'the help of any Muhammaden officers trained in British 
service 1 • 1 He could let him have some good men. This 
had the desired effect. On 23 May the Amir thanked him 
for his 'cordial letter' and said that Colonel Stewart 
and engineer officers would be received at Herat, but 
said he did not require Mohamedan officers. He wrote: 
When war breaks out with Russia on the frontiers, 
the Afghans and the British troops will act in 
concert and combine in repelling the enemy and 
fight side by side •.•. If there is any thing to 
take place at all it must take place this year 
..•. Every 1000 men that may be raised to-day 
will cost two lakhs of rupees a year. Therefore 
I want to know how many troops I should raise,2 
He took the opportunity of suggesting that he might need 
' another twenty lakhs of rupees, and that his troops 
needed leather ammunition-pouches in addition to the 
ammunition being sent. This news was very satisfactory 
to Ridgeway, who received in June a credit of four lakhs 
of rupees to be expended on the Herat fortifications, but 
only on condition that he himself was permitted to 
supervise works and verify payments. The full inspection 
by Stewart, Holdich and Peacock was made at the end of 
June, and they were hospitably treated by the Amir's 
officials. They found the city fortifications more 
effective than they had realised but in need of repair. 
Stewart made a detailed report which was forwarded to 
Salisbury on 1 July. To this Ridgeway added an 
interesting commentary. One especial point may be 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. July 1885, Nos 125-207, 
No.206, Kharita 690F. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. July 1885, Nos 288-366, 
No.288. 
mentioned. Ridgeway's report refers to the blowing up 
of the Musalla as having been done at the Amir's express 
order, and that the latter had it mined for this purpose 
already before the English officers were allowed into 
Herat. The destruction of this famous place was much 
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discussed at the time. Some of the English party were of 
the opinion that the Amir may have acted partly from 
motives of jealousy as he knew its destruction would 
arouse anti-English feeling amongst the more fanatical 
Moslems, and this would prevent the growth of too much 
admiration for Ridgeway and his party. But it is also 
true that Colonel Holdich had made a tentative 
suggestion that it would be better for the security of 
Herat if external eminences including the Musalla, 
overlooking the walls, could be destroyed. The Amir 
may have decided to act on this suggestion in a thorough-
going style. It is possible that he himself did not 
realise the local esteem in which this already ruinous 
ancient theological school was held. In spite of this 
evidence the British are still traditionally blamed for 
the destruction of the Musalla, of which all that remain 
today are the graceful but mouldering minarets 
1 
conspicuous from afar. 
The total impression of Herat was that it could 
withstand a siege for no more than a month, that the 
Heratis of the countryside would have no option but to 
side with the Russians and that the Governor himself was, 
as the Amir knew, not to be relied upon, and there was 
evidence that he was sending ill-gotten wealth to 
1 N.A.I., For. Sec. F, Pros. August 1885, Nos 244-309, 
No.248, Ridgeway to Salisburyi 1 July 1885. 
Samarcand in case he himself had to take to flight. 
Improvements of th~~defences continued and C.E. Yate 
reported his visit there on 18 August in company with 
five other English Officers. Holdich, speaking of the 
defence of Herat, writes: 
When all was ready, and the hopes of the 
military contingent of the Commission ran 
high •.. we heard that we were to demarcate 
a boundary after all, instead of defending 
a town •••. So it happened that whilst we were 
glad enough to hear that the change of 
Ministry at home had effected a change in 
our proceedings ... there was a distinct shadow 
of disappointment that the opportunity was 
lost of testing the value of our practical 
engineering in Herat.l 
1 Holdich, p.149. 
CHAPTER VII 
A JOINT COMMISSION AT LAST; 1885-86 
Demarcation 
The London Protocol of 10 September 1885, 1 
immediately brought about a nation-wide relaxation in 
both Empires from the uncomfortable incandescence of 
their mutual hostility over the previous five months. 
This change was immediately apparent, too, when the Joint 
Commission at last met on the Afghan frontier. Not only 
was the intensity of international ill-feeling completely 
gone, at any rate at the start, but the responsibility 
and work of the Commission had both been much reduced by 
the London Protocol, even if its prestige was also 
somewhat lowered, 
This Protocol was nothing more than the latest stage 
of the diplomatic continuum of 1884-85 which had begun 
the present year with the Russian Memorandum of 16 (28) 
January in which they insisted that Pul-i-Khatun and 
Penjdeh were both necessary to their planned control of 
2 Turkmen lands. This continued with a controversial 
memorandum in reply from Granville on 13 March, accepting 
in principle the Russian idea of a zone of inspection, 
but stating that as in other parts of Asia tribes were 
divided by international boundary lines, so it might 
happen in Penjdeh, unless the line of frontier were made 
1 See Appendix E. 
2 C.A. No.2, 1885, No.182, Inclosure. 
by the Commissioners on the spot with the 'assistance 
of the Ameer's officers'. They accepted as a southern 
limit of the zone the very line which the Russians 
wanted as frontier, namely~ 
a point on the Heri-Rud about six miles south 
of Zulfikar to Kehrizi Elias and Kehrizi Soume 
to the rivulet of Yegri Gueukj thence to 
Tchemenibid, and along the chain of hills on 
the right bank of the Kushk to Havuzikhan, thence 
to a point situated to the north of Meruchak, and 
thence by the heights which border the valleys of 
Kaisor and Sangalak to Khoja Saleh. 1 
This memorandum also restated as the northern limit the 
line from Sher Tepe to Sari Yazi, and thence along the 
northern outskirts of cultivation to Khoja Saleh, which 
the Afghans claimed as the northern frontier. This 
memorandum in its turn provoked a Russian set of 
'0bservations 1 , dated 15 (27) March which de Staal 
communicated to Granville on 1 April. The Observations 
blamed Afghan invasion of Penjdeh for 'having prevented 
the negotiations from following their natural course' 
and re-stated the Russian opinion that the oasis of 
Penjdeh had never formed part of the Afghan Province of 
Badghis. The Observations concluded: 
All these circumstances warrant the supposition 
that the negotiations for a definition of the 
limits of a zone of investigation could hardly 
come to a prompt conclusion; that they would 
probably only prolong the state of uncertainty 
which it is in the interest of the two 
Governments to put an end to as soon as possible, 
and that the best time of the year for the 
investigations of the Commission might in the 
meantime be wasted. 
1 Ibid., No.226, lnclosure. 
The difficulties above referred to could only 
be prevented if Her Britannic Majesty 1 s 
Government were to consent to adopt the 
frontier line proposed in the Imperial Cabinet's 
Memorandum of the 16th of January last as the 
basis of their investigations in which case the 
latter would be fully prepared to send their 
Commissioner to the spot .•.• l 
25C 
Three days later, the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
sent a much more conciliatory Memorandum, stating that 
at no time had they had, or did they have, any intentions 
of threatening Herat or any part of Afghanistan and 
their 'desire was to establish between their possessions 
and those of the Ameer an efficient and lasting frontier 
which would secure the peace of those regions and 
strengthen her friendly relations with England' . 2 On 4 
April Granville reported to Thornton his interview in 
London on that day with de Staal in which he (Granville) 
and de Staal had reached no conclusion. 3 A conversation 
between Thornton and de Giers on 8 April was equally 
unproductive. 4 
At this stage the report of the battle on the Kushk 
caused the delay which was referred to in the previous 
chapter. 
We have already seen how the Draft Proposal of 8 May, 
resulting from the London meetings of Granville, Kimberley, 
de Staal and Lessar, during the crisis, had suddenly put 
l Ibid., No.267 1 
2 Ibid., No.270 1 
notifying him of 
3 
Inclosure. 
Granville to Thornton, 3 April, 
the Memorandumi No.269, Inclosure. 
Ibid., No.271. 
4 C.A. No.4, 1885, No.8. 
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the Russian Foreign Office into a very cautious attitude 
about the true interpretation of 1 Zulfikar 1 • 1 But it was 
from this Draft that the Protocol of 10 September made 
the next small step, acceptable to both parties, and the 
Joint Boundary Commission was able to start almost at 
once. 
This Protocol, signed by Salisbury and de Staal, 
and fortified by two formidable survey maps, one of 
Zulfikar and the other of Penjdehi fixed the western 
starting point of the frontier as from 1 a point on the 
Heri-Rud about two versts below the fort of Zulfikar' 
and went on to direct the Commissioners absolutely to 
follow the line marked in red on the Map no.l ••• 
as far as point K in such a manner as not to 
approach nearer than a distance of J,000 English 
feet to the edge of the scarp of the western 
defile (including the crest marked L M N of the 
northern branch of the defile) •..• 2 
The Protocol then followed precisely the suggested 
direction of the Draft Agreement of 8 May with regard 
to the frontier along the Kushk. And then, leaving the 
right bank of the Kushk as before, the Protocol read: 
From Hauz-Khan the frontier will follow an 
almost straight line to a point on the Murghab 
north of Maruchak, fixed so as to leave to 
Russia the lands cultivated by the Sariks, and 
their pastures. 
Thus about a third of the whole frontier had been so 
fixed in London that actual demarcation was a simple 
matter. 
1 See Chapter VI, p.2J2, et. seq. 
2 C.A. No.4, 1885 9 p.75-6, Inclosure in No.108 [sic] 
meaning Inclosure in No.109. 
The Protocol contained the hortatory sentence: 
'The Commission shall conclude their labours as quickly 
as possible 1 • In spite of all this, the remaining 
delimitation was to take the better part of a year and 
then not reach finality. This prolongation was largely 
for two reasons; one~ that the English and the Russian 
Commissions alike were both fired with the most ardent 
ethnographical ambitions to do the right thing by the 
tribesmen whose affairs fell within the scope of each, 
and, secondly, that the new Russian Commissioner, an 
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able scientist, Colonel Kuhlberg, who had been the 
Geodetist appointed for the earlier stage of the 
Commission, was possibly no match for Ridgeway in the 
political field and hence was both prone to be doctrinaire 
in his reference to former authorities (this became very 
apparent in the dispute over 1 Khoja Saleh'), and to 
refer minor matters to the Russian Cabinet, as, in the 
terms of the Protocol, the respective Commissioners were 
instructed to do in case of difficulties. 
The delimitation problems connected with water-
usage had certainly not been unforseen by the diplomats. 
Having left the Commission to fix the point on the 
Murghab, the Protocol of 10 September then left them 
also only general instructions about the line beyond 
Hauz-i-Khan, as follows: 
Applying the same principle [with regard to 
agricultural and pastoral lands] both to the 
Turkomans subject to Russia and to the subjects 
of the Ameer of Afghanistan, the frontier will 
follow east of the Murghab a line north of the 
valley of the Kaisor, and west of the valley of 
the Sangalak (Ab-i-Andkhoi) and leaving Andkhoi 
to the East will run to Khoja Saleh on the Oxus. 
The Commissioners were also in general instructed to 
Hpay due attention to the localities and to the 
necessities and well-being of the local populationi. 
Another matter of importancei a tacit admission by 
the British that Penjdeh was in the Russian zone, was 
the reduction in area of the Penjdeh neutral zone, which 
was to be effective, according to the Protocol, from 
the very first meeting of the Commission. The zone was 
to be limited to a small strip of country occupying a 
rectangular strip very narrow from north and south, with 
its southern line between Hauz-i-Khan on the Kushk and 
Maruchak on the Murghab. Everything north of the strip 
was indisputably left to the Russians. The Protocol of 
10 September eliminated 1 too, any further need for talk 
about northern and southern limits of the zone of 
demarcation. It also meant that the King of Denmark's 
Arbitration over Penjdeh was quietly shelved about this 
time, as no longer necessary. 
As to the difficult relations of Ridgeway and the 
Kazi, there will be a good deal to be said about this 
in a later chapter. Here it will be enough to mention 
the statesmanlike approach of the Amir to the Boundary 
Commission at this time. He wrote to Ridgeway in the 
following words: 
1 
My object in procuring peace and friendship 
with that [Russian] Government is to obtain 
a peace and preservation of neighbourly rights 
which may remain intact for years, and that it 
should not happen that after writing a treaty 
of friendship and an agreement of neutrality, 
the subjects of that side may quarrel with 1 
subjects of this side on a trifling matter. 
N.A.I. 1 For. i Sec. Fi Pros. July 1886, Nos l-195i 
No.52, Amir to Ridgewayi JO November 1885. 
He went on to say that the Sariks of Penjdeh should not 
be confused with the Sariks of Maruchak. 
As it had been agreed in Protocol that the Escort 
Parties for the Demarcation were not to be in excess of 
100 on each side without the agreement of the two 
Commissioners, a section of the Indian party returned 
early in November to Quetta by the same route as it 
had come. The Escort remaining consisted of 100 men 
from the 11th Bengal Lancers under the command of Major 
Bax and Lieutenant Drummond. Sixty men from the 20th 
Punjab Infantry under Captain Cotton were left to escort 
and guard the treasure and stores wherever required. 
Those not on Escort duty had to refrain from coming too 
near the frontier, to make it quite clear that they were 
not part of the Escort. 
The Russian camp remained at Zulfikar and an English 
Advance Party fixed a site for the English camp a little 
south of Zulfikar, On the appointed date of 10 November 
the English party arrived at the new camp, and their 
Armenian interpreter, Anianantz, visited the Russian camp 
and reported that Colonel Kuhlberg, too, had arrived, 
whereupon Colonel Ridgeway rode to pay a formal call. 
M. Lessar, no longer 'Assistant Commissioner' but now 
'Representative of the Russian Foreign Office' on the 
Commission, also arrived that afternoon. The remaining 
English party consisted of fourteen; Ridgeway, Major C.E. 
Yate, Bax, Holdich and Durand, Captains Peacocke, Gore 
and De Laessoe, Mr Merk, Dr Owen, Lieutenant Drummond, 
Ressaldar-Majors Sirdar Mohamed Aslam Khan, Kazi Mohamed 
Aslam Khan, Khan Baba Khan. 
At last on 11 November 1885 the Joint Anglo-Russian 
Afghan Boundary Commission held its preliminary meeting 
and for a time a good deal of exchange of social visits 
at various levels ensued. The quality and frequency of 
the Cossack singing especially was much enjoyed by the 
men who had been so long isolated on the frontier. This 
was the first encounter between the English and the 
Russian officers and the first approach of Indian and 
Cossack soldiers and was mutually interesting. The 
atmosphere was entirely friendly. The first stone of 
the frontier pillars was laid on 12 November 'as near as 
possible on the spot laid down for the boundary in the 
1 Protocol 1 • Yate comments that the Russians had made 
a considerable concession at Zulfikar as they would 
have great difficulty constructing a new road in the 
defile left to them. 
The possession of Zulfikar would have just 
nicely rounded off the Russian frontier, and 
have given them the site for a good frontier-
post, with direct lateral communication between 
their main lines of advance up the valleys of 
the Hari Rud and the Kushk. By the loss of 
Zulfikar they are at present practically cut 
off from all lateral communication with the 
Hari Rud anywhere south of Pul-i-Khatun, nearly 
30 miles to the north.2 
There were fifteen Russian officers attached to the 
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Commission, including seven topographers. Captain 
Gideonov was appointed the Russian Assistant Commissioner, 
as Major Durand was the English Assistant.* Salisbury 
1 C.E. Yate~ p.75, 
2 Ibid., p.76. 
* See C.E. Yate, p.78~ for complete list of Russian 
personnel. 
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also gave Ridgeway authority to invite Holdich to take 
part in discussions if both Lessar and Gideonov attended. 1 
Placing pillars on the rough ground running east from 
the Pass involved a careful survey to test the main points 
as laid down on the Russian map used by Protocol. After 
this, Captain Peacocke and three Russian topographers 
went on ahead to survey the country east of Maruchak 
and a reduced main party moved pleasantly across Badghis 
following the line laid down by Protocol, checking points, 
fixing positions of pillars which were then constructed 
by an Afghan work-party, becoming acquainted, riding and 
hunting in the crisp early winter weather, the only 
difficulty being the small quantity of water available 
in the wells, which had necessitated sending most of 
the camp round by a longer route. 
On 2 December they reached Hauz-i-Khan, the point 
on the Kushk from which a line eastward was to bring them 
to the Murghab a little north of Maruchak. Now began the 
first really responsible work of the Commission. A 
small camp waited at Hauz-i-Khan while Holdich, Gore 
and Captain Komarov, Commander of the Russian Escort, 
thoroughly surveyed the country between the rivers to 
Maruchak, whither the main party had gone on. This was 
the second visit of some of the English officers to the 
Penjdeh country and they found the country a great deal 
wetter, and the Murghab more impassable 1 than it had been 
the previous yearo The officers renewed friendly relation: 
with Jamshidi and Sarik acquaintances of last year. 
1 C.A. No.2, 1887i No.22, 27 November 1885. 
25' 
Ridgeway observed that Russian and Afghan relations were 
decidedly strained. All this time Captain Cotton 1 s party 
was based at Charshamba near the Herat-Maimana frontier, 
where winter quarters were to be established for the 
English Party, 
In early December Ridgeway was hopeful to being 
'able to arrange that the free use of the present 
irrigation canals of the Kushk River shall be insured to 
1 2 the Afghans'. On 22 December he received a telegram 
from the Marquis of Salisbury authorising him to use his 
discretion as to the postponement of the Kushk Canals 
question. When heavy snow fell on 21 and 22 December 
demarcation stopped until February. But discussion 
continued on the matter of the land irrigated by canals 
on the Kushk and Kashan Rivers~ on which it had been 
centred for the last three weeks. 
The settlement was not nearly as simple as 
Ridgeway had hoped. The Russians had agreed to take 
over the heads of several canals which irrigated 
territory outside the frontier 9 and the Amir was to 
receive an equivalent amount of good land on the Kashan 
and Murghab which had formerly been occupied by Sariks. 
But this agreement was conditional on the Amir's allowing 
the Russians at some future date to construct a dam 
across the Murghab at the head of the Penjdeh Canal. 
This was at the site of the old main canal 9 from the 
Band-i-Nadir,* which through long neglect had become a 
1 C.A. No.2, 1887~ No.26. 
2 Ibid. 9 No • 30 • 
* At an earlier time the Band-i-Nadir had let water into 
a major canal cut to run parallel to the Murghab on its 
left bank the whole way down to Yulatan. The Russians 
intended to restore it. 
marsh. No new canals were to be built by the Afghans on 
the Kushk between two spots known as Kara-Tapa-Khurd and 
Chihil-Dukhter, and between the new Russian frontier and 
Torsheikh. The Sariks were not to have the right to 
complain if water diminished, or was stopped in canals 
which terminated in their territory, but of which the 
heads were in territory belonging to the Afghans. 
In January 1886 the Amir's Representative protested 
violently about this arrangement although he had 
previously accepted it. Ridgeway wrote on 17 January to 
Salisbury1 that the Afghans were told they could use 
existing canals but not extend them. In early February 
1886, the Amir objected to the proposed dam on the 
Murghab which was to restore the old Band-i-Nadir and 
Ridgeway proposed to give up instead a strip of 
marshland to Russia on the right bank of the Murghab 
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north of the Maruchak fort. This proved not to be 
necessary as the Amir in a later letter of 26 February 
consented to the con~truction of the dam subject to no 
Russian military post being built there, and to its not 
being used as a bridge except by the workmen looking after 
2 the dam. This was approved in March by both the Amir 
and the Russian Commissioner. Ridgeway was in favour of 
this concession. As he had written in his Report of 1 
February. 3 
1 Ibid., No.42. 
2 Ibid., No.97. 
3 Ibid., No.66. 
This would be a great advantage to Russia: 
(1) by saving for the cultivation of the lands 
in the Kushk Valley the water of the Kushk ... 
and in (2) rendering cultivable a great part of 
the Murghab valley between Penjdeh and Yulatan. 
From a military point of view the question had 
no importance.I 
In mid-February 1886, a break in the winter permitted 
Captains Peacocke and Kondratenko to begin a large 
scale survey of the Kushk-Kashan region. The Amir and 
Ridgeway were both in favour of creating an unoccupied 
zone along the frontier. 
On 12 March 1886, by the Fifth Protocol of the 
Boundary Commission, the frontier from Hauz-i-khan to 
Maruchak was established and the Afghans were reported 
at work placing the frontier pillars. 
Yet the matter of the Irrigation Canals on the 
Kushk and Kashan was by no means settled. In early May 
the Russian Governor of Penjdeh, a Caucasian, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Tarkhanov, reported to the 
Commission that the Afghans had refused to give water to 
Sarik cultivators in the Kashan Valley and Colonel Yate 
was sent down to confer with two Russian members of the 
Russian Commission Party . Tarkhanov complained: 
.•. 150 men have cultivation in the Kashan Valley 
and ... the Afghans there refuse to give them 
water •.• their crops will be ruined. They go to 
the Afghan picket there and try to explain their 
wants, but the Afghans do not understand them, or 
they the Afghans, and each party is ready to think 
the other insulting, and there is every danger of 
a quarrel. One day a quarrel would have occurred 
l Ibid., No.66. 
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had not a Persian-speaking Turkoman arrived 
and smoothed matters down.I 
Yate pointed out that there was a clause already in 
Protocol that the Russian subjects had no claim to water 
from any canal the head of which was in Afghan 
territory. The Russians at Penjdeh said they did not 
know about this and declared they should move the pillars 
to adjust the situation. Yate pointed out that the 
survey had been completed, and they must not do this. 
After further discussion they all agreed on the need for 
a fresh survey. At this stage Yate's old Afghan friend, 
General Ghaus-ud-din, arrived and he agreed to make a 
temporary adjustment. From two canals, the Sariks were 
to be allowed to get water for this one crop they had 
sown and no more, and from two others they could get it 
for three months only. The Sariks were satisfied with 
the settlement for the season and said this was all they 
had wanted. These canals were on the Kushk, whereas on 
the Kashan, where only one small region was under 
question, the Governor of' Herat was ready to give it over 
at once to the Sariks, if the Amir was agreeable. 
Just as the Commission's work on the Amu in the 
north was being concluded, in September 1886, the 
problem on the Kushk and Kashan Canals recurred. It was 
reported that, by the Amir's orders, JOO families of 
Afghan farmers had been settled on one of the upper old 
canals on the Kushk and were busy re-opening other old 
canals and might make new ones. The complaint had come 
from Colonel Tarkhanov, who pointed out that this would 
1 Ibid., No.150, Inclosure No.2. 
Diary. 
Extract from Yate's 
reduce the water available for Turkmen cultivators 
lower down the river and was contrary to the previous 
agreement whereby the Afghans could use existing canals 
but were not to cut new ones. Merk was sent there in 
September and reported with his customary thoroughness 
26 
on the geographical and social problems of the canals in 
question, also on the present relationship of the Afghans 
with the Russians and Turkmens in the district. 1 
This difficulty being in due course reported to the 
Foreign Office, that body asked the India Office to ask 
the Viceroy to suggest to the Amir that such 
transplantations on to the upper parts of the Kushk and 
Kashan could become very dangerous. The Amir, however, 
stood his ground and pointed out that this small group 
was an isolated one and that there was much uninhabited 
land between them and the Sariks. But the matter could 
not be regarded as settled; it was discussed at the Final 
Negotiations in St Petersburg during 1887, some 
modifications of frontier being worked out in the Sariks 1 
favour, and late in 1887 Yate and Peacocke were once more 
sent to the Afghan-Russian frontier to put these 
alterations into effect and see that the positions of 
several boundary pillars in the Kushk and Kashan valleys 
were corrected. 
Of the new frontier there is little to tell. 
The line we have demarcated is a little more 
than a hundred miles in length, and the 
watershed of the Chingurak range running east 
and west between the Kushk and Kashan streams 
forms the principal feature in it ••.. 2 
1 See Appendix F, extract from C.A. No.2 (1887). Further 
correspondence No.218, Inclosure 4, Merk to Ridgeway, 18 
October 1886. 
2 C.E. Yate, p.J86. 
Of the alterations to the frontier between Kushk and 
Maruchak which were made later at St Petersburg, C,E. 
Yate, the man who over a period of four years, 1884-5, 
1885-6 and 1887, had seen more of the Penjdeh oasis 
than any of the other Englishmen, affirmed his approval 
in the following sentences: 
This change gives the Turkomans some extra 800 
square miles of pasture-land, of which perhaps 
20 square miles may be culturable. The remainder 
is only fit for sheep-grazing. The Kara Tepe side 
of the Kushk valley, Chihal Dukhtaran, Torshaikh, 
and Maruchak Fort are all retained for the Amir, 
the only difference being that the Turkomans are 
given their formerly cultivated lands on the left 
bank of the Kushk up to Chihal Dukhtaran, at 
Robat-i-Kashan, and along the left bank of the 
Murghab in the Maruchak valley~ ... As there is no 
one else on the Afghan side to cultivate this land 
if the Turkomans do not, the restitution of it to 
the latter is no loss to the Amir. The doubtful 
question of the water-supply to the Penjdeh 
hamlets opp<Ysite the Maruchak Fort has thus been 
settled, and one essential result of the 
settlement is, that while treaties have been 
respected, tranquillity has also been better 
assured. The fact that by this last settlement 
the Russian frontier has been advanced 10 or 15 
miles nearer Herat .•. does not appear to me worth 
discussion. Once the old frontier from Sher Tepe 
to Sari Yazi proposed by Sir Peter Lumsden was 
given up, and Pul-i-Khatun and Panjdeh, the only 
two points of any strategical importance, were 
surrendered to Russia, the question of 10 miles 
here or there on the sterile downs of Badghis 
became of little moment.I 
At the end of December 1885 the party engaged in 
delimiting the Kushk and Murghab interfluve marched 
eastward some thirty miles to Charshamba just within the 
l Ibid., p.J82. 
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borders of Maimana. Here Captain Cotton and his party 
had already prepared very comfortable winter quarters 
with plenty of provisions for man and beast. Here for 
the first time they made the acquaintance of the Uzbeks, 
and heard of the extensive depredations which Turkmen 
raiders had made on the Maimana frontiers over a long 
period. 
Notwithstanding the uncertainty of the winter 
weather Captain Peacocke and two Russian topographers 
continued working on separate surveys of the formerly 
unknown frontier country of the districts of Maimana and 
Andkhoi. It became apparent that this country was by no 
means such desert as had been assumed but rather that it 
followed the now fam1liar pattern of the low rough 
hillocks of the Chul gradually reducing to the lower but 
still rough-surfaced country of the southern Kara Kum, 
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all of it country where spring pasture could be expected. 
On the Karabel Plateau to the north of Charshamba 
Peacocke found that the sharp northern escarpment of the 
plateau marked the line beyond which the really waterless 
desert began. Throughout the frontier country there were 
wells which had been dug by the Maimana people but had 
been largely abandoned because of the intensity of Turkmer: 
raids over those areas in the last fifteen years. 
Survey work was able to continue and the winter 
allowed for a good deal of friendly visiting between the 
Russian camp at Penjdeh and the English at Charshamba. 
Early in March winter=quarters were broken up and 
demarcation work continued. Part of the group returned 
to go op with the unsettled business at Maruchak. This 
time the Escort cavalry was sent on with the main camp 
via Andkhoi to Tashkurghan beyond Balkh on the road back 
to Kabul. The infantry waited at Charshamba. It was 
known that the Russians would argue about the frontiers 
of Maimana and Andkhoi, but no one yet realised what 
delay would occur over the matter of 'Khoja Saleh'. 
Because the Russian topographers had found great 
difficulty in mapping the broken chul country east of 
Maruchak, or for some other reason, the two Commissioners 
did not meet until 16 April and found their proceedings 
immediately disrupted by violent spring rains and floods. 
During the next month demarcation of the Maimana~Andkhoi 
frontier proceeded in spite of continuing floods. 
The Amir had expressed himself as willing to accept 
a settlement of this part of the frontier which would 
allow him fifteen to twenty miles of pasturage along the 
whole length of Maimana and Andkhoi and on to the Amu. 
The Maimana pasturage area was good pasturage. In 
2 
Andkhoi the chul was lower, sandier and drier. The 
Maimana pasturage could only possibly be of use to the 
people of Maimana, as unoccupied desert lay beyond. But 
the poor pasture and wells of the north-west of Andkhoi 
were from time to time occupied either by shepherds from 
Andhkoi or from Bokhara and thus had been in the past, for 
what they were worth, debatable ground. Dukchi was also 
a debatable place as roads connected it directly with 
Karki in Bokharan territory, where the Russians were to 
establish a large camp, and to Bosagha on the Amu 
adjoining Khamiab. 
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By the end of May only a small area of the Kashan-
Kushk region remained to be settled; but the 1 Khoja Saleh' 
of the diplomatic discussions and documents had to be 
found. Ridgeway already knew that trouble was likely 
over this. On 14 May Ridgeway was able to notify Lord 
1 Rosebery that the frontier from the Murghab had been 
settled as far as Dukchi some twenty-five miles from the 
Amu. The principle followed was that of finding all the 
wells along the likely frontier, leaving most of them 
~ inside the Afghan frontier, but leaving just enough wells 
outside so that the Russians could establish a future 
line of communication posts on their own side of this 
frontier. Frontier pillars were erected as far as 
Dukchi before the end of the month. On 31 May Ridgeway 
reported to Rosebery that the Maimana-Andkhoi frontier 
had been well received by Ishak Khan and officials of 
Afghan Turkestan generally. 
'Khoja Saleh' and the Bosagha-Khamiab Dispute 
If ever International Diplomacy had built a house 
upon sand, it came closest to it literally in the matter 
of the search for Khoja Saleh which occupied the Joint 
Commission during much of 1886. Even in March of this 
year, de Giers had stated categorically: 
1 Foreign Secretary of the new Gladstone Ministry which 
succeeded Salisbury 1 s early in February. 
2 Wells in this frontier were classified from 1 Very 
good and abundant' through 'brackish but men drink 1 , 
and 'putrid, but horses drink~ to 9 Putrid, horses won 1 t 
drink'. 
No doubt has ever been entertained as to Khoja 
Saleh being a well-determined point on the Oxus 
.... I can vouch personally for Khoja Saleh, 
because it has been my business to deal with the 
question in all its details from an early date.I 
There was no doubt whatever that there had been a Khoja 
Saleh. Moorcroft in about 1824 and Lieutenant Alexander 
Burnes 2 in 1832 both left very circumstantial accounts 
of their passage of the Amu at this point on their 
respective journeys to Bokhara. There was need to know 
what had happened to 1 the well~determined point 1 in the 
years since Burnes' visit, because this alone could 
determine where it was supposed to be as the terminal 
point of the Afghan Russian Boundary. 
What the river itself was capable of is clear from 
C.E. Yate' 1 s account of his journey down the Amu in 
February 1888. Writing of the forty-mile boat journey 
between Ak Kum and Kerki he writes of the desolate 
scenery: 
1 
..• nothing but low level sandbanks and river-
flats on either side, covered with water during 
the floods in summer 9 and just the tops of the 
fringe of trees visible in the distance marking 
the line of cultivation. Not a living thing was 
to be seen for the greater part of the way and 
the only time we really found ourselves close to 
habitation was where the river was changing its 
course and we passed a village in rapid course of 
demolition. The people were all busy tearing the 
woodwork out of their houses, cutting down their 
trees and doing their best to save what little 
C.A" No.2, 1887 9 No.76 9 Morier to Rosebery. De Giers 
had assisted Gorchakov for many years, before succeeding 
him as Foreign Minister. 
2 See Appendix B. 
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they could bef'ore the land was washed away from 
under their f'eet. The banks were falling in in 
great masses every few minutes as we passed, and 
house after house was gradually going, and 
probably by this time not a trace of that village 
is left.l 
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In Chapter III it was noted that the traditional 
frontier on the left bank of the Amu between Afghan Khamial 
and Bokharan Bosagha, legally delimited by the local 
people themselves in 1874 following a local dispute, had 
continued to work to their complete satisfaction. This 
arrangement had been completely unknown to the English and 
Russian Diplomats who, since 1869, had proclaimed that 
'Khoja Saleh' was to be the Amu terminal of the projected 
north-west frontier of Afghanistan. No European at that 
stage had worried about the existing local situation and 
it became firmly bedded in diplomatic minds, almost as a 
tenet of religious doctrine, that 1 Khoja Saleh' was the 
spot on the Amu where the frontier would begin to follow 
the river's course. 
We have seen that de Giers would have preferred to 
begin the delimitation there as being a definite 
geographical point and Sir Peter Lumsden, after his 
visit to Tiflis on the journey out, quoted Prince 
Dondukov-Korsakov as having said: 'Between Khoja 1!l'!fiJ 
Saleh and AJkhoi all the Commission would have to draw 
~ . . 2 
would be an imaginary line' We have just seen how this 
simple 'imaginary line' had been held up at Dukchi, and 
1 C.E. Yate, pp.397-8. 
2 C.A. No.2 (1885). Further Correspondence regarding 
Central Asia No.145, Lumsden to Granville, Tehran, 1 
October 1884. 
we can now :follow the iµvolved story of the search :for 
the north-eastern point o:f the same 'imaginary line 1 , 
which involved the survey o:f:ficers in more surveying~ 
the political o:f:ficers and interpreters in more 
conversation, and the Commission and their Eu.ropean-
situated masters in more verbiage than almost the whole 
o:f the rest put together. 
Ridgeway had sent two o:f:ficers, Captain Peacocke and 
Mr Merk, to examine the Amu river-lands in the winter o:f 
1884-85 but appears not to have rel.eased their report. 
Doubts about Khoja Saleh had :first been raised openly 
at the Meeting o:f the Joint Commission which produced 
Protocol No .. 3 on 9 December 1885, when M. Lessar 
deliberately asked Ridgeway i:f he could point but the 
:frontier east o:f Dukchi. Ridgeway said it should be a 
straight line :from Dukchi to the Amu at 1 Khodsha Salori 
as marked on the Russian Sta:f:f map and this was :four or 
f'ive miles north~east o:f the mound known as Dev=Kala 
below Khamiab. M. Lessar then stated that the Russian 
Sta:f:f Map had been drawn up on inaccurate and 
insu:f:ficient in:formation, and that the English Map sho~ed 
a place :further up river marked 9 Ziarat Khawaja Salar 9 • 
He pointed out that by the Agreement o:f 1872=73 the 
A:fghans could claim nothing on the le:ft bank below 
iKhoja Saleh 9 • 
Qolo~l Ri_9geway, agreed that the correspondence 
which :formed the basis o:f the Agreement ••. ought 
to be considered. He thought ..• that there was 
in reality no place corresponding to the Khoja 
Saleh o:f the Maps .•.• There was a Ziarat called 
Khwaja Salar, but neither a village nor a :ferry 
.•.• He thought the Agreement o:f 1873 must re:fer 
2 
to Khodsha Salor. M. Lessar's reading would 
result in Afghanistan being deprived of the 
district of Kham-i-ab, which had been occupied 
and effectively administered by the Afghans in 
1872-73 and even previously. As far as he 
recollected, the correspondence of 1872-73 
referred to a ford named Khoja Saleh. There was 
a ford at Khodsha Salor. 
M. Lessar said that the researches of the English 
officers showed that there existed no Kodsha Salor 
or Khoja Saleh near Dev Kala. The two names have 
always been used indiscriminately on the Maps. 
According to those same researches, the only point 
in the neighbourhood bearing that name is the 
Ziarat marked on the English Map; consequently, 
according to the Arrangement of 1873, the frontier 
ought to join the Oxus near that point. 
Colonel Kuhlberg was also of the opinion that the 
frontier ought to be drawn to the point marked on 
the English Maps under the name Khwaja Salar. 
In reply to the remark made by Colonel Ridgeway 
that Khoja Saleh probably indicated the district 
of Khoja Saleh. M. Lessar said that the post of 
Khoja Saleh was specially mentioned .... l 
This Protocol No.3, being long-delayed in the sending 
and long in coming overland, may perhaps have escaped 
immediate examination by senior eyes at the Foreign 
Office, and Ridgeway's Report of 1 February 1886 also 
did not reach London until the 23 February. 
It contained more information about the situation on 
the Amu. 'Another disputed point, and one of great 
importance, will be the district of Khamiab on the 
1 C.Ao No.2, 1887, Further Correspondence, No.52, 
Inclosure 'Protocol no 3', from Hauzikhan, 27 November 
(9 December) 1885 sent by Ridgeway on 31 December and 
only received by Salisbury on 15 February, 1886. 
2E 
Oxus •.. ,' he wrote, and recapitulated the history of' the 
1872-73 Agreement and mentioned what his two o:fi~icers 
had found out about the local settlement during their 
winter visit there in 1885. He continued: 
... the riverain tract along the left bank of' the 
Oxus from Ki.li.f' downwards to Bosagha is a rich 
revenue-paying district of' great fertility known 
as the 'Khwaja Salar' di.vision of' the Akcha Deputy-
Governorshipp which is a portion of' Afghan 
Turkestan; and to place the frontier at the point 
to which the Russian claim is extended~ would 
deprive the Ameer of' 20 miles of' landp which, for 
at least seventeen years, if' not longerp has 
formed an integral portion of' the revenue-paying 
dominions of' Afghanistan, and would virtually 
give the Russians the command of the very important 
strategical position of' Kilif' .••• A full discussion 
was postponed, pending the topographical survey. 1 Meanwhile I have instituted further enquiries •••• 
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While this was still on its way to London, a deadlock had 
already occurred at a meeting of' the Joint Commission, 
and Sir Robert Morierp the new English Ambassador at St 
Petersburg, reported to Rosebery by telegraph on 17 
March that de Giers was very worried by a report from 
Kuhlberg that Ridgeway wished to stop delimitation 
2 
operations and refer the question to the two Governments. 
On 20 March, de Staal in London called on Rosebery 
and said his Government could not possibly agree to 
Ridgeway's contention that Dev Kala was the real terminal 
point. Nor could there be any question that it was the 
1 C.A. No.2, 1887P No.66. 
2 Ridgeway only heard about this afterwards and 
telegraphed that it was not he but Kuhlberg who had 
held up proceedings, on oth~r grounds relating to a 
point on the Kaisar River. See C.A. No.2, 1887P No.106. 
post, and not the district, that was intended between 
the two Cabinets at the beginning of the recent 
negotiations. Nevertheless he much hoped that the 
Commissioners would be able to conclude this matter 
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on the frontier. Colonel Kuhlberg also was to receive 
instructions from the Russian Foreign Office to continue 
on the frontier 1 pendi,ng the reference to the two 
Governments of the dif'ference which has arisen respecting 
Khoja Saleh' • 1 As de Giers himself personally reported 
this to Marier, it was a retracing of steps from the 
Russians' earlier unyielding attitude. I.t assumed, as 
was to be the case, that eventually this matter would be 
decided at home. 
On 26 March Ridgeway was also instructed by Rosebery 
to go as far as possible, and, if possible, not to refer 
the Khoja Saleh matter to the two Governments. On the 
same day Rosebery asked Marier to express the hope of the 
English Government that Colonel Kuhlberg would be given 
sufficient lgtitude by his government to allow him to 
reach agreement with Ridgeway. The Russians were slow 
in sending any instruction of the kind suggested to 
Kuhlberg and, until it was forthcoming, Ridgeway flatly 
refused to hold any further meeting of the Commission. 
At last, on 12 April, Kuhlberg reported to Ridgeway 
that he had received a telegram from his Government that 
he might proceed with demarcation. 1 
The Commissioners again failed to agree and late in 
April Ridgeway suggested to Rosebery the alternative of 
working out two sets of boundary pillars to mark an 
Afghan and a Russian choice of frontier, leaving the set 
discarded later by Government negotiation to be removed 
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by the lucky party. He continued to regard settlement on 
the frontier as impossible. 
When he received instruction. from Her Majesty's 
Government, which Rosebery had despatched on 14 April, 
urging him to make the best arrangement he could on the 
frontier, taking as a base the Protocol of London of 10 
September 1885, he replied: 1 I should be glad to receive 
1 It was quite by accident that Marier met Zinoviev at a 
railway station at St Petersburg and heard from him that 
the delay of the sending of Kuhlberg 1 s instruction had 
occurred because of a confusion in the cipher used in 
two telegrams giving 1 an account in extenso of the 
original proposals of Sir West Ridgeway, which he 
(Zinoviev) observed, were quite inadmissible'~* so that 
they could not decode until the confusion was rectified. 
This being one of the misadventures that beset diplomacy, 
it is amusing to recall that the English Boundary 
Commission twice fell into difficulties with regard to 
its Code. During the violent snow-storm which overtook 
the English party returning from Bala Murghab to Gulran 
after the Kushk battle, a mule carrying the only copy of 
the English cipher escaped into the hills but was 
miraculously recaptured, complete with cipher, after 
several days at large. And C.E. Yate, returning to the 
Amu in 1887 to complete Boundary Commission proceedings, 
absentmindedly left the cipher in London, and had to get 
another one with much difficulty from India. 
* C.A. No.2, 1887, No.9J. 
further instructions as to the exact meaning which I 
should attach to the words "text of the Protocol of 
London". I am not certain whether the Protocol should 
be read in connection with Lord Granville's Memorandum 
1 
or if it should be read alone'. 
The Amir, having heard from his Agent, the Kazi, 
that the Russians were likely to claim Khamiab as being, 
by their interpretation, downstream from Khoja Saleh, 
wrcite very firmly both to Ridgeway on 26 February and to 
the Viceroy on 16 March, that he would never consider 
giving up Khamiab . To the Viceroy he wrote: 
.•. . Yet their (Afghan) satisfaction depends on 
Your Excellency sending special instructions to 
Colonel Ridgeway, in order that he may know that 
it is impossible for the Afghan Government to 
give up Khamiab in any case, and that it will not 
let the land, which has been in its possession for 
the last thirty or forty years, fall into the hands 
of Russia, though the matter may lead to war; for 
if it gives up Khamiab, it must also give up its 
claim to tbe Akcha district, for Khamiab is one of 
the dependencies of Akcha.2 
The system of barter having worked well in the case 
of 'Zulfikar for Penjdeh', the two Commissioners now 
approached their present problem in the same way, and on 
14 May Ridgew~y informed Rosebery that, subject to the 
approval of the Amir, he had agreed to give up the head 
of the Kashan Canal in return for a belt of pasturage of 
from twelve to sixteen miles in width along the frontier 
up to the Amu. And, in addition, also subject to the 
1 C.A. No.2, 1887, No.92, 19 April 1886, Ridgeway to 
Rosebery. 
2 Ibid., No.110, Amir to Viceroy, 16 March 1886. 
Amir's approval, Ridgeway had offered to give up the 
heads of canals in the Murghab Valley in return for 
Khamiab. Kuhlberg was also in fav-0ur of this proposal 
but would have to refer it to .St Petersburg. This 
arrangement would also give the Afghans Dukchi, which 
they demanded. 
The Afghan case for the settlement of the Khoja 
Saleh matter was based on the report of Captain De 
Laessoe, who had spent January and February of 'an 
exceptionally severe winter• 1 on this part of the river. 
On 2 June, both camps being established near Khamiab, the 
Joint Commission at last had a seance for the sole 
2 
purpose of discussing Khoja Saleh. The initial line taker. 
by Kuhlberg and Lessar was that, although the Afghan 
claim to Khamiab was undeniable, nevertheless, the 
British had by mistake given it away by the 1873 Agreement 
just as the Russians had by mistake lost the upper courseE 
of the Kushk, Kashan and Murghab, which, they said, were 
Turkmen lands. Ridgeway reported that the Russians were 
ready to trade Khamiab but that they wanted more of the 
Murghab lands than he had been inclined to offer, 
At' this stage the Amir refused to concede any more 
of the Murghab lands, although he offered to supply water 
to the Sariks as a favour. This was a serious setback. 
And Kuhlber~ too, at this stage delayed proceedings 
by insisting on yet another full-scale examination of the 
Khamiab-Kilif region. Merk and Komarov engaged on this 
for at least another two weeks, Ridgeway protesting 
1 Ibid., No.101, Ridgeway to Rosebery, 25 March. 
strongly against the loss of' time, and no sooner was it 
completed than Kuhlberg asked f'or permission to send a 
Russian survey of'f'icer to re-examine the river banks some 
thirty miles above Kilif'. Here, opposite the riverside 
village of' Chushka Guzar, was believed to be a village of' 
Khoja Saleh on the northern bank, as noted in a Report 
1 
of' General Kaufman's. This, although Kaufman himself' 
had been uncertain about the accuracy of' his information, 
proved to be quite true. Ridgeway reported: 
Local enquiry shows that Kushka Gazar f'ord 30 
miles above Kilif' exactly answers General 
Kaufman's description. It is a f'erry on the 
high road f'rom Balkh to Bokhara with a village 
called Khoja Salar on its bank.2 
Here indeed was a Khoja Saleh, and an unscrupulous 
Commissioner might have tried to make greater use of' it 
than was done. Beyond all point of' controversy the 
original Agreement and everything arising f'rom it had 
been pinned to Burnes' 'Khoja Saleh', westward, and 
about thirty miles downstream, f'rom Kilif'. But, could 
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the Russians have made f'ull use of' this Khoja Saleh thirty 
miles upstream, in conjunction with the curious f'act that 
there was now no Khoja Saleh downstream where it was 
expected, a great block of' river land might have been 
claimed by them on the strength of' it. But the Russians 
were probably making a great appearance of' play f'or 
Khamiab as a means of' getting what they needed on the 
1 For this preliminary history see Appendix G (Central 
Asia No.2, 1887, No.127, Inclosure No.l, The Amended 
Statement of' the Af'ghan Case.) 
2 - -N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. July 1886, Nos 552-711, 
No.613, Telegram, Ridgeway to Rosebery. 
Murghab. And in Moslem lands, as elsewhere, names of 
placed are frequently duplicated. 
In the middle of June the Russian Government 
adopted a hard-line policy and on 17 June Kuhlberg showed 
Ridgeway a telegram stating that he should not agree to 
any 'compromise for the retention of Khamiab by 
Afghanistan, and that the frontier should be demarcated 
as far as Khoja Saleh 1 • Kuhlberg understood this could 
only be the Ziarat of that name, which the English map 
showed several miles east of the main Kwaja Salar village 
of Karkin and a little south of the river. During these 
delays there was a considerable amount of potentially 
dangerous unrest and bad feeling developing between the 
·Afghans and the Ersari Turkmens on the Bokharan bank, 
both sides complaining of interference and intrigue. 
June ran into July without the Commission being 
able to meet .. Ridgeway complained that fever and 
dysentery were on the increase, and he reported on 1 
i'Y"I0.111.'j 
July that he had sent as ~ as possible of the camp 
to Shadian, a climatically favourable place in the 
mountains south of Mazar-Sharif. He feared that the 
Commission on the frontier would be delayed into a third 
winter. 
At last on 10 July Ridgeway succeeded in obtaining 
from Kuhlberg a statement of the Russian claims, in 
which the Russians had changed their ground somewhat and 
now, abandoning their claim that the Ziarat was the 
~post 1 of Khoja Saleh, according to Ridgeway, 
claimed as the post the building ~alled the 
Robat of Tahir Mahomet Khan, situated five 
2~ 
miles lower down the river and four miles 
above the site of a ferry which was 
abolished in 1868, and which appears to 
have been called Khoja Saleh. In my opinion 
the Russian claim is untenable, this building 
apparently fulfilling none of the conditions, 
for it is not a post, it is not called Khoja 
Saleh, it is not on the high road, and it was 
built after the Agreement of 1873 between the 
two Governments. 
I have therefore refused to acknowledge the 
validity of this claim, and Colonel Kuhlberg 
has made a reference to his Government.I 
The impasse on the frontier had already given the 
Gladstone Government the intention of authorising 
Ridgeway to fix the delimitation as far as Dukchi, 
'leaving the Khamiab question to be negotiated between 
2 the two Governments'. Rosebery's telegram notifying 
Ridgeway of this was one of his last acts before handing 
over the foreign secretaryship to the new Salisbury 
Ministry after the Conservative triumph at the July 
elections. 3 Rosebery had warned Ridgeway at the same 
time that the Gladstone Government's plans for a frontier 
settlement along the lines suggested might be suspended 
by the new Ministry. 
1 C.A. No.2, 1887, No.134, Ridgeway to Rosebery, Khamiab, 
10 July 1886. 
2 Ibid., No.135, Rosebery to Ridgeway, 17 July, telegram. 
3 Salisbury gave the Foreign Secretaryship at this time 
to the Earl of Iddesleigh, but resumed it himself in 
January 1887, on the Earl of Iddlesleigh 1 s sudden death. 
Lord Cross was the new Conservative Secretary of State 
for India. 
Meanwhile Morier had reported several times during 
July that de Giers was suffering from the usual lack of 
fresh information. 
however: 
Morier reported him as saying 
The one thing which has been manifest was that the 
facts as they now were cropping up did not tally 
with the Maps, and that, untili/perfectly reliable 
topographical information was within reach, no 
decision could be come to.I 
Late in July Ridgeway himself fell seriously ill 
from malarial fever and on 31 July reported that he 
~was going to recuperate at Camp Shadian. This 
was the very date on which from London the Earl of 
Iddesleigh, the new Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, had directed Morier to inform de Giers that it 
was desirable that the two Governments 'should, if 
possible, agree upon identical instructions to be sent 
2 to their respective Commissioners without delay'. This 
instruction bore the authentic Salisbury tone of 
authority and was next day followed up with instructions 
to Morier to tell de Giers that of the two alternatives, 
the settlement on the frontier or the settlement by 
direct negotiation between the two Governments, the new 
Cabinet much preferred the latter. They saw it as 
desirable to withdraw the British members of the 
Commission and the Escort without delay, and if no 
solution had been achieved on the spot by mid-September, 
the negotiations should be transferred to London or St 
Petersburg. 
1 Ibid., No.137, Morier to Rosebery, 9 July• 
2 Ibid. , No .143. 
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On 11 August Morier reported that the Russians 
concurred about the termination or the Boundary 
Commission but would like to discuss the next step in 
negotiations. Three days later Morier wrote that the 
Russians had suddenly offered a compromise settlement, 
namely, that in return for the heads of certain canals 
on the Kushk, Kashan and Murghab, they would agree to 
the frontier reaching the Amu at the head of No.12 Canal 
at Islim. 1 Islim was as near as anyone had bee.n able to 
get to the position of the former Southern or Afghan end 
of the one-time Khoja Saleh Ferry and so the Russians' 
compromise actually complied with the Agreement of 1873, 
but by this time it was clear that the dispute was no 
longer about Khoja Saleh but about Khamiab. Morier had 
replied that he was without instructions but that 1 If 
the whole Khamiab district were given to Afghanistan, 
the case would be different 1 • 2 He had already told the 
Russians that if the two Governments could arrive at a 
compromise, the Commission could proceed to demarcation, 
but that in any case Ridgeway could not stay on the 
frontier after mid-September. Morier, Vlangaly (for de 
Giers) and Zinoviev were still engaged on discussions 
when on 20 August Iddesleigh instructed Morier that Her 
Majesty's Government were prepared to agree to the 
following arrangement for settlement: 
1 
2 
The Commission, having completed the work of 
demarcation up' to Dukchi, to separate at once. 
The portion of the line beyond Duktchi'to be 
settled directly between the two Governments. 
Ibid., No.154. 
Ibid. 
2 
All things to remain in statu quo between Duktchi 
and the Oxus until the Governments have had time 
to come to an agreement.I 
The Russian Government accepted this1 on 21 August a~d it 
was ratified by an exchange of notef between Marier and 
Vlangaly, Acting Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
2 
on 24 and 25 August. 
Ridgeway returned from Camp Shadian at the beginning 
of September only to find that the temperature had 
dropped by fifty degrees and that there was every 
prospect of an early winter. He reported by telegram on 
6 September that the Afghan officials were satisfied with 
the proposed method of concluding negotiations and he 
intended to leave Khamiab on 15 September, which he duly 
did. The Russian Commissioner had at last received his 
delayed orders for return and was to leave on the 
following day. Ridgeway reported that they parted on 
'perfectly friendly and cordial terms' and that English 
'relations with the Afghans continue excellent' . 3 As 
he left Khamiab, Ridgeway notified Iddesleigh that he 
had sent Major Durand, the Assistant Commissioner, home 
to London via Astrabad 4 bearing the Protocol of the final 
seance of the Commission, which had been held on 13 
1 Ibid. , No.165. 
2 Ibid. , No.172. 
J Ibid. , No.189. 
4 Durand travelled by boat from Eosagha down to Charjui 
with Lessar and then via Merv and Ashkabad into Persia. 
Merk was left on the frontier to 'roll up and pay off 
the Postal line 1 , and, as mentioned, to re-survey the 
Kushk and Kashan Canals in October 1886. 
September, and that he himself hoped to reach India by 
the end of October and to arrive in London the following 
month with the Maps and Records of the Commission 'which 
I do not like to take out of the charge of my escort 
until we have reached more civilized regions 1 • 1 This 
letter was not received in London until 22 October, and 
meanwhile the Foreign Office could take no further step. 
From the outset, it had been agreed upon by all 
three parties that the present Boundary Commission would 
probably proceed to complete the demarcation of the whole 
of Afghanistan's northern frontier right up to Lake 
Issyk Kul. Ney Elias, a noted political officer and 
traveller, stricken with illness, came down through 
Badakhshan to spend a period under the care of Dr Owen 
at the English Boundary Commission camp in early 1886, 
and at this time Ridgeway sent a telegram to his friend, 
H.M. Durand, Foreign Secretary at Calcutta, which read: 
'After consulting Elias just arrived, I find that we 
could easily demarcate the frontier up to the Chinese 
2 border this year'. But it was not to be. The Russian-
English deadlock over Khoja Saleh only occurred after the 
Amir had himself declared that the survey was not to be 
continued. Its continuation was held as a possibility 
by both the English and the Russians until May 1886, 
when the Amir sent word to Ridgeway of the withdrawal of 
his permission to survey the Ghorband valley (north-west 
of Kabul) and the regions of Shignan, Roshan and 
l Ibid. , No. 198. 
2 NoA.Io, For., Sec. F, Pros. March 1886, Nos 247-74, 
No.272. 
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Badakhshan. At the same time he issued an instruction 
that the English surveyors were not to go beyond a line 
a little east of Mazar. Maitland, making a journey in 
the summer of 1886 went to look at Chushka Guzar above 
Kilif and was reproved by Ridgeway as this was eleven 
miles beyond the imposed limit. At this time too, the 
English camp at Shadian suddenly found that all sorts 
of restrictions had been imposed on the entrance of 
egg and milk vendors and others who had been in the 
habit of supplying the camp. After protests, these 
difficulties were smoothed over. Ridgeway blamed Ishak 
Khan for this. 
I understood that all these restrictions were 
imposed by Sardar Ishak Khan out of fear of 
the Amir, who suspected him of seeking our 
favour, if not of intriguing with us. Ishak 
Khan has recently received a warning from the 
Amir, and has been ordered to communicate with 
us through the Kazi.l 
This was still two years before Ishak Khan 1 s rebellion, 
but he was closely observed by the Amir, and a good deal 
of this interesting story is another part of the 
background of the Joint Boundary Commission 1 s stay in 
Afghanistan for which there is no room here. 
The almost certain reason for the Amir 9 s suspicion 
of a continued English survey of his territories was the 
visit of Colonel (later General Sir William) Lockhart to 
Wakhan, which the latter explored in 1885 from his base 
at G~lgit. He had only a small party with him, but, as 
1 N"A"I., For., Sec. F, Pros. October 1886, Nos 889-921, 
No.903, Ridgeway to Rosebery, 12 August 1886. 
Lockhart's later activity on the North-West Frontier of 
India was to reveal, the Amir's instinct about the 
nature of this man's activities was very sound. As 
Sykes writes of him in Sir Mortimer Durand, 
Thanks to his genial personality and fine 
presence he established British infiuence on 
a good footing in these remote states, besides 
submitting valuable reports as to the limits of 
the Amir's jurisdiction and the nature of the 
passes leading into Badakshan, the Pamirs, 
Wakhan and Chinese Turkestan.l 
C.E. Yate 1 s account of this situation is probably as 
correct as it is interesting. He writes: 
1 
It is amusing to us to see by the extracts 
translated from the Russian papers that they, 
too, have got the idea that we are bent on 
the annexation of Badakhshan. This they must 
have got from Afghan sources. How the rumour 
arose, or what put the idea into the Afghan 
mind, we cannot think •.•• First of all came the 
news of the arrival of Colonel Lockhart and his 
party on the Badakhshan frontier from Chitral. 
Then it was heard that he had JOO armed men with 
him, - the truth being, I believe, that he had 
left his mule-carriage behind owing to the 
difficulty of the roads, and that this terrible 
army of his was composed of nothing more formidable 
than Chitrali baggage-coolies. Just at that time, 
however, Sir West Ridgeway, in anticipation of an 
early settlement of this frontier, was making 
arrangements for a certain portion of the Mission 
to retu~n to India via Badakhshan and Gilgit, 
surveying the Upper Oxus and the little-known 
regions of Roshan, Shignan, and Wakhan on the way. 
These arrangements, coupled with the arrival of 
Colonel Lockhart 1 s party, by some curious 
misunderstanding gave rise to the :idea that the 
two parties were to act in co-operation, and to 
seize Badakhshan. 
Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p.180. 
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All chance of any of us returning via, Badakhshan 
has, of course, long since been knocked on the 
head. 1 
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An account of the diplomatic activity of this period 
should not obscure the basic work of the political and 
survey officers who painfully constructed the intricate 
parquetry on which diplomatic quadrilles could be 
executed. Working generally in small expert groups of 
mixed Russian and English (including Indian) personnel, 
they traced and re-traced, mapped and re-mapped, every 
inch of the Khwaja Salar sub-division of Ak Cha, They 
marked every habitation or sign of former habitation, 
they measured every trace of a road or track that had 
ever led to the river, and above all they patiently 
interviewed the local residents, especially the older 
men whose memories were most likely to include memories 
of the days when caravans had come from Andkhoi and 
Maimana, from Tashku_rghan and Balkh, to cross on the 
Khoja Saleh ferry. Some of the evidence was 
contradictory, but on the whole the great mass of 
evidence pointed to the former existence of the ferry 
between two settlements known as Islim on the Afghan 
bank and Charshanga on the Bokharan. The history of the 
ferry adds up clearly from the following pieces of 
evidence. The first is from Maulan Berdi of Charshanga, 
aged fifty, a local official (Khat Khuda) whose father 
had held the same post at Karkin. 
Turkmen. 
He was an Ersari 
The Ersaris settled at Karkin a little over 
eighty years ago, and over sixty years ago 
1 C.E, Yate, p.268. 
spread across the river to Charshanga .. ,.When 
the Ersaris first settled at Karkin there was 
no f'erry there, but eighty years ago~ soon 
after their arrival, his father started the 
Khwaja Saleh ferry. He never heard what 
induced his father to do so. As far back as 
he can recollect, as a boy, there were two 
boats on the ferry, and the ferry was working 
long before they left Karkin and settled in 
Charshanga. Previous to the Khwaja Saleh ferry 
being started (viz. eighty years ago), all 
traffic went by the old main caravan roads to 
Kilif ferry, which was the regular crossing 
place down from ancient times •••• On the Kilif 
route there was always a dread of the Alamans 
of the Lakai and Katighani Uzbeks, and when his 
f'ather started the Khwaja Saleh ferry, caravans 
soon began to cross by it in preference td the 
Kilif ferry as there was less danger., •. Thus 
traffic fell off on the Kilif route, and then the 
ferry service there became neglected ... only one 
or two boatmen remained at the Kilif .ferry. T'he 
Kilif ferry, however, was never closed •.• but the 
majority of the traff'ic was attracted to the Khwaja 
Saleh ferry, where there were his father 2 s two 
good new boats. 
(I, [i.e., Captain Peacocke,J here repeated to 
him the statement of the Balkh merchant [see below] 
and asked him if it was true.) - The merchant~s 
words are true. Merchants feared the Alamans and 
the bad boat on the Kilif route. The rocks, too, 
are there as he says •.• and they are avoided ..•. The 
tolls 1 ho-wever, on the Khwaja Saleh ferry were less 
than at Kilif, and all these combined attracted the 
main traffic to the Khwaja Saleh f'erry. After the 
Afghans settled in Turkestan they 1 broke 1 the Lakai 
Ala mans, and then, the Ki lif' ferry again became 
frequent when the new boats were put on it. 
Evidence ends.I 
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Another witness, Judi Kul.i, of Karkin gave evidence that 
he had worked on the ferry for a period thirty-three years 
1 C.A. No.2, 1887, No.190~ Inclosure 2, p.267. 
ago. His evidence that the Amir of Bokhara had 
established the ferry does not necessarily rule out the 
previous evidence; the Amir of Bokhara may well have 
ordered its establishment, and Maulan Berdi 's father may 
have carried on from there. 
The traffic on the ferry was large. I remember 
that the tolls were once farmed to a contractor 
for 2,000 tangas for six months, but he lost 500 
tangas on the speculation. The ferry was 
originally established by the Padshah of Bokhara, 
but I don't know when, and up to thirty three years 
ago the dues went to the Padshah. Subsequently to 
this, the receipts were shared by the Bokharan 
Padshah and Afghan Ameer. That is the only 
information I can give about the amount of traffic 
that passed by the ferry. I don 1 tknow why the 
ferry was disestablished by the Afghan authorities. 
It was not on account of the river at this place 
becoming any more unsuitable for working the ferry 
•... The reason that the boatmen assigned amongst 
themselves was that they (the boatmen) embezzled 
such a large amount of the tolls. The ferry was 
not always farmed out and when there was no 
contractor, the rule was that one-fifth of receipts 
went to the boatmen, and the rest to the 
authorities. 
One of the most extensive pieces of evidence was taken 
from Mulla Abdullah Hakim, a seventy-eight years old 
silk~merchant of Balkh formerly prosperous but now 
living in reduced circumstances. He had been twelve 
times from Balkh to Bokhara, always travelling with 
large caravans of 400 to 500 camels, his first journey 
having been made forty years ago and the last about 
twenty years ago. On ten of these journeys, he had 
travelled via the Khoja Saleh ferry, once by the Kilif 
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1 ferry and once by the Ak Kum ferry. He also mentioned 
the dangerous rocks near Kilif, and the unseaworthiness 
of its boats. Speaking of forty years ago, he said: 
If twenty caravans left Balkh, at least 
eighteen would have crossed by Khwaja Saleh 
or Akkum even, so dangerous and inefficient 
had become the ferry service at Kilif. 
Little else but salt caravans from Koh-i-ran 
had ventured by it.2 
The old man's father as far as he could recollect had 
always crossed at Kilif: 
As further proof that about forty years ago the 
Khwaja Saleh ferry had become the main river 
crossing, he mentioned that the Ameer of 
Bokhara crossed by it with a force of 10,000 
men, when marching to Balkh to attack Ishan 
Nakib. He both came and returned by Khwaja 
Saleh .... 3 
The bulk of the evidence pointed to the ferry having 
fallen into disuse soon after 1872 when the Kilif ferry 
had been reorganised by the Afghans. Up to about ls4t6 
it had started from the old Islim Bazaar about 1,000 
2 
yards north of the Islim Bazaar found by the Commission. 
In 18~ the old bazaar and the ferry landing and boatmen 1 E 
houses had been swept away. The river continued to change 
and in 1869 the site was moved abreast of the old Islim 
canal head, a little north of the place where the Robat 
Tahir Mohamed Khan was built. In 1870 it was moved 
1This ferry has always been used, and was the first 
ferry in undisputed Bokharan territory a little below 
Khamiab. 
2 Ibid., p.26J. 
3Ibid., p.26J. 
again to Kurtli Jungle, a place below the 1 ziarat 1 of 
Khwaja Saleh and above Karkin Bazaar. It was abolished 
in 1872 and the boats went up to Kilif. Its proximity 
in 1869 to Tahir Mohamed Robat and in 1870 to the Ziarat 
both were in the Russian favour, as Ridgeway1 pointed 
out, although by the time of the 1872~3 Agreement the 
Khoja Saleh ferry was already a thing of the past. 
By the latter part of 1886 its situation had 
become of mainly academic importance, as a frontier here 
would have gone against the bigger play of 'Khamiab for 
the Murghab Canals'. It would also have cut right across 
a small coherent agricultural region, and so offended the 
principles of the conferring parties. 
Return of India 
During the summer of 1886, while the working part of 
the Commission sweltered and sickened on the Amu, the 
main camp, including a few officers, and the greater 
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part of the Cavalry and Infantry, had been leading a 
pleasant life in camp near the small Tadjik village of 
Shadian, south of Mazar and at an elevation of 5,000 feet. 
On the way there they had found Kilif and especially 
Balkh of great interest. C.E. Yate, who had also been 
rather seriously ill on the Amu, had been sent up with 
the party to the mountains, and he has left us a detailed 
and interesting account of Balkh, as well as of Mazar 
which they visited from Shadian. He made an extensive 
study of the geographical divisions of Afghan Turkestan. 
1 Ibid., No.190, Ridgeway to ~ddesleigh, 17 August 1886. 
On 26 September, the party from Khamiab and the 
party from Shadian joined forces, and moved oh the 
homeward journey through the orchard-ringed and famous 
market-town of Tashkurghan, with its neighbouring ruined 
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fortress of Khulm. Then they lingered at Haibak, another 
ancient town a little south nearer the mountains. 
At this time the whole Mission consisted of 
sixteen European officers and sub-0rdinates, twenty-six 
Native officers and subordinates, 201 fighting men, 424 
followers, 358 horses and ponies, 647 mules and 138 
muleteers, 724 camels and 150 camel-men.~ For the return 
across the Hindu Kush, Ridgeway split them up into three 
parties for convenience in making the difficult journey. 
He himself led the first party, Lieutenant-Colonel. Bax 
the second, and Ressaldar-Major Bahawuddin Khan led the 
third, the heavy baggage party. Small detached survey-
parties under Holdich, Maitland, Peacocke, Talbot and 
Griesbach, the geologist, were sent on different routes 
across the mountains to meet again at Charikar. The 
three main parties followed one another over the main 
route to the south from Haibak via Bamian and over the 
Chahrdeh Pass to Charikar, where they all reassembled. 
The Mission had to travel fast over the mountains 
because of the impossibility of getting supplies en route 
and because at any moment they might strike foul weather. 
They were almost too late as it was, and a snow storm 
cost them the lives of two camel drivers, and on the 
highest pass, at an altitude of about 14,000 feet, many 
of the men suffered severely from syncope. 
Near Charikar, the Amir was waiting with a large 
force, apparently as a precautionary measure in case of 
trouble from the people of the region (Kohistan) where 
memories of both Afghan Wars were still bitter. 
They reached Kabul on 15 October and had intended 
to leave on the twentieth but the Amir treated them 
with great hospitality and insisted on their staying 
until the twenty-fourth when he farewelled the officers 
at a ceremonia1 durbar. The Amir publicly assured 
Ridgeway that he was more than sa tisf'ied with the 
s~ttlement up to Dukchi. 
The Commission Party then marched over the Pass 
from Kabul and down the valley of the Kabul River, 
through Jellalabad and the Khyber Pass, entering British 
territory at Jamrud on .31 October 1886, all, Indian and 
Englishman al.ike, glad to be back after two years in· the 
land of the Amir. At Peshawur they were welcomed by the 
Military Garrison under General Sir Hugh Gough. In 
Kabul, according to Ridgeway, 
great stress had been laid on the fact that 
now for the first time British and Afghan 
off'icers had eaten together and a hope was 
expressed that all former hostilities should 
be f'orgotten, and that the two nations should 
always be allies.l 
The Surv~ 
From some points of view, up to the time of the 
termination of its activities on the frontier in 
1 C.A. No.2, 1887, No.210, Ridgeway to Iddesleigh, 
London, 20 December 1886. 
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September 1886, the Demarcation had been an 
unsatisfactory affair. First, there had been the fiasco 
of 1884-85, and then, in spite of the good start produced 
by the London Protocol of September 1885, the Boundary 
Commission had now broken up without finality, and 
Ridgeway was hurrying home, only to be sent to thrash 
out the remaining problems at St Petersburg. At the 
present time, none of the three parties was satisfied, 
and all three had lost more than they had bargained on. 
The real triumph of the English Boundary Commission 
lay in the enormous amount of survey, topographical and 
cartographical work which had been achieved. This was 
largely the result of the additional amount of time 
devoted to the internal survey and exploration of 
Afghanistan during the period of the false start. The 
Russians, too, had carried on extensive topographical 
work in the Turkmen lands they had occupied on the 
Tejend and lower Murghab, this being done by their usual 
military and_civilian frontier topographical staff. But 
in this initial period both groups, English and Russian, 
had devoted their work to the western region. When the 
Joint Commission began its seances, the English knew the 
southern and the Russians the northern parts very well, 
and some areas, such as the Kangrueli-Namaksar region 
had been surveyed at different times by both parties. 
There is no doubt that Abdurrahman saw the advantage 
to his state not only of the demarcated frontier but 
that he welcomed the opportunity to have so much of his 
territory expertly mapped. For this, he was prepared to 
guarantee the security of teams of foreigners penetrating 
deeply within his :frontiers.· In spite of' the 
mediaevalism o:f many aspects of' his despotic rule, 
Abdurrahman was in many ways the :first modern man in his 
country and his own interest in, and aptitude f'or, 
certain aspects of' European progress was great. One of' 
the studies which opportunity had opened up to him was 
that of' cartography, and it was a matter o:f surprise to 
the Boundary Commission of'f'icers that this should be so. 
How it came about is recorded by Holdich. He tells 
how at Kabul on the return journey to India, he met an 
old acquaintance, Abdul Subhan, at that time a 
'Brigadier of' Artillery, Instructor in Signalling, 
Surveyor-General and many other public :functionaries all 
rolled into one 1 • 1 In India this man had been one of' 
Holdich's best surveyors and he :finally developed a 
considerable capacity as an explorer. He had been with 
Holdich during the Second Af'ghan War, but on his return 
to India had walked out on his job 'in a state of' deep 
disgust at the ref'usal of' the Indian Government to 
2 
raise his pay by a f'ew rupees per month', and had taken 
service w;i.th the Amir. Al though he later :fell into 
disgrace and was duly executed, he was clearly an 
inf'luential :figure at this time. Holdich writes: 
1 
2 
I have very little doubt that one result of' 
that inf'luence was the :freedom with which 
native surveyors were permitted to traverse 
the untrodden parts of' Af'ghanistan in the 
early days of' the Boundary Commission; and 
another is the remarkable acumen which the 
Amir has always displayed about maps. He not 
Holdich, p.168. 
Ibid., p.167. 
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only knows the meaning of a map when he sees 
one, and can decipher its topography, but he 
has shewn a shrewd appreciation of the part 
which a map may be shown to play in the 1 political arena of boundary agreements. 
Major Hill, the Chief Survey Officer appointed to the 
original Commission, had become ill at Quetta and his 
post had been given to Major Holdich. What he took over 
from Hill included the following instructions from 
Colonel De Pree, the Surveyor-General of India: 
Since you will pass beyond the limit of the 
triangulation hitherto executed by the Survey 
of India, it will be desirable if possible to 
carry out at least a single series of triangles 
in advance of any outlying points. If this is 
impracticable, then a traverse by means of 
measured short hases and dependent isosceles 
triangles of extreme length sides compared with 
the base, aided by azimuthal determination. If 
this be impracticable then a simple traverse must 
suffice with compass bearings and distances 
measured with lead line or pedometer or watch, 
but not by pacing if any other instrument whatever 
is available ..• but you should take independent 
astronomical observations for latitude and 
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longitude .... I wish to impress on you the necessity 
of putting imperishable marks on rocks or permanent 
objects ... it is incumbent on you to describe each 
station-mark .••• You will naturally enter upon 
friendly relations with the scientific officers of 
the Russian expedition and obtain from them all 
information which is of interest from a geographical 
point of view.2 
Holdich writes retrospectively as follows: 
l Ibid., pp.168-9. 
2 N.A.I., Mss, Survey of India Correspondence Record, 
D.D.N. Volumes No.599, vol.J02 (6) 80-90; No.674, Letter 
from Colonel G.C. De Pree, 1 September 1884. 
On our side nothing had been done to shed light 
on the dark places of that far-off frontier. 
The Indian Government does not encourage 
geographical explorations in far countries if 
there is a possibility of complications arising 
therefrom; and since the days of Pottinger's 
heroic defence of Herat no Englishman had set 
his foot in that city, neither had it been 
possible to push native exploration forward into 
the well-guarded province; so that we had 
everything before us. Not only the prospect of 
an open field extending almost from Quetta to the 
Herat valley, within which not a single point 
existed that would help us to the attain~ent of 
sound topographical mapping, but all Western 
Afghanistan, Eastern Persia [See note], and 
Afghan Turkestan lay before us for our survey 
marks. It was quite impossible to limit our 
work tb a mere local illustration of the actual 
boundary. That was our ostensible raison d'etre 
as surveyors, but the greater, and the better, 
part consisted in carrying up link by link a 
connecting chain of measurements all the way from 
India to the Oxus so as to place every square mile 
of those regions in the right position on the map 
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of the world; and on the basis of those measurements 
to e·xtent our mapping so as to leave nothing obscure 
regarding our own strategical position on the 
Indian frontier in relation to Russia's position on 
the far north-west. 1 
Under such circumstances, the Survey involved a wide 
field of related activities in which at one time and 
another nearly all the personnel of the English Boundary 
Commission Party became involved. It included the 
Survey proper, topography, cartography, and the extension 
of geographical knowledge of all kinds, to which anyone 
1 Holdich, p.97. 
Note: Holdich himself elsewhere mentions in 1886 the 
existence of a 'valuable map of part of Khorassan 
by Schindley, Director of Persian Telegraphs' 
(Survey of India Correspondence Record, D.D.N. 
Volumes, No.596, 80-90, J0/55(b).) I have not 
seen this. 
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might contribute some small point. It involved not only 
the natural features and the geological structure, but it 
involved the man-made use of these things, the nature and 
position of roads, fords, bridges, irrigation works, 
forts, fields, orchards, grazing grounds, towns and 
market days; it involved De Laessoe's study of caves and 
cave dwellings, Maitland's and Peacocke's tracing of 
abandoned roads and settlements. Everything was grist to 
the mill of the Survey in its broader aspects. Merk, a 
political officer, and Owen, a surgeon, had much to 
contribute in their special fields which might both be 
called ethnographical, but some of the most interesting 
observations about the various peoples, their customs, 
beliefs, legends, and attitudes were made by Imam 
Sharif, a sub-surveyor, and Griesbach, a geologist. 
Although both C.E. Yate and Holdich are owed a debt of 
gratitude for· their interesting published accounts of 
the doings of the Boundary Commission, it is a pity that 
the impressive results of this Survey were not produced 
in book form in their day, instead of being stacked away 
in official repositories, or destroyed. On the 
expedition there were several keen photographers and 
Griesbach's photographs or selections of them were 
produced in six copies, one for Simla and one for Calcutta 
Government House. Ned Durand was an industrious and 
skilful water-colourist. 
exist 
Perhaps his sketches still 
This Commission in its day was no puny affair. For 
instance one formidable file in the National Archives of 
India summarises 739 despatched from the India Office 
between October and AuguBt 1886 relating to the Central 
Asian scene and the Boundary Commission in particular. 
Surveyors know no rest. At the beginning they must, 
for their own professional satisfaction if for no other 
purpose, find a known point on their horizon from which 
to begin anew, and, as Holdich remarks somewhere, survey 
work is always incomplete; some part of it must always 
be likely to need revision. So the survey officers on 
this party began their work by linking up with the Survey 
of Beluchistan and triangulating the points on their 
route from the very first day when they went from the 
Beluchi frontier in the direction of the Helmand. 
At the end of their journey it was a matter of 
great satisfaction that never once, not even in the flat 
plains beyond Andkhoi, had they had to interrupt this 
continuity of the survey, and on their return from Kabul 
had been able to lin~ up with a point on the Indian 
North-West Frontier Survey. The frontier region itself 
took up the most exhaustive part of the work, both in 
surveying and cartography, but in the matter of general 
exploration and topography, this small party of 
surveyors and their able assistants made maps of and 
reports on the greater part of North-West Afghanistan 
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and its central mountains, a quite stupendous undertaking. 
so much of it being through dangerous and inhospitable 
mountain or desert, and among tribesmen of many kinds, 
many of whom had at least the reputation of being as 
inhospitable, under certain circumstances, as the land 
they inhabited. 
The survey, or initial triangulation, of the 
Helmand River region, had already been planned as an 
extension of the survey of the Beluchistan desert. This 
in its turn was a continuation of the system of 
triangulation in the mountains south and south-west from 
Kabul which had been laid down in 188J by Lieutenant 
Wahab assisted by Lieutenant Talbot. This has been 
continued in 1884 westward through Beluchistan by Talbot 
and Gore who presented their material to Major Hill at 
Quetta for preparation as a report. As we have seen, he 
became ill and handed over to Major Holdich, who was 
withdrawn for the purpose from the Ghob Valley, where he 
was already well experienced in Afghan and Beluchi 
regional surveys. Captains Peacocke and Maitland also 
were two senior officers, the one in Intelligence, the 
other a Political officer, who, like Holdich, had 
started as R.E. and were able to take a competent part 
in Survey. 
The following extract from Ridgeway's winter 
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report dated at Charshamba, 1 February 1886, and compiled 
while the English Party was in winter quarters there 
gives a good picture of Survey activities as they were 
concerned with the frontier: 
The survey of the country to the North and South 
of the frontier [Zulfikar to Chaman-i-bad] had 
been completed in detail by the Russian and 
British surveyors respectively before the 
Commission met, and sufficient triangulation 
points had been fixed by Major Holdich and 
Captain Gore in the vicinity of the frontier to 
render computable the absolute position of the 
pillars in Latitude and Longitude. But beyond 
Chamin-i-bad we had only a geographical sketch 
on a one-eighth scale of the country as far as 
Meruchak, while the tract beyond Meruchak, as 
far as the Oxus, would have been entirely 
unecplored if it had not been for Captain 
Peacocke's necessarily hurried reconaissance in 
the depth of winter. It was consequently necessary 
that a survey of this part of the frontier should 
precede demarcation, more especially asp according 
to the protocol, maps of the disputed area were to 
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be sent home in order that the frontier might be 
settled by the two Cabinets in the event of the 
Commissioners not being able to agree. Unfortunately 
the area in dispute was very large, for the Russians 
claimed ••• to the Ziaret Khwaja Salar. No 
triangulation had been carried beyond Chaman-i-bad, 
but, when the Commission met, Captain the Hon. M.G. 
Talbot was [extending triangulation] to Balkh from 
the base at Meshed through Bam,ln.l 
~, q.J 
At the first meeting, Holdich being present, they 
had agreed on surveying a belt four miles wide on each 
side of the frontier, and the country being for the most 
part so uninhabited and lacking in natural or artificial 
landmarks, both the Russian and English teams had agreed 
that a half-inch scale should be adopted. It was also 
decided at Holdich's suggestion, that the English 
surveyors should undertake the triangulation and the 
Russians the topography. 
1 
This condition, throwing as it did the great 
bulk of work on the Russian surveyors, tied our 
hands considerably when the details of the survey 
programme were being settled, but it was justified 
by the very superior strength of the Russian 
Survey Staff, C-0lonel Kuhlberg having at his 
disposal 8 or 9 trained topographers.2 
N.A.I., For,, Sec. F, Pros. September 1886, Nos 1-88~ 
No.9, Ridgeway to Salisbury, Confidential Report, 1 
February 1886. 
2 Ibid. 
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In his report from Oharshamba, 5 Apri1 1886., Ho1dich 
refers to the shortage of topographers as having been 
one of the main difficu1ties. According to Ho1dich, the 
Russian sty1e of topography was extreme1y e1aborate and 
their drawing exceptiona11y minute in detai1 and he 
regretted 'that in the absence of any high1y trained 
draftsmen such as they possess, I can give no assistance' • 1 
The Eng1ish Survey Party increased in size when 
Ta1bot returned from Ba1kh and an additiona1 three 
trained Indian topographers arrived to join it, They 
were then ab1e to take some of the burden from the 
Russian topographers. Peacocke, who was working through 
the Chu1 country in Maimana, wished to reduce the sca1e 
to one-quarter inch as there was 1itt1e in the way of 
identifiab1e features in the end1essly dissected sma11 
va11eys, but Kuh1berg insisted on retaining tµe one-ha1f 
inch sca1e. Ho1dich particu1ar1y praised Yusuf Sharif•s 
survey from Girishk to near Herat and the traverses made 
through the desert tracts by Ata Mohamed and that of Hira 
Sing to the va11ey of the upper Murghab and Firozkohi, 
He says in the same p1ace that a11 their work throughout 
had been p1ane-tab1ed on the basis of Captain Ta1bot 1 s 
triangu1ation. 
Meanwhi1e sma11 survey parties were covering as much 
as possib1e of unknown North-West Afghanistan. We have 
seen how, through the summer of 1886, such groups, 
usua11y mixed Eng1ish and Russian, were combing the banks 
of the Amu from be1ow Khamiab to above Ki1if, and how a11 
1 Ibid,, vo1.596, Ho1dich to Ridgeway, 2 June 1886, 
the desolate poor grazing land on the outskirts of 
Maimana and Andkhoi, confronting the desert itself, had 
been searched for wells. Meanwhile the inner sides of 
these provinces were being surveyed and explored and 
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the extremely rough mountain country in the south of 
Afghan Turkestan was being examined. For example, on 3 
April 1886, Imam Sharif set out on a notable journey with 
a very small escort to examine the Firozkohi country 
lying on the northern slopes of the Band-i-Turkestan and 
Koh-i-Balkh-Ab mountains and the sources of the northward-
flowing tributaties of the Andkhoi and Balkh rivers, and 
then worked round to the heads of streams which joined 
the Murghab. He worked south from Shiberghan down to the 
mountains through Uzbek country and in his report found 
time for detailed descriptions of the many different 
villages, and people such as Jews and Arabs settled here 
anq there, also of the unfortunate Hazara children who 
were continually captured by the Firozkohis and sold 
into household slavery. This was all additional to his 
s~rvey work which won the greatest praise from Holdich. 1 
The geologist with the English Party, C.L. Griesbach, 
wrote various long reports dealing with his geological 
explorations. As he had a very keen eye for matters of 
geographical and ethnographical interest, as well, and a 
delight in scenery for its own sake, his reports are 
highly readable. A German by nationality, he was a 
Deputy Superintendent in the Geological Survey of India. 
For several years after the present survey he was, at the 
Amir's invitation, seconded to work in Afghanistan, 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec, F, Pros. October 1886, Nos 12-22, 
No.16. 
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making the first systematic mineralogical survey of large 
parts of the country. The Amir finally became 
suspicious of him, as he did of so many others of his 
servants, and Griesbach returned to India. One of his 
reports covers his journey from Charshamba eastwards 
across Maimana to Mazar, which occupied from 10 March to 
19 May 1886. He left Charshamba on 10 March intending to 
explore geologically the area north of the great 
watersheds of Afghanistan. He travelled with four private 
servants, four sowars of the 11th Bengalis, and three 
Afghan sowars under Ahmed Ali Khan, Kabuli. He travelled 
through Uzbek, Firozkhoi, Hazara, Tajik and Kipchak 
villages. The following is a characteristic passage: 
I passed a large ziaret in a fine group of 
trees ••• which marks the boundary between the 
land belonging to Painguzar and Farad Beg. 
About 2t miles below the camping ground the 
road crosses the river by a narrow bridge; 
near it and on the right side of the valley is 
the first village of Farad Beg. Immediately 
below it I noticed about 8 to 10 artificial 
caves, or rather chambers, hewn out of a 
precipice on the right side of the valley. 
Most of them are partly destroyed by rock-
slips, and of some only traces are left •••• 
They all seem ex~avated in the conglomerate 
and sandstones of the post~pliocene fresh-water 
formation, which I describe in my geological 
notes. 
I had intended to go to the principal village 
of the (Farad Beg) group, but a terrific hail 
and rainstorm coming on, I had to stop at the 
second kishlak, although I found some difficulty 
in discovering a level space to pitch my tents; 
the village itself is built on the steep slope 
of the hillside which is mostly well-cultivated. 
The whole valley at the base of precipitous rocks 
seemed filled with loose mud, in which my 
baggage animals more than once seemed hopelessly 
lost. 
The inhabitants, in spite of the blinding rain-
storm, turned out - men women and children - to 
have a look at the stranger so suddenly appeared 
amongst them and all pushed forward to help 
holding our horses and doing anything that would 
enable them to have a good stare. A prayer-house 
was quickly opened for me and we were all glad -
myself and the sowars - to get into shelter out of 
the pelting rain. Tea and bread were quickly 1 brought, and arrangements made to house us all. 
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This journey took him westward through rough, mountainous 
country to Bamian, and then he followed the main road 
north to Haibak and Balkh. In this part of the world 
almost all roads led ultimately to Balkh or through it, 
and several other officers after Talbot passed through 
it and left accounts of the ancient town. That of C.E. 
Yate is probably the fullest. 
Colonel Ridgeway concluded his official letter 
covering the Report on the Survey with the following 
paragraph: 
1 
I have attempted above to do justice to the zeal, 
energy, and endurance of the officers of the 
Survey Department attached to this Mission; but 
the fact that, under circumstances of great 
difficulties, over 100,000 square miles of country 
have been geographically surveyed, in addition to 
the topography and triangulation connected with 
the demarcation, speaks for itself. This achievement 
is alone sufficient to justify the detention of the 
Mission in Afghanistan during the last two years.2 
N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros, October 1886, Nos 12-22, 
No.19. 
2 C.A. No.2, 1887, No.206, Ridgeway to Iddesleigh, 12 
October, enclosing Holdich's Report. See Appendix H. 
JO 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT 
In St Petersburg 
After he had delivered the English Boundary Party 
to p'eshawur, and had a meeting with Dufferin at Lahore, 
Colonel Sir West Ridgeway left almost at once for London, 
where he spent the last half of November and all 
December 1886, working over his extensive paperso These 
included Merk's report of his re-examination of the Kushk 
and Kashan Canals, for which purpose he had been left on 
the frontier. The English Ambassador at St Petersburg, 
Sir Robert Morier~ was home on leave and Ridgeway spent 
some time discussing the Afghan Boundary problems which 
were likely to arise when the Final Negotiations were 
opened. It was a foregone conclusion that Ridgeway would 
play a prominent part in them. 
On 7 January 1887, one of the last acts of the 
Foreign Secretary the Earl of Iddesleigh, before his 
sudden death, whereupon Salisbury resumed that post for 
himself, in addition to the Prime Ministership, was to 
instruct Morier that on his return to St Petersburg, he 
'should take an early opportunity of intimating to M. 
de Giers that Her Majesty's Government are ready to enter 
upon the discussion of the points still left 
1 
outstanding'. One of Salisbury's first acts was to 
1 C.A. Noo2, 1887, No.212. 
write to Ridgeway expressing the 'satisfaction of Her 
Majesty's Government' at his 'judgement, firmness and 
ability'. 
When Morier saw de Giers, the latter confessed that 
he himself had completely lost touch with the boundary 
question, and asked for an aide-memoire, with time to 
1 ------
study it. Morier reported that St Petersburg was 
unable to send any expert to negotiate in London, 
especially since M. Lessar was ill in Ashkabad and quite 
unfit to travel. It seems almost certain that in Russia 
the military party, including the War Office and some of 
Zinoviev's Asian Section of the Foreign Office, were 
throughout opposed to the demarcation of the Afghan 
J04 
2 Boundary, seeing it as 'an end ot their forward policy', 
and would have gladly seen the whole thing lapse. 
During April a section of the Russian press once again 
began to protest that the crest of the Paropamisus Range 
was the proper Russo-Afghan, or as some of them more 
openly expressed it, Russo-British Indian, Boundary. 
Nevertheless, by 22 February, Morier reported de Giers as 
ready to continue negotiations in St Petersburg and as 
having discussed the matter with General Obruchev, the 
Minister for War. All were now agreed it should get 
under way. 3 Morier had also ascertained that there was 
no truth in the rumour that either Colonel Alikhanov or 
General Komarov would be present. 
On 23 February Morier was notified that Ridgeway 
would be sent to the St Petersburg negotiations, and on 
1 Ibid., No.215, 26 January 1887, Morier to Salisbury. 
2 Sykes, History of Afghanistan, vol. II, p.167. 
J C.A. No.2, 1887, No. 220. 
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24 February Ridgeway was officially instructed to hold 
himself in readiness. The delay that followed was 
supposedly because of the continued illness of M. Lessar, 
the Russian negotiations being unable to proceed 
satisfactorily without him. On 30 March he was reported 
to be at last able to return from Ashkabad to St 
Petersburg, and M. Zinoviev suggested that a suitable date 
for the meeting there would be 13 April. But M. Zinoviev, 
with proper Russian disregard for the exigencies of the 
calendar, had quite forgotten that this date would 
coincide with Easter, including the pre-Easter period 
when Russian normal routine was traditionally interrupted. 
Ridgeway and Captain Barrow, the competent Russian 
interpreter who had been sent with Lumsden to the 
Frontier in 1884 as his Private Secretary and had 
returned with him to London, and Mr E.H.S. Clarke, the 
Chief of Office Staff for the duration of the Commission, 
arrived in St Petersburg on the appointed date and next 
day were joined by Captain De Laessoe. Preliminary 
discussions were held at Zinoviev's private house, but 
the first formal session could not be held until 23 April. 
According to Ridgeway, there was a certain reluctance on 
the part of the Russians to begin the formal sessions, 
and after the meeting at the Foreign Office on 23 April, 
discussions hung fire, and only on the intervention of 
Morier did the Russians agree and appoint M. Zinoviev as 
the Russian delegate. The Russian delegates were M. 
Zinoviev, 'as the man who had the whole question at his 
finger-tips' , 1 Colonel Kuhlberg and M. Lessar. 
1 Ibid., No.235~ quoting de Giers~ 
Ridgeway left London with wide instructions with 
regard to the forthcoming negotiations: 
You will resist any attempt to call in question 
the frontier-line already demarcated up to Duk.chi, 
except where it may be right to make allowance for 
slight errors of surveying, or where some moderate 
concessions would facilitate a favourable 
settlement in regard to Khamiab. 
As regards the remaining portion of the frontier, 
Her Majesty's Government consider that the 
intent~of the Agreement of 1873 was 
unquestionably to leave the Amir all the territory 
at that time in his possession ••• You will point out 
that it is only by insisting on an incorrect 
description, resulting from the want of proper 
information, that the frontier could be drawn higher 
up the stream. Her Majesty's Government will, 
however, be willing to consider any further proposals 
which you may submit for the settlement of the 
difficulty by a reasonable arrangement.! 
At the conclusion of the meeting on 23 April, M. Zinoviev 
suggested that the question might now be referred to de 
Giers and Morier. Ridgeway was very afraid that his 
duties 'might in that case be those of an expert assisting 
2 
the Ambassador'. However, Morier and de Giers insisted 
that only points in dispute were to be referred to them 
and the negotiations would be in the hands of Ridgeway 
and Zinoviev. As Morier wrote: 
1 
2 
The conclusion, therefore, I have come to is 
that some form should be found in which M. de 
Giers and myself, whilst nominally conducting 
the negotiation, and naturally being responsible 
for it, should leave it de facto in the only hands 
Ibid., No.225, Salisbury to Ridgeway, 6 April 1887. 
Ibid., No.231, Ridgeway to Salisbury, 23 April. 
capable of leading it to a s•ccessfu1 issue, 
namely those of Sir West Ridgeway and M. 
Zinoviev. 1 
Before this meeting Ridgeway had presented through 
the Ambassador a short Memorandum in which he pointed 
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out that the Frontier Commission had failed to agree on 
Khamiab, indisputably an Afghan district, because the 
Russian Commissioner excluded it on the grounds that it 
was below Khoja Saleh. He said that extensive researches 
of the Commission had shown that the former ferry had 
run from Is1im on the Afghan side to Charshanga on the 
Bokharan side of the river, but that a11 research had 
failed to identify the 'post of Khoja Saleh'. He said 
the Agreement of 1873 had certainly intended to draw 
the frontier below this point, and that, 'morally if not 
technica11y12 the Afghans were entitled to Khamiab. 
At the meeting of 23 April Colonel Kuh1berg brought 
up a matter which Ridgeway already knew the Russians 
wished to reopen - that of the need to rectify thirty 
miles of frontier westward from Dukchi to a we11 called 
Chich1i, already confirmed by the Russians on 25 April 
1886. It became apparent that there was a considerable 
disagreement over a we11 called Imam Nazar which 
Ridgeway claimed had already been given into Afghan hands 
but wh·ich Kuh1berg insisted had been given in error 
because of an inaccurate survey of the width of pasture 
allowed to Andkhoi at this spot. This was bound to 
come up for further discussion, but they agreed that two 
1 Ibid., No.234. 
2 Ibid., No.235, Inc1osure No.2, 19 April 1887. 
other wells for some reason unallocated would have to be 
left for on-the-spot decision at the time of the Final 
Demarcation which would obviously have to follow the 
present settlement. The rest of the meeting was devoted 
to Khamiab, with Ridgeway firmly heading Kuhlberg back 
from the question of Khoja Saleh. Further meetings were 
held on 28 and JO April. 
Kuhlberg presented a Memorandum which he stated was 
in answer to the last Memorandum prepared by Ridgeway 
before he had left the Frontier in the previous 
September. Kuhlberg referred in detail to a dispute 
which had taken place during the demarcation of the 
Andkhoi-Dukchi boundary. The disputants, Captains De 
Laessoe and Denisov, had applied to the Commissioners 
Jal 
for further instructions in regard to the wells of Chichli 
Gokcha and Oikul, but the matter of Oikul had remained 
undecided. So Oikul joined Imam Nazar as another place-
name of a desolate spot to be tossed back and forth in 
the St Petersbueg discussions. Kuhlberg also claimed 
that another part of the boundary along the Kaisor River 
east of Charshamba had never been completedo Ridgeway 
disputed this and a thorough deadlock ensued. The 
Russian War Ministry now sent a special delegate, 
General Ivanov, to represent it at sessions. On 11 May, 
de Giers complained to Morier about the 'extreme exiguity 
1 
of Sir West Ridgeway's counter-proposals' and on 12 May 
Ridgeway reported to Salisbury that the meetings were 
suspended pending reference to England. Morier was of 
the opinion that the Russian War Office was demanding 
l Ibid., No.242. 
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too much. Their chief demand concerned a greatly 
increased amount of territory for the Sariks in the 
Kushk-Murghab region, including that part of the Murghab 
on which Maruchak Fort was situated. Ridgeway flatly 
refused to consider this, Maruchak having been one of the 
three places (along with Zulfikar and Gulran) which 
Abdurrahman had said he would never surrender. 
The two meetings of 10 and 12 May, which produced 
both Protocol No. J and Ridgeway's suspension of meetings, 
covered a great deal of ground but the mood of both 
conferring parties had remained intransigent. The one 
point of agreement was the necessity for eli~~ting all 
,.. 
possibility of dispute between Afghan and Sar'ik in the 
Kushk and Kashan Canals area. The whole matter of Khoja 
Saleh was gone over again, the Russian Commissioner at 
last practically admitting the search for it had been a 
failure. And M. Zinoviev thought it 'right to affirm 
that the meaning of the term "post" had never been 
defined, so future enquiry on the matter would be 
completely useless'. He recalled that the Indian, 
Munshi Faiz Baksh, a British agent and explorer, had 
reported in 1869 that the Afghan~Bokharan boundary 
already lay between Khamiab and Bosagha. But he also 
recalled that in 1870, the British Ambassador, Sir A. 
Buchanan, had handed a Memorandum to Gorchakov in which 
the British Government declared: 
Provided Khoja Saleh be admitted to be within the 
Afghan frontier, Her Majesty's Government would 
not object to a definition of the frontier by 
which the rights of Bokhara should be determined 
to commence on the left bank of the Oxus 
immediately below that place. 
It was a mistake no doubt, said Zinoviev, but why should 
the Afghans benefit? Ridgeway replied that the British 
Government in 1873 had believed that Khamiab would be 
included and the maps showed Khoja Saleh in the place 
where Khamiab actually was. Ridgeway and Zinoviev now 
quarrelled as to whether Faiz Baksh in 1869 had marked 
a village of Khoja Saleh above or below Khamiab. 
Zinoviev protested that the Commission's treatment of 
the Sariks over the Kushk and Kashan canals had been 
'lacking in good-will'. In this meeting, too, Ridgeway 
was annoyed by Russian mention, by way of evidence 
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useful to themselves, of Holdich's paper in the Royal 
Geographical Society Journal for 23 March 1885, and pointed 
out that the paper was quite unofficial, and published 
before any detailed survey had been made. 
When Protocol No. 3 was issued, Ridgeway added to 
it a suave Annexe in which he regretfully accused 
Kuhlberg of having made 'several mistakes as to facts' in 
his Memorandum of 23 April and then politely excused him 
for them, and then laid down a firm line of procedure: 
This (error) is not unnatural, for ei9ht months 
have passed since my Memorandum of 4 ll6) 
September was sent to him, and my Colleague now 
writes regarding events which occurred nearly 
twelve months ago. 
It is evident that in questions where my memory 
of what passed contradicts that of my Colleague, 
it will be necessary for us to abide by what was 
recorded in writing, that is to say, in the 
Protocols and correspondence.l 
1 Ibid., No.244, Ridgeway to Salisbury, 18 May 1887~ 
Inclosure (Annexe). 
Referring to Kuhlberg's allegation about the 
inaccuracy of the frontier on the Kaisor, Ridgeway 
accused his fellow-Commissioner of having neglected to 
give his Assistant-Commissioner (Gideonov) the authority 
to agree upon the land to be given to the Afghans in 
compensation for that lost to them between Maruchak and 
the 'Meridian of Sofi 1 west of Maimana. Ridgeway reminded 
Kuhlberg that a telegram from General Komarov of 2 (14) 
November 1885 had clearly established that the Assistant-
Commissioner had the power to do so.* 
With reference to Kuhlberg's complaint that some of 
the sites of Boundary pillars had apparently been 
changed, Ridgeway pointed out that the rectification had 
always been done 'by the consent of both Commissioners', 
and in the settlement of the wells in the vicinity of 
Imam Nazar Kuhlberg must certainly have agreed to his 
Assistant-Commissioner's settlement, thus acting in line 
with the direction given by General Komarov. Ridgeway 
said that in some cases pillars had been constructed on 
incorrect sites by the builders, but that these had been 
pulled down and rebuilt on the sites agreed upon by the 
Commissioners. 
Ridgeway soon received a reply to his telegram on 12 
May announcing suspension of meetings. On 14 May he was 
notified by Salisbury that 'Her Majesty's Government must 
* It is mentioned at various times by Ridgeway in his 
reports that Kuhlberg had no great inclination to go out 
on field-work himself but preferred to direct undertakings 
from the Base Camp. In such a case, his Assistant 
Commissioner would have needed this local authority. 
consult the Government of India before furnishing you 
with fresh instructions 1 • 1 
In spite of the suspension of 
, 
seances about which 
Ridgeway hpd sent his telegram to London on the 12th, a 
change was really already under way in St Petersburg, 
On 13 May Ridgeway was 1 honoured with an interview' by 
Alexander III, in which the Tsar was most cordial and 
hoped that the negotiations would conclude successfully. 
The Tsar was then away from St Petersburg for a week 
during which Marier and de Giers consulted closely. 
When the Tsar returned, he called for a report, and, to 
continue in Ridgeway's words: 
... the result was a decided change, for on the 
24th May, when we were revising the draft Protocol 
of our last meeting, M. Zinoviev mentioned the 
Emperor's desire that a settlement should be 
effected, and his own anxiety that we should come 
to terms.2 
The discussions of this day, 24 May, were so favourable 
that on the same day Ridgeway sent an optimistic telegram 
to Salisbury reporting that there appeared to be at least 
three viable solutions to the Kushk-Murghab problem. 
They all involved starting from Pillar 19, a point just 
south of Islim on the Egri Geuk, the most ,western 
tributary of the Kushk, and proceeding by slightly 
varying routes to the Murghab. 
Just at this most hopeful upward turn at St 
Petersburg, Ridgeway received a telegram on 31 May, sent 
l Ibid., No.241. 
2 C.A. No.l (1888), No.l, Ridgeway to Salisbury, 15 
August 1887. 
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from London on the previous day, requiring his 
immediate return to London to answer questions asked by 
the Government of India 'with regard to the phase at 
which negotiations have now arrived', and which no one 
but he could answer. Before he left on 2 June, he had a 
further friendly talk with Zinoviev. 
On the evening preceding my departure M. 
Zinoviev called on me, and again expressed 
his hope that we should effect a settlement, 
and this, he assured me, he thought possible, 
if only we would deal fairly with the Sariks, 
and do to them as we would wish our own 
subjects to be done by. He would do his best to 
obtain a reasonable contraction of the Russian claim 
if I would meet him by a liberal expansion of our 
proposed concessions.l 
Ridgeway left Captain De Laessoe to represent him and 
went to London. Here he found official interest 
concerning the Afghan Boundary negotiations at the 
lowest possible ebb. At a later date, he wrote of it 
to his friend, H.M. Durand, as follows: 
1 
* 
I was positively shocked when I came home the 
first time from St Petersburgh to find that 
Lord Salisbury and his Cabinet wished to let 
the whole thing slide. It was only my personal 
endeavours, aided by Bradford, Currie and 
Sanderson,* that induced them to continue the 
C.A. No.l (1888), No.l. 
Currie, P.H.W., 1834-1906, in 1887 Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, later a British Ambassador 
in several senior posts. Sanderson, T.H., 1841-1923, 
at the Foreign Office for forty-seven years, rising to 
Permanent Under Secretary. In 1887 he was Senior Clerk. 
Bradford, E.R.C., 1836-1911, an experienced Anglo-Indian 
administrator recalled by Lord Cross to the India Office 
early in 1887 as Secretary in the Political and Secret 
Department. 
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negotiations. If it had not been for the 
accident of my interview with the Emperor, 
they would not have done so. It was only 
when I assured the Cabinet, staking 
everything on it, that the Emperor intended 
to come to a settlement, that they agreed to 
let the negotiations go on. Lord Salisbury's 
last words to me were: 'The demarcation is not 
worth the paper it is written on, but as you 
have begun it, you had better finish it, if you 
can' .1 
The reasons for this attitude of Salisbury's are 
not fully clear, but several may be suggested. It is 
possible that Salisbury simply had no time to give to 
the Afghan Boundary question. He was always before all 
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else interested personally in the affairs of Persia and 
matters in Persia in 1887, including negotiations about 
railway construction, and other matters which led to the 
Drummond-Wolff Mission of the following year, made it 
important for him to see that any collisions with Russia 
leading to crises such as those of 1885 and disagreements 
such as those of 1886 should be avoided. In addition 
the state of Afghanistan appeared precarious in 1887, as 
the Ghilzai rebellion, which had started in late 1886, 
was still not quelled. The British Cabinet may well 
have considered the position of Abdurrahman weaker than 
in fact it was. The rebellion of the Ghilzai tribes of 
Andar and Hotak was at its worst in March and April of 
1887, and in June the mutiny of a Ghilzai regiment at 
Herat had to be put down. The Amir was known to be 
watching Ishak Khan in Afghan Turkestan very closely and, 
1 Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, quoting letter written by 
Ridgeway to Durand in August 1887, p.148. 
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again, no one knew whether in the case of a rebellion, 
Ishak Khan might look for Russian help. From various 
sources the British and Indian Governments knew that a 
considerable build-up of Russian troops was taking place 
in Turkestan and Transcaspia, which the Russians said was 
needed for maintaining order in their newly expanded 
territories. Kerki was known to be being turned into a 
large Russian cantonment, and newswriters began to send 
in reports that Bosagha would probably be occupied by 
Russian troops. It seems likely that Salisbury wished 
to avoid the risk of any further trouble in Asia at this 
time, too, when relations with China over Burma, Nepal 
and Sikkim, especially the two latter, were at a delicate 
stage, and it seemed likely that Tibet might be a 
trouble-centre. But the most likely reason for loss of 
interest in affairs of the Afghan Boundary Commission 
was simply that it had already been dragging on too long, 
and if Ridgeway had not already succeeded after six weeks 
in St Petersburg, matters could well drag on indefinitely. 
Having thus tentatively examined the British 
situation, we may now glance at the Russian attitude at 
this time, which can be done conveniently through the 
eyes of the English Ambassador, Sir Robert Marier. In 
a long letter to Salisbury, written in May 1887, Marier 
stated that he was afraid that at any time the Russians 
might occupy Khamiab claiming it was a temporary 
occupation pending settlement. He said that the struggle 
between de Giers, representing Civil officials, and the 
1 Military (including Zinoviev) was 'as keen as ever', 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. August 1887, Nos 1-32, 
Correspondence furnished by the India Office, mainly 
extracts from Asia Confidential Prints, Section 525, 
22/23 May 1887. 
although he was personally assured by de Giers that 
nothing whatever had been heard about a proposed 
expedition to Bosagha, and de Giers also denied that the 
garrisons at Kerki and Charjui had anything aggressive 
in character. They were purely for preserving internal 
order. Marier continued: 
His Excellency's tone, however, in speaking of 
his military partners as on many former 
occasions w~s far from implying implicit trust 
as to what they might do next.l 
J)<,,\'<'? 
~ said: 
After all I am far too sure of my case to make 
an enquiry necessary, and I had much better say 
nothing, because ft,he, very fact of such an enquiry 
might put it into their heads to do the very 
thing which we do not want them to do.2 
Marier got the impression from M. de Giers that Colonel 
Kuhlberg had 
possibly met with sharp treatment at the hands 
of Her Majesty's Commissioner, which he had 
not been quick-witted enough to guard against. 
The general result was not as good as hoped, and 
positions most important to the Sariks had been 
abandoned .... It was for this that his superiors 
made Colonel Kuhlberg responsible.3 
As to Khoja Saleh, Marier remarked that the Russians 
really seemed indifferent about Khamiab and the conflict 
over Khoja Saleh 'had value in their eyes exclusively 
from the opportunity it afforded of remodelling the 
frontier by which the material interests of the Sariks 
1 Ibid., No.5, Marier to Salisbury, 16 May 1887. 
2 Ibid. 
J Ibid. 
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had been sacrificed 1 • 1 At the same time Morier reminded 
de Giers that the frontier, as far as it had been 
settled, was a 'treaty frontier settled once for all and 
2 incapable of being changed except by mutual consent', 
to which view de Giers assented and said he himself was 
absolutely convinced that 'this Afghan question will not 
lead to grave consequences or take a critical form' . 3 
At this time too Morier furnished the British Foreign 
Office with further evidence that sections of the 
Russian public were far from satisfied with the likely 
settlement. For instance, he sent a translation of a 
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news paragraph from the newspaper, Sviet, once more 
advocating 'the friendly partition of Afghanistan between 
England and Russia as the most satisfactory settlement 1 • 4 
He forwarded a report from the Embassy's Military Attache, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ivor Herbert, in whose opinion the 
mass of Russian military officers believed that the 
present negotiations 'must ultimately lead to war'.5 
In London, which he had reached on 4 June, Ridgeway 
held a (telegraphic) Consultation with the Viceroy and 
then, having permission from Salisbury telegraphed De 
Laessoe to get in touch with Zinoviev and ask him if he 
would consider another possible settlement to the Kushk-
Murghab frontier. This was still a fourth possibility in 
addition to the three which had been mentioned by 
l Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., No.12, Morier to Salisbury, 11 May 1887. 
s Ibid., No.3, 24 May 1887. 
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Ridgeway on 24 May. This suggested settlement was 
'from pillar 19 to Kara Tappa, thence to Torshekh, and 
1 thence to the head of the Yeki Yuz Canal on the Murghab'. 
There was however a settlement of Afghans near Kara Tepe 
and Salisbury was induced by Ridgeway to send a telegram 
to Morier: 
Following for De Laessoe from Ridgeway; Assure 
Zinovieff in my name, before he commits himself, 
that any further concession on Kushk and Kashan 
is absolutely impossible. Suggest arbitration 
if site of Khoja Saleh still questioned.2 
De Laessoe reported that Zinoviev agreed to negotiate on 
the suggested basis, on condition that the frontier 
should cross the Kushk at Chihil Dukhterin eight miles 
higher up than Kara Tepe, so as to leave the latter in 
Russian territory. 
Ridgeway's peremptory message crossed with a 
telegram sent by Morier from St Petersburg which indicated 
that the tide of affairs was flowing strongly in 
Ridgeway's favour. 
Zinovieff states that proposals will be 
acceptable if extended to Chihil Dukterin; 
also wells habitually used by Ersaris; I 
believe you can choose your own Oxus line, 
but I do not believe Zinovieff can accept 
much less than Chihil Dukhterin.3 
At this stage the situation appeared so improved that 
Salisbury gave Ridgeway his rather grudging permission 
for a return to St Petersburg. 
1 C.A. No.l (1888), No.l. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. August 1887, Nos 1-32, No.27. 
J Ibid., No.28, 24 June 1887. 
One may well wonder where the Amir himself came in 
all this diplomatic wrangle over his frontier. The 
answer is partly to be found in a letter from Ridgeway, 
written in London on 28 June, in comment on De Laessoe's 
interview with Zinoviev, and the position of the Afghan 
colony at Kara Tepe in view of Zinoviev's demand for 
Chihil Dukhterin. He wrote: 
If Afghanistan were tranquil and united, if there 
were no chance of an immediate Russian aggression 
or interference, I should advise not necessarily 
previous consultations with the Amir, but the 
communication to him, before we close with Russia, 
of the terms of settlement .... But Afghanistan is 
not tranquil or united: on the contrary, it seems 
to be in imminent danger of breaking up, and we 
learn from M. Zinoviev himself that if no settlement 
is effected, Russia will repudiate all her 
obligations as regards Afghanistan.I 
Therefore, Ridgeway recommended that the Amir be informed 
at the conclusion of negotiations, and, showing that 
even a man of the high moral character of Sir West 
Ridgeway was not unversed in Machiavellian procedures, he 
added: 
1 
.... Finally, the Amir might be told that, in 
consideration of the expense to which he has 
been put, and may be put, in arranging for 
the security of his frontier, a sum of money 
is placed at his disposal in the Peshawur 
treasury. I do not think the Amir will be 
able to resist this temptation, and, of course, 2 if he takes the money, he accepts the settlement. 
Ibid., No.28, 24 June 1887. 
2 Ibid. 
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Just before he left London again, Ridgeway suggested that 
at the conclusion of the present negotiations, the Final 
Demarcation on the frontier should be carried out by a 
small mixed party of British and Russian officers. He 
suggested the British could share the Russian Escort 
Party. 
On 1 July he received from Salisbury an instruction 
as to his procedure on his return to St Petersburg. The 
first thing was to inform M. Zinoviev that, although the 
British Government would be happy to hand over Chihil 
Dukhterin, it appeared that there was a newly settled 
Afghan colony close by at Kara Tepe and it 'could not be 
properly recommended to the Amir 11 to remove them. He 
was also told that should he find himself unable to 
proceed, the Russians were to be conceded to and as a 
last resource, to be offered arbitration by a third 
power (an offer which the Russians refused to consider). 
The whole tenor of the instruction was conciliatory: 
1 
You will therefore proceed to St Petersburg, and 
will endeavour to settle the matter on the terms 
proposed by you. Should you find yourself unable 
to do so, Her Majesty's Government would prefer 
to abandon the proposal of compensation for 
Khamiab in the Kushk and Kashan valleys, and would 
propose that the question of the point to which 
the frontier should be drawn on the Oxus should be 
discussed and settled on its own merits. They are 
ready to admit that there is a certain ambiguity in 
the description of the frontier given in Lord 
Granville's despatched of 17th October, 1872. They 
have taken due note of the evidence collected by 
you on the spot showing existence in former years 
C.A. No.2 (1887), No.252. 
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of a ferry at Khoja Saleh, and they authorise 
you to accept, as corresponding with the letter 
of the arrangement in 1873, a frontier line which 
could leave the site of the ferry to Afghanistan 
.... Should you find that some moderate compensation 
to the Sarik Turkomans for lands in the Kushk and 
Kashan valleys of which they have been dispossessed 
would obtain more favourable terms as regards the 
frontier of the Oxus, and would contribute to a 
harmonious and permanent settlement of the boundary, 
Her Majesty's Government will be ready to consider1 
any recommendations you may make on this point .... 
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Ridgeway reacµed St Petersburg on 5 July. Here, too, 
conciliation was in the air. Ridgeway and Zinoviev held 
private meetings for several days on the grounds that 
'until we had arrived at a decision it was preferable not 
to hold a formal meeting' . 2 Zinoviev said he still must 
insist on Chihil Dukhterin, and he still held to the 
doctrinaire point of view that in 1873, 
in consideration of the Russian acknowledgement 
of Afghan sovereignty in Badakshan and elsewhere, 
England agreed to the frontier post being drawn 
to the post or point of Khoja Saleh, and she 
formally surrendered all Afghan territory below 
that place.3 
The Russian Government, on the other hand, had not known, 
when they signed the Protocol of September 1885, that 
they were surrendering land held by the Sariks, and if 
the British Government would now allow them to repair 
this mistake, the Russian Government would allow the 
Afghans to keep Khamiab. Nevertheless the talks 
continued in a reasonable and friendly vein, and Ridgeway 
l Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
himself was prepared freely to admit that the Sariks 
would suffer a deprivation by the surveyed frontier. 
Commenting on this matter on his return to London after 
settlement had been achieved, he wrote: 'It will be seen 
that Russia had merely claimed the lands and canals 
necessary for her Sarik subjects' . 1 
At last Ridgeway himself found the solution, after 
a searching re-examination of Merk's detailed reports 
of October 1886. Here he found that the Afghan colony 
at Kara Tepe would not after all conflict with the 
Russian claim to Chihil Dukhterin which was based on the 
claim that the waters of the canals were necessary to 
the Sariks. The Afghans occupied only the left bank of 
the Kushk while the disputed canals were all cut on the 
right bank. 
I therefore proposed to M. Zinoviev a compromise 
according to which the frontier should run from 
pillar 14 to the junction of the Kushk and Magar 
below Kara Tappa, from which point it would 
follow the mid-stream of the Kushk to the head 
of the canal formerly possessed by the Sariks 
below Chahil Dukhter. From this point the frontier 
was to run in a straight line to the Chingurak 
watershed, which was to be followed as far as 
Torshek.h (which would remain Afghan), and thence 
to the head of the Yeki Yuz canal on the Murghab. 
The advantage of this compromise, besides that it 
fulfilled all the reasonable requirements of the 
Russians, was that it left Kara Tappa, Chahil 
Dukhter, and Torshekh with Afghanistan .... There 
is no doubt that the Ameer's reluctance to restore 
the lands in question will be greatly lessened by 
1 Ibid., No.270, 27 July. 
his retention of these places. It was with some 
reluctance that M. Zinoviev agreed to this 
compromise.l 
There still remained a new discussion, insisted on by 
Zinoviev, about the wells on the Andkhoi frontier-strip 
of thirty miles west of Dukchi, and there was also a 
certain amount of difference of opinion about the line 
the frontier should take from Dukchi to Khamiab. 
Zinoviev claimed all the wells in this area and Ridgeway 
pointed out that this would deprive the people of 
Khamiab of their pastures. During this new deadlock, M. 
de Giers fortunately returned to St Petersburg; a formal 
seance was held on 16 July; the frontier as far as 
Dukchi was confirmed, and M. Zinoviev agreed to an 
equitable distribution of the wells. Thus little 
remained to be settled. The Russians wanted both Imam 
Nazar and Oikul wells, respectively south-west and south-
east of Dukchi, for the Bokharans, and Ridgeway refused 
to give way on the point. By 18 July the Russians agreed 
to be satisfied with Imam Nazar, which had previously 
been allocated to the Afghans, and Oikul was left to the 
latter. Upon this sudden minor reversal taking place, 
all points of dispute were at last agreed upon, and on 
18 July Ridgeway was able to send a telegram to Salisbury 
reporting settlement. On 20 July he received word of 
Her Majesty's Government's approval of the settlement, 
and after the Fourth and Final Protocol was presented on 
22 July, it was confirmed on the same day by an exchange 
of note~ between Morier and de Giers. 
l Ibid. 
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In the same telegram of 22 July 1887 (sent from St 
Petersburg at 4.40 p.m. and received at the Foreign 
Office at 5.10 p.m.) Ridgeway was careful to draw the 
attention of the Foreign Office to two matters mentioned 
in the Final Protocol: 
And 
The British Government will communicate without 
delay the contents of this protocol to the Ameer, 
and the Imperial Government will take possession 
on 1/13 October. 
The frontier agreed to shall be locally demarcated 
by a Mixed Commission according to the signed maps. 
In case the work of demarcation should be delayed, 
the line traced on the maps shall nevertheless be 
considered binding by the two Governments.l 
Except for several trivial adjustments which had to 
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be made by the Final Demarcation Party, the Russo-Afghan 
Frontier from the Heri-Rud to the Amu was an established fac 
fact, but neither of its two chief English advocates, 
Ridgeway himself nor H.M. Durand, foresaw for it the 
length of life it has proved to have. H.M. Durand had 
written in November 1886, with reference to the boundary 
as far as it had been completed on the frontier by the 
Commission: 
Russia can openly defy us now if she chooses, 
but she cannot deceive us any longer .... Our 
position when realised is not pleasing in some 
respects, and if you and I live a few years 
longer, I think we shall see some desperate 
fighting, if nothing worse. Russia has much in 
her favour. She is coming on overland - a big 
nation absorbing a number of small weak tribes -
1 Ibid., No.265, Ridgeway to Salisbury, 22 July 1887. 
••.• We, on the other hartd, are a small body 
of foreigners holding two hundred and fifty 
millions of Asiatics in leash. The Russian 
position is a strong and natural position, 
ours is, prima facie at least, a weak and 
artificial one. But I think we shall pull 
through in the end, and our best chance of 
doing so is to work out beforehand everything 
that can be worked out. The Commission was an 
attempt to do this, and, on the whole, a 
successful attempt.l 
Ridgeway regarded his frontier as 'not a good frontier 
either strategically, politically or ethnographically 1 • 2 
On the same pages of Sykes' Sir Mortimer Durand quoted 
above there are two interesting quotations, one where 
Durand is recorded as saying: 1 I know I am right in this 
matter (the need for the Russo-Afghan boundary) for I 
have studied it as no one else has, except Ridgeway, in 
England or India 1 , 3 and Ridgeway as saying to Durand: 
'You were the only man who believed in me. I have never 
forgotten and shall never forget what I owe to your 
generous friendship and appreciation' . 4 
Marier saw the honours of the St Petersburg 
settlement, at any rate from the English point of view, 
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as being divided between Ridgeway and de Giers. He wrote 
that the satisfactory nature of the compromise was 
undoubtedly 
1 Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, pp.149-50, quoting a letter 
from Durand to his sister, Mrs Rivett-Carnac, written in 
November 1886. 
2 D.K. Ghose, 
N • A • I • , For . 
England and Afghanistan, p.209, quoting 
Sec. F, Pros. October 1887, Cons. 107. 
3 Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, p.149. 
4 Ibid., p.150. 
due to the great ability displayed by Sir West 
Ridgeway in the Conference, to his superior 
grasp of the vast material which he had to deal 
with, to his tact and conciliatory spirit, and 
above all, to the conviction he inspired of his 
perfect straightforwardness and fair dealing. 
And of de Giers, he continues: 
Nevertheless, I do not believe that even with 
these advantages we should have succeeded in 
emerging unscathed out of the imbroglio caused 
by the contradictory language of the Agreement 
of 1873 had it not been for the unflinching 
loyalty with which M. de Giers has at every 
critical moment stepped into the rescue and 
beaten down every pretension incompatible with 
an equitable settlement of the question.I 
The Amir was told of the settlement, and its chief 
points commented on, in a Kharita from the Viceroy dated 
Simla, 1 August 1887, and on 24 August, also from Simla, 
the Viceroy was able to notify Viscount Cross, Secretary 
of State for India, that the Amir had accepted the 
conclusions of the Demarcation. The Russian Statement 
forwarded by Morier from St Petersburg on 7 September 
expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the long 
negotiations, and, for a week or so, thanks, 
gongratulations and expressions of satisfaction were 
despatched by all the Offices concerned to all the 
parties concerned, those from the India Office being 
signed by an India Office Secretary whose name is 
identified by posterity with his more famous ancestor's, 
namel~ Horace Walpole. 
1 C.A. No.2 (1887), No.269, S~r R.B.D. Morier to the 
Marquis of Salisbury, 22 July 1887. 
The Final Demarcation. Old friends meet 
In London, Ridgeway stirred the Foreign Office into 
setting about organising the English part of the Mixed 
Commission to complete the Final Demarcation. In India, 
the Viceroy had suggested to the Amir that the English 
Party might be led by General MacLean from Meshed. 
However, in London, Ridgeway's candidates were adopted 
without further question. He thought that two members 
would be sufficient and at the same time suggested 
Captain C.E. Yate, now C.S.I., and Major W. Peacocke, 
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R.E., as the men for the job. He thought that Yate should 
be provisionally made 'Major' (he actually became a 
Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel). Ridgeway said the two 
officers should be independent of each other, that is, 
they should have equal responsibility. This proved to 
be very useful on the demarcation because it meant that 
each had the power to act, and the work was speeded up 
since two groups were able to work in different places 
at the same time. He recommended as to their 
instructions: 'These instructions should be very stringent 
as to no risks being run. Both officers are somewhat 
1 
adventurous but they will obey orders'. A little later 
the same deux-ex-machina decreed that Yate should be 
instructed to camp with the Russians (partly to keep him 
2 
out of mischief and hence out of danger), but there is 
no evidence that this was carried out to the letter. The 
idea of sharing the Russian escort had been abandoned. 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. November 1887, Nos 1-198, 
No.180, Memorandum from Ridgeway, 27 August 1887. 
2 Ibid., Pros. February 1888, Nos 224-308, No.239. 
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Instead they were to have an escort of thirty Indian 
sowars, who would once more come by the Quetta route from 
India, and they were especially not to have a local Afghan 
escort. They were to make all contacts and money 
transactions through MacLean in Khorassan. 
They left London on 22 September 1887; at 
Constantinople picked up their young Russian interpreter, 
Mr Woodhouse, whose father was a British Consul in the 
Middle East, crossed the Black Sea to Batum and reached 
Tiflis on 8 October. Here they stopped long enough to 
call on Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, General Zelenoi, 
Colonel Kuhlberg and other of their former Boundary 
Commission acquaintances. The Commander-in-Chief was 
most friendly, showed them his extensive collections, and 
told them of his recent visit to Merv and of the good 
prospects for its rich oasis under Russian direction. 
Zelenoi and Kuhlberg both entertained them warmly. 
Colonel Kuhlberg we had a warm chat with and he 
seemed pleased that I had remembered to bring him 
my photographs in return for the one of himself 
he had sent me from St Petersburg .•.. We had tea 
with Mrs Kuhlberg.l 
Here they also met Komarov and Gideonov, both now 
Lieutenant-Colonels, and the interpreter, Mirzaev, also 
Captain Kondratenko and the topographer, Ilyin. Komarov, 
as Head of the Mission, Ilyin and Mirzaev, were to join 
them presently on the frontier. From Baku they crossed 
the Caspian by a Russian steamer and landing at a Persian 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. June 1888, Nos 169-232, 
K.W. No.2, letter from Yate, Camp Shah Rud, 17 October 
1887. 
port crossed Persia in eighteen marches totalling 373 
miles from there to Meshed, where they were the guests 
of General MacLean for a week. Procuring a party of 
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twenty-four Turkmen Sowars they left Meshed on 5 November, 
and reached the Afghan frontier at Zulfikar on the tenth 
~two years to the day from our first arrival there for 
the meeting of the Joint Commission 1 • 1 The meeting place 
agreed upon was at Kara Tepe on the Kushk. Yate and 
Peacocke arrived there on 16 November, and, there being 
no sign of the Russian party, Yate in his informal way 
sent a letter addressed to Komarov through the Penjdeh 
Commandant, Tarkhanov, asking him to put in an appearance. 
Meanwhile, Yate took stock of this well-known country. 
He was glad to be back. As he wrote to H.M. Durand at 
this time, 'I, as you know, am rather an Afghanophile, 
if there is such a word 1 • 2 He mentioned that the recent 
surrender of Ayub Khan to the British 'has been tidings 
of great joy to the Afghan officials'. 
He was glad to know that the Afghan agent with the 
Mixed Commission while it was in Herat Province was to 
be Mullah Abdul Aziz Khan, Governor of Kila Nao, for he 
was the brother of General Ghaus-ud-din, with whom Yate 
had been especially friendly. The Afghan Turkestan 
Agent took over at Charshamba. The attitude of the 
Afghans throughout was uniformly friendly and obliging. 
The Russian party arrived on the 19 November, and 
finally on 22 November, the Escort arrived from India, 
having covered the 609 miles from Quetta to Kara Tepe in 
1 C.E. Yate, Letters from Northern Afghanistan, p.393. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. February 1888, Nos 224-308, 
K.W., 24 November 1887. 
forty-one marches. The Escort of thirty men was drawn 
once more from the 11th Bengal Lancers, under the command 
of Jemadur Khan Sahib Amir Mohamed Khan. The whole party 
was under the command of a familiar face, that of 
Subadur Mohamed Hussain, 2nd Sikhs, now 'Khan Bahadur'. 
A'lso Yusef Sharif was there, now promoted to Assistant 
Surveyor, also now 'Khan Bahadur'. Altogether there were 
103 men, including 'various other details', twenty-
eight horses and 107 mules. On 21 November the 
Demarcation commenced at Kara Tepe. By 17 December Yate 
reported very rapid progress because of the friendly 
attitude of Komarov, who did not insist on any full-scale 
surveying but only on simply verifying the position of 
the different pillars on the English one-quarter inch 
Survey. Defective portions of the rectified frontier 
were completed by Peacocke and Yusef Sharif, 'Khan 
Bahadur', 'almost as quickly as the pillars can be 
erected 1 • 
There proved to be some small errors in the St 
Petersburg map. Only on one point, Pillar 25, did 
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Komarov insist on referring the matter to Prince Dondukov-
Korsakov before a decision was reached. On one of the 
canals they unexpectedly found a settlement of 600 
Zemindarwari cultivators, and when the Afghan Agent 
referred this to Kazi Sa 1 ad-ud-din, now Governor of Herat, 
the latter reluctantly agreed to move them on to the banks 
of the Moghor, to Gulran and to other vacant places. The 
move was supervised by General Ghaus-ud-din. 
Once they got beyond the Murghab they worked in two 
mixed groups; Peacocke and Ilyin went to the north to 
settle the demarcation near Imam Nazar, and Komarov and 
Yate pushed quickly on to Khamiab. As had happened 
before, the corporeal signs of demarcation, the pillars 
made of bricks from ancient structures, were erected 
under local authority. Protocol No. 1 of the meeting 
held at Kara Tepe had directed: 'A cette besogne doivent 
participer les Afghans en pourvoyant aux briques et au 
ciment, et les sujets Russes en fournissant l'eau'. 
What happened later was that the Afghans 
made all arrangements for bricks and mortar, 
etc, for Major Peacocke's party, and the 
Bokharan officials did the same for Captain 
Komarov and myself, and thus we were able to 
work both sides at one and the same time.l 
Both parties camped at Khamiab. 
was completed on Christmas Day, 1887. 
The rectification 
Judging from 
Yate's account, this Christmas Day was a very lively and 
pleasant occasion. The party which dined together was 
extremely mixed, three Russians, three Englishmen, two 
Frenchmen and a German (these were visitors travelling 
under Russian auspices), four Caucasians (Alikhanov, 
Tarkhanov, Mirzaev and another). In the Camp beside the 
Officers' Mess were parties of Turkmens all in their best 
coats, Cossacks (whose evening singing added to the 
pleasure of the Of£icers' dinner), Bengal Lancers and 
Afghan cavalry, all of whom had been photographed by the 
visitors during the day. The Murghab region had recently 
been proclaimed by the Russians 'the Imperial Domain of 
the Murghab' and Alikhanov, as its Governor, was making 
1 C.E. Yate, p.395. 
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an extensive tour of the whole Domain, and no doubt was 
interested to see the conclusion of the demarcation of 
his frontier. 
His astonishment was great at finding that the 
Native Officer in command was an Afghan, a native 
of Kabul, and I don't suppose he had realised that 
we had so many Afghans in our ranks or what good 
soldiers they could be made. Jemadir Amir 
Mohammed Khan's show of medals, ranging from 
Lucknow to China, Umbeyla, Kabul and Kandahar, 
attracted much attention and was an honest and 
instructive record of the services done for us by 
our Indian Army.I 
After the Christmas festivities, the Demarcation was 
completed on 18 January 1888, and Yate reported this next 
2 day. The completion of records was finished on 27 
January and the next day they were 'all on the move 1 • 3 
On 27 February the Foreign Office notified the Viceroy 
4 that Yate and Peacocke had returned to London. The 
Escort Party returned at leisure, taking sixty-seven days 
to march home to India. 
The Final Demarcation Party had worked hard and 
harmoniously, but there had been time for recreation, 
pheasant-shooting, being initiated by the Afghans into 
hawking for deer; a pig-hunt in the reed-beds of the 
Murghab which turned unexpectedly into a tiger-hunt. 
C.E. Yate enjoyed the pleasures of nostalgia when he saw 
the mud chimneys and gravelled main street, all that 
1 Ibid., p.396. 
2 C.A. No.l, 1888, No.286. 
3 C.E. Yate, p.396. 
4 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. June 1888, Nos 169-232, 
No.177. 
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survived of their former camp at Bala Murghab. He 
appreciated the friendly renewal of acquaintance with 
the local people, but he was especially glad to renew 
his friendship with General Ghaus-ud-din. 
General Ghaus-ud-din was with me at Penjdeh and 
we have been great friends ever since .... I saw 
a good deal of him at Bala Murghab and many a 
time he has made me laugh by his stories of the 
war and the narrow escapes he had from being 
captured by our sowars, when fighting against us 
in the Logar Valley.I 
It is not clear why the Amir wished to defer this 
Final Demarcation until the spring of 1888, but on 6 
December 1887, he wrote to the Commission2 that because 
of the onset of winter and the lack of material for 
boundary pillars, demarcation should be deferred to the 
spring. Under the instruction that all Boundary 
Commission mail should be cleared through MacLean, the 
Amir's letter reached him, and it was presently followed 
by a peremptory letter from the Kazi, as Governor of 
Herat, ordering the Party to return to Persia for the 
winter. 3 It is to be believed that the delay was 
engineered at Meshed, because by the time that a reply 
was sent about this letter of the Amir's the Government 
of India reported to him in the same letter that the 
demarcation was completed, and enclosed a sketch-map 
4 thereof. 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. February 1888, Nos 224-J08, 
K.W., Yate to H.M. Durand, 4 November 1887. 
2 Ibid., No.265. 
J Ibid . , No . 2 8 6 • 
4 Ibid., No.29J. 
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Apart from the dispossessed Zemindarwaris, the only 
local people reported as having a genuine cause for 
complaint appear to have been the people of Andkhoi who 
had spent 2,000 tangas (533 rupees) in repairing the 
well at Imam Nazar after it had been awarded to them in 
the 1886 settlement, only to have it transferred to the 
Russians, during the negotiations at St Petersburg in 
1887, in exchange for the well at Oikul. 
tangas was probably a dead loss. 
The 2,000 
The journey home of the small English Party was not 
without its highlights, although the boat-trip from Ak 
Kum (not far below Bosagha) down the Amu to Charjui, the 
English in one boat and the Russians in a companion one, 
was 'anything but lively work 1 • 1 At Charjui, where the 
new railway bridge, a huge wooden structure on piles, 
was the wonder of the day, which they reached on 1 
February, they suddenly found themselves 'once more in 
the bustle of European life 1 , 2 and were entertained by 
General Annenkov, the supervisor of Transcaspian Railway 
construction. From here they travelled to Ashkabad in a 
special train of two carriages, one for the General, one 
for the Boundary Commission Party. Their train waited 
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for them at Merv while they were entertained to dinner by 
Alikhanov in his fine house erected at government expense, 
and admired his Turkmen rugs used, Russian style, as wall-
hangings, 'the finest collection of Turkomen carpets that 
I have ever seen' . 3 At Ashkabad, they visited General 
1 Yate, p.396. 
2 Ibid . , p . 4 0 4 . 
3 Ibid., P.412. 
Komarov, and throughout were treated as honoured guests. 
Here they had a last pleasant dinner with their Russian 
colleagues, Captain Komarov and Colonel Zakrechevski, 
who shared a house, General Annenkov and his Secretary, 
Topographer Ilyin, Interpreter Mirzaev, and another 
Russian officer. Captain Komarov toasted the 'brother 
soldiers, gentlem~n and patriots, with whom he had been 
living for the past two or three months and from whom he 
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was sorry to part'. They were presented with photographs 
of the Trans-Caspian Railway; they attended a ball at 
tha Ashkabad Club; they visited Geok Tepe, now the second 
railway station out of Ashkabad on the Caspian side, and 
marvelled that the Turkmens had been able to hold out so 
successfully against General Lomakin in 1879. 
Standing on top of the breech, one could not 
help thinking what a wonderful power of 
resistance these mud walls possess: and if so 
much could be done with a twenty-foot wall, 
what could not be done with Herat.2 
At Ashkabad, General Komarov, with true Russian 
hospitality, offered them his private railway-carriage 
to continue their journey, only, with equally characteristic 
Russian misfortune, to find it was undergoing repair, but, 
notwithstanding, they were provided with another private 
carriage, and at no stage were they allowed to pay for 
their journey. Crossing the Caf.~ian ~hey found themselves 
once more in Tiflis, where they heard that Prince 
Dondukov-Korsakoy was in St Petersburg, and his Deputy, 
General Sheremetov, was still ill, but they had a 'most 
1 Ibid., p.416. 
2 Ibid., p.418. 
convivial evening' with General Zelenoi and Colonel 
Kuhlberg, and were seen off at the railway station by 
Kuhlberg, Ilyin and Mirzaev. From Batum they crossed 
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the Black Sea on the S.S. Grand Duke Michail, on board 
which Yate wrote, under the date of 14 February, the last 
of the letters which were later in the same year published 
in his book. As already mentioned, they reached home on 
27 February 1888. 
Only on 9 May did Salisbury forward copies of the 
Final Demarcation Party's Protocols to Marier, saying 
that it seemed desirable that these, together with the 
synopsis of pillars and the maps 'should receive formal 
confirmation by the two Governments 11 and asked him to 
find out whether de Giers preferred to sign a Protocol 
or exchange notes with the Ambassador. Marier reported 
that de Giers, with the help of another, but brief, aide-
memoire, was considering the matter, but that Zinoviev 
preferred an exchange of notes. Marier presented his 
note on Jl May (12 June) and M. de Giers, for the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, replied with his on 8 June 
(20 June) 1888, recognizing 'the entire validity of the 
arrangements in question 1 . 2 
Rewards 
This long-drawn-out affair had received so much 
publicity and, at any rate to start with, had been 
regarded as such a special undertaking that the matter 
1 C.A. No.2, 1888, No.l. 
2 Ibid., No.4, Inclosure 2 (translation). 
of rewards was a foregone conclusion. The 
recommendations came from the two Commissioners, first 
Lumsden then Ridgeway, but many other interested 
parties put in recommendations. 
When he had returned to London in May 1885, Sir 
Peter Lumsden had made a generous assessment of the 
achievement of his English officers and Native Attaches 
and officers up to that time, which was partly based on 
notes from Ridgeway as commanding officer of the Indian 
Party. The long march through Western Afghanistan and 
the Survey work done on this crossing had provided a 
good opportunity for making judgements as to individual 
capacity, as also had the frontier tension up to the 
Battle of the Kushk. 
When Ridgeway assumed the position of Commissioner, 
the process of assessment was continued. Many of the 
English officers were careful to keep an eye on the 
chances of promotion and reward for the men working 
constantly with them, for whom they felt a genuine 
affection and even admiration. 
The Government of India only awaited the return of 
Ridgeway to complete work on the matter of rewards. It 
had already been discussed in Council, and H.M. Durand 
said on 21 September 1886, that the Foreign Department 
'should have everything cut and dried and then await 
Ridgeway'. The Foreign Department urged the other 
Departments involved, and the Government of the Punjab, 
to hurry on and conclude their part in the preparation 
of the list of Honour and Decorations, so that it would 
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be ready for Queen Victoria's Jubilee, the ceremonial 
occasion which was to be observed in India on 16 February 
1887. 1 
In conjunction with his final report, Ridgeway had 
written demi-officially to Durand on 19 October 1886, as 
follows: 
Please remember that these men have been for over 
two years in this weary work. They have endured 
all the hardships and many of the dangers of a 
campaign. After a campaign, however short, C.B.s 
and Brevets are showered .... Consequently I do not 
think it too much to ask for C.Bs for your 
brother, who, as Second-in-command, and Bax as 
commanding the Escort, and Holdich as head of the 
Survey, on whom the hardest work fell .... 2 
In the same vein Ridgeway concluded his long report to 
the Earl of Iddesleigh, on his return to London: 
I beg to apologize for the length of this 
despatch, but I would remind your Lordship 
that, during the two and a quarter years that 
the Mission has been in Central Asia, it has 
undergone many hardships, privations, and even 
dangers, and that every one of the handful of 
officers has thus had the opportunity of showing 
his individual merits .... 3 
In this same report he made special reference to the 
Native officers of the escort, and also mentioned that 
1 The true Jubilee of the accession of Victoria of course 
fell in June and in June was celebrated in England. The 
tenth anniversary of her becoming Empress of India would 
have occurred on 1 January 1887. The cooler season was 
obviously more suitable for exhaustive ceremonial, but 
I do not know why 16 February was selected. 
2 N.A.I., For. Frontier A, Pros. March 1888, Nos 475-
531, K.W., No.10, p.93. 
3 C.A. No.2 (1887), No.211. 
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he had brought to the attention of the Government of 
India 
the services of the Native Attaches, who were 
virtually the backbone of the Mission, and I 
have no doubt that their labours will meet 
with due appreciation. I must, however, bring 
specially to notice the excellent work done by 
Kazi Muhammad Aslam Khan, who was my confidential 
Assistant. 
Ridgeway also pointed out tha.t several, being of high 
Afghan birth, had had much to fear from the Amir's 
resentment. Five of the Native Officers were 
recommended to receive jagirs, a jagir being the right 
to the revenue of certain lands assigned to the recipient 
of this reward. It was a form of Absentee Landlordism 
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and was on the whole preferred to a cash pension, although 
the holder of it was involved in far more difficulties 
than he would have been from a pension. It was 
preferred by the Punjabis because the jagirdar acquired 
a certain amount of social prestige and it 'also 
creates connections with landholders if .he wished to buy 
corn or fodder or land itself'. It was also believed by 
the holder to be more likely to be passed on to his heir 
than a pension, but the Government of India did not 
commit itself on this point. 
One of the Native Attaches, Bahawuddin Khan, requested 
a jagir because his family of twenty persons (Afghan 
refugees) depended on him for support. His request was 
refused but the Government granted him a life pension of 
Rs 1,000 per annum. Kazi Mohamed Aslam Khan was 
recommended for 'a jagir on the liberal side, as well 
as a C.I.E.' Sardar Sher Ahmad Khan was recommended for 
an increased personal allowance rather than a jagir. 
Khan Baba Khan was recommended for a grant of 200 acres 
of waste land in the Punjab and the matter was reported 
to be in the hands of the Punjab Government. Ressaldar-
Major Mohamed Hussein Khan was recommended for a jagir of 
1 the value of Rs 800 per annum. 
1 The case of the other Mohamed Hussain, Subadur, 2nd 
Sikh Infantry, one of the Attaches, is interesting and 
complicated. He had been on special duty with an 
important 'Afghan Refugee' in India, Sher Ali Khan, ex-
Wali of Kandahar, when someone remembered him as a 
useful man to attach to the Boundary Commission. He was 
attached to it from Quetta and had then been with it 
throughout. In May 1885 Lumsden had reported the 
inadequacy of his salary of eighty rupees per month. 
This was then raised in line with the other attaches to 
Rs 200 per month, with back pay from the time of his 
joining the Commission. He was mentioned as a most 
successful Political Attache, especially at the time of 
the Penjdeh crisis, and then as doing valuable work with 
Talbot and Maitland during the extensive Heri-Rud-to-
Balkh Survey. 
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Subadur Hussein Khan was still dissatisfied and he 
wrote to Ridgeway on 3 September 1886 'most humbly 
submitting' the distinguished services of his father, a 
Hazara chief, whom the son followed into Indian service. 
He complained that he was jealous of the rewards to men 
who had rendered less important service. He noted that 
his young nephew, who had remained in Afghanistan, was 
receiving a salary or allowance of Rs 4,000 per annum from 
the Amir, while he, Mohamed Hussain, was still only a 
Subadur. He asked to be granted a 'jagir equal to his 
position' and for his services to be transferred from the 
Army to the Punjab Police as an Assistant-Superintendent. 
Captain C.E. Yate petitioned on his behalf, and his name 
was reported as already down for a 'Khan Bahadur', a 
sought-after titular rank taken over by the British in 
India from the Mughals, and a jagir. When Yate returned 
with Peacocke on the Final Demarcation, it has already 
been noted that Subadur Mohamed Hussain, now 'Khan 
Bahadur', and still in the 2nd Sikhs, was there in charge 
of the party from India. (continued) 
As to the two Commissioners, Sir Peter Lumsden on 
his return to London in 1885 was gazetted G.C.B., and 
Ridgeway, who already held a C.B. from the Afghan War, 
was awarded the K.C.S.I. in the Birthday Honours of 
June 1885, shortly after he had taken over from Lumsden. 
This was officially bestowed on him by Dufferin at a 
magnificent meeting of the Chapter of the Knights of the 
Order of the Star of India at Lahore on 4 November 1886, 
two days before he left for London. The account of this 
very serious and elaborate business in the Lahore Civil 
and Military Gazette is quoted in full by C.E. Yate, a 
monumental effort of provincial journalism. Ridgeway' s 
welcome at Lahore and this piece of grand ceremonial 
were undoubtedly his real reward for the leadership of 
the Boundary Commission. 
footnote 1 continued from p.340 
Ressaldar-Major Sardar Aslam Khan, thanks to copious 
correspondence from Ridgeway strongly supported by 
Captain Yate, had been made an 'Honorary Major' in 1886. 
He was awarded a jagir and a C.I.E., but the orders 
about it somehow became mislaid, and he must have 
communicated about this to or spoken with the Foreign 
Secretary in no polite terms. H.M. Durand wrote to his 
brother, Major Edward Durand, in an infuriated fashion, 
saying Mohamed Aslam Khan was 'troublesome' and his 
'language was improper'. 
* 
If I had known what class of man he is, I 
would not have recommended it ...• You had 
better warn him if he ever lets me hear him 
speak of the Queen's decoration as a disgrace 
he may find such notice taken of it as would 
astonish him.* 
N.A.I., For., Frontier A, March 1888, Nos 475-531, 
K.W., p.100, Simla, 13 October 1887. 
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Apart from the three C.B.s asked for by Ridgeway, 
for Durand, Bax and Holdich, Yate and Merk were each 
awarded the C.S.I., and most of the English members of 
the Commission received some appropriate honour or 
promotion. For several of the British officers the 
Boundary Commission brought a welcome chance for 
promotion. C.E. Yate had been stuck with a Captaincy 
since 9 November 1867, and Meiklejohn, who led the 
reducing party back to Quetta in 1885, had been a Major 
since 1861. H.M. Durand did not value Major Holdich 
highly and said of him 'I don't think Major Holdich 
deserves much .... A brevet is good enough for him 1 • 1 
Criticisms levelled at Holdich are the only examples of 
'faint praise' to be found in any reports about English 
officers either during or at the conclusion of the 
Commission's term of existence. Reasons for the 
criticism of Holdich will be mentioned briefly in the 
next chapter of this thesis. 
A special matter which was carefully dealt with was 
that of rewards for the seven surveyors. Holdich in 
July 1886 had drawn attention to the anomalous position 
of the Native sub-surveyors and others attached to the 
Survey. 
1 
2 
The work has been imperial in its nature, more 
or less disconnected from the Survey Department 
.... The Survey-General had received no reports 2 
and so they had no power for promotion in rank. 
Ibid., K.W., No.2, H.M. Durand, 27 October 1886. 
N.A.I., Frontier A, May 1887, Nos 9-22, No.10. 
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This matter was then thoroughly discussed by Ridgeway 
and Holdich and papers were sent to the India Revenue 
and Agriculture Department, and to the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. 
Holdich urged that Yusuf Sharif and Hira Singh, the 
Gurkha, should be made 'Assistant Surveyors' and have a 
considerable increase in pay. 
warmly in the following terms: 
Ridgeway supported this 
I would rejoice to think that Heera Singh and 
Yusuf Sharif were to be given the opening 
suggested by Major Holdich for rising in the 
service of the Government, instead of remaining 
irrevocably tied down to their present humble 
position. Such a recognition of their service 
would have an excellent effect. The fact is 
that this Mission has been particularly fortunate 
in the natives of India and Afghanistan attached 
to it, and no government could have been better 
or more loyally served .... l 
Holdich further reported that Yusuf Sharif, who already 
drew the highest pay in the Survey section (Rs 110 per 
month), was well known as a most able sub-surveyor and 
an excellent geographer. It was also recalled that he 
was socially well qualified for such a distinction. He 
and his two brothers, Imam Sharif, also a sub-surveyor, 
and Kadir Sharif, who must have been a junior, all three 
serving on the Boundary Commission, were 'gentlemen, both 
in manners and position'. Holdich thought Imam should 
also be made an Assistant-Surveyor as soon as he had 
qualified himself in mathematics. Gore also wrote in 
special praise of Imam, saying his 'geographical work 
l Ibid., No.9. 
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was of the widest scope and value of anyone on the 
Commission' and that he had been twice through the 
Taimani country right down into the Zamindarwari country, 
and he hoped that Imam would get the same titular honours 
as his brother Yusuf and Hira Singh. 
Yusuf and Imam Sharif indeed received sanads signed 
by Dufferin on 16 February, the Jubilee Day, 1887, 
awarding them each the title of 'Khan Bahadur', but 
Hira Singh was promoted 'Rai Bahadur', a lower titular 
rank. Could it be that in spite of Holdich's admiration 
for his Gurkha, the latter's versatility did not 
compensate for the guaranteed 'gentlemanliness' of the 
Sharif brothers? Yusuf Sharif was made an Assistant-
Surveyor of the Jrd Grade, his foot being thus put on 
the ladder of promotion, but Hira Singh was given instead 
a pay increase of Rs JO per month and a bonus of Rs 180. 
The Amir had liberally distributed Afghan decorations 
to the Party as it passed through Kabul on the homeward 
journey to India, and they were much appreciated. 
Captain Gore, who had been sent back to India by way of 
the Persian frontier, wrote hopefully to H.M. Durand at 
a later date enquiring if he might have received in 
absentia one of the Amir's coveted decorations. 
As to the Russians, their chief honours had been 
bestowed on their officers who had seen service in the 
clash at Penjdeh, and we have already mentioned C.E. 
Yate's meeting with Russian military members of the 
Commission who had received promotions, but it is not 
recorded whether these were routine or because of their 
services on the frontier. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE DIPLOMATIC SCENE 
'Ordinary Channels'. Circuitous Diplomacy 
The history of the Afghan Boundary Commission would 
not be complete without a short look at two of its most 
interesting features, first, its unusual diplomatic 
complexity, and second, the great variety of personal 
and racial relationships which marked its progress. It 
is an extremely full example of diplomatic activity at 
many levels and with wide interrelationships in other 
fields. 
At all levels, then even more than now, the exercise 
of diplomacy depends very much oh the interplay of 
personalities. The careful framework of Protocol, the 
background strength of military or other forces, the 
sensitive approaches of many alert minds, are all likely 
to be undermined by a foolish attitude at the council-
table, or by the chance action of an irresponsible or 
misguided individual far down the diplomatic hierarchy. 
The etiquette of diplomatic procedures is not to be 
confused with the growing structure of International Law, 
to which presumably the skilled diplomat only retreats 
as a last resource when the finesse of diplomatic 
negotiation has broken down. 
This whole Commission, the Survey and the Escort as 
well as the Commissioner and his assisting officers (one 
is speaking from the English side), was well aware of 
the political significance of the occasion, the first 
formal Anglo-Russian frontier demarcation to take place 
in the debatable land of Middle Asia, the first time 
that Russian and English officers met face to face on the 
common confines of their dependent territories. Any 
matter at all was likely to have diplomatic repercussions, 
whether it was Mr Finn's Persian Mirza falling into 
Turkmen hands while looking for a lost mule, or the 
jealous intrigues of Haider Kuli Khan, Jamshidi, the base-
born elder, against his younger brothers Yalantush and 
Amanullah Khan. 
Diplomatically speaking, both the Russian and the 
English Sections of the Afghan Boundary Commission were 
serving several masters. The Russian Foreign Office, 
under its placatory Foreign Minister, and also Alexander 
III (except on occasions when British actions aroused his 
patriotic rage) saw the Afghan Boundary Commission as 
advantageous at this time towards mollifying the English 
so palpably upset by the occupation of Merv; at a time 
too when the Prime Ministry of Gladstone, for whom the 
Russians had developed a high degree of admiration, 
might be easier to deal with than a Conservative 
Government. In Russia, as in England, the ultimate 
authority in foreign affairs theoretically lay with the 
Monarch, who almost always acted on the advice of the 
Head of the Foreign Office, but both were actually under 
strong pressures at times from other parties. The Tsar 
was in a stronger position than Queen Victoria to act 
authoritatively, although the position of Queen Victoria 
in matters of Foreign policy should also not be under-
estimated. The Russian Foreign Office as we have seen 
had a very strong Asiatic Department, headed by Zinoviev, 
with a forward policy much nearer to that of the War 
Office. There were certainly individuals in the Russian 
War Office, as there were among the Generals and other 
high-ranking military men of ambition whose destiny lay 
in Central Asia, who worked out plans for the invasion 
of India and the extermination of British power there, 
but on the whole the War Office wanted what it said it 
wanted, and this was also what the Foreign Office really 
wanted - an advance to the frontier of a country 
politically strong enough to ensure that turmoil did not 
lap over from it into the newly acquired Russian 
territories where the Russians were concentrating on 
quelling any effort on the part of the inhabitants to 
continue their old 'Asiatic', and therefore, bad, ways. 
The only question was, what country? The Foreign Office 
would settle for a strong Afghanistan with strong 
English backing. The War Office and newspapers, such as 
Sviet and Kavkaz, which were its spokesmen, saw a better 
solution in the dissection of Afghanistan into a Russian 
half north of the 'Paropamisus' and a southern part 
possibly incorporated into British India. The Foreign 
Office, under de Giers with his strongly developed sense 
of right and wrong, was the winner in the struggle, but 
its policy of joint discussion was complicated by the 
Asiatic Department's involvement with the ethnographers' 
ideas held by the Imperial Geographical Society and M. 
Lessar, that the Turkmen peoples should not be divided. 
And the desires of both the partisans of ethnographical 
frontiers and of the geographical frontiers which would 
make the former possible, were frustrated because of 
the lack of information about either on some parts of 
the frontier to be delimited. Therefore the diplomatic 
settlement often progressed in a style of 'tail-wagging-
dog' and the men on the frontiers, the surveyors and 
political officers, were the oracles on whose word the 
senior officials of the two Foreign Offices had entirely 
to depend. The cartographer was the final link between 
them. 
In diplomacy honesty of intention can only be 
measured in terms of immediate situations, and skilful 
diplomats must sometimes have to veil their eyes against 
the light of distant prospects which could make nonsense 
of their present honest affirmations. With this somewhat 
cynical preamble, referring as much to British as to 
Russian Imperial diplomacy, it is fair to point out that 
the Russian aim to control the Turkmens as their final 
advance in Southern Asia was a genuine one. And their 
declared intention not to make any advance down to Herat 
(unless under British provocation) was as honest as the 
forthright warning that Prince Dondukov-Korsakov gave to 
Lumsden at Tiflis that the completion of the Russian 
southern advance down the Tejend and Murghab over Turkmen 
territory must precede the Commission. 
Sir Peter heard this and at last rather reluctantly 
reported his conversation with the Prince, but it is 
quite clear that he partially deceived himself in not 
taking the Russian warning far more seriously. It may 
be said that the diplomat who deceives himself is far 
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more dangerous than the diplomat who deceives other people. 
It is perhaps easier to say outright that General Sir 
Peter Lumsden, a retired Adjutant-General of the British 
Army in India, with much experience in administration, was 
not able to practise the art of diplomacy which his 
successor on the Commission brought off with such skill. 
Although Bismarck's policy of encouraging Russia to 
turn her face to Asia already existed, there appears no 
reason to believe that the German Chancellor interfered 
in any way over the two crises of 1885, although he was 
undoubtedly an interested observer, and the German press 
and public took, with the rest of Europe, a very keen 
interest in the Penjdeh Crisis. The involvement of 
England with Russia in Central Asia at the same time 
that she was so immersed in difficulties in the Sudan 
was quite enough of itself to suggest to the Russian War 
Office that the time was opportune for speeding up the 
advance down the Murghab and Tejend. 
For Russia as for England, their respective 
Embassies at Tehran were places of importance with 
regard to proceedings on the Afghan-Turkmen frontier. 
Both countries were very much in need of access to 
Persia, and just as the English had large interests in 
Southern Persia, the Russians were her strong neighbours 
on the North and had made a hard bargain with her over 
the Khorassan-Transcaspian Frontier. The position of 
the Shah was thus unenviable. He could not afford to 
offend either party. For example, when the Zulfikar 
crisis was at its height, it was believed by the English 
Party that Russia was keeping its lines open down to 
Zulfikar by sending soldiers and supplies along the more 
accessible western side of the Tejend, that is, through 
Persian Khorassan. Thomson, from Tehran, reported 'much 
Russian activity along the Tejend-Heri-Rud' and said that 
he had written to the Shah telling him that 'sanction of 
such military movements on Persian territory at the 
present time constitutes, in my opinion, an act of 
hostility towards Afghanistan' . 1 Thomson also said he 
extremely doubted if the Persian Government could adopt 
effectual measures and foresaw that Russian control of 
the left bank of the Heri-Rud might become permanent 
unless the matter were taken up with St Petersburg. 
This was done, and the Russians declared they had no 
intention of encroaching on Persia. Shortly after this, 
the Persian Minister in London visited Salisbury and 
reiterated the need for England to take more interest in 
Persian affairs and the need for ensuring that Russia 
made no further inroad into Khorassan. 
To return to t°he matter of Russian internal 
diplomatic organisation, we may sum up that the Tsar 
and the Foreign Minister representing the Foreign Office 
were the ultimate authorities, but that major matters of 
policy were likely to be a matter of contention with the 
Asiatic sub-branch of the Foreign Office itself, the War 
Office, the Military Governorship of the Caucasus under 
its formidable commander-in-chief, Prince Dondukov-
Korsakov, who in his turn believed in deputing 
responsibility to General Komarov in Transcaspia. 
Komarov willingly listened to his own deputies, Alikhanov 
1 N.A.I., For. and Pol., Sec. F, Pros. October 1885, 
Nos 388-700, No.503, Thomson to Salisbury, 17 July 1885. 
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in Merv and Tarkhanov in Penjdeh. Also, of course, 
there was routine diplomacy with the Amir of Bokb,ara 
through the Russian Agent there, who in his turn was 
subservient to the Governor-General of Turkestan, at 
this period Gensral N.O. Rosenbach. 
In theory, the English Party was there to serve the 
interests of Abdurrahman as Amir of Afghanistan. 
was because Afghanistan was 'under the exclusive 
protectorate of England' and England 'had formally 
undertaken to defend the independence of the Amir' 
This 
1 As 
we have seen, for the most part they were also in 
actuality serving the Amir's interests, even if at times 
they appeared to be giving away to the Russians some of 
the places such as Chaman-i-bad which the Amir wished to 
have. As we have seen already, his main requirement was 
a frontier, and this he got, together with a total area 
of land greater than he had lost. 
The matter of Afghanistan was linked closely with 
the Indian Government, and however much the Amir would 
have welcomed direct contact with the English monarchy, 
all business was strictly conducted through the Viceroy 
and the Foreign· Department. For this purpose the Indian 
Government kept a Moslem Agent at the Court in Kabul, and 
the Amir kept an Agent at Peshawur. The Indian Foreign 
Department was responsible to the India Office in 
London, which in its turn was the senior of the second 
rank of Ministries under the trinity of the Exchequer, 
1 Sir Alfred Lyall, The Life of the Marquis of Dufferin 
and Ava, vol.2, p.95. 
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the Foreign Office and the War Office, and answerable in 
a way to all three. 
Much more definitely than the Russian Party, the 
English Party of the Afghan Boundary Commission suffered 
from a divided allegiance. As far as it concerned 
relations with the Amir of Afghanistan, it was the 
servant of the Government of India, but as it was in 
actuality an instrument of the highest Anglo-Russian 
Imperial diplomacy it came under the immediate control of 
the Foreign Office, which was bound to pass all its 
business on for the Queen's consideration, by way of the 
Prime Minister. 
It is not to be wondered at, that there is such a 
bulk of official material relating to this Commission, 
when one considers that the majority of the material 
from the frontier was usually sent to the Foreign Office 
directly, but that the Indian Foreign Department was 
kept closely informed from the Frontier, especially by 
Ridgeway who throughout seems to have felt his closest 
link to be with India through his friend H.M. Durand. 
The Foreign Office was most careful always to infor~ the 
India Office, which in its turn often sent on to the 
Viceroy copies of documents containing exactly the same 
information as had reached him earlier from the Frontier. 
Also the kharitas between Amir and Viceroy were 
confidentially circulated to the same groups. A good 
deal of material from the Frontier Party was also 
relayed to the British Embassy at Tehran, since much of 
it concerned the Persian Frontier, and this too was in 
due course communicated by the Tehran Ambassador to the 
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Foreign Office, and sometimes to the Viceroy. This was 
especially so during the period from the arrival of 
Lumsden's party in 1884 to the end of the Zulfikar 
crisis. All of this correspondence, except a great 
deal of demi-officials, survey reports, and other 
matters which primarily concerned Indian departments, 
found its way at last to the Foreign Office Records. 
The diplomatic correspondence with the Embassies in St 
Petersburg and Tehran also found its way immediately to 
the Foreign Office and much of it was sent on to the 
Viceroy. Thus the Foreign Office was both a final 
depository and a clearing-house. 
We are very fortunate in the study of this 
Commission that its importance was such that the whole 
sequence is very fully covered in the series of 
Parliamentary Papers on Central Asia from 1884 to 1888. 
The main one, Central Asia No. 2 (1887) covers the whole 
effective period from autumn 1885 to the termination of 
Ridgeway's work in connection with the St Petersburg 
negotiations in August 1887. A rough analysis of it 
reveals that of the 273 numbered items (many of these 
containing inclosures, and many of them being Protocols 
of meetings) the correspondence is composed as follows: 
of about seventy-five letters from the Foreign Office, 
these are about equally divided between the Boundary 
Commissioner and the Ambassador at St Petersburg. The 
greater part, about 130, are addressed from Ridgeway 
to the Foreign Secretary and about< fifty-five from the 
Ambassador at St Petersburg to the same gentleman. 
Eight are from the India Office to the Foreign Office, 
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usually about the relations of the Amir with the 
Commission or about some crucial stage in its 
proceedings. Four are from the Viceroy to the India 
Office, one is from the Viceroy as Governor-General in 
Council to the Secretary of State for India, enclosing 
a Kharita from the Amir, one is from the Ambassador at 
Tehran to the Foreign Office. On the frontier Ridgeway 
corresponded directly with the Amir, and also through 
the Kazi. He corresponded with the various provincial 
governors, with the Russian Commissioner as well as with 
his own officers; in St Petersburg he corresponded with 
the Foreign Office but also directly with his fellow-
negotiator, Zinoviev. There are a number of inclosures, 
too, of letters from Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, Komarov 
to Kuhlberg, one from Sirdar Ishak Khan to the Kazi, 
letters from the English officers in the field to 
Ridgeway. The system was roundabout but inevitable 
because of the spread of interested parties, but it did 
not work too badly as long as the telegraph between 
Tehran and Meshed, a weak point, was functioning. As 
the English Party of the Boundary Commission could only 
be reached directly by this line, its failure, as during 
the Penjdeh Crisis, could be serious. 
The ring of diplomatic communication was complete, 
except for one small break across which the spark could 
not jump. There was a complete tabu, to an even 
laughable degree, on direct communication between the 
Afghans and the Russians on the frontier. The reason, 
from the English point of view, was clear, that the Amir 
had put himself into their hands and they were 
negotiating for him. It suited the Russians, too, as it 
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made the case seem all the more obvious that the English 
were thus openly acting as the masters of Afghanistan 
and so were tarred with the same brush as the Russians 
themselves were with regard to Bokhara. The Amir kept 
strictly to this, although a letter of his to the Kazi 
at the end of 1885 makes it clear that he was rather 
irked by this limitation on his freedom. As to direct 
contact between the Afghans and the Russian-controlled 
Turkmens or the Russians themselves, this was difficult 
to police. There were too many approaches possible as 
for example, an intercepted letter from the first 
Russian-appointed Governor of Penjdeh, a Turkmen from 
Yulatan named Iwaz Khan~ to Amanulla Khan~ Jamshidi, 
Governor of Bala Murghab, reminding him he was a 'friend 
of his father's' (the Khan Agha, Jamshidi) and urging him 
to join the Russians. 1 But these things were bound to 
occur. It was more serious when the Kazi at the height 
of his antagonism towards Ridgeway briefly considered 
corresponding secretly with the Russian Party. There was 
a great commotion when the Russian Party was found to 
have sent on directly to the Amir a letter from an ardent 
stamp-collector who wished to acquire some Afghan stamps, 
Abdurrahman's predecessor, Sher Ali Khan, having 
instituted the first printing of postage stamps for 
Afghanistan. After the Commission was re-established, 
there was, too, always the possibility that the defeat at 
Penjdeh might still rankle in occasional Afghan breasts 
to such an extent that personal clashes might occur. At 
1 N.A.Io, For., Sec. F, Pros. August 1885, Nos 173-243, 
No.184, 14 June 1885. 
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any rate, British policy was to isolate the Afghans as 
much as possible from the Russians and the Turkmens. 
It was inevitable that such an authoritative-
seeming group as the Commission should find itself 
involved in frontier business other than that strictly 
concerned with delimitation. It was natural that the 
Turkmens and the Bokharans, whether Turkmen or Uzbek, 
should see the Russian Party and its Escort as their 
champions, and the Amir's subjects regarded the English 
Party and Escort in the same light. Abdurrahman had 
made it quite clear that any matters concerning the 
frontier, including frontier quarrels, were to be 
reported by the local authorities to the English 
Commissioner and his advice was to be sought and taken. 
But there is evidence that many of the local people had 
acquired an almost superstitious regard for the British 
Party, partly no doubt because of the good offices of 
Dr Owen, partly because of the strict discipline of 
the Escort Party which saw to it that no untoward acts 
disturbed the friendly relations of the Indian Escort 
with the local people, but mainly because English money 
flowed freely from the camp to the district where it 
happened to be at that time. 
The matter of paying for supplies was one which had 
had to be settled in the early period of the Commission. 
As mentioned earlier~ the Amir had insisted on providing 
the bulk of the supplies, at the same time that he had 
wished to limit the size of the Indian Party to 600, but 
as time went on, it became clear to Ridgeway that this 
provision of supplies was a general embarrassment - to 
the Indian Party, because rumours quickly spread that 
the Russians always paid the Turkmens for supplies and 
this rumour put the Russians ahead of the English in 
local esteem - to the local people, because as Ridgeway 
quickly found out, Abdurrahman merely sent orders that 
the English Party was to be supplied with certain 
commodities, that is, he made requisition orders and the 
local suppliers had to deliver the goods and remain 
unpaid. At last, after a series of polite kharitas, the 
Amir sent his gracious permission to Ridgeway allowing 
him to buy his own supplies. Ridgeway, under advice from 
India and out of his own good sense, saw to it that 
payment was always liberal. 
Some of the frontier business which came to the 
Commissioners was quite trivial and undoubtedly the 
Commissioner's advice was all that was sought, but a 
good number of local quarrels became tangled up with the 
affairs of the Commission in such a way that one 
Commissioner or the other would insist that the matter 
should be referred to his own distant capital in Europe, 
and this inevitably meant that his Government would refer 
to its ambassador in the other capital, and so the long 
diplomatic circuit, the 'ordinary channel' to which 
Ridgeway referred in one piece of correspondence, would 
be set in motion. Had the Commission not been on the 
frontier, many of these local difficulties would have 
been settled by local discussion or, at the worst, by 
some little local bloodshed or retaliationi but the hands 
of the Commissioners were tied, and although Ridgeway 
frequently complained about the 'timidity' of Colonel 
Kuhlberg, when it came to a point he, too, referred many 
local matters to the Foreign Office. 
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The following narrative is a useful example to 
illustrate how these local problems arose and how the 
Commissioners dealt with them. It is only one of half a 
dozen or so which spread themselves out over months, 
storms in teacups though they might appear in St 
Petersburg or London, and filled many pages of official 
paper and set the international telegraph wires humming 
over thousands of miles with Morse that tapped out the 
coded secret correspondence of the Foreign Office and 
their people on the frontiers. 
In the early winter of 1885-86, in spite of the 
known presence of the Boundary Commission, several large 
~ 
raiding-parties of Turkmens, at first reported to be all 
Kara Turkmens from across the Amu north of Kerki, came 
down into Maimana and Andkhoi and stole several large 
flocks of sheep and a number of horned cattle. Several 
of these raids took place in the neighbourhood of 
Charshamba, where the English winter-camp was, so the 
English party heard first hand about the Uzbek losses. 
The flocks were then driven off by the brigands into 
Bokharan territory. Although obviously some local inter= 
tribal exchange of information had taken place, once the 
matter was reported to Ridgeway he decided to report it 
to Salisbury, which he did on 20 January 1886, from 
Charshamba. Carried by postal sowars to Meshed, his 
telegram was despatched to London, and on 12 February 
Salisbury telegraphed Morier in St Petersburg that same 
day asking him to make representations to the Russian 
Government and to ask them to use their influence with 
Bokhara 'for the purpose of restraining the marauders 1 • 1 
1 C.A. No.2, 1887, No.51. 
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Several days after this (17 February), the Kazi addressed 
a letter to Ridgeway giving further information about the 
stolen flocks, which, he said, had been taken to Charjuia 
The Governor of that place impounded the flocks, thinking 
they had brought them from Russian territory, but said 
that if the raiders had brought them from Afghan 
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territory he would let them keep them. The Kazi continued: 
I therefore beg you to speak to Colonel Kuhlberg 
and tell him that, if the Russian Government 
considers Bokhara as their dependency, they 
should ••. return the flocks to us •••• If the 
Russians do not consider the subjects of Bokhara 
as their dependents, or if they say that their 
representations would not be attended to, Colonel 
Kuhlberg should tell us, through you, that his 
Government will not object to our making 
reprisals; for, unless out of regard for the two 
Commissions, we stop our people from making 1 
reprisals, they are quite prepared to make them. 
Ridgeway replied to the Kazi on 20 February that he had 
telegraphed Lord Salisbury again about these raids, but 
pointed out to the Kazi (a) that such things were the 
result of Afghanistan having no recognised frontier and 
(b) that Colonel Kuhlberg was only concerned with 
demarcation matters and also had no authority in Bokharan 
internal affairs. Ridgeway said he had always reported to 
Kuhlberg information about these raids. 'Everything 
regarding the demarcation is done through Colonel 
Kuhlberg; but all other matters are disposed of through 
the ordinary channel' • 2 
1 Ibid., No.125, Inclosure 1. 
2 Ibid.~ Inclosure 2. 
The stolen sheep were meanwhile allowed to remain in 
the hands of the brigands, who had told the Beg of 
Charjui that they had taken them from the Afghans. At 
last on 9 April, Kuhlberg reported to Ridgeway that, 
following the English complaints, his Government had 
complained to the Amir of Bokhara about the thefts, which 
according to Kuhlberg, were largely the work of Ersari 
rather than Kara Turkmens, and that the Beg, by order of 
the Amir of Bokhara, had again impounded some of these 
flocks. .But Kuhlberg also said he was instructed to ask 
that 'delegates from the injured parties, chosen from 
1 
among the inhabitants of C~~rshamba', should be sent via 
Merv to Charjui to receive 'the cattle in question'. 
When Ridgeway reported this in writing to the Kazi, the 
latter sent on a letter from Ishak Khan, the Governor of 
Afghan Turkestan, dated 5 April. Ishak Khan said he had 
just received a firman from Abdurrahman ordering that the 
exact number of flock losses should be ascertained and 
reported to Ridgeway, whom the Amir then asked to bring 
the list to the notice of the Russian Commissioner 
1 
2 
who would ask the Kara Turkomans for an 
explanation, and demand compensation for the 
loss of property, and punish the raiders, in 
order to prevent them committing similar raids 
in the future •.• if the said Commissioner takes 
no notice of the matter and keeps aloof, then 
the troops and the people will revenge themselves 
on the Kara Turkomans in such a way that they will 
be severely punished, and will not in future dare 
to commit raids.2 
Ibid., Inclosure No.J. 
Ibid., Inclosure No.J. 
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While sending on this letterp the Kazi also replied to 
the Russian proposal about sending the 'injured parties' 
via Merv to Charjui. He said that at this [Spring] 
time of year the men of Charshamba were all too busy to 
go and that the head-men of Maimana and Saripul should 
come to the Commission and prove their case 'in any 
manner that Colonel Kuhlberg may wish'. Then either the 
owners of the stolen flocks or an Afghan official would 
proceed to Charjui by the direct route to reclaim them. 
Ridgeway asked Kuhlberg to discuss the restoration 
of the stolen stock at their next interview~ but the 
latter averred that it was necessary to refer to higher 
authorities for instructions. On 16 May, having had no 
direct reply from Rosebery about his letter of 12 
February, Ridgeway sent all the documents on to him and 
they were received in London on 26 June. On 4 July 
Ridgeway reported by telegram to Rosebery that 
although for several weeks the owners of the 
stolen cattle have been ready to proceed to 
Charjui by direct route to bring the cattle 
back, the Russian Government have not yet 
signified to the Russian Commissioner their 
assent to these men proceeding by that road 
instead of by way of Merv.I 
As there are no further despatches on this matter, and 
the last two months of intense activity over the frontier 
delimitation were at hand, we can only hope that the 
Russian Government gave way on the matter of the long 
journey via Merv and the matter was satisfactorily 
concluded from the point of view of the original owners 
of the stolen stock. 
1 Ibid., No.132~ from Khamiab. 
Jt 
The Kazi 
Captain Ned Durand, describing his visit to an 
Afghan outpost, wrote something that probably is as close 
as we can get to a description of the simple patriotic 
Afghan's reaction to the presence of the Infidel. Rasoul 
KhanP Nurzai, was the head of a small Afghan patrol 
watching for Russian movements in Western Badghis, 
After he [Rasoul] left my tent~ Sirdar Bahadur 
Mahomed Hussain, Ressaldar Majorp who was with 
me, had a long conversation with Rasoul, which 
may not be without interesto He said that he 
had been filled with astonishment at seeing us 
up in Afghan territory, that he had a second 
shock when he saw the Russians, that it was out 
of bounds of all possibility that they could 
allow either us or the Russians to remain, and 
that one or other, Afghan or Kafir, must be 
killed off. When asked what he could do against 
the Russians armed as they were~ he said: 'What 
we did against you for three years, and at worst 
we can but die; but the land will not hold us 
both'. Another man said; 'God grant us peace 
for one year only till we have got all the 
promised arms and money, and then we don't care 
for either English or Russians'. In spite of 
a hundred strong asseverations of this nature, 
Rasoul Khan welcomed me to his guard tent out 
of the sun, next day, gave me tea and with all 
his men sat talking civilly and sensibly for an 
hour or more •••• 1 
This condition of shock and astonishment was 
certainly widespread among the Afghans at the presence of 
both English and Russians, but, as we have just shown, 
there were other factors to cushion the shock with regard 
to the English Party, especially as such a large section 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. October 1885, Nos 388-700, 
No.526, E. Durand to Ridgeway" 
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of it was as unquestionably Moslem as the Afghans 
themselves. Also, the Amir had issued firmans decreeing 
that the English must be tolerated on his frontier while 
the frontier was being made. They were his guests, and 
the guests of his people, since he had decided to use 
. 1 
the English for Afghan ends. 
Jc 
Ridgeway found that while neither English nor Russian 
was liked by Afghan soldiery and officials, the English 
were preferred. Just before the re-established 
Commission began work in the autumn of 1885, Ridgeway 
wrote to Salisbury that he found the Afghan soldiery at 
that time 'if not friendly 9 not hostile 12 but he said a 
Russian advance would cause panic and consequent outbreaks 
of fanaticism, but that so long as the Amir lived and was 
loyal to the English there was no risk. 'The Afghan 
officials do not much prefer us to the Russians', but in 
the year since the Indian Party had arrived, the English 
had become somewhat more popular than they were. Although 
for the sake of making a frontier, the Amir was prepared 
to let the English infidel into his territory, he did not 
like the size of the body they proposed to bring. 
1 This was a very equal arrangement. 
using the Afghans for English ends. 
letter of 14 February 1885: 
The English were 
See H.M. Durand's 
The possession of Kandahar would no doubt help us 
to counteract to some extent the establishment of 
Russian influence in the highlands of Central 
Afghanistan. But it would destroy our best 
safeguard, namely, a strong people in a strong 
country between us and Russia, fighting their own 
cause against our enemies. 
N.A.I., For., Sec. F~ Pros. June 1885, Nos 518-76, K.W. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. October 1885, Nos 385-700, 
No.60J. 
The key position of the Amir's representative with 
the English Party during this commission was an important 
and difficult one. Abdurrahman made his choice with care, 
selecting a man who would be most helpful to the English 
because he had a strong influence with the Afghans 
themselves. The Afghan whose native pride suffered most 
from the nature of the situation was undoubtedly this 
official, the Amir's Agent, Kazi Sa'ad-ud-Din. Relations 
between the Kazi and the English Commissioners. both 
Lumsden and Ridgeway, were almost inevitably at times 
extremely painful, and led both Afghan and English 
protagaonists into paroxysms of rage, and both complained 
by turns to the Amir. The Kazi had to take head-on all 
the patronising superiority of the English officers who 
were not used to thinking of 'Asiatics' as equals, or 
angry reminders that he was there in a purely subordinate 
capacity. The Kazi might relieve his feelings by writing 
directly to the Amir, or talking with the Governor of 
Herat who would join with him in complaints against the 
Boundary Commission. At the same time, Ridgeway having 
protested by telegraph to th~ Viceroy, the English 
complaints, blended with the honey of one of Dufferin's 
irresistible kharitas, might reach Kabul while the Amir 
was still 'in one of his fits' (Ridgeway's phrase), but 
a word from the Viceroy usually made him see the 
diplomatic wisdom of sending a firman to his Agent 
asking him to modify his displeasure and fall in with 
the Commissioner's requirements. Ridgeway contemptuously 
called some of the Kazi's direct approaches to himself 
'insolent nonsense'. 
It seems a likely analogy that, just as Sir Peter 
Lumsden partially disregarded the seriousness of Prince 
Dondukov-Korsakov's warning that the Russian advance 
would not stop short of the confines of Turkmen occupied 
lands on the Heri-Rud and Murghab, so the Kazi may have 
deliberately refused to believe that, on the frontier of 
his own country, he would not be accredited with the 
position of a full Delegate on the Commission. Even the 
Amir may have hoped for this. As already mentioned in 
Chapter III, three weeks before he announced the 
appointment of the Kazi 9 he had said in Durbar, according 
to the English Agent at Kabul, Sardar Afzal Khan, 'A 
Commission of British Officers has now been appointed 
•••• I shall also have an officer to represent me' • 1 
When the Commission had been first mooted in the 
spring of 1884, H.M. Durand and other members of the 
Indian Fbreign Department had seen nothing against 
including an Afghan delegate on the Commission, but 
when the Russians refused outright to permit an Afghan 
delegate, the British agreed. Writing on 25 August 1884 
de Giers thought it expedient specifically to remind the 
English Ambassador, Thornton, that 'the two Governments 
have already agreed that no Afghan Delegate shall be 
admitted' • 2 Nevertheless, Lumsden was informed by 
Granville that Her Majesty's Government had 
1 
2 
informed the Russian Government that you will 
be in communication with an Afghan official 
sent by the Amir; and that it would be very 
Ibid., No.93, 1 August 1884. 
C.A. No.2, 1885, No.92 0 Inclosure Noc2. 
\ 
inconvenient not to consult this officer 
before fixing the zone for the operations 
of the Commission.! 
J6 
Already in September 1884~ after their first meeting, 
after which he had described the Kazi as friendly and 
well-disposed, Ridgeway had begun to be irked by the 
'persistency' of the Kazi in observing the letter of 
the Amir's smallest instruction~ as for example when the 
latter had remonstrated about the size of the Commission 
Party from India and its Escort, and had refused to find 
supplies for more than the maximum 600 allowed for by the 
Amir. This led to the first of the Kharitas from the 
Viceroy to the Amir concerned with the relations of the 
Kazi and the Commission. DufferinB wrote: 'This is so 
serious a matter that I must bring it without delay to 
your Highness' notice' • 2 By 20 November the Kazi was in 
a very conciliatory frame of mind as he had just received 
a firman from the Amir instructing him that he must keep 
the Commission fully supplied and allow them to winter 
where they liked. In these early weeks after his 
arrival on the frontier Lumsden had already begun to 
write down to the Afghans in the language reserved for 
'natives'~ telling them that the Russians were 'deceitful 
people' • And he continued to assure them that the Afghans 
in Penjdeh were in no danger of a Russian advance, 
because of the strength of British diplomacy. 
Parallel with the unreal communications of Lumsden 
are the translations of the urgent letters from Penjdeh 
1 Ibid.~ No.126, 12 November 1884. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. October 1884, Nos 220-261, 
No.259. 
of General Ghaus-ud-Din to the Governor of Herat, and 
the latter's to the Kazi concerned with the Russian 
advance down the Murghab, and the Afghans' imminent peril 
of attack. By December the Kazi had apparently decided 
he must face up to the Commissioner. Under the date 21 
December 1884, there is a translation of the Kazi's 
clerk.ls verbatim report of a conversation which took 
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place on that date between the Kazi, the English Commission1 
and the Governor of Herat (referred to in Afghan style as 
the Deputy-Governor). Lumsden said to the Kazi that he 
did not need the Governor at Sarrakhs. 1 The Kazi replied 
•that 'it had been decided by His Highness the Ameer that 
the Deputy Governor with five leading men of Herat should 
be present when matters are discussed'. The Governor 
continued: 
My presence there is necessary for should the 
Russians not listen to your arguments ••• it will 
be necessary that I should tuck up my skirt, 
organize and strengthen my frontiers, and inform 
His Highness the Amir immediately. 
His Excellency the Commissioner thereupon said: 
If the Deputy Governor wishes to come, he may 
come, but neither you nor he shall attend the 
meetings, for a limited number of officers has 
been appointed by the two governments as 
members to discuss matters. You should state 
1 Sir Peter Lumsden told the Kazi he had heard that the 
Russian Commissioner would reach Sarrakhs on 27 January 
1885. He added 'I do not like their coming here to 
discuss matters because they are deceitful people •••• The 
more knowledge they gain~ the more injurious it will be' o 
(N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. February 1885, Nos 187-326A~ 
No. 306). 
the Amir's wishes now, so that I may endeavour 
to carry them out to the best of my ability.l 
The Kazi then said: 
Be pleased to give me a writing to the effect 
that the Commissioners will decide the matter 
as they like, otherwise it will not be possible 
for us .•• to report anything to the Ameer after 
it has been decided. 
His Excellency said: 
After the Commissioners form their opinions, 
they will submit them to their respective 
governments. If they are approved by the 
Cabinets, they will be endorsed by them and 
then reduced to the form of a document. You 
will at the same time communicate them to the 
Amir. If they chime in with His Highness' 
views, he would consent to them oth~rwise His 
Highness will communicate his wishes to you. 
The Kazi remarked: 
They will also be difficult, because if those 
opinions, after they were endorsed by your 
and the Russian's Cabinets, did not accord 
with His Highness' views it would not look 
well if His Highness did not consent to them. 
And he made the very clear point that it would be better 
to seek the Amir's opinion first. Lumsden asked: 'If he 
did not place confidence in us, why did he invite us?' 
And the interview continued. A great deal of discussion 
in English, not understood by the Afghans, then took 
place between Lumsden, Ridgeway, whom the Afghans 
described as 'the representative of the Indian Foreign 
Office', Mr Condie Stephen, 'the representative of the 
l Ibid. 
London Foreign Office' and the Mirza, Nawa' Husein Ali 
Khan. Finally the Mirza told the Kazi and the Governor 
that General Lumsden said that their admission to the 
meeting was quite out of the question, but that he 
approved of their suggestion that the Amir should at once 
be informed of the results of enquiries. 
Before the meeting finished, they asked Lumsden to 
insist on the neutrality of Yulatan, and he played his 
favourite gambit of asking them to find any document which 
might establish Afghan claims to the lower Murghab. Such 
an edgy argument between Lumsden~ an old Anglo-Indian 
military officer conscious of absolute superiority over 
all 'Asiatics' and the Kazi, a high-ranking Afghan 
conscious of racial superiority over allcomers, was not 
easily finished. Early in the New Year (3 January) the 
Kazi demanded the absolute establishment of his right 
to refer matters to the Amir before the Commission could 
give a decision, and also demanded the right to 
participate in discussion. This latter was refused 
outright but Ridgeway telegraphed the Indian Foreign 
Department, warning that they would probably hear from 
the Amir. 1 
Bad relations continued throughout January, made all 
the worse by a curious misunderstanding which led to Sir 
Peter Lumsden declaring he had been 'insulted'. Who 
knows? What happened was this: the Kazi had written 
fully to the Amir after the meeting of 21 December. 
Early in January, before the Amir wrote to the Viceroy, 
N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. January 1885, Nos 117-60, 
No.149, 
he had written to Lumsden in something the same vein as 
he was presently to write to the Viceroy, and this 
enraged Lumsden by its 'positively authoritative tone' 
(which was not especially obvious to other readers) and 
also he objected to portion of its being written 
diagonally across the sheet. He vowed that his Persian 
experts said this was a sure indication of consciousness 
on the part of the writer that he was addressing an 
inferior. The Kazi brought witnesses to give evidence 
that such a method of writing had no such significance 
amongst the Afghans. Lumsden announced that 'any insult 
that may be offered to me will be offered to the British 
1 Government'. This was smoothed over by an explanatory 
letter from the Amir to Durand as Foreign Secretary on 
2 21 January. This commotion was possibly one of the things 
which greatly increased Durand's dislike of Lumsden. 
At last the Amir wrote a letter of protest to the 
Viceroy about the Kazi's complaints dating back to 21 
December. It was not sent until 28 January 1885. 
If my official, the Governor of Herat, and the 
above-named Kazi are not allowed to be present 
at the time when discussions are held by the 
Commissioners, the Afghan Government will be 
lowered in dignity and the people of Afghanistan 
will raise objections •••• Therefore we do not 
know in what way our welfare lies •••• Unless the 
Russian and the Afghan Government exchange sanads, 
how shall we know which of the two parties, we or 
the Russian Governmentp violated the Agreement? 
This is not a thing intended to last but a day 
••.• I write to ask Your Excellency, who is my 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. October 1885, Nos 385-700, 
No.656. 
2 Ibid. 
kind friend, to write to General Lumsden that 
it is necessary that an Afghan chief should be 
present at meetings at which the Commissioners 
hold discussions, and that they should know 
what is discussed so that the matter may be 
satisfactorily and properly settled once for 
all. This is not my own private affair ••• it 
concerns the whole Afghan nation ••. oBy doing 
this, the illustrious British Government will 
bestow great favour on the (Afghan) nation.l 
The 27 January 9 when Sir Peter had thought he might be 
meeting General Zelenoi at Sarrakhs, came and went with 
no sign of the Russian Commission, and reports from the 
Murghab did not decline in seriousness. 
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The inactivity of the English Party must have 
appeared incomprehensible to the ordinary Afghan, and the 
officials and m~litary officers of Herat Province, aware 
every day of the Russian encroachment, and aware of the 
small but admirably manned and equipped Escort Party, must 
have blamed Lumsden personally rather than the unseen 
Cabinets and Diplomats beyond the frontier. Lumsden 
reported on 25 February to the Viceroy that the Kazi had 
officially complained that 'owing to our indecision 
Russians have succeeded in occupying considerable portions 
of the Amir's territory'. The Kazi stated that even then 
'if permitted and advised they could drive back the 
Russians even to beyond Merv as the Turkmens were 
prepared to rise' . 2 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. Fs Pros. October 1885, Nos 385-700, 
No.658, Amir to Viceroy» 28 January 1885. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. F 9 Pros. June 1885, Nos 518-74~ 
No. 541. 
It was not until 2 March 1885, that Lord Dufferin 
wrote to the Amir hoping that arrangements would be made 
for hearing all the Afghan representatives might have to 
say, but warning him, as it was now only too possible in 
the rising tension before the Russo-Afghan clash, that 
the negotiations might break down altogether. Even if 
the personal relationships had been good, the Kazi had 
an exacting job as the Amir's Agent, and in many 
respects seems to have been very helpful to the English 
Party. The problem of the bad personal relationship was 
inherited by Ridgeway when he became Commissioner, and 
after the Commission was at last functioning, in face of 
the Joint Commission, the Kazi felt himself to be in a 
position even more inferior than he had imagined. 
Before the Commission was re-established, the 
English had made another effort to get St Petersburg to 
consider an Afghan delegate, but although the Russians 
would not hear of this, they did agree in principle to 
having the Afghan Agent or other Afghan officials attend 
the sessions as Experts in an advisory capacity. This 
was a small step forward. On 10 November 1885, Ridgeway 
reported a meeting with the Kazi in which they had once 
more tackled this problem which so obviously rankled 
with the Kazi. The Kazi said: 
1 
I am fully conscious that you have the welfare 
of Afghanistan at heart in all you do, but 
occasional mistakes are possible" You will 
not willingly surrender any Afghan rights to 
the Russians, but on the other hand, what you 
consider a trifle may be to us a most important 
matter.I 
N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. July 1886, Nos 1-195, 
No.23J Memorandum from Ridgeway, 10 November 1885. 
Ridgeway assured the Kazi that decisions would only be 
given after he had been consulted fully, and asked him 
what more he wanted than that he should have the right 
to be present at all meetings. The Kazi said he also 
wished the Governor of Herat to be present, and 
Ridgeway gave his immediate approval to this. The Kazi 
said he would report objections to the Amir, and then 
once more asked: 'Am I part of the meetings of the 
Commission?' This provoked Ridgeway to a very full 
statement of the case: 
His Highness the Amir has been informed that there 
is no objection to your being present. The 
demarcation of the frontier must necessarily be 
done on the spot, and you will always be invited 
to accompany us .•• oWhat more can you claim? 
Surely not the power of stopping the work of the 
Commission (by) reference to Kabul? This would 
infinitely delay our proceedings •••• It is in your 
interest to expedite a settlement •• ~your 
objections will be heard by me before I form an 
opinion. If you like you can give them to me in 
writing, and they will be recorded by me.l 
Ridgeway also pointed out again that once the two 
Commissioners had reached an Agreement then it was out of 
the hands of everyone on the frontier and decision finally 
lay between the Amir and the Viceroy. On 12 December, 
the Amir wrote to Ridgeway from Kabul, saying that 'The 
Governor of Herat and the Kazi have been directed to render 
loyal and friendly and hearty assistance' . 2 
The nadir of their bad relations was reached in 
January 1886 when Ridgeway received an angry letter from 
l Ibid. 
2 Ibid., No.53. 
the Governor and the Kazi, dated 31 December 1885, in 
which they accused him of pandering to the Russians 
over Afghan interests in the proposed Maruchak 
settlement. They took a very strong line which 
Ridgeway naturally considered 'impudent' and demanded 
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that he should telegraph Salisbury and the Viceroy about 
their objection. They said they doubted his 
understanding of the situation and said: 'We are sure the 
mistake has occurred because we do not know English and 
you are not well acquainted with Persian'. They accused 
him of taking no notice of their advice and using threats 
towards them that if they did not follow the British line, 
'Komarov and Alikhanov will come again'. They taunted 
him that the English Party could expect no help from 
Persia, and so forth (Ridgeway: 'This, of course, is 
intended for impudence'). But Ridgeway commented: 
Of course I cannot explain to them that the 
Russians will not recognise them at all, for 
they contend they have nothing to say to 
Afghanistan and will not recognise her as an 1 independent power with whom Russia can treat. 
He said he had made several attempts to elicit their 
opinions about the Kara Tepe land but that they were too 
afraid of the Amir to express any without reference to 
him. The two agreed that they should not express 
opinions to the Russian Commissioner. 
The interview was terminated by Ridgeway because the 
Kazi's manner was 'so excited and threatening'. The 
Afghan transcription of this meeting and the English 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. July 1886, Nos 1-195, 
No.104, 12 January. 
version were somewhat at variance and Ridgeway insisted 
on the revision of the Afghan version. As he declared, 
'There is no material difference between their 
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memorandum •.. and ours, except that in the former Kazi 
Sa'ad-ud-din makes copious speeches which were never made' 
and he peppered their memorandum with angry marginal 
comments, 'untrue', incorrect' , . 'a sheer invention'. On 
1 February 1886, Ridgeway sent a long account of this 
painful period to Salisbury from which the following 
passages are abstradted. 1 
1 
Your Lordship will remember that one of my 
greatest difficulties has been the attitude 
of the Kazi •..• The Amir had demanded for him 
the right to attend meetings of the Commission, 
and had threatened not to permit the Commission 
to meet if his claims were not allowed. The 
concession was made and I fear that His Highness 
entirely misinterp:t"e-ted the motives which actuated 
Her Majesty's Go'verriment, and that he had been 
induced to believe that ·other concessions can be 
extorted in a similar way ...• But although Her 
Majesty's Government c6nceded the Amir's claim, 
the Russian Government were far from imitating 
their liberality. Colonel Kuhlberg and M. Lessar 
were reluctant to admit the Amir's right to be 
represented, but after some discussion they 
accepted the position which M. de Giers had taken 
up, namely, that an Afghan official might be 
attached to the Boundary Commission in the capacity 
of an expert .•. and accordingly it was agreed, at 
the first meeting of the Commission that the Amir's 
representative be invited to the meetings of the 
Commission in the capacity of an expert, whenever 
the two Commissioners so wished• and that he should 2 be present at the actual demarcation of the frontier. 
N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. September 1886, Nos 1-88, 
No.7, Ridgeway to Salisbury, 1 February. 
2 Ibid. 
Ridgeway then went over the meeting of 10 November and 
continued: 
Had the Amir's Agent been a orinscientious and 
reasonable man to whom ! could have confided 
the situation, the case would have been 
different ••• [but he is] a vain, bigoted priest, 
experienced only in hair-splitting •••• In short 
this priest is politically speaking, far less 
capable than any obscure grey-beard in an Afghan 
clan. He has the meanest idea of the military 
power and resources of England ••• while the recent 
events at Panjdeh and elsewhere have made a great 
impression on his mind in favour of the power and 
resolution of Russia. He is accordingly strongly 
in favour of a Russian alliance on the ground that 
Afghanistan would assuredly recover, as the price 
of her co-operation in the invasion of India, her 
lost district of Peshawur and Lahore .•• and we must 
always be prepared to find men of his class 
overriding at critical times and in moments of 
excitement the wiser councils of the state$~ 
often to be found at the head of Afghan affairs 
••.• The situation will not be clearly appreciated, 
unless it is fully understood that we were in 
some essential respects (supplies, postal 
connections) completely at the mercy of the 
Afghans ••.• The Afghans well understood this 
dependence, and when any serious difference of 
opinion has arisen they have rarely omitted to 
remind us of it. Under the circumstances it has 
been my endeavour to avoid having formal meetings 
of the Commission and, when they were inevitable, 
to hold them as quietly and unostentatiously as 
possible. The position was not pleasant and 
dignified, but it could not be avoided without 
bringing about the premature collapse of the 
Commission. Moreover, as far as Maruchak, nearly 
all the practical work of the Commission was done 
on the ground~ and on these occasions the Amir's 
Agent and the Governor of Herat were always present 
••• and I brought them forward as prominently as I 
safely could.l 
l Ibid. 
In the disagreements over the Kushk.-Maruchak frontier at 
the end of 1885, the Kazi declared to Ridgeway that he 
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was helpless in the matter as his 'orders from Kabul were 
positive' and he asked Ridgeway to remember that his life 
was at stake. Ridgeway found out about this time that the 
Kazi was very much alarmed about his personal safety, as 
his father, 'the principal priest of Afghanistan' had 
fallen under the Amir's personal displeasure. The Kazi 
himself appeared 'unhinged in mind and full of perplexity.1 
The Amir was also piqued at this time and according to 
Ridgeway wrote to the Kazi telling him to 'be on his 
guard against the attempts by us to cause bad feeling 
between the Afghans and the Russians' and to be 
'studiously courteous' to the latter. On 25 January 
Ridgeway received a telegram from the Government of India 
saying that the Amir had replied to the Viceroy's warning 
that unless he sent orders quickly to his officials the 
Commission was in danger of collapse. 
It was a source of great relief to me when I 
learnt from secret sources that a special 
courier had arrived from Kabul with orders which 
shattered the Kazi's dreams of a Russian 
alliance by instructing him to accept the 
decision of the Commission. Its affect~~on the 
Afghans was magical. Their insolent and 
obstructive attitude was at once abandoned and 
orders were despatched recalling the messenger 
who had been sent that same morning to the 
Russian camp •••• I hope our serious difficulties 
are over, for the Afghans, when once they have 
received unmistakable orders from the Amir, will 
not diverge from them by one hair's breadth.2 
1 ' N.A.I., Pros. July 1886~ Nos 1-195, No.44, Ridgeway to 
Salisbury, 26 December 1885. 
2 Ibid. 
This was indeed the worst period of mutual antagonism 
which developed and drove two able men into such a fury 
against one another. The Amir somewhat later wrote of 
the Kazi, who in the following year became Governor of 
Herats a post he held for many years: 
Although Colonel Ridgeway regards the appointment 
of Kazi Sa'ad-ud-din with dislike and considers 
his presence injurious to the objects and 
pµrposes he has fixed in his mind, the people* of 
Afghanistan like him and consider him worthy of 
the trust they have placed in him in respect to 
the affairs of their frontier. Kazi Sa 1 ad-ud-din 
is invested with this power ••• that he will question 
and ask the members of the Commission from where 
to where they are going and what they intend to do. 
But then he has no power to allow them to travel 
and move about until he reports the matter to me 
and gets my order. Up to the present orders have 
not been sent, nor will they be sent by me, that 
the officers of the illustrious Government should 
be prohibited to move about to survey and obtain 
knowledge and information regarding the frontier. 
But what presents great difficulty is that each 
officer rides from the Commission Camp and without 
obtaining permission or consulting Kazi Sa'ad-ud-
din goes from Herat to Balkh and from Balkh to 
Badakhshan .••• The cause of disagreement (is) the 
latter wishes them to visit safe places ••.. All 
this he does with my permission ••. while they wish 
to be free.I 
That the Kazi continued opposed to Ridgeway is apparent 
from the following report of Sardar Sher Ahmed Khan, 
Attache, who had been sent to Mazar in the Spring of 
1886 to make the fullest possible acquaintance with Ishak 
Khan, and also to find a suitable person to act as an 
Agent (or Spy) in Bokhara for Ridgeway. 
* A characteristic phrase of the Amir's. It means 'I, 
the Amir •••. ' 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. July 1886, Nos 552-711. 
I paid a visit to the Sardar. After I had 
convinced him about the frontier, the first 
thing that the Sardar said was: 'You ask me 
many important things about the Boundary but 
Kazi Sa'ad-ud-din Khan has written to me that 
the Commissioner has sent you here to get news 
from Bokhara, and that you have nothing to do 
with frontier matters. ~rom this letter of 
the Kazi's it is app~rent that he means me not 
to communicate with the British officers except 
through him. He wants me to submit to his 
wishes apd threatens me •••• In addition to this 
he has done several things contrary to my wishes, 
and which tend to disgrace our sovereign and to 
make him appear as an ignorant ruler •••• he [the 
Kazi] ought to act properly .•• [If I act] in the 
Amir's interests, and pl~asing to the British 
officers, the Kazi will either bring some 
accusation against me, or object to my 
proceedings. He wished me to annoy and behave 
badly to the Briiis& officers as he has been 
doing himself. If the Amir deposes me at the 
instance of the Kazi, I will be glad, but I do 
not wish that His Highness should get a bad name 
or be ruined' .1 
That the intense animosity between himself and the Kazi 
left a bad taste in Ridgeway's mouth long after is 
apparent from his reason for not wishing a formal 
Commission to go again to the Frontier, and for thinking 
a small mixed party of Russian and British officers would 
suffice. He wrote that he did not wish the formal 
Commission 
for I have a very lively memory of the critical 
position in which we were placed during the 
winter of 1885-86 by the insulting and 2 threatening demeanour of the Afghan officials. 
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1 NoA.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. May 1886, No.5, 39-97P No.93. 
2 N.A.I., For., Sec. Fp Pros. August 1887, Nos l-J2, Asia 
Confidential Prints 55/1. Ridgeway~ Memorandum, London, 
28 June 1887. 
The Amir 
As to the Amir AbdurrahmanJ Lt would be impossible 
to over-estimate, and equally impossible to describe~ 
the curious glow which his powerful and enigmatic 
personality spreads over thousands of pages of the 
proceedings and correspondence of this Boundary 
Commission. Much has been written about him~ both in his 
own time and sincep and already sufficient reference has 
been made to him in this thesis. A final paragraph or 
two mu~t, now suffice. 
Ridgeway, who called him 'the most grasping and 
jealous of Afghan rulers', also said of him~ as he 
summed up the results of the Commission: 
Abdul Rahman Khan is one of the few great men 
living; the manner in which he has evolved 
order out of chaos in Afghanistan in a few 
short years is extraordinary. He rules with 
a rod of iron; indeed he is a hard and cruel1 
ruler, but he rules a hard and cruel peopleo 
Although a successful ruler who died in old age 
when his old enemy, the gout, at last vanquished him, he 
steps like a great Shakespearian tragic character, a man 
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of passion, moods and action. Sometimes, at his moodiest~ 
observers in the durbar thought him mad, and the next 
moment he would emerge again as the brilliant politician 
that he undoubtedly was. He feared no man; he had supped 
on danger from his earliest years; he feared no hardship, 
for he had tasted all its kinds. He wrote at times as he 
spoke~ wildly, and at times he acted like a creature of 
1 West Ridgeway, 'The New Afghan Frontier' ~ The Nineteenth 
Century, October, 1887, po481. 
impulse, but the Viceroy's counsellors had long since 
realised. that violent letters from the Amir did not mean 
that he would act injudiciously, or other than 
diplomatically, when the time came. 
It is the Amir's way and means nothing more than 
that in some respects he is a disagreeable savageo 
I do not believe he will break with us over this 
demarcation in such a manner as to provoke us 
beyond endurance. He will go as far as he thinks 
he can go with safety, but he knows how much he 
depends upon us ••.. l 
The Amir, then, was unquestionably a realist in 
politics. Another of the secrets of his power to impress 
lay in the fiery metaphors and imaginative adaptations of 
homely phrases which shine in his speech and writing and 
are admirable even in translation. The use of poetic 
imagery he might share with many people who use the 
Persian tongue, but the particular quality of it is the 
Amir's own. 
His dearest policy in dealing with foreign powers 
was that no one, no Infidel or anyone who had sold 
himself to the Kafir, should interfere in Afghanistano 
When the Viceroy passed on some of Ridgeway's complaints 
about restrictions imposed by the Kazi, the Amir wrote in 
reply: 
1 
Therefore it is very necessary that I should draw 
the reins of the attention of all the officers of 
the illustrious British Government as well as all 
N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. July 1886, Nos 1-195, K.W.; 
H.M. Durand in consultation over Ridgeway's telegram of 
17 April 1886, in which the latter urged the Foreign 
Department to put pressure on the Amir for the recall 
of the Kazi. 
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the representatives of the Government of India 
towards the principle and nature of the terms 
of the friendship and concord of the Afghan 
Government with the illustrious British 
Government, and that I should ask them, when 
did the people of Afghanistan - small or great -
consent and agree to the power and authority of 
the illustrious British Government being enforced 
and established in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan? And how can these nations and tribes 
forget the engagement that they made with the 
illustrious British Government that in foreign 
affairs they will not go beyond the advice and 
counsel of that Government? Nor forget the sanad 
that their internal affairs should be under their 
own control?l 
For this reason, he never accepted British hints as to 
the advisability of posting a British Officer on his 
northern frontier, and only in the moment of danger, when 
it was desirable for British and Afghan to appear like 
brothers against the Russians on the Heri-Rud, did he 
allow British engineers into Herat and then only for a 
brief time. And if people like Holdich spoke loudly 
about the possibility of a British-built railway to 
Kandahar or to Herat, the words fell, as far as the Amir 
was concerned, on deaf ears. 
Russian and English 
JS~ 
The Russian and English officers on the Afghan 
Boundary Commission spoke, figuratively, the same 
language. They were well aware of being Europeans in a 
sea of Asians, and each group had a double responsibility, 
to uphold the honour and dignity of the motherland before 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F~ Pros. July 1886, Nos 552-711, 
No.670, Amir to Viceroy, 28 May 1886. 
both the other European group and the 'natives' j and also 
to put forward the interests of the group~ whether 
Turkmen or Afghanp as whose aegis they were servingo The 
position of the Caucasian officers with the Russians was 
perhaps a little different as their Moslem culture 
brought them into much closer touch with the Turk.mens and 
Uzbekso It is to be doubted whether many of themp career 
officers in the Russian army» were as openly reckless in 
expressing their opinions as Colonel Tarkhanovs the 
Governor of Penjdeh, as recorded by C.E. Yate on his final 
visit to the frontier in 1887. Reporting his friendly 
visit to Penjdeh he described Tarkhanov~ a Circassian 
Moslemp as follows: 
He is a festive old chap, though getting rather 
decrepitp with a great affection for Englishmen. 
I shall never forget my first meeting with him 
when he told me in front of the Russians that 
he was now a Colonel in their service and their 
most devoted servantp and then no sooner was he 
round the corner than he sent to say he hated the 
Russians like the devil and if the British would 
only land a brigade in the Caucasus the whole 
country would riseol 
In this same letter from Yate to Durandp there is 
description of the famous Alikhanov as a 'weather-beaten 
worn-looking man with bushy reddish brown whiskers' P by 
no means particularly distinguished-looking, aged forty-
one. Can this be the same person whom Holdich remembered 
as 'that ever-restless firebrand of the Russian frontieri 
whose 'fine commanding figurep fair complexion and good 
looks identified him as an almost typical Caucasian 1 ? 2 
1 N.Aoio~ For., Secc F, Pros. February 1888P Nos 224-508~ 
K.W.P CoE. Yate to H.M. Durandp 4 November 1887. 
2 Holdich, pol24o 
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As we have already pointed out, this opportunity of 
meeting Russian officers in a friendly fashion on the 
frontier, when for so many years ancestral voices had 
been heard prophesying war, an Anglo-Russian war in 
Central Asia, undoubtedly was one of the chief attractions 
for the numerous English army officers in India in hoping 
to join the Commission party. That the concourse of 
English and Russian was eminently friendly is borne out 
both by C.E. Yate and Holdich, two full-time members of 
the English Party from start to finish. Yate wrote in 
detail and on the scene itself, with enthusiasm, and his 
observations are backed up by Holdich writing some years 
later and remembering everything, as he usually did, 
couleur de rose. But there is no reason why it should 
have been otherwise. Political disagreement there 
sometimes naturally was, and this was trying, especially 
to the opposing Commissioners themselves. Although 
Ridgeway was sometimes irritated by Kuhlberg's apparent 
timidity as a.Delegate, he seems on the whole to have 
liked him personally, and in the article in the 
Nineteenth Century quoted above, he writes 'Inch by inch 
we fought our way - luckily we had courteous opponents -
to the banks of the Oxus' • 1 Even when in the winter of 
1885-6 the Kazi was endeavouring to enter into 
communication with the Russians, Ridgeway took the 
tolerant view that Colonel Kuhlberg was not to be blamed 
for this as his instructions would have asked him to 
approach the Afghans when possible. Holdich admired 
Kuhlberg as 'one of the first Russian scientists' and 
1 Nineteenth Centu!:Y_, October 1887, p.471. 
was flattered when he appreciated the English Survey 
Party's excellent triangulation. 'He did us the honour 
to accept our basis, and to work his own maps upon it' • 1 
Holdich admired the veteran Central Asian Russian 
explorer-surveyor, Benderski~ who was among the Russian 
party, and was glad to meet him again years later on the 
Pamirs Boundary Delimitation of 1895. 
Of the Survey parties 9 of which he naturally saw 
most, Holdich writes: 
All along the British and Russian surveyors 
worked in peace and amity togethero The 
acerbities of political discussion, such as 
they were, were not for us. I found the 
Russian topographer ever ready to welcome 
any English colleague in the field of 
geographyo•••Of course there was a certain 
amount of rivalry in the field~ and there 
were a few little plots to secure the first 
information about wells and cultivation, and 
such other items of intelligence as might 
effect the position of the boundary; but 
they were all understood to be conducted on 
strictly business principles which in no way 
affected private social relationso2 
We have already mentioned the amount of successful wining 
and dining and shared sporting events which enlivened the 
1885-1886 period of the Joint Commission, and the 
welcome which Yate and Peacocke received everywhere on 
their return visit in 1887. To quote again from Holdich: 
1 
2 
But it was the cordiality of the unofficial 
relations between the surveyors and the 
military on either side which made that last 
Holdich, p.151. 
Ibid.~ p.156. 
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year's work a work of pleasures as well as of 
deepest interest •••• We were a smaller party 
and more closely drawn together. The immediate 
purpose of our work from day to day was to make 
maps of all the country under dispute. It was 
the purpose of both sides equally •••• l 
When professional soldiers of different nations meet 
there is inevitably a mutual curiosity about all forms of 
training, equipment, and organization, and this meeting 
of Russian and English and English-trained Indian 
soldiery was no exception. The Russians, while appreciatir 
the fine horses and equipment and soldierly nature of the 
Ihdian Escort, seem to have been both amused at and 
contemptuous of the amount of equipment, as well as the 
number of camp-followers, considered necessary. The 
English officers were ultimately most impressed by the 
versatility and suitability of the Cossacks to frontier 
military activities. CoE. Yate devotes a whole lively 
chapter to this matter. 
When not on active service, soldiers of all ranks do 
not have enough to do with their time and this is 
probably one reason for the quite inordinate detail which 
soldier-travellers of the nineteenth century such as 
C.E. Yate and Major Burnaby devote to description of 
regimental trappings. The peace-time soldier becomes 
obsessed with the need for cut of uniform, and spit and 
polisho At first the Russian Cossacks were a sore 
disappointment to the English newcomers who observed 
small men clad in drab belted long-skirted surtouts 
reaching far below the knee, and mounted on small shaggy 
l Ibido, p.158. 
ponieso In justice to that masterly reporterp Colonel 
C.E. Yate, the following passages are quoted directly: 
I was surprised to find •••. The Cossack himself 
is a cheery, hardy little fellow, and I cannot 
imagine better material for an irregular soldier. 
They are all great singers, especially in chorus, 
and every squadron has its special chorus •••• The 
more one sees of the Cossacks, the more, I think, 
is one inclined to wonder what part they are 
destined to play in action. Mounted on ponies, 
sturdy though they arep still too small to meet 
regular cavalry in the open •• o.There is nothing 
for it, therefore, but to class them as 
irregulars pure and simple.I 
He continues with a comparison between the Cossack and 
the Indian cavalry, whom he found 'utterly dissimilar'. 
1 
2 
The Cossack is an irregular, a scout, a forager, 
and an outpost manp rough and ready for any 
contingency, but he is a conscript who can be 
ordered about anywhereo ••• The sowar, though 
theoretically an irregular, has been gradually 
worked up into the most regular of regulars, 
but, withalp is a volunteer, and to be treated 
accordingly •••• The Cossacks do everything, from 
carrying d~ks and parcels to survey or other 
worko We here hire Turkomans and Afghan sowars 
to carry our d~ks, and send out coolies to put 
up survey-marks, never makin~ use of our fighting-
men for any such purposeoc•• 
In the Cossack squadron there is no one but 
fighting-men. What a contrast to our squadron 
of Bengal cavalry~ with its saises, and 
bheesties, and sweepers, and servants of all 
kinds and degrees •••• The Russian officer, even 
with us here on a commission of peace has 
only his soldier-servant to look to, while most 
C.Eo Yate, p.298. 
Ibid.» p.299. 
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of us have four or five native servants of 
sorts •••. How can we hope to compete on even 
terms with the Russians, in a barren country 
like Afghanistan for instance, when every 
army corps of 25,000 men ••• means 25,000 
followers.l 
He also compared the Russian increases in pay for field-
service, the economical field-ambulance service of the 
Russians, and the Russian commissariat establishment, 
finding in the latter case, again, that the Cossacks 
were their own cooks and bakers. To appreciate in its 
context this chapter of Yate's, interesting as it is to 
to-day's reader, one must remind oneself what it was like 
to be a reader of those times when every English person 
was interested in the 'Great Game' in Asia, and when so 
few people had had the peace-time opportunity of Yate to 
be able for such a long time and at such close quarters 
to make a comparison of the legendary Russian Cossacks 
with the British and Indian troops he already knew. 
Personnel 
When one has been plunged for some time in this sort 
of frontier history, one inevitably makes the close 
acquaintance of a number of people, and finds oneself 
continually evaluating their personalities and performance. 
One realises how many cogs there are in a piece of 
diplomatic machinery of this scale, and how much at times 
progress depends on some small, concealed piece of the 
whole. But at the end one is faced with a hard and sad 
reality - that this man or that did an excellent job, or 
l Ibid., pp.306-8. 
did not; and that~ either way~ he helped make history~ 
perhaps even shaped it a little~ but thats as far as 
being an individual whose biography should appear in 
these or any other pages 9 he is more than a little 
expendable. 
As one reads the scrupulous reports of Merk or 
Peacocke, or the many-faceted~ human-centred memoranda 
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of C.E" Yate or de Laessoe or Griesbach~ one cannot help 
feeling one is in the presence of living figures, the sort 
of man each was those eighty years ago, unclouded by the 
man he would become at last, some retired old Anglo-
Indian in Leamington or Cheltenham, or grumbling away in 
his London club, more firmly convinced than he had been 
in the very darkest moments on the frontier~ that the 
Afghan or Indian was in continual need of British 
disciplineo Or worst of all (and this is Sir Charles 
Yate, once the hero of Penjdeh and the friend of General 
Ghau9-ud~din), emerging from retirementP an angry diehard, 
to take part in London in the newly-formed British-
India Association, to fulminate against the iniquities of 
the Montagu~Chelmsford Reforms and the India Act of 19190 
Much mention has been made in passing of some of 
these people, and two or three have already been 
submitted to a more detailed study 9 pride of place having 
been rightly accorded to the Amir, and out of necessity~ 
to the Kazi, his Agento Colonel Ridgeway has emerged as 
a sound senior military officer with much political 
experience in Afghan and Indian affairs, who proved to 
be a highly able diplomata It must also have become 
apparent that he was a person who would not suffer fools 
or knaves, nor anything that suggested a diminution of 
the dignity of his military or political position. 
Ridgeway above all was the man who saw it through from 
first to last, from its organisation in Simla, to the 
frontier~ to London, to St Petersburg, and to London 
again, and without whom the position on the frontier 
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might have got dangerously out of hand, or without whom 
the final diplomatic negotiations could easily have been 
allowed to lapse, or slide further away from the interests 
of Afghanistan. 
Apart from the men on the frontier, the diplomats 
and officials of this time form an interesting group of 
able men. As to the Prime Minister, Gladstone and 
Salisbury, Gladstone's own part, apart from the delivery 
of his famous speech in the House of Commons on 27 April 
1885 after Penjdeh, was mostly that of a figurehead. He 
seems to have been ill-informed about the details of the 
frontier, remote as it was from the many political pre-
occupations of the English mid-1880so As far as has been 
ascertained, the use of the Penjdeh Crisis as a means of 
drawing off public opinion from the Fall of Khartoum and 
British troops from the dangers of the Sudan, was the 
suggestion of Sir Charles Dilke, who with others in the 
Cabinet also formulated the opinion that the way to 
prevent any Russian advance at this time was to frighten 
them into believing that Britain meant action on a large 
scale. As late as 9 April, several weeks after Dilke 
had made his suggestion to this effect, Gladstone was 
still proclaiming 'I am not prepared to go upon any terms 
(from the Sudan), Russia or no Russia' • 1 Salisbury, 
whether as Prime Minister supporting the Earl of 
Iddesleigh or as Foreign Minister himself, approached 
affairs on the Russo-Afghan frontier as an experienced 
Foreign Secretary with his usual business-like elan, 
until the period of the St Petersburg negotiations. 
There was always a deliberate vigour in his approach to 
English-Russian affairs. This was different from the 
gentlemanly approach at an earlier stage, of Clarendon 
who had negotiated with Gorchakov when the matter of an 
Afghan frontier from Persia to the Amu was broached, and 
from that of Granville, his successor. But by 1884 
Granville's powers were failing and he was possibly 
himself much to blame for the lack of speedy contact 
between the frontier and the Foreign Office which so 
distressed both Lumsden and Ridgeway in the period before 
and after Penjdeh. The third Foreign Secretary concerned 
with this Commission's affairs was Lord Rosebery, who in 
dealing with Russia very largely carried on the 
gentlemanly tradition established by Clarendon and 
Granville. In Gladstone's Ministry which initiated the 
Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission, Kimberley, a hard-
working man, occupied the post of Secretary of State for 
India and in the Conservative Ministry which succeeded, 
Lord Randolph Churchill made a very successful Secretary 
of State for India. He was succeeded by Lord Cross. 
In the diplomatic sphere, Sir Edward Thornton, who 
was Ambassador to St Petersburg in the period when the 
negotiations of 1882 were reopened in 1884, was succeeded 
1 Gwynn and Tuckwell, The Life of the Rt Hon Sir Charles 
Dilke, p.117. 
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by Sir Robert Moriera Morier gave the strongest support 
to Ridgeway at St Petersburg in 1887 as his relations 
with de Giers seemed productive of much goodwill. As to 
the two Viceroys, Ripon and Dufferin, they were both, if 
not, as C.E. Yate suggested of himself, 1 Afghanophiles 1 , 
nevertheless they were both deeply aware of the need to 
build a strong friendly relationship with an Afghanistan 
independent, in all but foreign policy, of the British 
in Indiao In Dufferin's case his long diplomatic 
experience, both in St Petersburg and in Constantinople, 
and his personal interest in Abdurrahman, about whom he 
had first begun to learn when he, Dufferin was in St 
Petersburg, and Abdurrahman an exile in Samarcand, made 
him the ideal administrator in India at this time~ when 
Indian frontier affairs, through the matter of the 
Russo-Afghan frontier, became so closely linked with 
British and Russian Imperial policies. As Lyall writes 
in his Life of Duff~, 
The Afghan Boundary Commission was on the 
disputed frontier when he took charge; and 
he determined at once to get the Amir down 
to India and if possible to come to a better 
understanding with him •••• 1 
When he returned to London at the end of 1886 and 
made his report to the Earl of Iddesleigh, Salisbury's 
Foreign Secretary, Ridgeway was able to outline the merits 
of the several officers who had impressed him most over 
their two years of close association. The senior officers 
he spoke most highly of were his Assistant-Commissioner, 
Major E.L. Durand, Captain C.E~ Yate, Mr W. Merk, Captain 
1 Lyall, vol.II, p.313. 
D. De Laessoe and Dr Owen. Of the others, he especially 
praised Major Meiklejohn, one of the Escort officers 
'an able, resolute officer - who kept well in hand the 
high-spirited young Afridis of that fine regiment, the 
20th Punjab Infantry' "l He also praised the intelligence 
officers. 'Major Maitland is a zealous and painstaking 
officer with a natural taste for exploration •••• ' Of 
Peacocke, perhaps his especial favourite, he wrote: 
Perhaps the name of no officer in the Mission has 
been more prominent than that of Captain Peacocke, 
R.E., whose versatile and exceptional abilities, 
his enterprise and unusual physical powers of 
endurance, and, above all, his cheerful readiness 
to undertake any duty, however disagreeable, have 
induced me to select him whenever there was work 
of any particular danger or difficulty. Captain 
Peacocke's survey, in the midst of winter, of the 
road between the Murghab and the Oxus was a feat 
of skill and endurance; and his detailed survey of 
the desert to the East of the Murghab, in the 
following winter, was also an admirable and useful 
piece of work.2 
Captain Yate he described as an 
officer whose ner"VEl patience, and temper have 
never failed him, notwithstanding that those 
qualities have been exceptionally tried during 
this long and tedious business. I particularly 
recommend this officer to your Lordship's notice.3 
Mr W. Merk, 
1 
2 
the sole representative of the Bengal Civil 
Service with the Commission on the frontier, 
is an officer of high intelligence, whose 
linguistic attainments and experience in 
dealing with frontier tribes specially 4 qualified him to render me valuable assistance. 
C.A. ~o.2, 1887, No.211. 
Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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Captain F. de Laessoe, an accomplished linguist, 
Western as well as Eastern, originally joined 
the Commission as Translator, but has been very 
generally employed on political duties.l 
As we have seen, Ridgeway later took De Laessoe withr him 
to St Petersburg, where his political savoir-faire, as 
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well as his linguistic ability, was valuable to the English 
delegation. 
Only Holdich seems to have been found wanting on this 
expedition, in a mi.tter which seems strange in a senior 
Survey Officer, namely in the matter of professional 
accuracy, It seems likely that he must have combined a 
certain degree of slap-dashness with an undoubted natural 
enthusiasm, which could lead him to do everything in a 
hurry. His first preliminary survey work on reaching 
Badghis proved so inaccurate that Captain Maitland 
complained he had to do it all over again before he could 
use it as a basis for the extended work assigned to him. 
Holdich in his turn belittled the ability of the 
Intelligence Officers in map-making, and seems to have 
acted jealously towards them. 
In the last stages of the Commission party at 
Khamiab there is evidence of strained relations between 
Ridgeway and Holdich, but this may have been as much due 
to the high tension which Ridgeway was suffering at this 
time, because of disagreement with Kuhlberg, lack of 
progress, and malarial fever, as to Holdich himself. As 
to the Survey, most of the field-work was done by Talbot 
and Gore and the Sub-Surveyors, whose quality has 
l Ibid. 
previously been mentioned. Holdich had wished to publish 
a full report, but this caused discussion not very 
favourable to himself, in the Indian Foreign Department 
in 1887, H.M. Durand expressing the opinion that 'There 
is no more reason for Survey Officers to publish the 
results of their work than for any other officer' • 1 The 
Viceroy was also against it 
especially as Maitland says the geography is all 
wrong, and in spite of the plea of General R. 
Strachey, C.S.I., Member of the India Council, 
and President of the Royal Geographica;L Society 
[which had already awarded Holdich its Gold Medal]. 
Durand, writing on 24 March 18882 said: 
In my opinion, it is not desirable to publish 
detailed information about Afghanistan or 
Chitral and I would not do it. As to Col. 
Holdich 1 s Memorandum, I would tell General 
Strachey that it was not accurate and that 
our military authorities are opposed to the 
publication of such matters •••• 3 
As to the relations at close quarters of Russian and 
Afghan, we have seen that there were the beginnings of 
intrigue between the Kazi and the Russian Commission, 
but this probably began as an act of resentment on 
the Kazi 1 s part, inspired by his annoyance at Ridgeway. 
There is some evidence that the Governor of Herat was 
not to be relied on, and that he intended to flee to 
Central Asia should he be dismissed by the Amir. There 
is plenty of evidence of divided tribal allegiance 
amongst the Jamshidis, and Russian approaches were made 
1 N.A.I., For., Sec. F, Pros. May 1888, Nos 1-11, K.W. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
3S 
not very successfully to Maimana, but there is not a 
great deal about the meeting of Afghan and Russian. 
The following passage from C.E. Yate describing how 
during the Final Demarcation in 1887 a mixed party came 
to a hot spring in the desert, contains one such glimpse: 
••• I think almost every man 7 not only in ours, 
but in the Afghan camp as well, had a real good 
wash that day. All our men and the Afghan bathed 
away most amicably all day; but in the afternoon 
when the Cossacks joined in, Afghan fanaticism 
began to show itself, and Nazir Nurudin [the 
Afghan Turkestan Agent with the Party] had 
eventually to post sentries over the water, and 
put a stop to the bathing for fear of a row.l 
There is a good deal of information about and reference 
to current Central Asian rumours in the reports of the 
Native Attaches~ especially those of Sardar Mohamed 
Aslam Khan on duty at Andkhoi, and Sardar Sher Ahmad 
Khan at Mazar, and in the collections of Newsletters, 
which points to disaffection against the Russians by 
the Bokharans, and especially to dislike of the new Amir 
of Bokhara, dubbed 'Rusi Bachcha' 9 or 'Russia's Child' 
by the Bokharans. There is also much concerning his 
brother, Abdul Malik Tora, a refugee in India 7 who had a 
strong following in Bokhara. But this interesting 
material,, like so much that fell into the hands of the 
British Party of the Afghan Boundary Commission, is 
excessive to the requirements of the present thesis. 
1 C.E. Yate, p.J94. 
CHAPTER X 
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION 
Aftermath 
The long period of warfare against the Turkmens of 
Transcaspia, which finished at Geok Tepe, had, as we 
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have seen, put the Russians in the position of being not 
only the custodians of these turbulent folk, but of 
becoming at the same time their champions. To establish 
unity among the Turkmen tribes on these frontiers, against 
the Afghans and the Persians, the Russians had, under the 
guidance of Lessar, that prince of ethnographer-explorers~ 
committed themselves to occupy the Tejend, and on the 
Murghab they had found it necessary to fight the Afghans 
to ensure that their prot~g~s, the Turkmen Sariks, should 
occupy the Penjdeh Oasis. 
What had they won for the Russian empire? We have 
seen that Ridgeway, who knew it well, regarded the long 
oasis as second-rate grazing land. Having acquired it, 
the Russians, in the methodical way of their long-
established bureaucracy, took a census of the new 
possession. An official Russian account prepared in 1885 
by Major-General Bayev, and published in 1888, gives the 
result of this census, made immediately after the 
'neutrality' of Penjdeh was lifted. In the Penjdeh 
Oasis there were 4,238 kibitkas, 1 4,100 horses, 5,200 
1 A kibitka might house seven to ten people. It was the 
usual way of census-taking in Central Asia, a census as 
one might say, of 'households' and so the result would be 
in round figures only. 
camels, 2,600 horned cattle, 2,400 muleso The oasis 
seldom grew enough grain for its own needs. Bayev much 
admired the white sheep of Penjdeh. By 1887 the 
Russians had got far beyond census-taking and were 
already engaged upon restoring the Murghab irrigation 
canals, especially an old Persian weir, Band-i-Sultan, 
near Yulatan, but this was again badly damaged by a 
flood in 1894 and only repaired again much later; 
meanwhile, another dam, the Hindu Kush Dam, was built. 
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In 1897-98 the Murghab Branch Railway Line was 
constructed, leaving the main Transcaspian line at Bairam 
Ali in the southern part of the Merv Oasis and terminating 
at Kushk Post on the Afghan frontier, twelve miles north-
west of Chihil Dukhterin. In recent years a ten-mile 
extension of this railway has brought it down to terminate 
in Afghan territory at Torghundi, where it meets the new 
major highway linking it to Herat, Kandahar and ultimately 
to Kabul. On the Murghab Line~ the sixth station out of 
Bairam Ali was Tash Kepri, near the scene of the battle 
of JO March 1885.* By 1899 it was classified as a 
Second-Class Station with Buffet, and nearby was the 
Russian War Memorial which recorded the names of the few 
Russian and Turkmen soldiers lost there. A little 
further on, twenty-two versts from the frontier and 
close to Old Penjdeh, was Takhta Bazar, which by 1899 was 
a small town of 327 permanent residents, listed as 
ninety Jews, fifty Persians, sixty Bokharans, thirty-nine 
Khivanst thirty-four Armeniansr thirty Russians, twenty 
* In several modern maps 'Tash Kepri' is placed on the 
Murghab below its junction with the Kushk11- and not on 
the Kushk. I cannot explain this. 
Afghans, four Georgians and Tatars. The Turk.men Sariks 
were conspicuously not town-dwellers. The Jews had a 
synagogue in Takhta Bazar and owned about half the 
fifty-seven buildings. It was a centre of trade with 
Afghanistan. In 1899 there were imported from Afghanistan 
1 28,266 poods of dried fruits, almonds, wool, skins, 
cotton, carpets. Also 86,630 sheep had been driven in, 
and 2,868 horned cattle. The trade with Afghanistan was 
reported to be growing. Kushk Post itself, a swampy 
2 
malarial spot hedged in by the crests and spurs of the 
Chingurek Range, had fifty-three buildings and a fine 
white stone railway station, through which 1,782 
passengers passed in the year 1900. The Post was a Fort 
of the Fourth Rank. 
By this time, too, two small Russian peasant 
villages had been started near Kushk Post, the 'most 
southern peasant-settlements in Imperial Russia' • 3 It 
was, of course, peasant settlements such as these which 
were ultimately most sharply to distinguish the nature of 
the Russian Empire in Central Asia from that of the 
British Empire in Indiao The two Kushk settlements were 
the creations of General Kuropatkin, now Governor of 
Transcaspia, and he showed for them a 'constant 
solicitude'. It does not seem that they flourished, for 
when Count Pahlen visited Kushk Post in 1908 he found the 
1 A pood = 36 lbs. 
2 The British Party, wintering at Charshamba in 1885-86, 
was very sorry for the Russians sickening in Penjdeh. 
3 Lietuenant Colonel V.N. Antipini, Pootevodite~ 
Turkestani i Sredne-Aziatskoy Zheleznoy Dorogi, St 
Petersburg, 1903, p.278. 
1 
whole district extremely depressed. One, Aleksevsky, 
started in 1892 with 400 Ukrainian settlers who had 
emigrated from Volkchansk in Kharkov Province, had forty-
one families in about 1900. The other, Poltavsky, begun 
in 1896, had thirty-five families in 1900. Aleksevsky 
had a church and an elementary school. Kushk Post had 
electricity by 1906. An interesting account of this 
place is to be found in Angus Hamilton's Afghanistan 
{1906). He reported that offers of fraternisation made 
from time to time by members of the Kushk Post garrison 
were nearly always rebuffed by the Afghans. 
He described the weekly bazaar at Kushk Post as 
similar to that held in the Afghan centres to the South. 
The chief trade was in salt, rice, soap, carpets and 
horses, while the Russians encouraged the native 
merchants to display stocks of Russian sugar, matches and 
cotton piece-goods, silks from Bokhara and Meshed, but 
nothing of English, Indian or European manufacture. He 
found that the whole valley, both in the Afghan and 
Russian sections, was riddled with malaria and the 
population was declining, but especially on the Afghan 
side, where many cultivators had reverted to nomadism. 
In the Kushk valley ••• an ever present feeling of 
irritation exists in the lower parts ••• against 
the Afghan villagers who control the head-waters 
of the river and divert it to their own fields. 
This difficulty prevails along the entire line of 
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the frontier .•.• T.here are many exceptions to the 
misfortune and, so far as is possible, the division 
is arranged in a spirit of mutual ownership, although 
1 Count K.K. Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, 1908-1909 
{trans.), London, 1964. 
the natives, on the Russian side of the frontier, 
have no claim to compensation if there is not 
enough water.I 
Although he heard of local bad relations across the 
frontier at Kushk Post and further east at Chushka Guzar 
on the Amu, he also noted that all Afghan frontier 
guards were relieved monthly, by orders from Kabul, to 
prevent fraternisation, and he saw Russia as 'really the 
supreme and dominating factor in Afghanistan' . 2 
Nevertheless he found evidence that some high officials 
in Herat Province, including its long-standing governor, 
our old acquaintance the Kazi Sa'ad-ud-din, had recently 
been recalled to Kabul for having accepted complimentary 
gifts from Merv. 3 
In 1891 when Abdurrahman had been extremely ill, 
discussions took place in the Indian Foreign Department 
about his possible decease. Such a contingency was 
considered almost certain to produce disturbance on the 
Russian frontier, since Ishak Khan, who after his 
unsuccessful revolt in 1888 had retired to Russian 
Central Asia, might expect to be Abdurrahman's successor 
and might win Russian support. 
Much as modern Russian historians disapprove of 
Abdurrahman's British affiliations, 'ingratitude' and 
'feudal' policies, they do not believe that he was 
strongly anti-Russian. As to this frontier, it is not 
extensively mentioned by Masson and Romodin or Khalfin. 
1 Hamilton, Afghanistan, p.1J7. 
2 Ibido, p.166. 
J Ibid o , p . 16 5 • 
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The former rely almost wholly on the Afghan chronicle, 
~i£~c:tJ-:L~~~r~i1£h, written some time after the period of 
the Boundary Commission, and Abdurrahman's Autobiography. 
They quote with pleasure the Amir's statement that he 
was not going to 'pick chestnuts out of the fire' for 
the British. 
As to the subsequent history of the Heri-Rud-Amu 
frontier, there were inevitably a series of small border 
incidents which both the Amir and Herat authorities and 
the Russian officials in Ashkabad and elsewhere decried 
and checked, using the legally established frontier as 
a guide. For instance, as early as October 1887, 
Brigadier MacLean's Newswriter (or Spy) at Penjdeh 
reported: 'The Bilkonak1 troubles the people accusing 
2 them of communicating with Bala Murghab and Maruchak'. 
We have already seen that Colonel CoEo Yate, 
returning to the frontier at this time for the final 
demarcation, also had to arrange for the removal of 
intruding Zemindarwari settlers. In 1888 General Ghaus-
ud-din was involved in minor problems such as arranging 
for the return to Penjdeh of eight camels stolen by 
Afghans. The English Party's Sarik camel-contractor, 
deciding to return to Penjdeh, invested his earnings in 
camels in Maimana, and also had great problems, spreading 
well over a year, in getting permission to transfer them 
from Afghan territory. Migration of nomads was bound to 
1 This appears to be a Turkmen corruption of Polkovnik, 
i.e., Colonel, so probably refers to the governor, 
Colonel Tarkhanov. 
2 N.AoI., For., Sec. F, Pros. March, Nos 397-454, No.444, 
Allah Baksh~ 
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occur and could possibly not be wholly controlled. In 
1888 Turkmens from Shibbergan, Andkhoi and Daulatabad 
were reported to be moving with their flocks into Russian 
territory. There was a great deal of migration, both to 
Russian territory and to Herat, by groups of Jamshidi 
tribesmen. 
In 1889 the Amir denied rumours received by the 
Viceroy that nomads with their flocks were still freely 
crossing and re-crossing the frontier and spoke out on 
the need for closed frontiers: 
If all the cattle of the subjects of the God-
granted Government die on account of want of 
grass, I will not consent that they should pass 
over the Russian frontier to graze; and in the 
same way I will not agree that the flocks and 
herds of that side should put their foot on 
this side. 
In October 1888 a clash between Russian Turkmens and 
Afghans, resulting in minor bloodshed, occurred on Afghan 
territory. The Turkmen were firmly dealt with by Colonel 
Tarkhanov. 
In the summer of 1892 the spotlight of Russo-Afghan 
frontier relations focussed on the upper Amu where a 
minor Afghan-Russian frontier clash occurred at Somatash. 
The aftermath of this led to the completion, in 1895, of 
the delimitation of Afghanistan 1 s northern frontier, 
which Abdurrahman had originally intended to be made by 
the Boundary Commission appointed in 18840 
While the Pamir frontier delimitation was still 
being carried on in 1893, a new crisis involving the 
Kushk Canals arose and was serious enough to be brought 
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to the highest diplomatic level. This was again the 
familiar problem that Afghan subjects on the upper Kushk 
had enlarged their water usage, which led to a water-
shortage for the Penjdeh Sariks. Complaints along the 
'ordinary channels' led to the appointment of a small 
mixed Commission on which the English Commissioner was 
Colonel C.E. Yate, than whom, by this time, none can have 
been better qualified to study the Kushk Canals problems, 
The Russian Commissioner was V. Ignatiev, not a member of 
the former Commission, but an authority on the Afghan 
frontier, who published at Ashkabad in 1895 a Short Sketch 
of the Tribes inhabiting Afghanistan. A very detailed 
record of this dispute is to be found in R.So Rastogi's 
Indo-Afghan Relations 1880-1900. It was settled to the 
'entire satisfaction of both contracting parties', but 
in its very nature was insoluble. In 1903, for example, 
the Governor of Ashkabad once more had to complain about 
the construction by Afghan subjects of dams on the 
Murghab and Heri-Rud. But the important thing was that 
all these occasions were automatically referred to 
authority for a proper ruling. The Kushk Canals Dispute 
of 1893 is regarded in a more serious light by Masson and 
Romodin (History of Afghanistan, vol.II) whose rather 
tangled account sees a sinister figure, 'Colonel C.Eo 
Bate', involved in intrigue with the Herat authorities to 
retain canals for the Afghans at the expense of the 
Turkmens. The account seems to be based on the 
previously mentioned Siradj-i-Tavarikh, and the change in 
personnel may be due to a simple confusion of Persian 
letters at some stage. It is interesting to note that 
on this occasion there was a fully recognised Afghan 
delegate and signatory, Mohamed Painda Khano 
In 1896, the Indian Foreign Department received 
reports that the Penjdeh frontier had a strict guard of 
Cossacks and no one from AfghaR territory was able to 
enter Russian territory, the new Russian Customs Line 
accounting for this. Nevertheless it was said that food-
shortages in Herat province were being caused because of 
the amount of food that was finding its way across the 
Russian frontier. A customs post and a strict place of 
entry was just what the Amir had requested in 1894. The 
1 two places of entry were from Kara Tepe and Maruchak. 
In 1888 Colonel C.Eo Yate already saw plenty of 
evidence of the westernisation which Russian occupation 
was bringing to Central Asia. He saw new river-steamers 
on the Amu carrying cotton to Charjui, he found a 
passenger train running twice a week from Charjui to the 
Caspian. In Merv there was not only the railway station 
but 'the Russian bazaar, the club-house, the hotel and 
the caf~ chantant, and other emblems of civilisation. The 
Turkomans to a stranger are hardly in evidenceo ••• • 2 The 
confident expectation of progress was in the air: 
1 
When the new Band-i-Sultan is finished, however, 
it will all be brought under cultivation again; 
and General Annenkov has great schemes on hand 
for the colonisation of all this land.ooby 
Russian peasantso We heard that to provide funds 
for the new Band-i-Sultan the Emperor has advanced it million roubles out of his own private purse, 
N.AoI., For., Sec. F, Pros. June 1896, Nos 130-2, April 
1896, Nos 39-52, August 1896, Nos 239-82A, various 
documents. 
2 C.E. Yate, p.410. 
and in return is to receive one sixth of the 
land reclaimed as his own private property.l 
Progress there was, but slower than anticipated. The 
Penjdeh Oasis in particular was not an easy place for 
Russian peasant colonies any more than it was for any 
other people mainly agricultural in their interests. 
In spite of a growth of trade from north-western 
Afghanistan, the Murghab Railway was in the main a 
military one taking quantities of military stores to 
stockpile at Kushk Post. A fair sized military garrison 
and a number of railway workers made up the population. 
It was a place to breed dissatisfaction and it is 
interesting to notice that at the time of the Tashkent 
Mutiny in November 1905 strikers at the Kushk Post 
railway works managed to isolate it for some days from 
contact with outside and considerably confounded the 
2 Garrison Commandant. 
On the formation of the Bolshevik Government in 
Tashkent in 1917, Kushk Post was seized and became a 
Bolshevik island in territory in general under the 
influence of the local Menshevik government set up at 
Ashkabad. The Ashkabad Government presently joined 
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forces with the Intervention Forces of General Malleson 
which had come from India in 1918 to guard Khorassan and 
Afghanistan against possible Turkish or German penetration 
and then were almost inevitably drawn into the Central 
Asian struggle. Ridgeway~ Holdich, C.E. Yate and other 
1 Ibid., p.409-10. Count Pahlen gives an hilarious 
account of the 'new Band-i-Sultan' and its misfortunes 
up to 1908-9. 
2 R.A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia 2 1867-1917, p.241. 
old men from the 1885 frontier period must have followed 
with interest as much as they could learn of the progress 
of Generals Dickson, Malleson and Beatty 'virtually 
isolated and dependent on a line of communications 800 
miles long and dependent on a thinly held mountain and 
1 desert track for supply and support'. The veterans of 
1885 must have drawn a parallel between this position and 
their own near Herat during the Penjdeh and Zulfikar 
eris es. 
When fighting broke out in the Merv oasis and the 
extraordinary 'railway carriage war' was waged along the 
Transcaspian line as far as Charjui on the Amu, between 
the joint Ashkabad-'Mallmiss 1 forces and the Bolsheviks, 
the Bolsheviks were able to use much valuable rolling-
stock and milita~y equipment brought up from Kushk Post. 
In late Tsarist days Kushk Post had been a considerable 
stronghold with as many as 5,000 troops attached to its 
garrison. Early in 1919 British forces managed to occupy 
Kushk Post, but shortly afterwards the whole British 
force was withdrawn from Central Asia. 
Had the British force not occupied Kushk Post at 
this time, the chances are that this and the Penjdeh 
region might well have maintained an unbroken connection 
with the Tashkent government. As it was, the whole oasis 
from Merv to the Afghan border became temporarily a 
power-vacuum. This inevitably led to an occupation by 
local Afghan forces at the very time that mutual Soviet-
Afghan diplomatic approaches were beginning to be made. 
1 CoH. Ellis, The British 'Intervention' in Transcaspia, 
1918-19, p.67. 
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In the summer of 1919 some Afghan officers took over the 
whole Murghab region including Merv, which they made their 
headquarters. They revived the original 1884 claim to a 
boundary from Sarrakhs through Imam=Baba to Khamiab-
Bosagha. While this was going onll Amanullah 1 s embassy 
to Moscow passed through Tashkent and asked for a 
Bolshevik envoy to be sent to Kabul. The envoy sent was 
Bravin, a former official in the Russian Consulate at 
Meshed. He was not a very important envoy but he visited 
Kabul with instructions from the R.S.F.S.R. to pave the 
way for a treaty of friendship with Afghanistan. At Kabul, 
Amanullahp the new Amir, demanded various things 
including the 'restoration' of Penjdeh to Afghanistan. 
On his return, Bravin recommended this to the Tashkent 
Committee~ but nothing was done. Lenin wrote personally 
to the next ambassador to Kabul, Suritz, that he was in 
favour of adjusting the frontier and repairing the 
Tsarist government's injury to the Afghan people. There 
is evidence that as late as this there was still 
nomadizing by Turkmens across the frontier. The Tashkent 
government was not prepared to grant the Sarrakhs - Imam 
Baba line, but was prepared to grant a compromise - Pul-
i-Khatun to Sari Yazi to Bosagha. This curious period of 
Afghan-Russian relations has been skilfully pieced 
together by W.M. Hale in his unpublished thesis, 
'Afghanistanll Britain and Russia 9 1905=1921'. According 
to him, up to this, the infant R.S.F.S.R. had been acting 
in a spirit of 'rosy euphoria' but about the time that the 
offer of a compromise line was made to Afghanistan, the 
Russians realised that Amanullah was playing his own very 
Afghan game, and interfering on behalf of the 
• 
conservative Amir of Bokhara, and entering into 
discussions with the British 9 and g~nerally not doing 
what was hopedp at the same time that he was asking for 
the frontier to be revised. In January 1920 a Bolshevik 
force moved into Merv and forced the Afghan Consul to 
withdraw all the Afghan troops. By this time early 
Soviet enthusiasm and generous feelings towards their 
Imperialist-oppressed neighbours had waned somewhat and 
it was less likely that the Afghans would be allotted 
the Penjdeh Oasis without reserve~ but the Afghans, once 
having reoccupied it~ were all the more likely to make a 
strong claim, and there was probably a good deal of 
trouble. This new state of mind on the part of the 
Russians is reflected in the confusing Clause IX of the 
Soviet-Afghan Treaty which was finally ratified in 
Moscow on 20 April 1921 and in Kabul on 14 August: 
In fulfilment of and in accordance with the 
promise of the RoS.FoS.Ro expressed by Lenin 
as its head to the Minister Plenopotentiary 
of the Soviet State in Afghanistan, Russia 
agrees to hand over to Afghanistan the 
Frontier districts which belonged to the 
latter in the last century observing the 
principles of justice and self~determination 
of the populations inhabiting the sameo The 
manner in which such self-determination and 
will of the majority of the regular local 
population shall be expressed shall be settled 
by a special treaty between the two states 
through the inteymediary of Plenipotentiaries 
of both parties. 
Whether this was from the outset deliberately a tangled 
web can only be guessed at. Meanwhile such a confused 
1 Quoted by W.M. Hale • 
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statement was enough to leave this problem on the shelf 
until it was finally solved in 1946. Penjdeh remained 
in Russian hands and from time to time minor frontier 
troubles had to be settled by discussion. It had been 
suggested earlier in 1921 that a plebiscite on Penjdeh 
might be held. 1 The clause quoted above ensured that it 
could never carried out. On 13 September~ 1932, the two 
countries appointed six frontier commissions, specifying 
geographical limits for each along the whole Soviet-
Afghan frontier. The frontier commissions dealt with 
local problems as they occurred. 
As to the Amu, that river with its problematical 
shifting course, also had caused local troubles. The 
worst of these occurred in December 1925 when an island 
called variously 'Urta Tagai' or 'Yangi Kal'a', which 
had been occupied by Afghan soldiery, was taken in an 
armed clash by Soviet troops. The island had formerly 
belonged to Bokhara, but the Russians admitted that a 
misunderstanding had occurred. The island was given to 
Afghanistan by a diplomatic agreement on 28 February, 
1926, when a ceremonial meeting of detachments of Soviet 
2 
and Afghan troops took place. This helped to bring 
about the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 31 
August 1926. 
It was not until 13 June 1946, that an agreement was 
made in Moscow which cleared the Soviet-Afghan frontier 
situation finally. The Kushk district was reincorporated 
1 Rahul, quoting Aitchison, Treaties, etc., Appendix VII, 
vol.XIII, pp.CXCVII-IX. 
4: 
2 Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-27, pp.239-40. 
in the u.s.S.R.~ as it had not officially been since 1921 
although de facto it would appear to have been under 
Soviet control throughout the period. Another more 
important decision was made and that was that the ~lweg 
of the Amu would henceforth be the boundary between the 
two. In a river given to such changes as the Amu, it was 
the long-delayed sensible solution, although it did 
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involve one further redefinition of the Urta Tagai island, 1 
and no doubt involved minor adjustments with every flood, 
But with the exception of Penjdeh in 1921 all these have 
been minor local changes and as to Penjdeh itself, until 
some further information is available on this matter, it 
is very difficult to know just what did occur between 1921 
and 1946. 
Some modern Afghan historians believe that 
Abdurrahman bitterly felt the loss of Penjdeh, which he 
had occupied very much on his own initiative. He did not 
wish to have any broken tribes on his frontiers. They 
affirm that as to the modern frontier, the boundary line 
is strictly adhered to and there is no 'unoccupied zone'. 
There is no legal means of crossing the frontier except 
by passport. Occasionally nomads may come across but 
the strictness of the frontier control is insisted on by 
the Russians. On the east, between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, there is some free movement (of Powindars etc.), 
but none whatever in the north between Afghanistan and 
the u.s.S.R. When I was in Afghanistan in 1966, by very 
special permission, and accompanied by an approved Afghan, 
I was enabled to visit modern Kushk~ the headquarters of 
1 See Rahul, op. cit. 
the Governor of Badghis, still a sub-province of Herat~ 
not far south of the frontier town of Torghundi. But 
at that time it was quite impossible to obtain permission 
to visit the Amu, although it was done unofficially by 
severai people I met. 
Conclusion 
The 'Ridgeway Line' , 1 as that doyen of Afghan 
historians, Professor Mohamed Ali Khan, graciously and 
correctly calls it, was destined both to last, with the 
one strange variation in early Soviet times just 
mentioned, and vastly to clarify Russo-Afghan relations. 
It was also a forward step in the establishment of 
precision in Anglo-Russian relations in Central Asia, a 
matter which reached finality in 1907. 
As to Anglo-Afghan relationss the picture is 
different. In a measure the period of best relations 
between the British Government in India and Amir 
Abdurrahman occurred in the first part of his reign and 
perhaps reached its highest peak in the Amir's meeting 
with Dufferin at Rawalpindio After the period of this 
Boundary Commission, in spite of polite congratulations 
on the completion of the new frontier, this, important 
as it was to Afghanistan and to England in their 
individual relations with Russiaf did little to improve 
Anglo-Afghan harmony. Short of the periods of military 
invasion of Afghanistan during the First and Second 
Afghan Wars, the ten years which followed the making of 
1 M. Ali, Afghanistan: The Mohammedzai Period, p.1J6. 
4. 
this frontier must surely be recognised as the worst 
period of British aggrandisement at Afghan expense, even 
if much of the territory absorbed into British India at 
this time was truly debatable land occupied by Pathan 
tribesmen who were capable of being equally umbrageous 
whether they were looking towards Kabul or Peshawur; no 
other than modern 'Pushtunistan'. The Pathan lands 
absorbed before the end of the century included the 
Upper Zhob Valley, the Kurram Valley, Bannu, the 
territory of the Wazirs and Mohmands, Chitral and many 
other districts, and saw of course the visit of HoM. 
(now Sir Mortimer) Durand to Kabul and the formation 
there in 1893 of the 'Durand Line', which no one can 
imagine was pleasant for the Amiro One matter which 
particularly outraged him was the extension in 1893 of 
l 
the railway from Quetta to New Chaman, which he insisted 
was in Afghan territory, and for having permitted which 
he sacked the Governor of Kandahar. 
Whatever contribution to Afghan goodwill the English 
Party had made by helping secure the north-western 
boundary was many times undone by these depredations 
along the eastern frontier. The British were truly doing 
to the Amir the very thing from which they had helped 
cause the Russians to desist. It was this policy of the 
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British along his eastern frontier which led to the Amir's 
bitter letter to the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, quoted in 
his Autobiography: 
I will gradually make them peaceful subjects and 
good friends of Great Britain. But if you should 
cut them out of my dominions, they will neither 
be of any use to you nor to me: you will always 
be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, 
and they will always go on plundering ••• if at 
any time a foreign enemy appear on the borders 
of India, then frontier tribes will be your 
worst enemies.I 
Perhaps the real attitude of Abdurrahman with regard to 
the British is to be found in the following passage of 
conversation he had with Miss Lillias Hamilton, the 
woman doctor he appointed to his Harem, who became his 
trusted confidant: 
If I were to tell you that it is because I love 
the British you would not believe me, so I will 
say that it is because it suits my policy. 
Russia is my geographical enemy, who would 
seize my country if she could, because it is on 
her route to a sunny sea and a fertile country 
from which she could get supplies, but I have 
nothing to fear from Great Britain.2 
This chapter must re-state briefly the expressions 
of approval which the three parties concerned gave after 
Ridgeway returned from St Petersburg. Ridgeway reported 
to Salisbury: 
1 
2 
I do not think the Ameer has any reason to be 
dissatisfied with the result of the demarcation. 
He himself pressed for the delimitation of his 
frontier and he himself decided that Penjdeh was 
not worth fighting for. It seems to be supposed 
that we forced the Ameer to acquiesce in the 
Russian annexation of Penjdeh, but at the 
interview between Lord Dufferin and the Ameer 
at Rawal Pindi the Ameer, without any pressure 
from the Viceroy, decided to give up the valley. 
High Highness then mentioned those places which 
he considered essential for Afghanistan, namely, 
Zulfikar, Gulran and Meruchak. Accordingly, if 
Abdurrahman, Autobiograpliy, volaII, p.158. 
Quoted in Angus Hamilton, Afghanistan, p.J90. 
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the frontier had been demarcated just north of 
those three places, the Ameer would have had no 
course for complaint. But now much more has 
been done for the Ameer ••• he has gained land 
which was never before in his possession. 
Indeed, I calculated that, after allowing for 
the loss of Penjdeh and the lands now given up 
in the valleys of the Kushk, Kashan, and Murghab, 
the territories of the Ameer are increased by 400 
square miles. Penjdeh was lost to the Ameer before 
the demarcation began, but through the demarcation 
of the frontier he has not lost a penny of revenue, 
a single subject, or an acre of land which was 1 
occupied or cultivated by any Afghan subject •••• 
At the same time, the Russians expressed gratification at 
having re-gained the Sarik lands in the Kushk-Kashan area 
in return for their 'sacrifice' of Khamiab. The St 
Petersburg statement read: 
1 
••• the Imperial Government, by giving up the idea 
of taking advantage of the above misunderstandings 
(in the 1873 Agreement), acquired the incontestable 
right of claiming a rectification of frontier at 
the other point. The urgency of that rectification 
was to be considered all the greater in view of the 
fact that the bad effect of the delimitation which 
had been carried out had declared itself in a way 
very damaging to the maintenance of order on our 
borders. Not possessing in the Oasis of Penjdeh 
sufficient pasturage, our new subjects the Sariks 
had this very year, as in the last year, crossed 
the frontier arbitrarily and occupied on the other 
side pasture lands of which they had formerly 
enjoyed the use without hindrance. In consequence 
of the annexation to the oasis of the territory 
lying between the Kushk and the Murghab which had 
not yet been occupied by the Afghans~ it has become 
possible to look upon the above-mentioned troubles 
as being settled. Further, the results now obtained 
may be considered as entirely carrying out the view 
C.A. No.l, 1888, No.I, Ridgeway to Salisbury, 15 
August 1887. 
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which the Imperial Government has always held 
since the commencement of the negotiations 
respecting the Afghan delimitation.I 
Abdurrahman wrote to the Viceroy with more than usually 
effulgent Persian politesse. After expressing his 
gratitude to the Queen-Empress, he continued: 
Secondly, the good and State-adorning opinion of 
the Representatives of the illustrious Government 
is worthy of praise and the cause of happiness and 
thanks, for the knots in the threads of discussion 
with the Russian Government, which were tied with 
regard to the Afghan frontiers, have been untied 
and opened with the tips of the fingers of 
excellent measureso ••• It is one of the results and 
consequences of the sincere friendship of the two 
parties that the Russian Government, notwithstanding 
its large number of troops, its power, and its 
natural noise and despotism, has entered the door 
of refraining and abstaining from conquest and war 
with these two auspicious Governments, as it knew 
that it [the war] would have an unhappy result and 
would entail a heavy loss on itself.2 
He then expressed his full approval of the Khamiab~Sarik 
lands exchange. 
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In Ridgeway 1 s article in the Nineteenth Century 
previously mentioned, he put the value of the geographical 
exploration very high. He referred to the exaggerated 
opinion generally held of the extent of the Herat Oasis, 
and described Herat as far from its old magnificence, 
being then according to him, 1 a mass of hovels sheltering 
1 C.A. No.l, 1888, No.5, Inclosure, Morier to Salisbury, 
St Petersburg, 7 September 1887, Russian Official 
Statement (Translation). 
2 Ibid., No.12, Inclosure No.J, Amir to Viceroy, 16 
August 1887. 
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1 
some 5000 souls'. One of the stranger features of this 
delimitation is, that while the English-Russian agreement 
of 1873 had envisaged the Afghan northern boundary as 
going from Sarrakhs to the Amu, ~uch of this land had only 
weak earlier links with Afghanistan. We have seen how 
much this was so in the Eastern Badghis from the Kushk to 
the Murghab, but the situation in the Western Badghis was 
still more confusing. Here was a territory which had for 
long been under the domination of Persia 9 an extension of 
Khorassan, but in the nineteenth century, with the 
increasing weakness of Persia, and the consequent 
frequency of Turkmen raids it was little better than a 
no-man's land, especially in the area between Gulran, the 
Heri-Rud and the salt desert of Namaksar, its northern 
edge. When Ridgeway and others counted up the total 
addition of good land in Afghanistan's acquisition as a 
result of the Boundary Commission, quite a lot of it was 
in this area. There was little to show that Herat had 
held any land north of the Boorkhut range. Even Zulfikar, 
on which the Amir insisted, lay north of this. 
Ridgeway wrote: 'When we first entered Badghis it 
was quite terra incognita to the Afghans and even to the 
neighbouring Heratis 1 , 2 and he looked forward to new 
prosperity for these much troubled places: 
1 
2 
Since the Russian occupation of Merv the country 
has become safe, and now that the Joint Commission 
has included these fertile lands within the Afghan 
frontier, Afghan colonies begin to find their way 
Ridgeway, ~p. cit., n.472. 
Op. cit., p.473. 
there; indeedp lands which return sixty - to 1 
eighty fold ought to attract a large population. 
He took pains to point out that it was far superios 
country to the mostly pastoral lands of Penjdeh of which 
he wrote, referring contemptuously to the English war-
mongers: 
This is the district which we have restored to 
the Turcomans of Panjdeh, and this is the 
district, where, as the critics gravely assure 
us, the Russians are to mass and canton armies 
for the invasion of India, and where the 
Turcomans are to increase and multiply.2 
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He pointed out that there was little risk of 1 imaginary 
encounters between fabulous outposts at fictitious 
localities' of the kind already being reported in the 
pressP because, except 'where the border people are 
kinsmen and live peacably together 1 there was uninhabited 
land. There was no need, he saidp to fear the spread to 
that frontier of internal disturbances in Bokhara or 
Afghanistan 9 and proceeded to ridicule an article of 
Vambery's in an 1884 National Review, full of gloomy 
foreshadowings of the failure of such a Boundary 
Commission. He pointed out that the decision of Her 
Majesty's Government in 1884 was not whether she should 
take responsibility for the Amir's frontiers; that had 
already been taken; but whether they should be responsible 
for an Afghanistan of which the frontier was unknown and 
disputed. Or for an Afghanistan of which the frontier was 
known and admitted by Russia in a formal undertaking. 3 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p.478. 
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He believed very strongly that without this legal frontier, 
the Russians could not have avoided further encroachment 
into Afghan territory. He believed that this frontier 
could no longer be a possible cause of war but that a war 
in Europe might see the frontier violated 'but the Afghan 
frontier will not be the cause of war in Europe 1 • 1 What 
is perhaps most valuable in this interesting article 
written by the man who was above all others the architect 
of this frontier and who had indeed met the Russians 
'face to face 1 is his impassioned appeal to his British 
readers to remake their prejudices against Russia. 
In making this assumption [as to non-war] I not 
only rely on the honesty, good faith and pacific 
tendencies of the Emperor - in all of which I 
firmly believe - but in the foresight and sa.gaci ty 
of Russian statesmen •••• No, I think we may dismiss 
as purely chimerical the fear that Russia will 
violate the new frontier with a view to the 
invasion of India, or even of Afghanistan 
supported by England •••• Lastly, it is sometimes 
contended that the demarcation of the Afghan 
frontier has made, not the Emperor of Russia, 
but the Russian frontier officer - say Alikhanoff 
the arbiter of peace or war. Here I do not 
hesitate to join issue with the critics, ••• 
absolutely to deny that any Russian frontier 
officer will dare to violate a treaty entered into 
by his Imperial master without specific authority 
to do so, especially now that the telegraph 
connects St Petersburg with all important posts on 
the frontier.2 
He described Tarkhanov, Governor of Penjdehp and Charikov, 
Resident at Bokhara, as 'both conciliatory, moderate 
gentlemen'. He considered that Russia's advance in Asia 
had been 'the triumph of civilisation', a fact which had 
l Ibid. 
2 Ibid., pp.479-80. 
been keenly brought home to the English officers when 
they saw the results of the dreadful inroads of the 
Turkmen man-stealers in North-Western Herat. Ridgeway 
believed that Russia had now come to a halt in her Asian 
advanceo 
In only one thing was Ridgeway over~optimistic, and 
that was in the hope that the doors of Afghanistan would 
never again be closed to British officers. As to the 
settlement itself, he firmly said: 
The settlement was not obtained by smartness on 
this side or by sharp play on that side; it is 
due to the moderation and fair play of the two 
governments.I 
This is a verdict which any one who has followed these 
years of diplomatic negotiations between Russia and 
England over this frontier will hardly dispute. It is 
all the more remarkable when one remembers what an 
atmosphere of hostility existed in the press of the two 
countries in periods of crisis and how many firebrand 
Russophobes or Anglophobes were abroad. 
History seldom 'concludes' but this, as an 
'historical thesis' may suggest the following conclusions. 
Economically the relation of the two countries is even 
closer now than was the old caravan-trade link between 
Afghan Turkestan and Central Asia centring on Bokhara. 
In the old days there was frequent rivalry in this 
market, for many of the products of the lands immediately 
south of the Amu Darya were much the same as those to the 
north of it. Modern U.SoS.R. and modern Afghanistan have 
l Ibid. , p. 4 7 5. 
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evolved a most satisfactory 'favoured nation' treatment 
of one another which up to now leaves their spheres clear. 
Afghanistan is the raw producerof cotton, wool, fruit, 
and now, most likely increasingly, of natural gas, all of 
which is required by the industrial u.s.s.R. mainly for 
Central Asian factories. Tashkent has replaced Bokhara 
as the central market. Afghanistan relies a great deal 
on the machinery, for transport, hydro-electric concerns, 
irrigation, agriculture and local manufacture, which she 
imports from the u.s.s.R. To any one visiting Afghanistan 
this seems the obvious geographical development, although 
Afghanistan in the South is also improving and developing 
her contacts with industrial Pakistan, 
Arnold Toynbee wrote of the Amu in 1961: 
As I stood on the quay at Quzyl Qala and looked 
at the Soviet ships meeting the Afghan lorries 
there, I found myself ardently wishing 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union success in this 
imaginative joint economic enterprise of theirs. 
For a Westerner to grudge success to them would 
not only be ungenerous; it would also be short-
sighted.I 
What he saw in 1961 has been dwarfed by increasing trade 
since the building of the two great northern roads by 
Russian engineers, and the yearly development of air 
transport. 
As to the general picture of Afghanistan as a state 
able increasingly to take its part in the modern world, 
and to be in process of becoming 'the Switzerland of 
Asia', as a devoted U.N.E.s.c.o. Austrian educational 
1 Toynbee, Between Oxus and Jumna, 1961. 
expert, Dr Thurner, described it to me in Kabul, if 
Abdurrahman had not decided that his kingdom needed 
'strong walls', the picture might well have been a 
blurred, if not a completely obliterated one, a drawing 
with a stick on the sand of Asian history. Abdurrahman's 
frontiers helped to make a state so stable as an entirety 
that it has survived such setbacks as the assassination 
of two of its rulers, and the period of incredible 
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misrule in 1928-29, to become the state that it now is, 
still poor, still economically and educationally backward, 
but advancing every year, even every month, fast along 
the road of democratic progress, and its people of many 
races are now welding themselves not into one race but 
into one nationality, proud, as the tribal Afghans were, 
of the name Afghanistan. 
The division of people which has come about by the 
strict policing over the same period of this artificial 
frontier is an extremely interesting one to which I have 
by no means the full answer. I have a fair idea of what 
are the main external differences between a Turkmen of 
the Turkmen S.S.R. as regarding his present political, 
economic and general social (education and so forth) 
situation, and those of his relations living in 
Afghanistan, but I have not much information as to the 
hopes they may have for racial re-integration or 
association. Nor do I know, for instance, how much 
meaning to each there might be in such a word as 
'freedom'; or how such a conception as 'my people's 
history and culture' may be interpreted by the Turkmen 
among Turkmens. This is true equally of the Uzbek people 
of the two states, and of the Tadjiks. It is even true 
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of the smaller groups such as the Jamshid£s who are now 
broken into three or more groups, in the original 
Badghis,in Soviet Penjdeh and also as a group of city-
dwellers in Herat. Of the Turkmens and Uzbeks, how many 
came south to escape from the controls of the Russian 
Tsarist colonisers, and how many came at different periods 
after the establishment of Soviet power? Or is it true~ 
as the Marxist-trained Turkmen historians told me, that in 
this later period only the feudalists did not return north, 
but all the poor misguided drudges who followed them into 
Afghanistan had long since returned to the economic 
security of collective farms. I sometimes find myself in 
some doubt about this, in part because of the great 
increase that seems to have taken place in the spread of 
Turkmens geographically over Afghanistan, as well as their 
numbers in the present population. Probably most Turkmens 
are still semi-nomadic agriculturists or wholly nomadic 
pastoralists and even in socialised Turkmenistan 
collectivisation and standardised education must come 
with difficulty to the rural Turkmens who live and move 
across one of the world's notoriously desert regions. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE GRANVILLE-GORTCHAKOFF AGREEMENT OF 1873 
Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus. 
Foreign Office, January 24, 1873. 
My Lord, 
Her Majesty's Government have attentively considered 
the statements and arguments contained in Prince 
Gortchakow's despatch of the 7/19th December, and the 
papers that accompanied it, which were communicated to 
me by the Russian Ambassador on the 17/29th December, and 
to your Excellency by Prince Gortchakow on the 29th of 
that month. 
Her Majesty's Government gladly recognise, in the 
frank and friendly terms of that despatch, the same 
spirit of friendliness as that in which, by my despatch 
of the 17th of October, I desired to convey through your 
Excellency to the Russian Government the views of that of 
Her Majesty in regard to the line of boundary claimed by 
Shere Ali, the Ruler of Cabul, for his possessions of 
Afghanistan. 
Her Majesty's Government see with much satisfaction 
that, as regards the principal part of that line, the 
Imperial Government is willing to acquiesce in the claim 
of Shere Ali, and they rely on the friendly feelings of 
the Emperor when they lay before him, as I now instruct 
your Excellency to do, a renewed statement of the grounds 
on which they consider that Shere Ali's claim to the 
remainder of the line of boundary, referred to in my 
despatch of the 17th of October, to be well-founded. 
The objections stated in Prince Gortchakow's 
despatch apply to that part of Shere Ali's claims which 
would comprise the province of Badakshan with its 
dependent district of Wakhan within the Afghan State. 
The Imperial Government contend that the province of 
Badakshan with its dependency, not having been formally 
incorporated into the territories of Shere Ali, is not 
legitimately any portion of the Afghan State. 
To this Her Majesty's Government reply that the 
Ameer of Cabul having attained by conquest the 
sovereignty over Badakshan, and having received in the 
most formal manner the submission of the chiefs and 
people of that province, had the right to impose upon it 
such a form of government as he might think best adapted 
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to the position of affairs at the time. In the exercise 
of this right he appointed a local governor, and he 
consented experimentally to receive a fixed portion of 
the revenues of the country, instead of taking upon 
himself its general financial and other administration. 
But the Ameer expressly reserved to himself the right of 
reconsidering this arrangement, which was, in the first 
instance, made only for one year, of at any time 
subjecting Badakshan to the direct Government 6f Cabul, 
and of amalgamating the revenues thereof with the general 
revenue of the Afghan State. Her Majesty's Government 
cannot perceive anything in these circumstances 
calculated to weaken the claims of Shere Ali to the 
absolute sovereignty of Badakshan. The conquest and 
submission of the province were complete; and it cannot 
rea~onably be urged that any experimental form of 
administration which the Ameer, with the acknowledged 
right of sovereignty, might think fit to impose on 
Badakshan, could possibly disconnect the province from 
the general territories south of the Oxus, the 
sovereignty of which the Russian Government has without 
hesitation recognised to be vested in the Ameer of Cabul. 
Her Majesty's Government have not failed to notice 
in portions of the statements to the Russian Government 
to which I am now replying, that its objection to 
admitting Badakshan and Wakhan to be under the 
sovereignty of Shere Ali is rested in part on an 
expressed apprehension lest their incorporation with the 
remainder of Afghanistan should tend to disturb the peace 
of Central Asia, and specifically should operate as an 
encouragement of the Ameer to extend his possessions at 
the expense of the neighbouring countries. I alluded in 
my despatch, of the 17th of October, to the success which 
had attended the recommendations made to the Ameer by the 
Indian Government to adopt the policy which had produced 
the most beneficial results in the establishment of peace 
in countries where it had long been unknown; and her 
Majesty's Government see no reason to suppose that similar 
results would not follow on the like recommendations. 
Her Majesty's Government will not fail to impress upon 
the Ameer in the strongest terms the advantages which are 
given to him in the recognition by Great Britain and 
Russia of the boundaries which he claims, and of the 
consequent obligation upon him to abstain from any 
aggression on his part, and Her Majesty's Government 
will continue to exercise their influence in the same 
direction. 
Her Majesty 1 s Government cannot however but feel 
that, if Badakshan and Wakhan, which they consider the 
Ameer justly to deem to be part of his territories, be 
assumed by England or Russia, or by one or either of 
them, to be wholly independent of his authority, the 
Ameer might be tempted to assert his claims by arms; 
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that perhaps in that case Bokhara might seek an 
opportunity of acquiring districts too weak of themselves 
to resist the Afghan State; and that thus the peace of 
Central Asia would be disturbed, and occasion given for 
questions between Great Britain and Russia, which it is 
on every account so desirable to avoid, and which Her 
Majesty's Government feel sure would be as distasteful 
to the Imperial Government as to themselves. 
Her Majesty 1 s Government therefore feel that the 
Imperial Government, weighing these considerations 
dispassionately, will concur in the recognition which 
they have made of Shere Ali 1 s rights, as stated in my 
despatch of October, and by so doing put an end to the 
wild speculations, so calculated to distract the minds 
of Asiatic races, that there is some marked disagreement 
between England and Russia, on which they may build 
hopes of carrying out their border feuds for purposes of 
self-aggrandisement. 
Her Majesty 1 s Government congratulate themselves 
upon the prospect of a definite settlement as between the 
two Governments of the question of the boundaries of 
Afghanistan, the details of which have been so long in 
discussion. 
Your Excellency will read and give a copy of this 
despatch to Prince Gortchakow. 
Lord A. Loftus. 
I am, &c., 
Granville. 
Prince Gortchakow to Count Brunnow,-(Communicated to 
Earl Granville by Count Brunnow, February 5.) 
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St. Petersbourg, le 19/Jl Janvier, 1873. 
M. le Comte, 
Lord Augustus Loftus m1 a communique la response du 
Principal Secretaire d'Etat de Sa Majeste Britannique a 
notre depeche sur 1 1 Asie Centrale, sous la date du 7/19 
Decembre. 
Je joins ci-pres une copie de cette piece. 
Nous voyons avec satisfaction que la Cabinet Anglais 
continue a poursuivre, dans ces parages, le meme but que 
nous, celui d'y assurer la paix et autant que possible la 
tranquillite. 
La divergence de nos vues consistait dans les 
frontieres assignees aux domaines de Shir Ali. 
Le Cabinet Anglais y fait entrer la Badakshan et le 
Vakhan, qui, a nos yeux jouissaient d 1 une certaine 
independance. Vu la difficulte de constater, dans 
toutes ses nuances, la realite dans ces parages lointains, 
vu le plus de facilite qu 1 a le Gouvernment Britannique 
de recueillir des donnees precises, et surtout vu le 
desir de ne point donner a cette question de detail plus 
d'importance qu 1 elle ne comporte, nous ne refusons pas 
d 1 admettre la ligne de demarcation Anglaise. 
Nous sommes d'autant plus portes a cet acte de 
courtoisie que le Gouvernement Anglais s 1 engage a user 
de toute son influence sur Shir Ali pour le maintenir 
dans une attitude pacifique et insister sur l'abandon de 
sa part de toute agression ou conquete ulterieure. Cette 
influence est incontestable, Elle repose non seulement 
sur l 1 ascendant materiel et moral de 1 1 Angleterre, mais 
aussi sur les subsides dont Shir Ali lui a 1 1 obligation. 
Nous pouvons, des lors, y voir une garantie reelle pour 
la conservation de la paix. 
Votre Excellence voudra bien faire cette declaration 
a M. le Principal Secretaire d 1 Etat de Sa Majeste 
Britannique et lui remettre une copie de cette depeche. 
Lord Granville y verra, nous en sommes convaincus, 
une nouvelle preuve du prix que notre auguste Maitre 
attache a entretenir et a consolider les meilleures 
relations avec la Gouvernement de Sa Majeste la Reine 
Victoria. 
Le Comte Brunnow. 
Recevez, &c. , 
Gortchakow. 
My Lord, 
Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus. 
Foreign Office, February 5, 1873. 
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The Russian Ambassador communicated to me today 
Prince Gortchakoff 1 s despatch of January 19/Jl, in reply 
to my despatch to your Excellency of the 24th of January 
respecting Central Asia; and I said that I should have 
great pleasure in communicating it to my colleagues. 
I am, &c., 
Lord A. Loftus. Granville. 
APPENDIX B 
An abridgment of passages from Lt Alexander 
Burnesu Travels into Bokhara etc. (18J4), 
referring to 1 Khoja Saleh'. 
1. We left Balkh at midnight and JO miles brought 
us to the limit of the waters of the Balkh-Ab. 
We entered the desert and travelled all night on 
the way to the Oxus. We left the great high road 
from Balkh to Kilif, the usual ferry, from fear 
of robbers, and journeyed westward. At daylight 
we halted and had an insight of what we were to 
expect in the deserts of Tartary. The mountains 
of the Hindu Kush had entirely disappeared and a 
wide plain like an ocean of sand surrounded us 
on all sides. We saddled at sunset and after a 
journey of fifteen hours and a journey of JO 
miles, found ourselves on the banks of the great 
river. Till within a mile and a half of the 
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river 1 we had traversed a peculiarly inhospitable 
and unpromising country 1 quite destitute of water; 
and its stunted herbage either protruded from 
mounds of loose, drifting sand, or made its 
appearance through sheets of hard clay. We halted 
on the banks of the river, near the small village 
of Khoju Salu. The vicinity of the Oxus is 
intersected by aqueducts for nearly two miles, but 
by no means industriously cultivated; it was a 
better sign of a more tranquil country, to see 
each peasant's house standing at a distance from 
that of his neighbours and in the midst of his 
own fields. We were detained for two days on the 
banks of the river, till it came to our turn of the 
ferry-boat; which transferred our caravan, on the 
17th June, to the northern bank, or the country of 
Toorkestan, more commonly known to Europeans by the 
name of Tartary. After our passage of the Oxus, 
we commenced our journey towards Bokhara, and 
halted at Shor-kudduk, where there were no 
inhabitants, and about 15-20 brackish wells. 
(Vol.l, pp.244-51.) 
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2. On leaving the hilly ground below Kilif, about 
sixty miles north-west of Balkh, the channel of 
the Oxus does not exceed 350 yards; on the plain 
it is wider spread, and we crossed it at Khoju 
Salu, JO miles below that point, with a channel of 
823 yards as determined by the sextant. At 
Charjooee 200 miles lower down within twenty leagues 
of Bokhara~ it had a channel of 650 yards. A 
detailed account of the river at these points will 
furnish the best data for a determination of its 
capabilities in a military and commercial point of 
view. At Khoju Salu on the 17th June, a month 
before the periodical swell had attained its 
greatest height, the Oxus was divided into three 
distinct branches, only separated from each other 
by sand-banks, The width of the arms respectively 
was 295, 113 and 415 yards; which gives the total 
breadth of 823 yards. The soundings were irregular, 
and at the deepest place did not amount to 20 feet. 
(Vol.II, pp.190-1). 
APPENDIX C 
Diagram of the Valley of the Murghab from 
Penjdeh downstream north to Yulatan, a 
distance of 88 miles 
Yulatan 
Chaha 
Kala 
Hazrat Imam 
Q) 
(.) 
c Sandak 
ro 
> 
'O 
ro 
Dogru c 
ro 
·i-i 
rJJ 
rJJ 
~ Sari ~ 
Aima 
Orush 
Kara Tepe !:::, 
Pul-i-Khisti[Tash-Ke 
Ak TeP, 
~· 
'?~ 
+v 
18 m. 
Bagh 
lJ m. 
Bruµ. 
6 m. 
[Imam Baba] 
6 m. 
Kishan 
r-i 
ro 
J m. ~ ro 
Ali H 'O 
,.q 
..µ 
6 m. ·i-i ~ 
Yazi c 
ro 
4 
,.q 
Q.o 
'1-l 
Jar <i: 
5.5 m. 
oshan 
6.5 m. 
hali 
lJ m. 
7.5 m. 
Old Penjdeh 
Q) 
(.) 
c 
ro 
> 
'O 
ro 
c 
ro 
fn 
'1-l 
<i: 
based on N.A.I.? FOR., Sec. Fi Pros. Sept. 1888, 
l\Tnc 1c:;,1n._lt~ rn1c~all!::.Ylan. ... "1c 
4Jl 
APPENDIX D 
THE AFFAIR ON THE KUSHK 
These notes are extracted from Central Asia No.5 
(1885). They contain Sir Peter Lumsden 1 s points 
of disagreement with General Komarov's account 
of the battle. 
No.27, de Giers to de Staal, 11 April, passed on by de 
Staal to Granville, 12 April, and sent by 
Granville to Lumsden on lJ April. 
Komarov telegraphed from Tash-Kepri, 1 April (20 
March O.S.) 
On 25 March, our detachment approached Dash-
Kepri on one bank of the Kushk. Near the bridge 
I found an intrenchment occupied by Afghans. In 
order to avoid a conflict 9 I placed my troops five 
versts from the Afghan position. On the twenty-
sixth communications began with Captain Yate. 
When the Afghans had convinced themselves that we 
had no intention of attacking them, they began 
each day to come nearer to our camp, The 27th 
March they sent against our company, which was 
charged with covering a reconnaissance, three 
companies with a cannon and some cavalry. Their 
audacity and arrogance increased by degrees. The 
28th they occupied a height which commanded the 
left flank of our camp, began to throw up 
intrenchments there, to establish a post of 
cavalry behind our line, and placed a picket at 
gun-shot distance from our ford. The 29th March 
I sent to the' commander of the Afghan detachment 
an energetic summons to evacuate by the evening 
the left bank of the Kushk and the right bank of 
the Murghab up to the mouth of the Kushk. I 
received an answer that, by the advice of the 
English, he refused to retire across the Kushk. 
I again addressed a private letter, couched in 
friendly terms, on the JOth March. To support my 
demands, I marched with my detachment against the 
Afghan position, counting still on a pacific 
result, but artillery fire and a cavalry attack 
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compelled me to accept the combat, the results of 
which are already known. 
No.40, Thornton to Granville~ 10 April, enclosing a 
comment from the Journal de St Petersbourg, 
April 10 (March 29). 
It suggests that the movement of the Russian 
forces must have been provoked by hostile acts on 
the part of the Afghans, and that the affair was 
but an accidental conflict. 
No.42, Granville telegraphs Lumsden, 15 April. 
Continue to report fully by telegram, but 
specify in each case what you know for certain, 
what you have reason to believe, and what is 
merely based on hearsay evidence. 
No.48, Lumsden to Granville, 14 April (crossed with 
No.42, it was received 17 April). 
Russians assert their attack was provoked by 
Afghan acts of hostility. This allegation cannot 
be maintained. Two specific acts were complained 
of ..•. These comparatively trivial incidents were 
at once dropped, on Captain Yate bringing to 
notice serious and successive forcing of Afghan 
posts by Russians~ any one of which was equivalent 
to a declaration of war. Colonel Alikhanov had 
penetrated Afghan lines •.. and Russian infantry had 
advanced •.• against the Afghan line on the right 
bank of the Murghab ...• Captain Yate showed that 
the Afghans held Pul-i-Khisti position previous to 
17th Marchj and had merely strengthened and 
developed it as a military necessity in response 
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to hostile advance of Russians and development of 
their position at Kizil-Tepe •... Colonel Ridgeway 
had advised the Afghans to withdraw from their 
position at Pul-i-Khisti on left bank of Kushk, and 
to keep the country there flooded in order that it 
might be inaccessible to either side. But the 
Afghans maintained their position contrary to his 
advice. 
No.50, [Granville reports to Thornton on 17 April that 
de Staal showed him a despatch from de Giers 
stating that 1 it was impossible not to ascribe 
its (the battle's) cause to the military 
character which the British Government had 
thought it necessary to give their Commission'. J 
No.59, Lumsden criticises Komarov 1 s telegram of the 1 
April (No. 27). 
(1) Komaroff 1 s claim to either bank of the Kushk 
is untenable. The left bank •.• had always been 
held by Afghans ..•• 
(2) The intrenchment of Afghans near the bridge 
had been there prior to General Komaroff's advance 
and to the agreement mentioned in 'Your Lordship's 
telegram of 17th'. 
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(3) General Komaroff's mention of '5 versts' can 
only have applied to the main body, not Kizil Tepe. 
(4) So far from the Afghans being convinced of 
General KomaroffUs innocent intentions, the 
continued and irritating daily attempts to excite 
hostility convinced Afghans of Russian determination 
to provoke conflict ..•. 
(5) A reconnaissance in force in itself meant 
hostile intention. A Russian company meant 250 
men .... On 27th two bodies of Russian troops 
simultaneously advanced, Colonel Alikhanov with 
cavalry pushed past Pul-i-Khisti, and Russian 
infantry penetrated the right flank of Afghan 
position on right bank of Murghab. Colonel 
Alikhanov only retired when intercepted by Afghan 
cavalry some four miles in rear of Afghan position, 
and Russian infantry only when Afghan Commander 
drew up three companies and warned Russian officer 
that if he advanced further he would be fired upon. 
(6) Afghan audacity and arrogance increased by 
degrees. It may have been so, but, if so, it was 
entirely caused by Russian action, as the Afghans 
did all they could to avoid collision •..• 
(7) It was the case that the Arghan Commander did 
on 28th ••• place a post of observations on the hills 
on right bank of Murghab ... but this post was 
withdrawn the next day. 
(8) and (9) ~umsden disputed Komaroff's accounts 
of the correspondence between himself and the 
Afghan commander.] 
(10) Of course Afghans were obliged to defend 
themselves. Certainly the engagement was not 
commenced by artillery fire .•. as infantry firing 
was heard continuing several minutes before the 
first gun. 
No.65, de Giers to de Staal 9 (21) April, shown to 
Granville. 
In any case, immediately after the engagement 
of the 18th March, General Komaroff resumed his 
former positions on the left bank of the Kushk.. 
This circumstance being of a nature to ensure the 
status quo in these districts against all danger, 
it appears to us that there is nothing to prevent 
the two Cabinets from continuing the negotiations 
which have for their aim the settlement of the 
frontier question. 
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APPENDIX E 
THE LONDON PROTOCOL, 10 SEPTEMBER 1885 
[Translation] 
THE Undersigned, the Marquis of Salisbury, Knight of 
the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Her Britannic Majesty's 
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. &c., 
and his Excellency M. Georges de Staal, Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the 
Emperor of All the Russias at the Court of Her Britannic 
Majesty, &c., have met together for the purpose of 
recording in the present Protocol the following agreement 
which has been arrived at between Her Majesty the Queen 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and 
His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias:-
1. It is agreed that the frontier of Afghanistan, 
between the Heri-Rud and the Oxus, shall be drawn as 
follows:-
The frontier will start from the Heri-Rud about 2 
versts below the fort of Zulfikar, and will follow the 
line marked in red on the Map No.l attached to the 
Protocol as far as the point K in such a manner as not 
to approach nearer than a distance of J,000 English feet 
to the edge of the scarp of the western defile (including 
the crest marked L M N of the northern branch of that 
defile). From the point K the line will follow the crest 
of the heights bordering on the north the second defile, 
which it will cut a little to the west of the bifurcation 
at a distance of about 850 sajens from the point where 
the roads from Adam-Ulan, Kungrueli, and Ak-Robat meet. 
The line will then continue to follow the crest of the 
heights as far as the point P marked on Map No.2 attached 
to the Protocol. From thence it will run in a south-
easterly direc~i6fi-rt~~rly parallel to the Ak-Robat road, 
will pass between the salt lakes marked Q and R, which 
are to the south of Ak-Robat and to the north of Souma 
Karez, and leaving Souma Karez to the Afghans, will 
run to Islim where the frontier will cross to the right 
bank of the Egri-Gueuk, leaving Islim outside Afghan 
territory. The line will then follow the crests of the 
hills which border the right bank of the Egri-Gueuk, and 
will leave Chemen-i-Bid outside the Afghan frontier. It 
will in like manner follow the crest of the hills which 
border the right bank of the Kushk as far as Hauzi Khan. 
From Hauzi Khan the frontier will follow an almost 
straight line to a point on the Murghab to the north of 
Maruchak, fixed so as to leave to Russia the lands 
cultivated by the Sariks, and their pastures. 
Applying the same principle both to the Turkomans 
subject to Russia and to th~ subjects of the Ameer of 
Afghanistan, the frontier will follow east of the 
Murghab a line north of the valley of the Kaisor, and 
west of the valley of the Sangalak (Ab-i-Andkhoi), and 
leaving Andkhoi to the east will run to Khoja Saleh on 
the Oxus. 
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The delimitation of the pastures belonging to the 
respective populations will be left to the Commissioners. 
In the event of their not arriving at an understanding, 
this delimitation will be settled by the two Cabinets on 
the basis of the Maps drawn up and signed by the 
Commissioners. 
For the sake of greater clearness the principal 
points of the frontier-line are marked on the Maps 
annexed to the present Protocol. 
2. It is agreed that Commissioners shall forthwith 
be appointed by the Governments of Her Majesty the Queen 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and 
His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, who shall 
proceed to examine and trace upon the spot the details 
of the Afghan frontier as fixed by the preceding Article. 
One Commissioner shall be appointed by Her Majesty the 
Queen and one by His Majesty the Emperor. The escorts of 
the Commission are fixed at 100 men at most on either 
side, and no increase shall be made without an agreement 
between the Commissioners. The Commissioners shall meet 
at Zulfikar within two months from the date of the 
signature of the present Protocol, and shall at once 
proceed to trace the frontier in conformity with the 
preceding stipulations. 
It is agreed that the delimitation shall begin at 
Zulfikar, and that, as soon as the Commissioners shall 
have met and commenced their labours, the neutralization 
of Penjdeh shall be limited to the district comprised 
between a line to the north running from Bend-i-Nadir to 
Burdj-Uraz-Khan and a line to the south running from 
Maruchak to Hauzi Khan, the Russian and Afghan posts on 
the Murghab being respectively at Bend-i-Nadir and 
Maruchak. The Commissioners shall conclude their labours 
as quickly as possible. 
J. It is agreed that in tracing this frontier, and 
in conforming as closely as possible to the description 
of this line in the present Protocol, as well as to the 
points marked on the Maps annexed thereto, the said 
Commissioners shall pay due attention to the localities, 
and to the necessities and well-being of the local 
populations. 
4. As the work of delimitation proceeds, the 
respective parties shall be at liberty to establish 
posts on the frontier. 
5. It is agreed that, when the said Commissioners 
shall have completed their labours, Maps shall be 
prepared and signed, and communicated by them to their 
respective Governments. 
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In witness whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized 
to that effect, have signed the present Protocol, and 
have affixed thereto the seal of their arms. 
Done at London, the 10th September, 1885. 
(L.S.) 
(L.S.) 
SALISBURY. 
STAAL. 
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APPENDIX F 
GREAT BRITAIN PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS CENTRAL ASIA 
N0.2 (1887) 
Central Asia No.2 (1887) No.218 1 Inclos. 4 
Mr. Merk to Colonel Sir West Ridgeway 
Camp, Zulfikar, October 18, 1886. 
IN continuation of my Report, dated the 9th instant, 
I have the honour to submit a Report upon the canals in 
the Kushk Valley, from the Russo-Afghan frontier at 
Karatapa Khurd up to Chardarra. 
2. Taking the canals in their order, stream upwards, 
from the Russo-Afghan border towards Chardarra, those 
that first come under consideration are the three canals 
irrigating the level land in the vicinity of Karatapa 
Khurd. Of these, one lies on the left bank of the 
Kushk and two on the right banka The canal on the left 
bank is called the Joe Chapghul Payan, and takes off 
from a point about 3 miles above Karatapa Khurd, 
ceasing about 1 mile above the boundary. It irrigates 
a plot of good land over a mile in length, and from 
400 to 800 yards in width, which till last year was 
cultiva~ed by the Saryks. Of the two canals on the 
right bank, the larger and older one 9 known as the Joe 
Karatapa Khurd, takes off about 5 miles above Karatapa 
Khurd, and is continued across the border towards 
Chemen-i-Bid. In its upper portion it can irrigate a 
considerable quantity of good level land; at about 2 
miles from Karatapa Khurd it enters broken ground for 
about a mile; it then emerges on to the plain round 
Karatapa Khurd and goes on towards Chemen-i-Bid. The 
Saryks used this canal till last year, but appear to 
have availed themselves of it more for the land lying 
between Karatapa Khurd and Chemen-i-Bid, than for the 
land above Karatapa Khurd. Of the latter, they 
cultivated a plot of about three-quarters of a mile in 
length and a few hundred yards in width, at the upper 
portion of the canal; and, again, a few fields near 
Karatapa itself. The second canal is much smaller and 
of more recent construction. It takes off at about 3 
miles above Karatapa and flows in, and below the level 
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of, the flat alluvial bank of the Kushk 1 till close to 
Karatapa, where it has gained sufficient elevation to 
permit of its being used for irrigation. It was 
principally used for the land below Karatapa Khurd but 
also irrigated a little land at Karatapa which was under 
Saryk cultivation till last year. 
J. For about 1 mile above the head of the Joe 
Karatapa Khurd, the bed of the valley is coated with a 
saline efflorescence and is uncultivable, but bears a 
dense tamarisk jungle. Where this ceases, the end of 
the Sheikh Juwain Canal is reachedo This canal takes 
off about 4 miles further up-stream on the right bank, 
and about 1 mile below the canal head commences to 
irrigate the tract of excellent arable land, about 3 
miles long, with an average breadth of half-a-mile, 
which is called the Mahal-i-Sheikh Juwain from the 
"ziarat" close by. This is a valuable piece of ground. 
It was cultivated till last year by the Saryks, who had 
also constructed a small water-cut taking off from the 
Kushk opposite the Dahana Shor Araba, to supplement the 
supply of water afforded by the Joe Sheikh Juwain. 
There can be no cultivation on the left bank here, the 
hills coming close down to the river. 
4. Next, and on the right bank, come the two small 
canals, which were fed from the Tanura spring about it 
miles above the Joe Sheikh Juwain canal head. They 
have not been used for many years; the Upper Joe Tanura 
is about half-a-mile in length, and extends to the south; 
the lower is about three-quarters of a-mile long, and 
flowed to the north. At Tanura are the ruins of a brick 
mosque and a mill, said to have been constructed by 
Jamshidis. 
5. About Jt miles up-stream from Tanura, the Joe 
Chapghul Bala took off on the right bank of the river, 
and commencing at half-a-mile below the canal-head, 
irrigated a bay of valuable arable land, about 2 miles 
long, and on an average half~a-mile broad called the 
Mahal-i-Chapghul. This ground has lain waste for many 
years: the canal is still in fair repair. All along the 
left bank here, the hills skirt the stream close~y, and 
leave no space for cultivationo 
6. Next, and on the left bank, is the Joe Karatapa 
Kalan, which irrigates the Karatapa lands down to 
opposite the Joe Chapghul Bala canal-head. It took off 
formerly about it miles above Karatapa, but the head was 
washed away last year, and a fresh head has been made 
about 1 mile above the old site, The Karatapa lands are 
of good quality, and were cultivated till last year by 
the Saryks. 
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7. Three hundred families of Afghan cultivators 
from Zamindawar have last month been brought by the 
Ameer's orders to Karatapa Kalan, where they are living 
now, and it is intended that they shall cultivate the 
Karatapa Kalan and Chapghul Bala lands; but I was told 
by the local Afghan frontier official the Sheikh Juwain 
and Karatapa Khurd lands were to remain uncultivated arrl 
uninhabited. 
8. Next in order is the Joe Haji Jir, which takes 
off on the left bank at the mound of ancient ruins called 
Haji Jir; it extends for about 1 1/4 miles along the 
left bank of the Kushk, irrigating a tract of fair land 
about 1 mile long, and a few hundred yards wide. This 
land was not cultivated by the Saryks; it lay fallow for 
a long time, but has this year been brought under 
cultivation by Shighai Ferozkohis (nomads), of whom 500 
families were planted in the Kushk Valley from Karatapa 
Kalan to Chardarra last year by the Governor of Herat. 
Within these limits their "kibitka'' settlements are 
scattered along both sides of the river, and wherever 
they have cultivated lands or intend to do so, it will 
be mentioned. 
9. Higher up-stream the Joe Firzasain, an important 
canal, takes off on the right bank it miles above Haji 
Jir, and irrigates good fertile soil from about 1 mile 
above Haji Jir, down to opposite the present head of 
the Joe Karatapa. 
The Saryks, till 1885, cultivated the land 
irrigable from this canal from opposite Haji Jir down 
to the end of the canal, and this plot of land is the 
southern limit of Saryk cultivation in the Kushk Valley. 
At present, the Joe Firzasain is used by some of the 
Shighai Ferozkohis mentioned above. 
10. Next comes the Joe Chihal Dukhteran, which, 
taking off on the left bank about 1 mile above the old 
Jamshidi shrine of Chihal Dukhteran, terminated at Haji 
Jir. The lands attached to this canal, commencing about 
half-a-mile from its head, were last cultivated by Salor 
Turkomans, who migrated to Sarakhs twelve years ago, 
since when they have not been cultivated. 
11. Higher up are two small canals, the Joe Daghi 
and Joe Sarchashma, on the left and right banks 
respectively. They are each about 1 mile in length, 
and irrigated plots of land about half to three-quarters 
of a-mile long, and JOO to 500 yards broad, which were 
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last cultivated by Salor Turkomans twelve years ago. 
Some Shighai Ferozkohis have now settled at the ruined 
Kila Sarchashma, and intend to reopen the Joe Sarchashma. 
12. Finally come two old and large canals, the Joe 
Shahr Khalil and the Joe Sanghur. 
The Joe Shahr Khalil took off on the left bank of 
the Kushk about l! miles above Chardarra, and extended 
to 4 miles below that place. Irrigation commenced 
three-quarters of a-mile below the canal-head, and was 
assisted by two Karezes (now fallen in) near the ruins 
of the town of Shahr Khalil. The land attached to this 
canal and the land that was irrigated by the Joe 
Sanghur is a considerable area; it is good and fertile, 
and is said to have been las~ cultivated by Jamshidis, 
some thirty years ago. It b~~rs no-traces of recent 
cultivation. Half-a-mile below Shahr Khalil are the 
ruins of an old Jamshidi fort. 
The Joe Sanghur took off on the right bank of the 
Kushk, a little below the Joe Shahr Khalil canal-head, 
and went down nearly to Darakht Tut, where it terminated, 
4! miles from Chardarra. About 150 Shighai Ferozkohis 
are living at and near Chardarra, and they mean to 
reopen both the Shahr Khalil and Sanghur Canals. 
APPENDIX G 
NO. 127. 
Colonel Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery.-
(Received July J.) 
Camp, Andkhui, May 24, 1886. 
(Extract) 
I HAVE the honour to submit, for your Lordship's 
information, a copy of the amended statement of the 
Afghan case regarding Khoja Salar, which I have now 
formally communicated to the Russian Commissioner. 
INCLOSURE I IN NO. 127. 
Amended Statement respecting the Khoja Salar Question. 
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AT the meeting of the Commission held on the 27th 
November, 1885, the question arose as to the point on the 
Oxus where the Afghan frontier from the Murghab should 
terminate. I was of opinion that it should terminate at 
the point marked in the Russian Staff Map as Khodsha 
Salor, a few miles north-west of Dev Kila; but my 
colleague, Colonel Kuhlberg, held that_ it should meet the 
Oxus at the point shown as the "ziarat" of Khwaja Salor 
in the English Map of 1885. · 
The tract in dispute comprises almost the whole 
district of Khoja Salar, which is a strip of cultivated 
land along the Oxus, extending from Bosagha to the Kilif 
ferry, a distance of about 35 miles, with a width of from 
2 to 4 miles. Coming from Kerki, the last settlement in 
the Kerki province is Bosagha, and the first settlement 
in Khoja Salar is Kham-i-ab, the distance between the 
last Bosagha houses and the first Kham-i-ab houses being 
only a few hundred yards. The district of Khoja Salar 
has a population of about 4,800 families, with 60,000 
sheep and several thousand cows, and pays to the Ameer a 
total revenue of about 20,000 Cabuli rupees. At present 
it comprises some fourteen villages~ Kham-i-ab, Robat 
Abdullah Khan, Dali, Islam, Yaz Arik, Dinar, Khan Tapeh, 
Iki Yuz, Karkin Bazar, Shur Tepe, Serai of Khoja Salar, 
Arik Batyr, ziarat of Khwaja Salar, Agha Juyia, &c., under 
a Governor, and is inhabited by Karkins and Ersaris. The 
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latter came there towards the end of the last century. 
They than occupied both banks of the Oxus from Kerki to 
Kilif, and also Akcha, Daulatabad, Sar-i-pul and other 
places in the interior, where they are still to be 
found. The Ersaris of Khoja Salar are not nomads, but 
peaceable cultivators, living in houses. They say that 
they found the country uninhabited, and that they 
themselves dug all the irrigation canals. They further 
state that, when they came, Akcha was under Bokhara 
rule, but that the provincial division, viz., Kerki, 
Akcha, and Bokhara, was the same as at present. Khoja 
Salar was part of Akcha, and paid revenue to the Ruler 
or Governor of that district. We also khow from 
Moorecroft, who visited the Khoja Salar district in 
1825, that the Ersaris at that time ~aid revenue to 
Afghanistan. 
There are five ferries between Kerki and Kilif, viz., 
Kerki, Khotab, Moghri, Ak-kum, Kilif, the Ak-kum ferry 
being the nearest in Bokhara to Kam-i-ab. The river is 
quite unfordable, even at low water, and it is believed 
that no ford exists below its junction with the Kokcha. 
If any proof is required that the lands from Kham-i-
ab to Kilif constituted the Khoja Salar district, and 
that these, as such, belong to Akcha, at least, as long 
as Akcha has been Afghan, i.e., for the last twenty-five 
years at least, such proof would be easily given. 
First, I invite inquiry among the people of Bosagha 
and other neighbouring places in Bokhara outside the 
sphere of Afghan influence. 
Secondly, I can produce a formal declaration by the 
headmen of the Kerki province of Bokhara that Kham-i-ab 
is Afghan territory; also the evidence of the inhabitants 
of Khoja Salar and of the Nazir (Revenue Collector or 
Superintendent) of the Akcha province, who has held his 
present appointment since 1868, and finally, I have the 
Revenue records and other documentary evidence. 
As to Akcha, I would remind my colleagues that, 
when the Durani power was on the decline, and Bokhara 
was weakened by wars with Khiva and other States, Afghan 
Turkistan formed a complex of small States, continually 
intriguing against each other, and submitting to Afghan 
or Bokhara supremacy, according to the dictates of the 
moment. 
Thus we find that Akcha in 1825 was Afghan, while 
in 1840 it acknowledged the sovereignty of Bokhara. 
About 1850 it again began to lean towards 
Afghanistan, and in 1860 it was definitely turned into 
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an Afghan district, the Ameer deposing and imprisoning 
the last independent Ruler, Ishan Urak. Finally, and 
this is a point of vital importance, by the understanding 
of 1872-73, Akcha is acknowledged to be one of the 
provinces fully belonging to Afghanistan, and it is a 
clear inference that any district which, at the time, 
formed part of Akcha, equally belongs to Afghanistan. 
If, then, I can prove that Khoja Salar was part of 
Akcha in 1872, then I think that I have sufficiently 
established the right of Afghanistan to that district. 
But my colleague contends, if I am not mistaken, 
that, according to the Agreement of 1873, the frontier 
should be drawn in the "post", "Kho.ja Saleh" on the 
Oxus, and that Afghanistan should not claim the river 
bank lower down than that point. 
I admit the justice of this contention, and if I 
were not prepared to prove that the ziarat of Khoja 
Salar is not the post of ~'Kho ja Saleh 11 referred to in the 
Agreement of 1872-73, there would be nothing left but to 
bring the frontier round the north of the village of 
Kham-i-ab to the point in question. But this would be a 
very awkward and inconvenient frontier, and it would cut 
off nearly the whole of Khoja Salar district (including, 
of course, Kham-i-ab) from the river for a distance of 
nearly 20 miles. Under these circumstances, I would 
appeal with confidence to the spirit of justice and 
moderation which has so conspicuously characterized my 
colleague during these negotiations, and I would invite 
him to give effect to the instructions contained in the 
Protocol of the 10th September, 1885, which enjoins us 
to pay due attention to the localities, and to the 
necessities and well-being of the local populations, 
as well as to the status quo. 
There is, however, no need to consider this difficulty 
inasmuch as it is clear that the British and Russian 
Governments in the Agreement of 1873 did know definitively 
which spot they meant by Khoja Salar, and that this spot 
corresponds with the Ak-kum ferry or the Khoja Salar of 
Burnes, for both the Russian and English Maps of that 
time show nKhoja Salehu down stream from Khami.ab, and in 
the neighbourhood of Ak-kum. Thus the Russian chromo-
li thograph Map of the Turkestan military circuit, by the 
Russian Topographical Department, dated 1877, gives a 
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Khodsha Saleh passage at a spot 34 miles down stream from 
Kilif; and the English Map of 1868 shows "Khoja Saleh" 
28 miles down stream from Kilif 9 while the English Map 
of 1879 places "Khoja Saleh" 32 mi.les below Kilif. Only 
in later editions of the Russian Maps, and, borrowing 
from them, also of the English Maps, is a position 
assigned to "Khoja Saleh" which is near the ziarat of 
Khoja Salar. 
I think, therefore, that I shall be able to prove, 
to the satisfaction of my colleague, that, according to 
the letter, as well as the spirit of the understanding 
of 1873, the Khoja Salar district belongs in its entirety 
to Afghanistan. 
It was agreed in our meeting of the 27th November 
that we should consider this question by the light of 
the correspondence which led to the understanding of 
1873. I accordingly append to this Memorandum a brief 
summary of the more important passages of that 
correspondence. It will be seen that the understanding 
of 1873 between England and Russia was the result of 
recent events in Central Asia, the unsettled state of 
which had caused Russia to advance to the confines of 
Bokhara, while England had been on the point of being 
involved in the internecine strife in Afghanistan, just 
ended by Shere Ali 1 s success. Both Powers felt the 
necessity of taking measures which would secure future 
peace; but while the expediency of such measures was 
fully recognized, and the leading principles easily 
agreed on, it was a more difficult matter to settle 
details. Central Asia was, in fact, so little known, 
that even the final. agreement becomes somewhat obscure 
whenever it enters into details. The best, and perhaps 
the only way of elucidating such points is by a 
reference to the leading spirit, the general principles, 
which guided the two Governments in their decision. 
It is evident from the correspondence that Russia 
and England both considered the case less a question of 
personal interest than as a matter which, while deeply 
affecting their respective subordinate allies, Bokhara 
and Afghanistan, might in future times involve the peace 
of Central Asia, and thus endanger common interests. 
Evidently, what both Powers desired was to firmly 
establish the status quo 9 to make permanent the 
tranquility which had succeeded a long period of strife 
and disturbance; and, accordingly, both Powers agreed 
that the frontier must be defined as it actually existed, 
and both were equally desirous of giving to each country 
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what at the moment actually belonged to ito This is the 
general leading principle of the understanding of 1872, 
as it is that of the Protocol of the 10th September 1885. 
The only point which caused some discussion and delay 
was the difficulty of ascertaining what actually belonged 
to each country; for it is not an easy matter to 
ascertain this with any amount of precision, even on the 
spot, much less is it so when both parties are dependent, 
as in 1869-73 9 on native information and the casual 
remarks of solitary travellerso 
One of the obscure points of the understanding is 
the reference to Khoja Salar or Khoja Saliho The summary 
of the correspondence shows that the British Government 
called it, in turn, a ford, a post, and a passage across 
the Oxus on the road from Balkh to Bokhara. The Russian 
Government designated it in more general terms as a 
"point", but afterwards M. de Giers, in his note of the 
6th July, 1884, to Sir E. Thornton reverted to tne 
definition "post~~ o In December 1872 the Russian 
Government forwarded a Memorandum by General van 
Kauffman, who defined it as the point where both 
banks of the river cease to belong to Bokhara. He added 
that the village Khoja Salar was on the right bank of 
the river, near a passage called Tchouchka Guzar. 
Neither the one nor the other can be identified; and 
as General Kauffman further said that his information 
regarding details was uncertain, it may be supposed that 
some confusion of names has taken placeo (There is 
certainly a Tchouch-ka or Kushka Guzar, which is a well-
known ferry on the Oxus; but, as it is 35 miles higher 
up than Kilif; and even east of the meridian of Balkh, it 
cannot, of course, be the place meant by General Kauffman.) 
It is, however, evident that both Governments 
believed that there was a frontier-post Khoja Salar on 
the high road from Balkh to to Bokhara, where both banks 
of the river ceased to be Bpkharian, and that they 
accordingly selected this point as the limit of Afghan 
territory on the Oxus. As I have already stated, both 
Governments must have understood it, and meant it to be 
a spot below Kham-i-ab, and at at a distance of about 32 
miles from Kilif. 
The point which my colleagues are inclined to consider 
as the Khoja Salar of this Agreement is the Ziarat of 
Khoja Salaro Does this place, then, answer to the 
description given, and is it likely to be the place meant 
by the two Governments? This question must, I think, 
clearly be answered in the negative. The Ziarat is 
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neither a village on the right bank, nor is there a 
village of such a name on the right bank between Ak-kum 
and Kilif, as there ought to be according to General 
Kauffman 1 s description; nor is it a "post" on the left 
bank as stated by the English Government, and still less 
is it a passage across the river, being several miles 
inland; but least of all does it fulfil the most essential 
condition of being close to the actual frontier of 187J. 
It is about 20 miles from the frontier, well inside a 
district fully belonging to Afghanistan, and I submit 
that to consider such a point as the truth frontier 
would be to violate the leading principle of the 
understanding of 187J. 
As careful investigation has failed to discover any 
place called Khoja Salar which satisfies all the 
conditions of the Agreement, I think, therefore, we may 
abandon the search for the least essential and most 
uncertain thing, the name, and only try to ascertain if 
a place exists which, fulfilling all conditions, may be 
fairly supposed to represent the place on which both 
Governments intend to agree. We find that such a place 
does really exist. Her Majesty's Government stated 
that Khoja Salar was at the passage of the Oxus on the 
high road from Balkh to Bokhara. The only high roads 
between Kilif and Kerki are Kilif, Ak-kum, Magri, Khotab, 
and Kerki. The maps and correspondence on which the 
Agreement of 1873 was based clearly prove that neither 
Kilif, nor Magri, nor Khotab, nor Kerki is the high road 
in question. There therefore only remains Ak-kum, which, 
as I have already stated the maps of the time at which 
the Agreement was made show to have been meant as the 
passage in question, and which is, in fact, a passage 
across the Oxus, at the point where both banks cease to 
belong to Bokhara; in other words, where the actual 
frontier was in 1872, and where it still is. There is, 
further, near to this passage, a place which might be 
termed a "post" as being the head-quarters of the 
Khoja Salar Horse, who have always been employed by the 
Afghan authorities for the protection of the frontier, 
in the same manner as on other parts of their frontier 
they employ Usbeg and Aimak Horse. 
The local name of this passage is Ak-kum. There is 
certainly nothing to show that it was ever called 
Tchouch-ka-gouzar, nor is it locally known as Khoja 
Salar; but, being on the limits of the Khoja Salar 
district, this name might have been applied to it. 
Again, it is on the road from Balkh to Bokhara, in this 
sense, that travellers not taking the Kilif road, use 
this passage, and such travellers would probably, if 
they were asked where they crossed the Oxus, say at 
Khoja Salar, the district being better known than the 
small villages of Ak-kum and Bosagha, opposite the two 
landing-places. For instance, Burnes stated that he 
crossed the Oxus at Khoja Salar; but from the distances 
given by him from Balkh to the point where he crossed 
the Oxus, it is clear that he crossed by the Ak-kum 
ferry. He adds that Kilif was the usual ferry, but that 
he deflected westwards, and did not go to Kilif from a 
fear of robbers. The head-quarters of the Khoja Salar 
sowars are at the village of Kham-i-ab, and this place 
would naturally be called the Khoja Salar post. 
Evidently, then, the Ak-kum passage could, according 
to the wording of the understanding of 1873, be claimed 
by Afghanistan; but the Afghans appear to have considered 
the name Khoja Salar as indicating the district, for, 
when the Agreement of 1873 was communicated to them, and 
they proceeded, in co-operation with the Bokhara officials, 
to delimitate the frontier in accordance with the 
Agreement, they drew the boundary which we now claim for 
Afghanistan, leaving the Ak-kum passage just outside of 
it. 
I particularly invite the attention of my colleagues 
to this delimitation. It was carried out without any 
hesitation or difficulty, it was satisfactory to both 
sides, and under its terms, the inhabitants on either 
side are well contented and have lived in peace and 
concord. 
Even if there had been a Tchouch-ka-gouzar with a 
Khoja Salar village on the right bank, and a post of 
the same name on the left, I should, if this place had 
been at a distance from the undisputed, actual frontier, 
feel well convinced that the two Governments would not 
adhere to a name, in preference to the great principle 
inspiring the understanding of 1872-73, as well as the 
present settlement. This is the universally acknowledged 
principal that the strongest and indeed fundamental title 
to State jurisdiction is long continued and undisturbed 
possession. The Agreement of 1873 declaring the status 
quo, did not dismember the Afghan State in violation of 
this principle. Nor can we proceed to ignore or 
reverse the rights of the Khoja Salar district created 
by such possession which has lasted for at least thirty 
years, and which has repeatedly been acknowledged and 
admitted, both by the State immediately concerned, viz., 
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Bokhara, and by Russian officers. The application of 
this principle has worked well, and has, as far as this 
part of the frontier is concerned, fully effected its 
principal object" As a matter of fact, the cultivated 
land on the left bank of the Oxus from Kilif to, and 
including Kham-i-ab, has remained in the continuous and 
undusputed possession of Afghanistan for the last thirty 
years. The peace which has been preserved between 
Afghanistan and Bokhara, has on the frontier developed 
the most friendly relations between the people and 
authorities on both sides. Bokhara flocks graze in 
Afghan territory, not only unmolested, but effectively 
protected against raiders by Afghan guards. 
Afghan officials when they visit a Bokhara village, 
are treated with as much courtesy and respect, as if 
they were in their own country, and are on the best 
terms with the Bokhara authorities. Trade is unimpeded 
and daily increasing. The Ersari inhabitants of the 
Khoja Salar district are contending and well behaved. 
All this would change if a disturbance of the actual and 
long-recognized frontier injured one party by depriving 
them of what they consider as their undisputable rights, 
and gave to the other side what would be enough to 
excite the desire for more, and too little to confer any 
material advantage. The old rivalry and enmity would 
revive and the work of years would be lost labour. Such 
could not possibly be the intention of either of the 
Powers interested in the peace of Central Asia. 
In conclusion, I recapitulate the various points 
which I am prepared to establish. They are as follows:-
1. The correspondence leading to the Agreement of 
1873 shows that the intention of both the English and 
Russian Governments was to preserve the status quo, and 
to give to Bokhara and Afghanistan the lands in their 
actual possession, and the same principle is the basis of 
the Agreement of the 10th September 1885. 
2. The Agreement of 1873 declared that the province 
of Akeha belonged fully to Afghanistan. 
3. For nearly 100 years the Khoja Salar district, 
including Kham-i-ab, has been part of Akcha. 
4. In 1873, and for many previous years, the Khoja 
Salar district, being part of Akcha, belonged to 
Afghanistan, and paid revenue to the Governor of Akcha 
through his deputy, whose head-quarters have always 
been, and are, at the village of Kham-i-ab. The present 
Deputy has been there since 1868. 
5. Kham-i-ab was in 1873, and for many previous 
years, and is still, the Afghan frontier post. 
6. The ziarat of Khoja Salar in no way answers to 
the description of Khoja Salar given in the 
correspondence. 
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7. The passage of Ak-kum just below Kham-i-ab does 
answer to that description. 
8. In showing the geographical position of Khoja 
Salar, the English Maps have taken the Russian Maps as 
their authority_ since 1882. Previously to that dat~ 
~'Kho ja Saleh" had been marked on our maps, on the 
authorities of Burnes and Vambery, about 32 miles below 
Kilif, that is to say, below the village of Kham-i-ab. 
Also on the Russian Maps it had been up to 1878 marked 
below Kham-i-ab; and the two Governments, in their 
Agreement of 1873, clearly, from the maps at the time, 
meant a spot down stream from Kham-i-ab. 
9. All the various authorities-Burnes, Vambery, 
Moorcroft, Kauffman, and Faiz Buksh-placed Khoja Saleh 
differently. 
10. The cause of this discrepancy is now clear: 
instead of Khoja Salar being any particular point, it 
was a district. 
11. Burnes, however, crossed at the Ak-kum ferry 
and called it Khoja Salar, placing it below Kham-i-ab. 
Vambery, in his map, places it at Kham-i-ab, and as 
there has occasionally been a boat stationed for local 
use at this spot, it might have been argued that this 
was the Khoja Salar ferry. But it was not a regular 
ferry for caravans and travellers, but a boat 
temporarily detached there from the regular ferry, 
according to general custom on the Oxus for local 
requirements. I have therefore refrained from using 
this argument. 
12. Faiz Buksh, who was specially sent in 1869 by 
the Indian Government to the spot to make inquiries, 
placed the frontier, that is to say, the limit of the 
Khoja Salar district, in the proper place, namely, 
between Kham-i-ab and Bosagha. 
13. The recent Russian Maps have fixed the 
frontier post of Khoja Salar in the same position, 
namely, north-east of Dev Kila, just above Bosagha and 
below Kham-i-ab, and, doubtless, with these maps before 
him, M. de Giers suggested in 1885 that the Commissioners 
should begin their work at Khoja Salar, which was a 
"knownu point, regarding which no difficulty would occur, 
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instead of commencing on the Heri-Rud. But, I should 
add, though the positions on these maps of Dev Kila and 
Khodsha Salor are relatively correct, both have been 
pushed 10 miles nearer Kilif than they actually are. 
14. In 1878, the Russian steamer ~'Samarcand,u when 
it ascended the Oxus from Petro-Alexandrovsk with a view 
of investigating the capabilities of the river, apparently 
discovered the true Khoja Salar frontier; but it was not 
till the beginning of 1885, that the district in 
question was visited, and the same facts ascertained, by 
English officers. 
15. The district of Khoja Salar is inhabited by 
Karkins and Ersaris. The former are not Turkomans, and 
the latter, who also reside in Akcha, Daulatabad, Saripul, 
and other places in the interior, are not nomads, but 
have been for the last century revenue-paying 
cultivators, and are peaceable, contented subjects of the 
Ameer. 
16. Should the frontier be drawn at the ziarat of 
Khoja Salar, the district which has been a unit for the 
last 100 years, would be divided between Bokhara and 
Afghanistan, and the result would be discontent, 
inconvenience, and future complications. 
(Signed) J.W. RIDGEWAY, Colonel. 
APPENDIX H 
NO. 206. 
Colonel Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Iddesleigh -
(Received November 15.) 
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Camp, Charikar, October 12, 1886. 
(Extract.) 
I HAVE the honour to submit a Report drawn up by 
Major Holdich, R.E., on the work done by himself and 
the officers of the Indian Survey Department subordinate 
to him with the Boundary Commission during the years 
1884, 1885, and 1886. 
I am glad of this opportunity of bringing to your 
Lordship's notice the valuable services rendered to 
the Commission by the Survey Staff, consisting of Major 
Holdich. R.E., Captain St. George Gore, R.E., and 
Captain the Honourable M.G. Talbot, R.E.; with Sub-
Surveyors Hira Singh, Imam Sharif, and Ata Muhammad, 
and subsequently Sub-Surveyors Esuf Sharif, Sayad Ulla 
Khan, and Abdulla Khan. 
Major Holdich joined the Mission on its arrival at 
the Helmand in October 1884, and personally directed 
and shared in the survey operations described by him on 
the long and arduous march to Kuhsan on the Heri-Rud. 
At that time the daily routine of work included, 
besides a very hard day 9 s march, the measurement of a 
base line, observations from two or three stations, 
computation and projection of points for the next day's 
work, night observations for latitude and azimuth, and 
their reduction, together with the topography of all the 
country visible from the line of march-an amount of 
work which was severe on all the officers. 
From Kuhsan Major Holdich accompanied Lieutenant-
General Sir Peter Lumsden, G.C.B., on the march across 
Badghis to Penjdeh, Meruchak, and Bala Murghab, and 
conducted the survey of that tract. The entire 
supervision and duty of distributing the work, and 
directing the movements of the various members of the 
survey party, have fallen throughout on Major Holdich. 
He also personally undertook the extension of 
triangulation along the frontier on the part of the 
Joint Commission, with occasional help from Captains 
Gore and Talbot, and thus enabled the position of most 
of the boundary pillars to be scientifically fixed 
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beyond possibility of dispute. Major Holdich was 
engaged on this duty during very severe weather last 
winter and spring, and on the completion of the 
demarcation he directed and completed, throughout the 
excessive heat of a summer on the Oxus, the preparation 
of the various maps recording the settlement. He is now 
engaged on the survey of the Chahardar Pass over the 
Hindu Kush. 
In all questions of detail connected with survey I 
have always had recourse to Major Holdich 1 s advice and 
experience, and whenever any such question arose during 
the meetings of the Joint Commission I gladly availed 
myself of the permission given me to call in Major 
Holdich to give me the benefit of his suggestions. 
Major Holdich has always maintained friendly relations 
with the Russian Surveyors. 
I have already brought to notice the great credit 
which is due to Major Holdich, His high reputation and 
long record of distinguished service needs no further 
testimony of mine. To Major Holdich 1 s system of 
geographical work doubtless much of the geographical 
results achieved by the Mission is due. 
Captain Gore was in independent charge of all the 
survey work through Beluchistan, and, with Captain 
Talbot's assistance, carried triangulation and topography 
across the desert from Nushki to the Helmund. On the 
march from the Helmand to Herat the topography by plane-
tabling was carried out by Captain Gore almost the whole 
way-work which was especially severe at the rate the 
Mission was theh marching. From Kuhsan Captains Gore and 
Talbot carried triangulation and topography combined along 
the line of the Paropamisus towards the Murghab, and early 
next spring (March 1885) Captain Gore was again in the 
field working from Gulran and Kuhsan towards the Persian 
frontier. In April he left Tirpul for Meshed to fix the 
longitude of that place by telegraph differentially with 
Tehran, and though, owing to the many difficulties he 
encountered, this duty was not successfully terminated 
till the beginning of July, the opportunity was not lost 
by him of extending topography in all directions round 
Meshed, and of making a junction with Captain Talbot's 
triangulation, thus securing a direct series between 
Kuhsan and Meshed, which formed the basis of all 
subsequent work. 
September and October were passed by Captain Gore 
in still further extension of the surveys into eastern 
Persia in the direction of Birjand, and in November he 
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joined Major Holdich for the first meeting of the Joint 
Commission at Zulfikar. During the progress of the 
demarcation Captain Gore was mainly responsible for the 
mapping of the boundary, first by carrying on a 1/4-inch 
reconnaissance between Zulfikar and Meruchak, and next 
by taking charge of the final topographical survey of 
the districts between Daulatabad and the Oxus-a great 
deal of the topography having been executed by himself. 
During the past hot weather Captain Gore further gave 
great assistance in fair mapping and copying field-work, 
in the absence of a sufficient staff of draftsmen. 
Captain the Honourable M.G~ Talbot assisted Captain 
Gore id the survey of the Biluch Desert; indeed, it was 
due to his own work when serving with the Mission to 
Kharan and Punigoor, under Sir Robert Sandeman, in the 
spring of 1884, that it was possible to extend 
triangulation to the Helmand. 
During the march to Kuhsan Captain Talbot worked 
almost without intermission-as a rule he was the 
triangulator where Captain Gore was the topographer-as 
far as Bala Murghab. In the spring of 1885 Captain 
Talbot carried a survey along the left bank of the Heri-
Rud, over the Istoi Mountains, during very severe weather, 
and subsequently along the north of the Herat Valley, 
past Kurrukh to the Dawandah range, where he filled in a 
large area of mapping. After this, he carried his work 
up the Heri-Rud Valley to Daulatyar, and had not the 
threatening aspect of affairs necessitated his recall 
at that time, he would doubtless have succeeded in 
reaching the highest peaks of the Koh-i-Baba, which are 
the furthest of the Cabul survey in 1880. 
In October, when the chance of war was over, Captain 
Talbot again attempted to complete his work, but deep 
snow and the setting in of an early winter absolutely 
prevented his reaching the summits of these gigantic 
peaks, and it was only in the face of daily increasing 
difficulties from snow and bitter cold that he succeeded 
in crossing the Koh-i-Baba to Bamian, and carrying out 
triangulation to Balkh. Captain Talbot's powers of 
endurance, when sustained hard work is necessary, are 
certainly unusual, and when it considered that he 
undertook such topography as was possible as well as the 
triangulation-there being no plane-tabler to send with 
him-his performance is deserving of every credit; indeed, 
as a feat of skill and endurance combined, it must, I 
think, rank highest in the survey records of the Afghan 
Commission. 
Captain Talbot rejoined the Commission in January 
1886, and worked with Captain Gore at the Oxus topography 
during the winter and spring; and he subsequently 
connected the boundary triangulation with his work at 
Balkh, and added to our mapping in the neighbourhood of 
Shadian. 
I would take this opportunity of rendering justice 
to the tact and judgment displayed by both Captain Gore 
and Talbot in their relations with the authorities and 
people of the country, with whom they have had to deal 
when in charge of detached parties. The invariable good 
sense and courtesy of these officers have won them a 
welcome, and the good-will of the authorities wherever 
they have worked. 
The services of the native sub-surveyors have been 
brought to the notice of the Government of India, and I 
trust that they will obtain the recognition which they so 
thoroughly deserve. They have proved worthy 
representatives of perhaps the best class of native 
subordinates in the service of the Indian Government. 
No record of the work done by the Survey Department 
would be complete without a reference to the services of 
Captain Peacocke, R.E., of the Indian intelligence Branch. 
Major Holdich has already described Captain Peacocke's 
adventurous reconnaissance of the country from Meruchak 
to the Oxus in mid-winter, and the excellent results 
achieved despite the small means at his disposal, and the 
extreme severity of the weather which he had to encounter. 
Not only, as Major Holdich says, was our geographical 
knowledge of that part of the country very greatly 
increased by the reconnaissance, but the survey then 
carried out by Captain Peacocke formed the basis on 
which the Agreement regarding the frontier between the 
Murghab and the Oxus, as recorded in the London Protocol 
of the 10th September, 1885, was negotiated between the 
two Governments, and, in fact, up to almost the very last, 
it was the standard Map upon which the Joint Commission 
worked. 
In addition to this, Captain Peacocke made an 
admirable reconnaissance of Badghis up to the Salt Lakes 
to the north of the line taken by Captain Gore and 
Talbot in December 1884, and in the spring of 1885 he 
carried it on down the Valley of the Heri-Rud as far as 
Sarrakhs. 
On the meeting of the Joint Commission at Zulfikar 
in November 1885, Captain Peacocke was deputed by me to 
make the necessary arrangements with the local Afghan 
officials for the survey, by Rissuan topographers 
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told off for the duty by Colonel Kuhlberg, of the 
country between Meruchak and Daulatabad, and, not only 
was this duty most efficiently performed, but Captain 
Peacocke also carried out, during January and February 
1886, a most valuable reconnaissance on the 1/4-inch 
scale of the Maimana Chul 1 from Kila Wali on the east to 
Daulatabad on the west, a copy of which I was enabled 
to send to Colonel Kuhlberg long before the large scale 
surveys of his own topographers were completed. We were 
thus enabled to commence negotiations regarding that 
portion of the frontier far sooner than otherwise would 
have been possible. This reconnaissance was carried 
through by Captain Peacocke, despite severe inclemency 
of weather, and it is to his hardihood and energy that 
we were indebted for so early a map of that hitherto 
unknown portion of the frontier. 
Subsequently, Captain Peacocke carried out, in 
conjunction with Captain Kontratenko, of the Russian 
Topographical Staff, a large scale survey showing the 
canal and irrigation systems in the valleys of both the 
Kushk and Kashan streams. I cannot close this despatch 
without bearing ample testimony to the willing and 
efficient aid which Captain Peacocke has rendered in 
survey duties, additional to his own, throughout the 
whole time he has been attached to the Mission. 
I have attempted above to do justice to the zeal, 
energy, and endurance of the officers of the Survey 
Department attached to this Mission; but the fact that, 
under circumstances of great difficulties, over 100,000 
square miles of country have been geographically 
surveyed, in addition to the topography and triangulation 
connected with demarcation, speaks for itself. This 
achievement is alone sufficient to justify the detention 
of the Mission in Afghanistan during the last two years. 
APPENDIX I 
'Khoja Salah, Khoju Salu, Khoja Saleh, Khodja Sala, 
Khodsha Salor, Kwaja Salar, Khwaja Salar .••. ' 
A Note on Transliteration. 
In a world becoming enchained by systematisation in 
all fields, the assumed need for standardising the 
spelling of proper names transliterated from alphabets 
other than the Latin looms as a proper bogle. The 
standardisers would prevent one from roaming at will in 
that charming maze where Turcomans, Turkomans, Toorkumens 
Toorkumans, Turkumans, Turkumens, Toorkmuns, 
Toorkmans, Turkmens, Turkmans, ride to Mushhudd, Mussud, 
Meshed, Meshhed, Mashad, Mashhad; or where Dooranees, 
Doorranees, Duranis, Durranis, read the sannads, sanads, 
sunnuds, of the Amir, Emir, Ameer, whether at Bulkh or 
Balkh or Belch; at Caubul, Caubool, Cauboul, Cabool, 
Kabel, Kaboul, Cabul or Kabul; at Jalalabad, Jullulubad, 
Jallallabad, and now Dzhalalabad; and it doesn't take 
the wisdom of the Prophet (And how many are the English 
versions of his namet) for the reader to recognise at 
once what the author intended. 
Transliteration from Persian, with its wonderful 
alphabetical economy in the elimination of short vowels 
in writing, is an especial provider of these amusing 
variants. One has only to put oneself in the position 
of a foreigner listenting to the countless variations on 
that so-called 'indeterminate 1 vowel-sound which is such 
a.characteristic of spoken English to realise what 
happens from Persian into English in the transliteration 
of the short unwritten vowels. The sound can only be 
passed by tongue to ear, and there are as many modes of 
pronunciation as there are degrees of hearing. Hearing 
such a word as 'apples', will the foreigner hear it as 
appuls, appels, appals, appals, appils, app 1 ls? And so 
with Persian, where only hearing will suggest to the 
Westerner the short vowel he must supply, and of any 
four people he listens to, three may have varying vowel 
sounds. 
With regard to Central and Middle Asia, the 
situation has been further complicated because the 
Russians have been the geographers of the whole of 
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Central and parts of Middle Asia, and this has meant a 
double system of transliteration, from the Asian to the 
Russian, and only then into English, which tongue has a 
most imperfect alphabet to start with, thus further 
complicating the problem of transliteration. 
With years of careful work on the part of 
geographers and linguists, a standard system of 
transliteration has been developed, which is of great 
value for map-makers, time-table-makers, and other 
people who require spelling formalised for international 
use. As far as writing on present day affairs, this 
standardised spelling might appear to be the most 
convenient one to adopt. In the several maps prepared 
for this volume I also have adopted the modern standard 
spelling, but I think it would have been inadvisable to 
do so in the text of this thesis on a localised piece 
of history of the last century, and I have therefore 
simply adopted some one of these contemporary versions 
of spelling as that to be used throughout the present 
thesis, well knowing that in any few pages of some of 
my sources any recurrent proper noun from Persian or 
Turkic might have been spelt in several different ways, 
each one of them immediately comprehensible, and 
sometimes rather delightful. 
APPENDIX J 
HOMAGE TO HERAT 
This is a brief traveller's-eye contemporary view 
of three neighbouring cities which have come in for 
much mention in these pages 1 Meshed in Iran, Herat in 
Afghanistan, and Ashkabad, capital of the Turkmen 
s.s.R. 
Meshed, that famous centre of Moslem religion and 
trade, in 1885 filled to overflowing with Afghan 
refugees, the supporters of Ayub Khan, and a centre of 
English and Russian intrigue, is now a bustling city of 
almost half a million people, connected by rail, road 
and air with the outer world, its business highly 
Americanised. (It is the site of an enormous Coca-
Cola factory, the source of much of its prosperity.) 
Its streets are filled with the latest models of every 
kind and size of automobile, its night is haunted by 
the commotion from at least a dozen cinemas, and the 
sound of transistors drowns the muezzins from the 
foreigner-excluding mosque, and crowds assemble in the 
architect-designed gardens of the outdoor restaurants 
and picnic resorts. And only the few strict Moslems 
who bring their dead from afar to be buried in the 
endless burying-grounds surrounding this holy city can 
now think of it as such. And only the occasional 
romantic traveller takes a short taxi-ride to the tomb 
of Firdauzi, or to the garden-shrines of the town of 
Tus. Iranian Meshed is modern and Americanised, but 
brightly Persian still, and the foreigner is still rare 
enough to be an object of interest. 
A couple of hundred miles to the North and East 
of Meshed respectively, lie Ashkabad and Herat. 
Ashkabad, a small old market~town in the edge of the 
Akhal Tekke oasis, when Abdurrahman passed through it 
on his first flight to Central Asis, had become by 
1885, in addition, a Russian cantonment of traditional 
style, somewhat more solidly designed than a British 
cantonment town of the same period in India. To-day 
it is the capital of the Turkmen S.S.R. Undoubtedly 
there are Turkmens here but they are Europeanised and 
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there are almost more Russians. Ashkabad to-day is in 
all respects a typical Soviet 1 new cityi 9 standardised, 
hygieni~ well-designed, re-built since its disastrous 
earthquake of 1947 wholly of earthquake-resistant 
concrete, with all cultural facilities 9 with block after 
block of new apartment houses set in gardens along 
finely tree-planted, wide avenues, the whole town quiet, 
kindly, well-tempered. Nearby is a busy airport buzzing 
with helicopters of many kinds and uses, from 
agricultural spraying of the cotton fields, or 
meteorological work to keeping endless watch on the 
frontier passes of the Kopet Dagh and the valley of the 
Heri Rud. And nearby, too is that Soviet miracle, the 
Kara Kum Canal with its water brought from the Amu many 
hundreds of kilometres to the east. It is all so 
excellent, bu~ how rejoiced one is to see a solitary 
Turkmen dressed in red and wearing his dark fur hat 
bicycling in from an aul somewhere, or a couple of 
Turkmen women in their long red dresses and long dark 
plaits hurrying up some side street to their place of 
work, where carpets are made in the traditional 
patterns but on modern upright looms instead of on the 
back-breaking ground-level horizontal looms of the 
kibitka. The loss of individuality is surely the high 
price of progress. 
Modern Herat, one of the several biggest towns in 
Afghanistan after Kabul, is a great, quiet market-town 
of some 100,00_0 persons, a number which perhaps includes 
several adjoining villages. It has more than regained 
its former size and agricultural prosperity after the 
days of decline, when Ridgeway estimated that there 
might be only 2,000 families left within its walls. 
The city walls have mouldered, and new city streets 
have grown in front of them. But it is undeniably a 
provincial city, a backwater, where most of the wheeled 
traffic is still horse-drawn, the commonest mode of 
transport a donkey 9 and a bicycle a thing to treasure. 
And yet, over Herat, is the aura of its former glory. 
It shines perhaps in the pleasant manners and gravity 
of its older people 9 the cheerful friendliness of its 
young as they come from the lycees and the modern 
school for girls, or even from the crowded mullah 1 s 
school in a vacant shop in the bazaar, and in the good 
conduct of the crowds of people of many racial typesand 
costumes thronging about its great mosque and bazaar-
streets 9 or the blue-robed Tadjik farmers working at 
their little green farms in the mud-walled surburban 
districts beside the ruined monumentso 
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One begins to think that only in Afghanistan 1 
haunted by material insufficiency as it still isi have 
people not yet lost the right to follow their own racial 
idiosyncrasies 9 within the walls of Abdurrahman 1 s house, 
without becoming slave1 to 
1 the remorseless nationalism 
of contemporary Asia 1 • 
1 Quotes from Dick Wilson 9 'Where the World 1 s Roof Ends', 
Far Eastern Economic Review! Hong Kong 9 12 March 1965. 
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